

APPROACHES TO
GREEK MYTH

Second Edition

Edited by Lowell Edmunds

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Contents

Preface vii

General Introduction 1

Lowell Edmunds

1 *Introduction* 42

The Reception of Greek Myth *Jordi Pàmias*

2 *Introduction* 84

What's Sauce for the Goose Is Sauce for the Gander: Myth and Ritual,
Old and New *H. S. Versnel*

3 *Introduction* 152

Greek and Near Eastern Mythologies: A Story of Mediterranean
Encounters *Carolina López-Ruiz*

4 *Introduction* 200

Hierarchy, Heroes, and Heads: Indo-European Structures in
Greek Myth *Joseph Falaky Nagy*

5 *Introduction* 245

Odysseus and the Oar: A Comparative Approach to a
Greek Legend *William Hansen*

6 *Introduction* 280

Narrative Semantics and Pragmatics: The Poetic Creation
of Cyrene *Claude Calame*

- 7 *Introduction* 353
 Myths in Images: Theseus and Medea as a Case Study
 Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood
- 8 *Introduction* 407
 Greek Myth and Psychoanalysis *Robert A. Segal*
- Contributors* 457
 Index 459

Preface

The quarter-century that has passed since the first edition of this book has witnessed an enormous interest in Greek myth—in scholarship, the arts, and popular culture. For students and scholars, who are addressed here, excellent companions and handbooks have put on record the main ways of thinking about this always intriguing, always contested subject. These works, which I have cited again and again in my general introduction and in my separate introductions to each of the chapters, also offer bibliographical aids that this book does not aspire to reduplicate, let alone surpass.

This second edition complements the handbooks and companions, discussing at some length and in some detail eight approaches to Greek myth. Two chapters reprinted from the first edition (Versnel's and Sourvinou-Inwood's) have been reedited and provided with new contextualizations in my introductions. Three chapters have been revised (those of Nagy, Hansen, and Calame, to whom I am grateful for their willingness to participate in this project). Two chapters, those on Greek and Near Eastern mythologies and on Greek myth and psychoanalysis, have new authors (López-Ruiz and Segal), and a new chapter (by Pàmias) gives a history of the reception of Greek myth. To these three new authors I am also grateful. All these chapters have new introductions. A chapter from the first edition has been dropped (the one on Greek myth and history, a topic considered at the end of my general introduction). The approaches discussed in these chapters will not soon cease to be of interest. These are, in the sequence in which they appear in this book, the history of myth, myth and ritual, comparative mythology (Near Eastern, Indo-European), comparative folklore, narratology, iconography, and psychoanalysis.

If the passage of time since the first edition has made possible the gains or hoped-for gains of all the revision, it has also brought a particular loss. Those who

knew Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, who died in 2007, remember her brilliant, sometimes impassioned conversation. The originality and force of her mind persist in her chapter reprinted here.

Email makes everything easier except the customary expression, at this point, of gratitude to all those who helped the author or, in this case, the editor. So many messages have gone and come that it is no longer possible for me to keep track of them. To mention some names might seem deliberately not to mention others. To all I offer warm thanks. Thanks also to Susan T. Edmunds for many useful conversations and for practical advice. Finally, I thank Linda Strange, whose lynx-eyed preparation of the manuscript for the printer improved every part, I could almost say every page, of this book.

Approaches to Greek Myth

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General Introduction

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A Greek myth is a retold story about gods and heroes and sometimes the monsters with whom they have to contend.¹ In a theogony, the gods may include elemental divinities like Dawn, Sun, Moon, Earth, Ocean, and Night and also deified abstractions (as they appear to us) such as Death, Sleep, Deceit, Eros, and Strife.² The setting of myths is in the past, and the past has a chronology that extends from the origin of the world and the gods down through the age of the heroes, with which the present time is continuous.

Anyone could retell a myth. In Euripides' *Ion*, serving women, visitors at Delphi with their mistress, behold the sculpture on the west pediment of the temple of Apollo.³ Concerning the figure of Iolaus, who stands by his uncle, Heracles, they ask: "Is this the man whose story is told at my weaving [verb *mutheuein*, lit., 'tell the *muthos* of']?" (196, cf. 506). They identify also Bellerophon, Pegasus, and the Chimaera, without naming them, and the Gigantomachy (201–7). Their knowledge of the myths goes beyond what could have been represented in the sculpture.⁴ This myth-telling was a practice that went on at all social and intellectual levels. In Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, in conversation with the son of Pericles, Socrates refers to the valor of the great Athenians of the past, starting with Cecrops, whom we would consider mythical. His mythical history extends unbroken down to the recent past, to the generation of the Persian Wars (3.5.9–11). It is easy to understand this mythical narrative in the terms of Walter Burkert's well-known definition of myth: "Myths are traditional stories with special 'meaningfulness.'"⁵ Socrates presents a record of excellence that he thinks could inspire present-day citizens to emulate their ancestors, and this excellence is the meaning he gives, in the context, to Athenian history, including the early mythical part.

To know the myths and to be able to tell them was normal. This ability is still assumed in the period of the Roman domination of Greece, as by Strabo (1st c. B.C.E.), who somewhat disprizes it, in his *Geography*. Contrasting the value of his own work with history and myths (*muthoi*), he makes the point that myths have no practical application:

[F]or instance, if a man should tell the story of the wanderings of Odysseus or Menelaus or Jason, it would not be thought that he was making any contribution to the practical wisdom of his hearers—and that is what the man of affairs demands—unless he should insert the useful lessons to be drawn from the hardships those heroes underwent; still, he would be providing no mean entertainment for the hearer who takes an interest in the regions which furnished the scenes of the myths.⁶

As Strabo's way of introducing his example suggests ("a man," which in Greek is τις, "someone"), the ability to tell such stories was not special.

About two centuries later, when the knowledge of Greek myths was beginning to fade, Greeks who wanted to know about this aspect of their heritage could turn to various kinds of support. The *Bibliotheca* (Library) of Apollodorus (probably 2nd c. C.E.), which is our standard handbook of Greek myth, is the best-known example. While it may have had more than one purpose and more than one intended readership in its own time, it certainly bears comparison in some respects to the mythical material found in the "subliterary" papyri. Monique van Rossum-Steenbeek, in a study of four categories of such papyri, calls them "a kind of readers' digest containing noteworthy knowledge." One category is the learned list of names, of which there are several in Apollodorus.⁷ He names, for example, the suitors of Helen, thirty-one of them in all.⁸ As a passage in Athenaeus (fl. ca. 200 C.E.) shows, to be able to recite such lists or catalogues in learned company was an admirable accomplishment.⁹ We have no way of knowing whether Apollodorus expected that any of his readers would memorize his list of suitors, but we can at least say that his presentation of such a list is flattering. His readers might, he implies, wish to learn all these names, or some of them, and in this way to display their familiarity with their cultural heritage.

The women's reference to myth-telling in *Ion* was prompted by the sight of sculpture in a pediment. Visual contact with Greek myth was normal and, one can assume, a daily occurrence in antiquity—indeed, the primary access to myth, along with story-telling, for most persons.¹⁰ The media for the visual representation of myth, besides sculpture, free-standing and relief (pediments and also metopes and statue bases), included carved gems, coins, wall painting, vase painting, woven cloth (later in *Ion* a servant describes pictorial weavings, including one with Cecrops and his daughters [1163–65]), and terra cotta plaques. All Athenians and no doubt many other Greeks knew of the peplos (robe) woven

for Athena Polias and presented to her at the Panathenaea, the major Athenian festival.¹¹ Socrates asks Euthyphro: “Do you believe that there were the conflicts amongst the gods as the poets and painters say and as depicted on the peplos?” (Pl. *Euthyphr.* 6b7–c4; cf. Eur. *Hec.* 466–74). The monumental *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae*, completed in 1999, surveys the surviving visual material in articles arranged by gods, heroes, other mythical figures (e.g., Centaurs), and other things (e.g., the zodiac). The iconography of vase painting is an especially intriguing approach to Greek myth, because it seems to offer the possibility of another, that is, visual, kind of “reading,” as in the metaphor of Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood (see chapter 7 of this book).

Verbal sources remain the predominant ones for most students of Greek myth. Oral myth-telling, impromptu, as by the women at Delphi, or in regularized contexts like the symposium, was normal but usually went unrecorded.¹² We rely on the written record of Greek poetry and on mythography (for its history, see chapter 1; see also the conclusion to this introduction), supplemented by information that turns up in other sources such as inscriptions and historians. The Greek poetry to which we have access in texts was itself oral. All the archaic poetic genres—epic, melic (or sung, as distinguished from spoken), lyric, elegiac, and iambic—come from oral traditions that predate the use of the alphabet in Greece (perhaps early 8th c.). Even after they could be written down, poems continued to be performed.¹³ Some would say (this view is discussed below) that poetic performance was the primary mode of the communication of myths.

In Greek poetry, myth shows two contrary tendencies that clearly predate our earliest sources. One is system and the other is variation.¹⁴ As for the first, it takes the undoubtedly traditional or received form of genealogy, the fundamental organizing principle of Hesiod’s *Theogony* and of the *Catalogue of Women* that goes under his name.¹⁵ Greek myth is, then, already a mythology, in the sense of an organized body of myths. Some of the first prose writers—Pherecydes of Syros (6th c. B.C.E.), Hecataeus (ca. 500 B.C.E.), his contemporary Acusilaus of Argos, and Hellanicus of Lesbos (mid-5th c.)—compiled revisionist genealogies (for these writers, see chapter 1). Their motives can to some extent be discerned in the surviving fragments.¹⁶ In any case, the fundamental impulse toward system persists into mythography and continues down to Apollodorus.¹⁷ Furthermore, family trees are rooted in particular places; geography goes with genealogy.¹⁸ But geography could go into another kind of catalogue, too, as in the “Catalogue of Ships” in the *Iliad*, which records, apropos of the twenty-nine Greek contingents

at Troy, the cities from which they came (2.484–760). About 180 places in all are named. The catalogue is hardly an extemporaneous creation; it is the climactic form of a list long since in the making.¹⁹

Putting together Homer and Hesiod (the *Catalogue* in particular), one can see a map of the major myths that has archaic Greece divided into four main parts. One is Aetolia, Elis, and Pylus (the Calydonian Boar Hunt, the war of the Curetes, and the Aetolians). The other three are: the Argolid and Lacedaemon (the Trojan War), Thebes (Oedipus and the Seven), and Iolcus (Jason and the Quest for the Golden Fleece).²⁰ Each of these bodies of myth either was already in the form of heroic poetry or went into this form.²¹ The so-called Epic Cycle, which consisted of the poems on the Theban and the Trojan Wars, suggests that these two bodies of myth were the most productive of poetry. In fact, Trojan War poetry took much from the poetry of the other places—Achilles from Iolcus, Nestor from Pylus, Diomedes from the Epigonoι (the sons of the Seven), and, for the return of Odysseus, some of Jason's adventures.²²

As archaeologists speak of a “visiting god” when they find a votive to one god in another god's sanctuary, the mythologist could speak of a “visiting hero” in the cases just mentioned. In the *Iliad*, Achilles is, after all, the protagonist of an episode that takes up only forty-odd days in the tenth year of the war. The basic story, or the myth, that underlies the *Iliad* (and the *Odyssey*) is something else: the Judgment of Paris, his abduction of Helen from Sparta, the gathering of a Greek army, the siege of Troy, the Trojan Horse, the recovery of Helen, and the return of Menelaus and of the other heroes to their home cities.²³ The plot, so to speak, of this story is Spartan, that is, the recovery of the Spartan queen, even if it is Agamemnon, the Mycenaean brother of the wronged husband, who is the leader of the Greek army.

While the systematic tendency was inherited by Homer and Hesiod, their refinement of the particular traditions in which they worked had the result of conferring on their poems a supra-regional acceptance and authority. These poems belong to a movement toward Panhellenism, the sense of a national identity, manifested in the archaic period especially in the establishment of sanctuaries (Delphi, Olympia, Isthmia, Nemea) that served as inter-polis meeting places (and in three of these places, for athletic competition).²⁴ Herodotus implicitly comments on this function of Homer and Hesiod when he says, in the context of his argument that Greek religion is for the most part derivative from Egyptian religion and is therefore much younger than the Greeks believe,

Whence each of the gods came and whether they all existed always and of what sort they were in appearance, they [the Greeks] did not know until yesterday or the day before, so to speak. For I think that Homer and Hesiod lived four hundred years before my time. These are the ones who created a theogony for the Greeks and gave the gods their epithets and distinguished their honors and arts and indicated their appearances.²⁵

Although Herodotus is wrong about these two poets as *creators* of a theogony, he is right about their influence.²⁶ (I return to the matter of myth and religion below.) It was not only a matter of the gods. It has been said apropos of the “Catalogue of Ships” that “the list of leaders and their cities became a mandatory chronological framework for any later local mythologies. This meant some tweaking of the local stories, both to fit them into the overall chronology and to accommodate what had originally been independent evidence.”²⁷ But as the author of these words has clearly shown, the local myths remained of equal or greater importance in their locales. Pausanias (2nd c. C.E.) heard and recorded many of these local myths in his tour of the mainland Greek cities and their sanctuaries. The view of Greek mythology from Pausanias contrasts markedly with the view from Homer and Hesiod and awaits integration into a larger, more accurate picture of this subject.²⁸

Homer is also a source for variation, the tendency opposite to system. Variation appears in the myths recounted by characters in the epics.²⁹ (Homer’s own reference to both Trojan War and non-Trojan myth outside the time frame of the epics is infrequent and concise.) Although scholars have alleged that Homer “invents” myths, the fact is that his characters always assume their addressees’ knowledge of the myths they recount.³⁰ This assumption would have annoyed Homer’s audience if it, too, did not already know the same myths. What is called “invention” is therefore variation and would have been perceived as such by Homer’s audience.³¹ Failure to grasp this point seems to arise from failure to grasp the difference between Homer as narrator and a given Homeric character as a narrator.³² A brief excursus on the difference is required.

In Plato’s *Republic*, Socrates, taking Chryses in *Iliad* Book 1 as an example, distinguishes between *diēgēsis* (the poet refers to speech by the character or reports it in indirect discourse) and *mimēsis* (the poet lets the character speak and tries to make it seem that it is not the poet but the character who is speaking).³³ Plato’s distinction reappears in the narratology of Gérard Genette (although, in

keeping with his focus on the novel, Genette is more interested in the mimesis of events).³⁴ From Genette it has now made its way into the discourse of classical scholarship. Some of Genette's main terms and concepts have been taken up by the new Basel commentary on the *Iliad*, as earlier by Irene de Jong in her commentary on the *Odyssey*.³⁵ The distinction made by Plato was made also by Aristotle, in different terms, apropos of Agamemnon's speech of reconciliation in Book 19 of the *Iliad* (fr. 163 Rose³ from schol. T *Il.* 19.108). Aristotle observed that Agamemnon's self-justifying mythical paradigm of a great mistake (19.95–133) did not come from Homer's own voice and that Homer did not introduce these matters as really happening but as traditional.³⁶ (The great mistake was the oath that Hera deceptively caused Agamemnon to swear at the time of the births of Eurystheus and Heracles. As the result of the oath and of Hera's meddling in the sequence of the parturitions, the weaker Eurystheus, born first, became king. Thus the subservience of the mightier Heracles to him.)

Within *mimēsis* Plato finds stylistic differentiation. Socrates asks further, “. . . whenever [Homer] gives a speech as if he were someone else, shall we not say that then he makes himself as like as possible in his style (λέξις) to the one whom he introduces as speaking?” (393c1–3). Plato's observation on Homer's variation of style in speeches has been confirmed by modern scholars.³⁷ They have found that not only do the characters differ from one another in their speeches but there is even a difference between the Greeks as a whole and the Trojans as a whole.³⁸ But Homer's differentiating between himself as master narrator and his characters as speakers (and occasional narrators) goes beyond style.³⁹ The “solution from the character” (λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου) was a way of explaining a contradiction between the words of one character and those of another, such as the one between Phoenix in the *Iliad* (9.497) and Nestor in the *Odyssey* (3.147) on the gods' pliancy. What might have seemed a contradiction in the thought of Homer can be resolved, a scholiast on the *Odyssey* explains, “from the character” who is speaking, that is, as coming from the character's point of view.

To return to Homeric characters as narrators of myths, a good example is Antinous's story of the drunken Centaur Eurytion.⁴⁰ The archery contest is underway. Penelope has agreed to marry whichever of the suitors can shoot an arrow through a row of axes. After some of the suitors have failed to bend the bow, Odysseus, still disguised as a beggar and still unknown to Penelope, asks to be allowed to try. Antinous then rebukes him for his presumptuousness:

Wretched guest, isn't it enough for you that you dine with us haughty men at your ease, and do not lack for a dinner, but listen to our words and speeches? No other guest and beggar listens to our words. Honey-sweet wine is wounding you, as it hurts others, too—whoever gulps it down and does not drink moderately. Wine infatuated the Centaur, too, glorious Eurytion, in the hall of great-hearted Peirithoüs, when he came to visit the Lapiths. When wine had infatuated his mind, he went mad and did criminal deeds in the house of Peirithoüs. And grief took the heroes, and they sprang up and dragged him outside, through the courtyard. They cut off his ears and his nostrils with the pitiless bronze. He, because his mind had been infatuated, went away bearing his guilt in his reckless spirit. From this time, there has been conflict between Centaurs and men, but he was the first to pay the penalty for his drunkenness. (*Od* 21.287–304)

Antinous goes on to say that, like Eurytion, Odysseus will be punished if he tries to string the bow (305–310), that is, Odysseus's offense is the equivalent of Eurytion's. Antinous did not have to specify the offense, because everyone knew it. The incident to which Antinous refers took place at the wedding of Peirithoüs to Hippodameia in Thessaly (*Pindar frag.* 166 S-M). Peirithoüs, king of the Lapiths, invited the Centaurs to the wedding. Unaccustomed to wine, they soon became drunk. Eurytion tried to carry off the bride; other Centaurs tried to carry off her attendants. A brawl erupted, and a continuous war between Centaurs and Lapiths ensued (*Il.* 1.260–73).

In Antinous's use of the story, wine is the point of contact between the story and the situation in which Antinous is speaking. The moral or application of the story is: do not drink in excess. Antinous adds an etiological conclusion: it was the beginning of enmity between Centaurs and men: not only was Eurytion's drunkenness bad for him but it led to a new, worse phase in the relations between Centaurs and human beings. But the story has implications of which Antinous is unaware, and they suggest a meaning the opposite of the one he intends. In fact, Antinous and his friends are the ones who are violating the laws of hospitality, and they are the ones who are going to be punished. The implicit connections between the story and the situation are the real ones.⁴¹

The following aspects of Antinous's use of the Eurytion story are typical of how Homeric characters use myths. (1) Antinous finds a particular point of contact between the story and the situation to which he wishes to apply it (the drinking of wine). (2) He uses the story as an exemplum or argument.⁴² He finds a moral

in the story: do not drink in excess. (3) Because of (1) and (2), he tells the story in an elliptical form. He leaves out a great deal. He assumes that his addressee already knows (Homer assumes that his audience already knows) the story. He slants the story toward the moral with which he will conclude. (4) The story has a meaning beyond the one intended by Antinous.⁴³

The last of these typical aspects of the Homeric characters' story- or myth-telling implies Homeric detachment from the practice. One could say that, as mythology in the sense of an organized body of myths is already implied in Homer (especially in the "Catalogue of Ships"), so mythology in the sense of reflection on myths or on the practice of myth-telling has already begun. This reflection has come from the self-consciousness of the highly evolved poetic medium in which Homer is working. Poetry is not only different from myth; poetry is the critic of myth.⁴⁴ If so, the question arises: what is Homer's relation to his own myth, the myth or basic story of the Trojan War that was outlined above? This myth or large self-contained parts of this myth (e.g., the return of Odysseus from Troy) ought themselves to be large-scale mythological exempla in the way that Antinous's myth is an exemplum. But exempla of what and for whom? As Gregory Nagy has pointed out, "Homeric poetry makes no overt reference to its own social context, the occasions of its own potential performability."⁴⁵ Although the question that is posed is one for Homeric scholarship, it can be suggested in passing that if Homeric poetry has the highly self-conscious relation to myth that I have suggested, it has the same relation to its own myth or myths. The basic Homeric story or myth, to repeat, is the abduction of Helen, and Helen, from within her role in this myth, self-consciously looks to her status as a subject of poetry. She says that she and Paris will be sung of amongst men in the future (*Il.* 6.344–58). Further, Helen's weaving of a cloth in which she depicts the trials that Trojans and Achaeans have suffered on her account makes her a figure of the poet (*Il.* 3.125–28). The history of this interpretation of her weaving goes back to antiquity. A scholiast on the passage said that here "the poet created a worthy paradigm of his own poetry."⁴⁶

Antinous has told a single episode of the Centaurs and the Lapiths, a miniaturized variant, for the purpose of the moral that he can draw from it, a moral that is unlikely to have been drawn from other versions of the same myth. Likewise, when Achilles tells the story of Niobe, he compresses the usual version and adjusts it to correspond to Priam's situation, to turn Niobe into an example of someone who broke her fast despite her grief, as, Achilles says, Priam should do (*Il.* 24.599–620).⁴⁷ These examples of myth-telling by Homeric characters are

accentuated versions of the same practice on the part of the poets themselves in other archaic genres. It has been said that every myth in Greek poetry serves as an exemplum.⁴⁸ (This proposition does not entail denial of entertainment value, nor does the proposition that Greek myths were entertaining entail denial of exemplary value.) The poem of Alcaeus in which he compares Helen with Thetis, to the advantage of the latter, is a case in point (fr. 42 V).⁴⁹ He praises Thetis as the mother of Achilles and thus, I think, implicitly contrasts her with Helen as the mother of an only daughter.⁵⁰ Elsewhere, Alcaeus explicitly refers to Helen's child (singular) (fr. 283 V), assuming the same version as in Homer (*Il.* 3.161–244; *Od.* 4.12–14), which version is itself in competition with the distinctly minor one attested for Hesiod, in which she also had a son.⁵¹ (Sappho, in keeping with the Homeric version of Helen's motherhood, refers to a child [singular], apparently her daughter, Hermione [fr. 16.10 V].) If the symposium was the context of Alcaeus's poem, then it is easy to understand it as Alcaeus's lead-off of, or contribution to, a chain of examples of different kinds of women.⁵²

A striking kind of variation is the correction of a myth.⁵³ It can take the form of a poet's repudiation of something he said in an earlier poem. In *Works and Days*, after the proem, Hesiod begins: "So there was not one kind of Eris (Strife) on the earth but there are two" (11–12), correcting at some length (12–26) the account of Eris he gave in the *Theogony* (224–32).⁵⁴ Likewise, Stesichorus offered a palinode or recantation of an earlier work, in his case of a whole poem, which was about Helen. This earlier poem followed the Homeric version (but with episodes not in the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*: the oath of the suitors and the wedding of Helen and Menelaus).⁵⁵ The most substantial fragment of the palinode says:

This account is not true,
neither did you go on well-benched ships,
nor did you reach the citadel of Troy.⁵⁶

"This account" is Stesichorus's earlier, Homeric version of the myth. A medieval Greek commentator on the fragment says: "... to the Trojans, who then went with the image (*eidōlon*) of Helen," and it is clear in the context that the reference is to the moment when Paris and his fellow Trojans left Egypt, Proteus having seized Helen and substituted an image.⁵⁷ (Thus Helen's not going "on well-benched ships" means not going beyond Egypt.⁵⁸ From Egypt onward, it was an image of her.) So even the basic Homeric story of the Trojan War could be repudiated. Herodotus took Stesichorus's palinode seriously enough to write a rationalized version of it (2.112–20). Homer and Hesiod could also be used to

correct other, later poets' versions of a myth, as Socrates, in the pseudo-Platonic (but 4th c.) dialogue *Minos*, uses them to correct the negative Athenian view of the mythical Cretan king Minos (318d9–321b5).

A milder form of correction is the refusal to assent. In an ode celebrating a victory at Olympia, Pindar appropriately recalls Pelops, the originator of the Olympic Games. He refers to Poseidon's falling in love with him when he was pulled from a cauldron with a shining ivory shoulder, to replace the one consumed by the distracted Demeter at a banquet served by Pelops' father, Tantalus (25–27). In the usual version of the story, Tantalus cooks and serves his son, as a way of testing the gods' perceptiveness. Here Pindar has the neighbors say that the gods sliced up and boiled Pelops (46–51).⁵⁹ Then he comments: "For me it is impossible to say that any of the blessed ones is gluttonous. I stand apart" (52–53). Pindar will not endorse this story. Likewise, Pindar rejects Homer's account of the sufferings endured by Odysseus on his return from Troy, and he denies that Ajax committed suicide after the arms of Achilles were awarded to Odysseus and not to him:

I think that the story of Odysseus has become greater than his suffering [i.e., than it really was] through the sweet-speaking Homer.⁶⁰ For there is a dignity upon his falsehoods and his winged artifice. But craft cozens, leading astray with words.⁶¹ The great crowd of men has a blind heart. For if they could know the truth, the mighty Ajax would not, angry over the arms, have planted a smooth blade in his midriff, the strongest man in battle except Achilles, whom the escort of the Zephyr brought in swift ships to carry away his wife for fair-haired Menelaus. (*Nem.* 7.20–30 S-M)

To say that Homer exaggerated or that Ajax did not commit suicide is not the same thing as to say that the Trojan War did not take place.

Even for the historians Herodotus and Thucydides, the Trojan War is a given. Although Herodotus, as said, rationalizes the Stesichorean version of Helen's abduction, implicitly supporting this version as against Homer's, he is far from doubting a Homeric framework for what we would call early Greek history. In the time grid for Herodotus constructed by Justus Cobet, the heroes occupy a distinct period that extends for about three hundred years, or nine generations, from Cadmus to Orestes.⁶² Between the time of the heroes and human, or historical, time there is no dividing line; there is, rather, what Cobet calls a "floating gap." The gap might seem to be fixed in the oft-cited passage in which Herodotus

refers to Polycrates as the first “within the so-called human generation” to be the ruler of a thalassocracy (3.122). But when he speaks of the magnitude of Xerxes’ expedition against Greece, one of the terms of comparison is the Trojan War (7.20). There is no fixed gap between these events. Again, at the end of the *Histories*, Herodotus evokes sacrileges committed by the Persian commander of the Chersonesus against a shrine of Protesilaus in Elaeus, a city in that region, in such a way as to link the beginning of the Trojan War to the end of the second Persian War (9.116–20).⁶³ It is a single great period of time. (Protesilaus was the first Greek killed at Troy; *Il.* 2.701–2.)

Although Thucydides criticizes Homer in his so-called “Archaeology” at the beginning of Book 1, the event and the personages, as in Herodotus, remain intact.⁶⁴ The oath of the suitors, which has been ironed out of Homer but was clearly still alive in memory, is a case in point.

Agamemnon, I think, assembled the expedition as one preeminent in power amongst the men of those days and not so much as leading the suitors of Helen bound by the oath of Tyndareus. Those, too, of Peloponnesians who have received in memory from their forebears the clearest accounts say that Pelops first, by great wealth, with which he came from Asia among indigent people, girding himself with power, had the country named after himself although he was a foreigner; that later . . .⁶⁵

Thucydides proceeds to give a very condensed account of the line of succession that leads ultimately to Agamemnon (1.9.2). He then returns to the oath:

Agamemnon, I think, with this inheritance and at the same time surpassing the others in ships, assembled, by fear more than goodwill, and led the campaign. He seems to have arrived with the most ships himself [*Il.* 2.576] and in addition furnishing ships to the Arcadians [*Il.* 2.610–11], as Homer makes clear, if in anyone’s opinion Homer is sufficient witness.

Thucydides does not deny that there was an oath any more than he doubts that the Trojan War happened.⁶⁶ If there was an oath, there must have been a Helen. As for Homer, Thucydides is sometimes skeptical.⁶⁷ In the present instance, where it is a question of numbers, his attitude is consistent with his view that Homer as poet is likely to exaggerate (1.10.3), a view already expressed by Pindar in *Nemean* 7. Thucydides holds that, in general, poets exaggerate (1.21.1, in his programmatic statement on method). This kind of demurrer does not take anything away

from his fundamental acceptance of the tradition. Likewise, pre-Socratic critique retains and reconfigures some elements of the myths that are criticized and does not follow a straight line from *mythos* to *logos*.⁶⁸

Myth, then, has the status of what we would call history, and it is judged by the criterion of truth, alike in poets and historians. Pindar, in the passage quoted above, distinguishes between truth (ἀλάθεια; 25) and falsehood (ψεῦδος; 22). Stesichorus says in the fragment repudiating the Homeric version of the abduction of Helen, “This account is not true” (fr. 192 Page/Davies). If this is the criterion by which myth is judged, it is a kind of narrative fundamentally different from fiction. No one would demand of fiction that it be true! At the same time, fiction can have a kind of truth. The grounds for this possibility are articulated for the first time in Aristotle’s *Poetics*. “The job of the poet,” Aristotle famously wrote, “is not to say what happened but what sorts of thing might happen and are possible according to the probable and the necessary. For the historian and the poet differ not only by the use, or not, of meter (you could put Herodotus into meter and it would be no less history with meter than without meter) but by the one’s saying what has happened and the other’s saying what sorts of thing might happen. Therefore poetry is more philosophical and serious than history. For poetry tells rather the general, history the particular.”⁶⁹ It is noteworthy that these stipulations, in the history of Greek literature, precede the practice of narrative fiction as invention or creation in which the writer’s words bring into existence the things to which they refer. If fiction is defined in terms of narrative material as “unretold stories,” then, in extant Greek literature, fiction appears for the first time in Chariton of Aphrodisias (1st c. C.E.?).⁷⁰

But the precursor of fiction is tragic *mimēsis* as defined by Aristotle.⁷¹ As Wolfgang Rösler showed in “The Discovery of Fictionality in Antiquity,” the possibility of a theory of fiction coincided with the broader cultural change from oral to written communication.⁷² “[T]he Greek discovery of fictionality is ultimately the consequence of writing, in two steps: first, to the extent that the introduction of writing led to a heretofore unattainable accumulation and fixation of tradition; second, to the extent that the act of reception shifted from personal participation at oral performance to isolation with the written text.”⁷³ Aristotle “the reader,” as he was known in Plato’s Academy (*Vita Marciana* 6), says that tragedy can have its proper effect without benefit of actors and performance, that is, in reading.⁷⁴ If tragedy, as defined by Aristotle, can speak to a solitary reader, then the conditions of possibility of fiction have arrived.⁷⁵ But so long as poetry was judged in terms of truth and falsehood, as even Plato judged it, the concept of fiction was impos-

sible.⁷⁶ Plato's own practice as a writer was another matter. It can be argued that in Plato, the distinguishing characteristic of prose fiction, which Genette located in the distinction between author and narrator, has already been attained, even if it is not applied to something that we would call fiction.⁷⁷

Fiction, then, comes with writing, and, contrariwise, myth went with oral story-telling and oral poetry. The necessary condition for the reception of an oral performance of some part of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* was knowledge of the whole story. Few if any Greeks ever heard the whole of either epic, certainly never on a single occasion. Not, apparently, until the time of Hippias (tyrant 527–510 B.C.E.), at the Panathenaea, were rhapsodes even required to maintain the narrative sequence of the poems in their performances (ps.-Pl. *Hipparch.* 228b–c).⁷⁸ To appreciate fully a rhapsodic performance of Homer, the auditor had to have in mind the whole of the story to which today's part of the poem belonged, and it would have been the oral currency of the story that gave him or her this competence.⁷⁹ Likewise, in the case of vase paintings, understanding required knowledge of the story. Like the women visitors at Delphi in Euripides' *Ion*, those who happened to see these images understood them with reference to a story or stories that they had heard and knew. As for knowledge of Homer through reading, whenever it first became possible, the goal of reading would have been memorization and recitation. The rare person in the fifth century who could afford to, and had the desire to, own all of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (whatever "all" meant) still had recitation as his goal, and to memorize these poems would have been a rare achievement for anyone but a rhapsode (Xen. *Symp.* 3.5). Everyone else had to rely, for the parts of the epics learned from reading and memorized, on the larger narrative context put together from oral performance and hearsay.

If Aristotle opened the theoretical door to fiction in the *Poetics*, did he also admit fictional plots in tragedy? The answer is a qualified yes. In chapter 9, having observed that comic poets give their characters any names that occur to them (1451b13), he says that tragedians hold to names that have already been used. They do so because these names are attached to persons in events that have already happened, that is, in received myths, and such events have the advantage of seeming possible precisely because they have happened. (One notes the assumption, at least the tragic audience's presumed assumption, about the historicity of myths.) But, says Aristotle, in some tragedies some of the names are invented (literally, "made"), and in the *Antheus* (not extant) of Agathon, both the names and the events are invented—we would say fictional. So the tragic poet does not have to cling to the received myths (1451b15–25). The *Antheus* is a unique

example, however, and the qualification of the positive answer to the question posed above seems to lie in Aristotle's implicit recognition that the still on-going practice of poets was to use the old myths—despite his curious statement to the effect that the familiar mythical names are familiar only to a few (1451b25–26).⁸⁰ In chapter 14, in his discussion of what kinds of tragic acts are terrible and pitiable, Aristotle observes that “it is not possible to undo the received myths” and gives as examples the fact that Orestes killed Clytemnestra and Alcmeon killed Eriphyle. (Sophocles, Euripides, and others wrote tragedies on Alcmeon, none of them extant.) This stipulation seems to contradict what he said about the invention of plots, but his very next sentence can be interpreted to mean that the tragic poet should do it artistically, whether he is using a received plot or inventing his own.⁸¹

From Aristotle's comments on the matter, one concludes that invention on the part of the tragedians took place within adherence to the received myths.⁸² Even Euripides, held to be the most “creative” of the tragedians, when he is not instead a “debunker” of myths, follows this rule. A good test case is *Andromache*, a tragedy in which imagination at first seems to have taken over. The action, however, follows from the combination of two facts well established in tradition: Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles, gets Andromache as his share of the spoils after the sack of Troy and has a child by her; Neoptolemus marries Hermione, promised to him by her father, Menelaus, on the battlefield, although earlier he had promised her to his nephew, Orestes.⁸³ The setting of the tragedy is Phthia, the ancestral kingdom of Neoptolemus. Hermione is barren, a fact that could have been inferred from the tradition, but here it becomes the cause of her hatred of Andromache, and this hatred drives the plot. Hermione believes that she is barren because Andromache has poisoned her and so plans to kill her and her son. Andromache has taken refuge with the child at an altar of Thetis (the goddess grandmother of Neoptolemus) in the absence of Neoptolemus, who is at Delphi. (As one later learns, Orestes has also been at Delphi, plotting against Neoptolemus. It is Euripides' elaboration on the traditional location of the death of Neoptolemus.) Menelaus arrives to support his daughter; then Peleus, the grandfather of Neoptolemus, enters and rebukes Menelaus, retelling main events of the Trojan War in such a way that they count against him, even if he was the victor. It is a new version of Trojan War myth within a new version of post-Trojan War myth. Menelaus departs. Hermione is now isolated and in fear for her life. Orestes arrives to rescue her. He tells his story, beginning with facts anchored in tradition, in such a way as to explain his first-time, mythologically unprecedented appear-

ance in Phthia (966–81). (Like Peleus, Orestes comes into the story of Neoptolemus and Hermione for the first time in Euripides' tragedy.) He and Hermione depart. They will fulfill the marriage that was one of the two provided for in the tradition, the other having been unhappily fulfilled in Phthia, as here dramatized. A messenger arrives from Delphi to report the death of Neoptolemus; then his corpse is brought in. Thetis appears as a *dea ex machina* and predicts the future of the Phthian characters by reestablishing the main outlines of received myth. Neoptolemus is to be returned to Delphi (where tradition located his grave). Andromache will marry Helenus and they will settle in Molossia in northwest Greece, where the descendants of her son will be kings. Peleus will be immortal and live with Thetis in the sea (a mythological plus for him, although the rest of her dispensation follows tradition).

Euripides has begun, then, with an imagined conflict between Andromache and Hermione, with Neoptolemus absent in Delphi. He has the conflict involving Menelaus on one side, then Peleus on the other, and finally Orestes, who is further involved in the death of Neoptolemus, still in Delphi. Orestes and Hermione are at last united. The play as a whole tells a new story, but all the characters are already known in epic, and everything that they do or suffer is either already attested or a plausible inference from their known stories. Euripides' new version of a received myth or myths is not an intellectual game but, like all new versions of myths, tragic or other, wants to say something relevant to the context, which is Athens in the year (uncertain) in which it was performed. (It is a question not to be gone into here.) In tragedy in particular, the heroic past could be used as a critique of contemporary life and, vice versa, the heroic past could be implicitly criticized in some respect from a point of view contemporary with the tragic performance.⁸⁴

The inventiveness of Euripides extended to new cults or new rituals in existing Athenian cults and to new etiologies for these rituals. (For that matter, Aeschylus had already provided in *Eumenides* [458 B.C.E.] a new *aition* for the Court of the Areopagus in Athens, which entailed assimilation of the fearsome Erinyes to the already established Athenian goddess called the Semnai.) The function of these elements in Euripidean tragedy is not easy to grasp. What, for example, did the Athenian audience think when it heard Apollo, at the end of *Orestes*, say that he has taken Helen to the palace of Zeus, where she will share a throne with Castor and Polydeuces, a savior (like them) of sailors (1629–37) and, further, that she will have a throne next to Hera and Hebe, the wife of Heracles, and will be honored with libations, receiving cult worship along with the Dioscuri (1682–90)?⁸⁵

Had anyone ever heard of Helen's saving a sailor? Did anyone really expect to hear of such a thing? Scholars debate the problem. One proposal is that a Euripidean etiology for a cult be understood in the context of each tragedy and as an aspect of his treatment of myth.⁸⁶ On this understanding, Euripides' etiological inventiveness could be fitted into the picture of his plots' relation to received myth, as just suggested. A larger question remains.

What is the relation of Greek myth to Greek religion? As it happens, this question has been answered in modern times in terms of the relation of myth to ritual in particular. The so-called myth-ritual theory has had a longer life than any other. H. S. Versnel tells the story of its origins and permutations (see chapter 2 of this volume).⁸⁷ In its original form, the theory held that all myths originate from rituals, and in its most recent form, the one given it by Walter Burkert, it has been revised in terms of basic biological and sociobiological "programs of action," such as those governing maturation and initiation into society, that determine certain widespread narrative types.⁸⁸ But neither Burkert nor anyone else would claim that all myths can be so explained.⁸⁹

Another way of thinking about the relation of myth and ritual has been to privilege poetic performance as the primary medium of myth and then to see that medium as itself a ritual. "Once we view myth as performance, we can see that myth itself is a form of ritual: rather than think of myth and ritual separately . . . , we can see them as a continuum in which myth is a verbal aspect of ritual while ritual is a notional aspect of myth."⁹⁰ But the "performance" of Greek myth was vastly more pervasive in Greek life. It began in childhood with the stories told by nurses and mothers.⁹¹ It continued in everyday life, as in the examples discussed at the beginning of this introduction. It served as what we could call historical precedent in speeches.⁹² Before there was scientific geography, it served as way to locate oneself in space, as in the oft-cited example of Phaedrus, who asks in the eponymous dialogue, "Isn't it from somewhere around here that Boreas is said to have carried off Oreithuia?" (229b–e), but also in the historians.⁹³ Herodotus traces Xerxes' entrance into Greece by markers from myth.⁹⁴ Having crossed the Hellespont into Greece, Xerxes has the tomb of Helle, daughter of Athamas, on his right (Hdt. 7.58.2); he holds a review of his troops in a land once the Cicones' (Hdt. 7.59.2, without having to remind his readers that it was Odysseus's first land-fall after he left Troy); the promontory Serrheion is "renowned" (7.59.2, without having to say that the Ciconian women murdered Orpheus there). Although it is not geographical, it is worth mentioning another of Herodotus's mythological

glosses on Xerxes' entry into Greece. In his long excursus on the review of the troops, Herodotus comments: "these Pamphylians are the descendants of those who were scattered when they left Troy with Amphilocheus and Calchas" (Hdt. 3.91 and 7.91 = *Nostoi* fr. 13 Bernabé). Herodotus, whose two uses of the word *muthos* (2.23, 2.45) are a poor algorithm for understanding his relation to myth, could supply more examples.⁹⁵ He is hardly alone. Socrates' friend Xenophon reports that the troops of Cyrus, marching through Phrygia, pass "Midas' Spring," so called because Midas mixed wine in it in order to catch the satyr Silenus (Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.13). In short, it is impossible to regard the quotidian pervasiveness of myth (which includes the visual media mentioned above) as somehow secondary and poetic performance as the primary medium of myth.

It is also the case that the poetic performances of the same myth can contradict each other, as in the burial place of the Seven, who fought to restore Polyneices to the kingship of Thebes and died in the attempt. Pindar, the Theban, has the Seven buried in Thebes.⁹⁶ Aeschylus, an Athenian from Eleusis, has them buried in Eleusis.⁹⁷ In Euripides' *Suppliants* (ca. 422 B.C.E.), they are cremated at Eleusis and their ashes are returned to Argos, by Athena's dispensation, at the end of the tragedy (1210–12). As Athena makes clear, the location of the burial has reverberations for future—that is, from the point of view of the audience, present—relations between Athens and Argos. Already in the sixth century, Argos, whence the Seven set out under the leadership of Adrastus, its king, was using the myth in its rivalry with Sparta for ascendancy in the Peloponnesus.⁹⁸ Argos is the first word of the first line, a one-line fragment, of the *Thebaid*, the Cyclic epic poem on the ill-fated campaign. The last words are: "whence the lords," that is, set out (fr. 1 Bernabé = fr. 1 Davies). But these were not the only places that claimed a connection with the myth of the Seven, nor were poets the only spokespersons for the claims. The people of Eleutherae, on the road from Thebes to Eleusis, said that the common soldiers of the seven contingents were buried in their town.⁹⁹ The people of another town on the Boeotian border, Harma (Chariot), said that their town was named after the crash of the chariot of Adrastus, the sole survivor. He then fled on his horse, Arion (Strabo 9.2.11). In a variant local tradition, that of Colonus Hippius, a town two kilometers north of Athens, Adrastus arrived there on his chariot when he was fleeing from Thebes (*Etym. Magn.* s.v. Ἰππία).¹⁰⁰ There was also a hero cult of the Seven at Eleusis and one of Adrastus at Colonus Hippius (Paus. 1.30.4).¹⁰¹ This localism of myth does not entail poetry, nor does it entail performance, unless one wants to call some Harman's story about Adras-

tus a performance. There seems to have been no motive for these stories more profound than the desire to connect one's town with one of the great Panhellenic myths.¹⁰²

Still, it seems that the rich polytheistic Greek mythology must have some important connection with Greek religion. In continuing with this possibility, one has to begin not with mythology but with religion and thus with cult—cult to different gods in different cities and, within cities, organized at different levels, from that of the *polis*, to the deme (in the case of Athens), to the group of friends within a deme (like Aristophanes' friends' cult to Heracles), to individuals (like Cephalus, seen in Plato's *Republic* sacrificing alone to, probably, Zeus Herkeios, Zeus of the Courtyard).¹⁰³ One begins with cult because Greek religion (a notoriously difficult concept) has no identity, while the identity of a *polis* religion, in terms of its cults, can always be determined.¹⁰⁴ (Greek religion was polytheistic, but no Greek was a polytheist.) What myth contributed to cult was probably a sense of the identity of the gods (cf. the passage of Herodotus quoted above), and the visual media of myth showed what the gods looked like. For the rest, cults at the higher levels of organization had their rules of conduct, which survive in the form of the many "sacred laws" inscribed on stone.¹⁰⁵ These rules tend to be detailed and are specific to the cult in question. One could say, then, that the tendencies of cult, toward regulation of specific rituals, and of myth, toward variation in widely shared stories, are opposite. Further, civic and other (e.g., to heroes) cults sought the protection of the higher powers; in Athens, tragedy, drawing on the traditional myths of epic, sometimes portrayed gods and heroes on whom one might not want to rely.¹⁰⁶

For the question of myth and religion, the question of belief in the gods of cult might arise.¹⁰⁷ In particular, does myth have something to do with belief in these gods? One has to begin, again, with religion. The well-known charge of impiety against Socrates in 399 B.C.E. is instructive. The first item of the indictment is usually translated as "he commits injustice not believing in the gods in which the city believes."¹⁰⁸ But the word translated as "believe" means "observe customary practices regarding."¹⁰⁹ Thus in Xenophon's *Apology*, Socrates can make a commonsense defense against the charge concerning the city's gods: "anyone else who happened to be there, and Meletus himself [one of Socrates' accusers], if he had wanted to, used to see me sacrificing in the communal festivals and on the public altars" (11). Belief, then, was not distinguishable from the ritual acts, sacrifice in particular, expected of citizens. A central point of agreement between Jean-Pierre Vernant and Walter Burkert, whose theories of sacrifice oth-

erwise sharply diverged, was that the gods to whom it was nominally offered did not matter: sacrifice “can be understood without reference to any real or imagined supernatural third party,” in terms of its social or psychological function.¹¹⁰ Myths, then, whatever their relation to cult, are not supporting belief.¹¹¹

This introduction has emphasized what in the 1990 edition I called the practice of Greek mythology, that is, how persons used and experienced myth in daily life, in which myth was pervasive. This notion of the practice of Greek myth has entailed a distinction between different practices, between myth in poetry and what might be called the ordinary use of myth. In notable instances (not always), myth in poetry was Panhellenic; ordinary myth was often (not always) local. But all instances of myth, poetic or ordinary, Panhellenic or local, belong equally to Greek mythology.

In the past two decades or so, however, some scholars have sought to define Greek myth in terms of a special practice, namely, choral or monodic song composed for and performed on particular occasions. The myths in these songs have particular meanings for the songs’ audiences. With the means at our disposal, philology and historical methodology, we can return to these songs and thus to myth as lived. This approach to myth is grounded in speech act theory—in particular, on the notion of performative speech; in deixis; and in social anthropology. Further, because the given occasions are festivals or occasions that we would call religious, and these events can all be called rituals in some sense or other, ritual is worked into the definition of myth (cf. the quotation above beginning, “Once we view myth as performance . . .”). An important book published in 2007 stated its program in these terms: “Strictly linked to the communities for which it was composed, religious choral song . . . provides a framework and a privileged context within which the much-contested relationship between myth and ritual may be investigated, and a background against which myth can be seen in action within a cult community.”¹¹²

This approach to Greek myth has been given a name, pragmatics, and it is contrasted with semiotics, which includes structuralism and all approaches that focus on myth as narrative in a written text, whatever its original mode of communication.¹¹³ (The text on which pragmatics focuses is thought of as a script for performance or as a transcript made after the fact.) One of the examples that has emerged in work on myth that takes the pragmatic approach is Sappho fr. 17 V.¹¹⁴ This fragmentary poem or song is a hymn, addressed to Hera, of which the first twelve of twenty lines can be made out with certainty. In the following, the marks

of ellipsis indicate lacunae in the papyrus; the parentheses give the translator's supplements and queries:

Let your (graceful form appear) near me (while I pray), lady Hera, to whom the Atridae [sons of Atreus, i.e., Agamemnon and Menelaus], (illustrious) kings made prayer(?); after accomplishing (many labours), first around (Ilium, then on the sea), they started out to this island [Lesbos], but could not (complete their journey until they (called on) you and Zeus the god of suppliants and Thyone's lovely (son) [Dionysus]; now (be gracious and help me) in accordance with that ancient precedent. Holy and fair . . . maiden(s) . . . to be . . . to reach (the shrine?).¹¹⁵

Comparison with Alcaeus fr. 129 V shows that Sappho and the maidens are in the sanctuary of the three deities that was located five kilometers north of the ancient town of Pyrrha.¹¹⁶ The shape of the hymn is clear: Sappho summons Hera, recalling in lines 3–10 an illustrious instance of Hera's earlier aid to suppliants, when the Greek fleet stopped at Lesbos on its return to Greece and the leaders prayed to her in this very sanctuary. The rest of the poem (the last two stanzas are almost completely missing) would have shown what Sappho was praying for.¹¹⁷ In other words, a myth, in fact a local version of a Panhellenic myth, is brought into a direct appeal to the goddess that is tied to the here and now by various kinds of deixis (the first person singular; the untranslatable present-marking particle *δή*; the adverb “hither,” translated above as “to this island”). “[T]he time and space of the heroic action are tightly woven into the time and space of the ‘song act’ constituted by the performance of the poem: the category of ‘myth’ thus infiltrates the category of ‘rite.’”¹¹⁸

The claim of this pragmatic approach, as already indicated, is that it takes us back behind our written texts to a more immediate use and experience of myths. But other scenarios for Sappho fr. 17 V have to be considered. What if someone in Mytilene, a week, say, after the day of the performance, read the song or heard it read or recited in a solo performance? Did the myth become less real or somehow less a myth? In thinking about the answer to this question, one has to bear in mind the ambiguity of deixis, that capacity of language to connect speech to the particular instance of its delivery. In the foundational work on this subject, Karl Bühler distinguished between two kinds, *deixis ad oculos* and *deixis am Phantasma*.¹¹⁹ One could say “ocular deixis” and “imaginary deixis.” A demonstrative may point to something that the poet and his audience can really see, as presumably at the performance of Sappho 17 V in the sanctuary north of Pyrrha, or it may

point to something that the poet is, in effect, inviting his audience to imagine, or that, in the case of reading, the audience has to imagine. Further, in the course of time, the first kind will inevitably turn into the second, as the original performance context is forgotten.¹²⁰

Another scenario is suggested by an anecdote concerning Solon preserved in Aelian. Solon heard his nephew sing a song (unidentified) of Sappho at a symposium. Solon asked his nephew to teach him the song. It was, he said, the one last thing he wanted to do before he died.¹²¹ Let us imagine that the song in question was the one that we call fr. 17 V. The anecdote shows that even in a performance context, the all-male symposium, that differed *toto caelo* from the original one, a song retained its appeal, quite apart from whatever it meant to its original performers and audience.¹²² Has the myth of the Atridae become less meaningful at the symposium? Is imaginary deixis less meaningful than ocular deixis? From a fragment of Aristophanes, it is known that compositions by Alcaeus and Anacreon were also reperformed at symposia.¹²³ Reperformance has been a theme of Pindaric scholarship; there is a consensus that, after its first choral performance, an ode could be followed by a solo version, accompanied by the lyre. The symposium would have been the setting.¹²⁴ The same questions can be asked about these reperformances of Alcaeus, Anacreon, and Pindar as I asked about the example of Sappho.

The immediacy of myth in the pragmatic conception can also be called into question. Let us take choral performance as an example again, this time of Bacchylides' victory odes and dithyrambs. David Fearn has argued:

Bacchylides uses mythological narrative (and character speech within it) extensively, but often makes the connection between it and its frame (poetic or contextual) difficult to grasp . . . [W]e should take very seriously indeed the challenge of interpreting the gaps between these mythological narratives and their frames, as well as those gaps which open between the words spoken by the mythological characters and the eyes and ears of Bacchylides' ancient and modern audiences . . . [W]e need also to consider the issues of communication and understanding that such a technique poses to readers and original audiences of victory odes as well . . . With his dithyrambs, access to truth is rendered problematic because of complex narratorial presentation, in ways that often invite self-conscious reflection about the nature of *muthos* and of storytelling in general.¹²⁵

Neither in the case of Bacchylides nor (a fortiori, I would say) in the case of Pindar can it be argued that a myth in an original performance context had the direct communicative value that pragmatics is claiming for it.

The social anthropologist Edmund Leach said: "From the viewpoint of a social anthropologist like myself, myth loses all meaning when it is taken out of context."¹²⁶ This normative model of contextual understanding is the one to which the pragmatics of myth would like to adhere. The meaning that the myth has for the native (or, in the case of a Greek myth, the original) teller or performer is the primary one and, at least in Leach's formulation, the only one worth having. But as soon as the native (or original) myth becomes known to a nonnative person, to an outsider, it may inevitably escape its context, and the norm of contextual understanding may prove untenable. Let us take the Egyptian story "Two Brothers" as an example. Every element, beginning with the names of the brothers, Bata and Anubis, which are the names of Egyptian gods, has an interpretation specific to Egyptian culture and history.¹²⁷ The story is in three parts. In the first, Bata is working on the farm of his older brother, Anubis. One day, Anubis' wife attempts to seduce Bata. He refuses. She then tells Anubis that Bata had tried to seduce her. Anubis would have killed Bata, but he escapes, and a god causes a body of water full of crocodiles to appear between them. From the other side of the river, Bata tells his brother what had happened, swears an oath to the sun god, and castrates himself (in confirmation of his oath). As soon as the outsider perceives this outline of the first part, it appears as an international story, one often going under the name "Potiphar's Wife" (ATU 870). The best known of several ancient Greek versions is the myth of Theseus, Phaedra, and Hippolytus.¹²⁸ It is impossible to say that this international dimension of "Two Brothers" is not as much a fact about the story as the Egyptological facts. Contextual understanding does not, then, suffice. The comparative perspective that comes with the perception of trans-local or supra-contextual significance changes the social anthropologist's picture. (One could even say that myth *loses* some of its meaning when it is confined to its context.) To start from the Greek example, no matter how good the pragmatic description of Euripides' *Hippolytus*, the myth as dramatized for the Theater of Dionysus cannot escape the comparative perspective any more than "Two Brothers" can.

The title of an article by Fritz Graf posed a question about Greek sacrifice: one generation after Burkert and Girard, where are the great theories?¹²⁹ (As his discussion shows, the name of Vernant might well have appeared next to the other two.) The same question can be asked about theories of myth, if pragmatics is not the new great theory. But if new theories are lacking, it would not mean that the old approaches are only stopgaps. The old comparative approaches, well-

represented in this book by the chapters of López-Ruiz, Nagy, and Hansen, work on new evidence and make new discoveries in myths known long since. The myth-ritual approach, here represented by Versnel's chapter, also has a comparative basis and, as Versnel shows, was given new life by Burkert. Like psychoanalysis, these approaches work from narratives as written, from myth in mythographical tradition, not from the performed narratives of pragmatics (when such performances can be recreated). Sourvinou-Inwood's chapter offers the chance of a new theory for a vast source of Greek myth, vase painting, still largely unstudied from the point of view of myth, as the field of art history has gone in a different direction (cf. my introduction to chapter 7).

At the time of the first edition of this book, the French structuralist approach was already too well known to require a chapter.¹³⁰ But a particular feature of this approach, namely, ideological analysis, has been renewed in a broader application of the concept of ideology to Greek myth. This kind of analysis is well represented in a study of the myth of Heracles that shows that "it accesses and confuses the ideological categories of labor."¹³¹ This approach offers a means of organizing the body of interpretation of Greek myth produced by gender studies in the last generation.¹³² The aphorism of Sian Lewis ("the role of mythology in gender studies has become much greater than the role of gender in mythological studies") might come to be reversed, if gender became an articulated approach to myth and myth ceased to be only a subject matter.¹³³ There might be a new chapter to be written and a new contributor to be sought out by the next editor of this book.

Whether or not he or she will be looking for a new contribution on myth and history remains to be seen. There will be various senses of history to be considered, besides myth as history, as it was for the Greeks (cf. above).¹³⁴ Scholars have always, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, looked for history in myth. To start with history on the largest scale, history unconnected with any particular time or place, there will be the future of Burkert's "programs of action" to be considered (cf. above and chapter 2).¹³⁵ At the other end of the scale lies the old example of the Trojan War, which, ever since the excavations of Heinrich Schliemann (1822–90) at Tell Hisarlik, has been seen by some scholars in every generation as a historical event—an expedition of Mycenaean Greeks against a prosperous city on the Hellespont. New excavations and new work on Hittite texts have inspired a new historical confidence. In the words of Joachim Latacz, "for the first time in the history of the study of Troy, it has been possible to give Homer's *Iliad* the status of a source text."¹³⁶ Both the linguistic and the archaeo-

logical arguments for Latacz's view have met with strong challenges.¹³⁷ The controversy continues, and its end, if it reaches one, will have to be described in the future. The time will come also for a synthesis of impressive work on myth in Greek history (as distinguished from history in Greek myth). Greeks used myths to advance territorial and other claims. The example of Argos, discussed above, is one of many.¹³⁸

To find history in myth is also the goal of the Italian historical-anthropological school. The Centro Interdipartimentale di Studi Antropologici sulla Cultura Antica at the University of Siena, directed by Maurizio Bettini, is engaged in producing an *Atlante antropologico della mitologia greca e romana*.¹³⁹ In his introduction to an issue of the journal published by his Centro, Bettini describes the rationale of this project as follows:

At the center of our interest we have placed not so much the stories considered in themselves as certain themes of cultural relevance that emerge from the myths of the Greeks and the Romans, that is, those elements, namely, that the "significativity" of myth is able to "pass on" through the story-line, bringing them in this way to the attention of the community to which these stories are addressed. Such themes have been identified through the analysis of the narratives that articulate them, and have then been analyzed and structured in an anthropological perspective. In substance, the myths that we have taken for examination [i.e., the examples of entries in the Atlas that are published in this issue of the journal] have been studied as narrative strategies . . . each called to construct, hand down, mediate and negotiate models of social behavior and of the organization of kinds of knowledge.¹⁴⁰

While the Gruppo Triestino di Ricerca sul Mito e la Mitografia (GRIMM) at the University of Trieste has encyclopedic projects, its interests (as reflected in reviews and other activities) include historical approaches.¹⁴¹ A book by one of its directors, Ezio Pellizer, has appeared in a series edited by Bettini.¹⁴²

Finally, the history of Greek myth in the sense of mythography, written collection of myths, will certainly need a chapter in a future edition of *Approaches to Greek Myth*. The period of time is vast, from Pherecydes of Syros (6th c. B.C.E.) (cf. above) to at least Apollodorus (probably 2nd c. C.E.). The authors are many and various.¹⁴³ After Roman domination of Greece (dated from the destruction of Corinth in 146 B.C.E.), a mythographer might be writing for sophisticated Romans able to read Greek (Parthenius of Nicaea) or for a Greek-speaking audience that wanted to attain cultural literacy (Apollodorus).¹⁴⁴ The aspirations of

this latter kind of audience are implicit in the subliterate papyri studied by van Rossum-Steenbeek (cf. above). The sociology, so to speak, of Greek mythology, which clearly differs from one part of the Roman Empire to another, remains to be studied, as do the strategies of the authors, for whom the mere compilation of myths was hardly an end in itself. The condition for this kind of research is good editions, in need of which most of the mythographers have long remained. But in the past fifteen years, things have begun to change. From the research project on Greek mythology at the Universitat Autònoma in Barcelona have come a surprising number of new editions: of Eratosthenes' *Catasterisms*, of Pherecydes, of Hyginus, of Apollodorus, and of Antoninus Liberalis.¹⁴⁵ Robert Fowler has also edited Pherecydes and the other early mythographers.¹⁴⁶ The fourth-century (?) rationalizer Palaephatus has been newly edited; so, too, Parthenius and his near-contemporary Conon (36 B.C.E.–17 C.E.).¹⁴⁷ Along with these editions have come commentary and discussion, thus altogether the beginning of a new chapter in the metaphorical sense, preparatory to a new real chapter that will look back and put together the story of this productive period.

NOTES

1. What is a story? One could say: an account of an action having a beginning, a middle, and an end (cf. Aristotle's criterion for the plot of a tragedy: *Poet.* 1450b27). A genealogy is not, then, a myth until the subjects do something. Cf. Burkert 1993, 18: "Zum Mythos gehört Aktion . . ."

2. On these abstractions, see West 1966, 33–34.

3. See Lee 1997, 177–78, for the identification of the pediment (i.e., as the west one) and for other interpretive problems.

4. Donzelli 2010, 144: "Quei pochi tratti dovevano bastare a evocare i racconti mitici in tutta la loro complessità, che non poteva certo essere rappresentata nella fissità dell'immagine."

5. Burkert 1993, 17: "Mythen sind traditionelle Erzählungen mit besonderer 'Bedeutungssamkeit.'" For critical reflection on the two main terms here ("traditional" and "meaningfulness"), see Bettini 2012, ii–iii.

6. Strabo 1.1.19. Trans. Jones 1917, 39. I take (as Jones appears to do) Strabo's way of introducing his example (οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι) as indicating verbal myth-telling, in contrast to the writing of geography. The geographer (noun γεόγραφος), on the other hand, to whom he refers shortly after the passage I have quoted, is a writer.

7. van Rossum-Steenbeek 1997, XIII. Sometimes these lists, or catalogues, as she calls them, are found in combination with a mythical story. The other three categories are: (1) hypotheses (i.e., narrative summaries in prose or verse) of tragedies and comedies; (2) Homeric hypotheses (i.e., prose summaries preceded by the first line of the section of Homer summarized); and (3) stories from Mythographus Homerus (a name coined in

1892 to designate the mythographical items found in the so-called D-scholia to Homer, some of which are also preserved in papyri).

8. In the fragments of the pseudo-Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women* there is a list of Helen's suitors. Twelve names survive. Five of these names are not in Apollodorus. Another list of suitors can be found in the *Fabulae* of Hyginus, thirty-seven in all (line 81). For analysis of these lists of suitors (Hes.; Apollod.; Hyg.), see Hirschberger 2004, 398–99. Hyginus omits four of the suitors found in pseudo-Hesiod. Clearly, various lists were in circulation in the time of Apollodorus, as in the case of the suitors of Penelope, listed by Apollodorus in the *Epitome* (7.26–30).

9. Cameron (2004, 160–62) discusses the passage. In Book 13 of the *Deipnosophists*, Myrtilus gives a catalogue (he begins with καταλέξω at 573b) of *hetaerae*, under various headings. At the end, while the others are amazed at his memory, the philosopher Cynulcus scorns him. What is the use of all these names, when you don't know the names of the men who were enclosed in the Trojan Horse or the names of Odysseus's companions and the ones who were devoured by the Cyclops—that is, more important names (13.610b–d)? It is clear that the display of memory in itself is not what Cynulcus objects to. Indeed, as the *Deipnosophists* shows again and again, encyclopedic knowledge was an expected accomplishment.

10. Ieranò (2010) concludes a discussion of Euripidean characters' references to painting as sources of knowledge as follows (*Hipp.* 1004–6; *Tro.* 687–88; *Ion* 271–73): “Quando i tre personaggi . . . riducono la loro conoscenza di queste situazioni all'ascolto di *logoi* e alla visione di *graphoi*, è dunque un tratto di realismo quotidiano che viene qui introdotto nel testo drammatico. Ippolito, Ecuba e Ione non sono sotto questo profilo molto diversi dall'ateniese medio” (245–46). For good brief introductions to visual sources for Greek myth, see Buxton 1994, 53–66; Delattre 2005, 165–84 (also for methodology).

11. On the peplos, see Barber 1992, 112–16.

12. On the symposium, see Edmunds 1990b, 8–9. Another regularized nonpoetic context is the funeral oration, on which see Buxton 1994, 37–38. Speeches by the sophist Hippias (i.e., professional myth-telling) in Sparta (context unspecified) on genealogy and foundation of cities are in *Pl. Hp. mai.* 285d6–e2, on which see Buxton 1994, 38–39. Hippias refers to Spartan fondness for ancient stories (ἀρχαιολογία; 285d8). For “ancient things” as a way of referring to what we call myth, see Calame 2009, chap. 6, text to nn. 5–6.

13. Buxton 1994, 21–29.

14. I had spoken of Greek mythology as a system in Edmunds 1990b, 15–17; cf. Dowden and Livingstone 2011b, 3–4 (“Mythology as System”).

15. On the importance of ancestors in Greek ideology, see Thomas 2012. Compare the “Catalogue of Women” in *Od.* Book 11, on which see Heubeck, in Heubeck and Hoekstra 1989, 90–91. For a bibliography on genealogy in Greek myth, see Delattre 2005, 231.

16. See Pàmias, chapter 1 in this book; see also Pellizer 1993, 286–89, and Dowden 2011b, 55–66, for overviews of these writers.

17. Hesiod and Apollodorus: Hirschberger 2004, 32–41.

18. Examples in Griffiths 2011, 198–200.

19. See Kirk 1985, 173–77, on the place names and their implications for the catalogue. For a map of “The bases of the Greek contingents in the Catalogue of Ships,” see Dickinson 2011, 154.

20. This overview follows West 1985, 137. For Pylus and Iolcus and the unexpected connection between them, see West 1988, 160.

21. West 1973, 187: “Perhaps the Greeks always had the habit of celebrating heroic exploits in verse.” On the Indo-European ideology of the hero, see West 1988, 154; 2007, 454–64 (“The Hero as Warrior”); Nagy 2005.

22. West 1985, 137 n. 30; Nagy 1999 [1979], 140–41.

23. On the concept of basic story, see Lord 2000, 100–101.

24. On Homeric epic as part of this tendency, see Nagy 1999 [1979], 7–9. On the chronology and definitions of Panhellenism, see C. Morgan 1993, 18–20.

25. Herodotus 2.53. I made a different point concerning this passage in Edmunds 1990b, 4–5.

26. Lloyd, in Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007: “Herodotus mistakenly assumes that the beginning of his evidence reflects the introduction of the phenomenon.” It is also the case that Homer and Hesiod were not completely consistent with each other on the gods; see Létoublon 2011, 28–29.

27. Graf 2011b, 217.

28. In other words, the status of Pausanias as a source for Greek myth will have to change. His current status is still the one that he had in Burkert 1993, 13, where, after listing five literary corpora of Greek myth (Hesiod, Homeric Hymns, Stesichorus, tragedy, and Apollodorus), Burkert adds: “Gewiß kommt dann noch Wichtiges dazu, vor allem was bei Plutarch und Pausanias steht.” Curiously, Homer does not count as a corpus, because his poetry transcends myth.

29. Edmunds 1997.

30. They appeal to “memory.” Cf. Moran 1975.

31. See Nagy 1992 for another way of arguing this point.

32. This incomprehension, aggressively stated, can be found in Graf 2011a.

33. *Rep.* 392d1–393b5. In Aristotle’s broader concept of *mimēsis*, it has three modes (lit., “the how” of *mimēsis*): alternating between narrative and drama (“as Homer does”); always narrating in the same voice; and wholly dramatic (*Poet.* 1448a19–24).

34. Genette 1980 [1972], 162–69.

35. Genette is not the only source of the “Homeric poetics” of Nünlist and de Jong 2001 (prolegomena volume of the Basel commentary), but he is cited thirteen times; de Jong 2001 (*Narratological Commentary on the Odyssey*). See in Nünlist and de Jong 2001 lemmata for “Argument-Funktion” (with many cross-references), “Erzähler,” “Erzählung,” “Figuren-Sprache,” and so forth.

36. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὅλον μυθῶδες· καὶ γὰρ οὐδ’ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ταῦτά φησιν Ὀμηρος οὐδὲ γινόμενα εἰσάγει, ἀλλ’ ὥς διαδεδομένων περὶ τὴν Ἡρακλέους γένεσιν μέμνηται.

37. Griffin 1986; de Jong 1987, chap. 5 (“Character-Text (Speeches)”); Martin 1990; cf. Nagy 1992, 315–17; Griffin 2004. de Jong gives it as a rule that “the presentation by characters in character-text is conditioned by the identity of the speaker and addressee and by the situation . . .” (192–93). Beck 2012 studies the techniques for presenting speeches in Homer (as distinguished from the content of speeches) and finds a spectrum underlying the two epics. Characters and principal narrators occupy different places on the spectrum, but “the ways that the main narrators use speech mention form a sub-set of—rather than a set distinct from—the ways that characters use speech mention” (128).

38. Greeks and Trojans: de Jong 1987, chap. 5, examples 1, 4, 8; Mackie 1996.

39. A functional difference between Herodotus as narrator, on the one hand, and persons in Herodotus as narrators of past events, sometimes myths, on the other, has been shown by Boedeker (2012). She concludes, employing a Benvenistean distinction established earlier: “Herodotus’ speakers demonstrate the use of *discours* to engage and persuade an immediate audience, in contrast to the broader and more objective *récit* that is appropriated by the primary narrator” (34).

40. The following discussion is taken from Edmunds 1997, 418–20. In that article I was relying on research for a paper given in March 1994 (at the fifth Coloquio internacional di Filología griega in Madrid), which I doubted would ever be published. It was, in fact, published as Edmunds 2002 (received in October 2003).

41. The inconsistency between the moral stance of Antinous and his and his companions’ conduct has often led scholars to consider all or parts of the passage corrupt. See Fernández-Galiano, in Russo, Fernández-Galiano, and Heubeck 1992, on *Od.* 21.293–310.

42. In the two Homeric Hymns that contain a narrative within the poet’s narrative, the practical use of story-telling observed in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* is clear. Hermes’ theogonic song has the purpose of softening the anger of Apollo at the theft of his cattle, and the song is successful: Apollo says that it is worth fifty cows (*Hymn. Hom. Merc.* 436–37). Aphrodite establishes the precedents for her union with Anchises by telling the stories of Tros (*Hymn. Hom. Ven.* 200–217) and of Tithonus (218–38). The latter story also explains why the mortal Anchises cannot become her husband.

43. For a different view of the use of myth by characters in Homer, see Nagy 1992, 315 (“the privileged status of myth in Homeric poetry”); 317 (“myth is special speech”).

44. On the difference of poetry from myth, see Pàmias’s quotation of Graf 1993 [1987], 2, in chapter 1 of this book; see also Burkert 1985, 120–21.

45. Nagy 1992, 320.

46. Schol. *Il.* 3.126–27 bT: ἀξιόχρεων ἀρχέτυπον ἀνέπλασεν ὁ ποιητής τῆς ἰδίας ποιήσεως. For bibliography on Helen’s weaving as an image of poetry, see Pantelia 2002, 25 n. 21. Note that Kennedy (1986) dissents from this view. Pantelia’s article, useful in other ways, is marred by its subjectivist treatment of Helen and poetry: Helen “understands” the importance of poetry, “has poetic awareness,” and so forth.

47. Macleod 1982, 139, on *Iliad* 24.596–601; Richardson 1993, 340, with citation of earlier literature.

48. Slater 1977, 195.

49. On this poem, see Davies 1986.

50. But cf. Biraschi 1989b, 35 and n. 35, for the ideological value and use of Trojan War myth in Lesbian politics and, further, for the antiheroic dimension of Alcaeus.

51. Hes. *Cat.* fr. 175 M-W = *9 H = 248 Most. The son is variously named, most often as Nicostratus: Cinaethon fr. 3 B; Lysimachus *FGrH* 382 F 12 = *Cypria* fr. 12 B; Hes. fr. 175.2 M-W (see West 1985, 118–19); as Maraphius: Ariaethus *FGrH* 316 F 6; or as Pleisthenes: schol. Eur. *Andr.* 898 (citing “the author of the ‘Cyprian Researches’” [*FGrH* 758 F 6]) = *Cypria* fr. 12 B (again). He is probably the one alluded to at Soph. *El.* 539, where Clytemnestra says that Menelaus had two children.

52. Caprioli (2012) suggests that fr. 42 V was a *skolion* (improvised drinking song) and Helen was chosen as a subject precisely because she was controversial, and that the

song could stimulate other singers to respond with their own evaluations of her. But if the symposium is the context, one can just as easily imagine other kinds of provocation: to respond with other examples of bad women (easy) or other examples of good women like Thetis (more difficult).

53. I have taken the term *correction* from Seidensticker (2008), who shows that it is a recurring phenomenon in the later reception of Greek myth.

54. On the deification of abstractions, see n. 2 above.

55. Frs. 187–89 Page/Davies. For a long time it was thought that there was only one such palinode. The publication, in 1962, of a papyrus fragment reporting the research of the Peripatetic scholar Chamaeleon showed that there were two (fr. 193 Page/Davies, from POxy 2506). For a survey of scholarly opinion on the reliability of the report of two palinodes, see Cerri 1993, 329 n. 2; Brillante 2001, 20 n. 15. Cingano 1982, on the basis of an exhaustive investigation of the testimonia, concludes that there were two.

56. Fr. 192 Page/Davies, from Pl. *Phaedr.* 243a2–b3; cf. *Rep.* 9.586c4–6; and Page's apparatus. Wright (2005, 82–115) attempts to argue that Plato invented the *eidōlon* and even wrote the lines that he attributes to Stesichorus (*Phdr.* 243a8–b1). It is necessary to Wright's argument that he suppress *Rep.* 586c4–6, cited only at 107 n. 146. It is not clear how Wright would explain the references to Stesichorus's palinode in Cic. (*Att.* 2.9.1, 4.5.1, 7.7.1). For the extensive ancient tradition that seems to derive from Plato and not from first-hand knowledge of the palinode(s), see Davies 1982.

57. Tz. *Antehomerica* 149; a somewhat different text of the same line is in Tz. *ad Lyc.* 113. Not in Page; Davies 1982, 179, under fr. 192. Cingano and Gentili (1984) defend the text as given in the *Antehomerica*.

58. See Page 1963, 36.

59. For the sources for Tantalus, see Gantz 1993, 531–36. For the Tantalus myth in Pind. *Ol.* 1, see Stinton 1985 [1976], 245–47.

60. Taking *οἱ* to refer to Homer.

61. *μῦθοι*, “words,” not “mere fables” (Carey 1981), because in the immediately following illustration of the *gnomē*, it is not a matter of fables that were told.

62. This paragraph, apart from the parenthesis on Orestes, is following Cobet 2002, 405–11 (a section entitled “Spatium Historicum, Spatium Mythicum, and the Floating Gap”).

63. Cf. Boedeker 1988 on the significance of the historian's evocation of the Trojan War at this concluding point in the *Histories*; Boedeker 2012, 21.

64. See Kim 2010, 38–44.

65. Thuc. 1.9.1. For a bibliography on this passage, see Biraschi 1989a, 90 n. 2; for more recent work, see Grethlein 2010, 257 and notes.

66. Jung 1991, 41 and n. 14 (“Thukydides hinterfragt keine der mythischen Gestalten, die er nennt, auf ihr Existenz als solche”); Hornblower 1991, 31.

67. Hornblower 1991, 17.

68. See K. Morgan 2000, 46–88, on Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Parmenides. The *mythos* to *logos* picture of Greek intellectual history is studied from various points of view in Buxton 1999.

69. Aristotle *Poet.* 1451a37–b7. Cf. Rösler 1980, 309; Gill 1993, 74–79.

70. Lowe 2000, 222. For the concept of fiction underlying “unretold stories,” see Hamburger 1968, 113.

71. On mimesis as fiction, see Halliwell 2002, 166–68. Ford 2002, 231: “The Greek word that can be said to express a concept of fiction is Aristotle’s *mimesis*.”

72. Rösler 1980. Bowie 1993 is framed as a critique of Rösler. Gill 1993, 70, isolates the key criterion in Bowie for deciding between traditionality and fictionality (invention by the poet) and offers counterarguments. For the question of innovation in Homer, see Edmunds 1997, 428–34.

73. Rösler 1980, 285.

74. Pl. 1450b18–20; 1453b1–7. Halliwell 1987, 7: “The tragedian’s art is firmly centred on the design of a dramatic structure of action in poetic media, and such a structure need not be acted out for its effects to be felt: reading (by which some sort of recitation is meant) is sufficient.” Cf. Rösler 1980, 315, 317 n. 99. On Aristotle and tragedy as text, see Edmunds 1996, 18–20.

75. Whether or not reading was silent. On this matter, see Edmunds 2001a, 65–66, 116.

76. For a more detailed discussion of Plato’s conceptual framework (truth vs. falsehood) that supports Rösler, see Gill 1993, 41–51. Pratt (1993) argues for a “recognition of poetic fictionality” in archaic poets and their contemporary and later critics in antiquity. She maintains that falsehood is reprehensible when unsuccessful; otherwise it has the status of what we would call fiction.

77. Genette 1990. Gill (1993, 66–69), however, takes the view that Plato would not have considered his dialogues fictional. This view is not, I think, inconsistent with a longer historical view that sees the dialogues as a step in the direction of fiction.

78. On Hippias and Homer, see Nagy 2002b, 9–35.

79. I am borrowing this idea from Nagy 1999 [1979], xvii, and Nagy 2003, 14–15. Nagy argues for “the essential notion . . . of a total and continuous narration” as the background of any given performance of Homeric epic.

80. Apparently contradicted, as Else (1967, 318 n. 62) observes, by the implications of Antiphanes fr. 189 K-A (PCG 2.418): the comic poet has to invent everything (*πάντα δεῖ / εὐρεῖν*), but the tragic poet has only to mention the name of the hero and the audience immediately knows all the rest.

81. Else 1967, 416–17.

82. For overviews of myth and tragedy, see Graf 1993, 142–75; Buxton 2007; Alaux 2011.

83. For the child or, in other versions, children, see schol. *Andr.* 24. On the double betrothing of Hermione, see Allan 2000, 16–17. On Neoptolemus, see Gantz 1993, 687–94; Allan 2000, 25–30. For a brief survey of the myth before Euripides and in other fifth-century tragedy, see Stevens 1971, 1–5. For a very useful overview of the whole relation of the tragedy to the mythical tradition concerning Andromache and the other characters, see Allan 2000, 4–39.

84. Calame 2007, 261; Allan 2008, 53–54.

85. Before the first century B.C.E., joint worship of brothers and sister appears only in a single deme of Attica.

86. Kyriakou 2006, 27–28, and see 22–30, with footnotes, for an overview of the problem; see also Mastronarde 2010, 182–86. Romano (2012) holds that “debates over the veracity of cult information in tragic aetiology are a false problem, and . . . this information

can be understood as the rhetorically selective and biased reports of characters" (138–39). Romano's article provides an overview of cult etiologies in Euripides and up-to-date bibliographies.

87. See also Graf 1993, 39–42, 50–53. For a fuller history, see Bell 1997, 1–89. On the "Cambridge school" of classicist practitioners of the ritual approach to myth (Arthur B. Cook, Francis M. Cornford, James George Frazer, Jane Ellen Harrison, Gilbert Murray), see Ackerman 1991.

88. On initiation and Greek myth, see Dowden 2011a.

89. Burkert 1979, 56–58.

90. Nagy 2002a, 243. For a similar formulation, see Calame 2007, 261.

91. Eur. *Heracles* 98–100: "Soothe your children with words (*logoi*), concealing your deceptions with tales (*muthoi*)."⁸⁷ Cf. Pl. *Leg.* 887d2–3. Myths could also be used for the opposite purpose. In the *Republic*, Socrates says, "Let mothers not terrify their children, wrongly telling them the myths (*muthoi*)."⁸⁸ He refers in particular to gods' wandering around at night in assumed guises (381e1–6). A story that was used to scare children concerned Lamia, a queen of Libya who, having lost her own children, out of envy ordered that the newborn children of all the other women be destroyed (Duris *FGrH* 76 F 17 [from schol. Aristoph. *Vesp.* 1035]; Diod. Sic. 20.41.3; schol. Aristoph. *Pax* 758).

92. Gotteland 2001.

93. Cf. Polybius: "in the present day, now that all places have become accessible by land or sea, it is no longer appropriate to use poets and writers of myth as witnesses of the unknown" (4.40.2). I took this quotation from the announcement, which appeared during the writing of this introduction, of "Greek Myths on the Map: The Sixth Bristol Myth Conference" (31 July–2 August, 2013).

94. On myths and toponyms, see Delattre 2005, 187–202.

95. For this kind of algorithm, yet again, see Schirru 2009, 135.

96. *N.* 9.22–24 (ca. 474 B.C.E.); *O.* 6.15–17 (468 B.C.E.).

97. *Eleusinians* (ca. 475–467 B.C.E.); cf. *Hdt.* 9.27.3; *Lys.* 2.10.

98. Hall 2007, 336–38; Kowalzig 2007, 178.

99. Eur. *Suppl.* 754–59; Plut. *Thes.* 29.4. For a map, see Steinbock 2013, 6 (fig. 1).

100. Ἐκλήθη οὕτως ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ ("Thus Athena was called") . . . then two explanations for her name, and then a third: Ἡ ὅτι Ἀδραστος Θήβηθεν φεύγων, ἐπὶ Κολωνῷ στήσας τοὺς ἵππους, Ποσειδῶνα καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν ἱππίους προσηγόρευσεν ("or because Adrastus, fleeing from Thebes, stopped his horses on [the hill] Colonus and addressed Poseidon and Athena as gods of horses").

101. On the evidence for Eleusis, see Steinbock 2013, 160.

102. For an overview of these local myths on the end of the Seven, see Steinbock 2013, 159–69.

103. On cult to Heracles, see *IG II²* 2343; Olson 2002, 83–84. On Cephalus sacrificing alone, see Pl. *Rep.* 328c1–2, 331d6–7; cf. Pl. *Euthyd.* 302c6–d3 on Herkeios as one of the aspects of the Athenians' Zeus.

104. Gladigow 1987, 161.

105. Parker 2012.

106. Parker 1997.

107. Distinguish between (1) belief or view *that* gods exist (or the contrary) and

(2) belief in a god or gods (e.g., the gods of one's city): (1) is ancient (e.g., *Pl. Leg.* 887b5–8; *Apol.* 26b8–28a1) but in its positive form did not take creedal form; (2) is not ancient Greek. Cf. Steward and North 2012.

108. *Pl. Apol.* 24b8–c1, 27a5–6; *Xen. Apol.* 10; *Diog. Laert.* 2.40.

109. Burnet 1924, 184 (on *Pl. Apol.* 24c1): “The charge is one of nonconformity in religious practice, not of unorthodoxy in religious belief.” Cf. De Strycker and Slings 1994, 87.

110. Thoneman 2013, 9. On these theories and also that of Girard, see Graf 2012.

111. As for the separate question of belief in myths—that is, as distinguished from belief in gods—see Buxton 1994, 155–65.

112. Kowalzig 2007, 4.

113. Calame 2009, 53–58; 2011.

114. Calame 2011, 518–20.

115. Campbell 1982, 69.

116. For the location, see Edmunds 2012, n. 36, and for a map see fig. 2.

117. Page 1955, 58–62.

118. Calame 2011, 519.

119. Bühler 1990 [1934], 140.

120. See Edmunds 2008, 85–86, and the opening generalizations on deixis in Edmunds 2012 (unpaginated).

121. Solon T176 Martina (Aelian fr. 187 Herscher). Cf. the similar anecdote preserved by Val. Max. 8.7 ext. 14 (Solon T140 Martina). Cf. Herington 1985, 35–36.

122. The preceding sentences are adapted from Edmunds 2001b, 17.

123. 235 K-A (*PCG* 3.2.142). Cf. Nagy 1990, 107–15.

124. See Morrison 2012, with a bibliography of earlier work at 111 n. 1, to which add Morrison 2007.

125. Fearn 2012, 325, partly summarizing his earlier work.

126. Leach 1982, 6. Quoted in Nagy 1992, 313.

127. On the names, see Hollis 2008, 47–70.

128. For the other versions, see Hansen 2002, 337–49 (including Latin versions). Calame (2009, 67–93) discusses another Greek version, the one concerning Bellerophon.

129. Graf 2012.

130. For the intellectual history of this approach, see Zeitlin, in Vernant 1991, 3–24; Von Hentzy 2002, 270–77.

131. Csapo 2005, 309. For a broader contextualization of Csapo's ideological approach, see Von Hentzy 2002, 278–303.

132. Csapo 2005, 262–63 (6.1 “Structure and Ideology”; subtitle: “Woman as Ideologeme”).

133. Lewis 2011, 454–55. But already there was Doherty 2001. In some of the contributions to Zajko and Leonard 2006, feminism is articulated as an approach to Greek myth.

134. For an overview of various approaches to history in myth, see Saïd 2008, 110–20. See also Buxton 1999, 167–248 (the five chapters in Section V: “Myth and/or/into History and Ethnography”), for various *mises au point*.

135. One of these programs, initiation, is the theme of Brelich 1969. Brelich is spoken

of, with his predecessor in the University of Rome, Raffaele Petazzoni, as the founder of the Roman School of the history of religion. On Brelich, see Brillante 1990, *passim*.

136. Latacz 2004, 91.

137. On the archaeology, see Hertel 2011. For a list of his works, see “Further Reading” in Hertel 2011, 440. On the linguistic side, see chapter 3, n. 22, in this book. For an overview, see Raaflaub 2005, 58–60; also Raaflaub 2011; Grethlein 2009, 123–26.

138. In addition to the work on Argos cited above, see the works by Malkin in Works Cited, below.

139. Bettini also edits a series on Greek myth. For the titles, see Edmunds 2011, nn. 1–2.

140. Bettini 2012, v.

141. Its elaborate webpage is at <http://grmito.units.it/>.

142. The other two directors are Michele Faraguna and Gennaro Tedeschi.

143. For a repertory of ancient sources for Greek mythology, see Säid 2008, 135–48; also “Postilla bibliografica,” in Pellizer 1993, 300–303. For overviews of mythography, see Heinze 2002; Rusten 2012.

144. Parts of the story of Greek mythography in the Roman Empire are told in Cameron 2004.

145. Eratosthenes: Pàmias 2004; Pàmias and Zucker 2013. Pherecydes: Pàmias 2008. Hyginus: Soler i Nicolau 2011. Apollodorus: Cuartero 2010–12; Cuartero forthcoming. Antoninus Liberalis: Almirall 2012. Several other mythographers have been edited as doctoral dissertations in the ambit of the Barcelona project and await publication. For a complete list of dissertations and publications, see <http://grupsderecerca.uab.cat/mito/grafsgrecs/content/publicacions-del-grup-o>.

146. Fowler 2000. The commentary volume is forthcoming.

147. Palaephatus: Stern 1996. Parthenius: Lightfoot 1999. Conon: Brown 2002.

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1 INTRODUCTION *Reception* means, in aesthetic experience, a reader's, a viewer's, or a listener's (perhaps also a participant's) understanding of or "take" on a work of the relevant kind. If this person happens to make creative reuse of his experience, as in James Joyce's reworking of Homer's *Odyssey* in *Ulysses*, then reception calls for further reception. In the field of Classics, the word *reception* most often refers to a particular writer's or other artist's take on a work from antiquity, as in the example just given. Classicists also talk about reception in larger senses—that of Homer by Flavian epic poets (Valerius Flaccus, Statius, Silius Italicus, 1st c. C.E.), for example, or even that of something as large as Greek myth in times posterior to classical Greece, as in the Hellenistic period (conventionally dated 331–323 B.C.E.). Jordi Pàmias works on this large time scale, offering a history of the reception of Greek myth from the beginning up to the nineteenth century, often, however, "zooming in" on particular writers.

Pàmias starts, in fact, with the earliest Greek literature and shows how internal evidence in Homer points to already ongoing reception. There was, in short, Greek myth before the Greek myth that we know, and it was being reworked from the beginning. Further, as in the "Catalogue of Ships" in Homer or as in Hesiod's *Theogony* and in the *Catalogue of Women* attributed to Hesiod, Greek myth is already taking systematic forms, mainly of genealogy. Already, then, there is an incipient *mythology* in the sense of an organized body of myth. A new stage of mythology comes in the fifth century with Hecataeus of Miletus, Pherecydes of Athens, and Hellanicus of Lesbos: *mythography*, the writing down of myths. (The term is accurate even if it is anachronistic for the fifth century.) From the fragments of their works, it is clear that each has his own agenda. In each case, however, writing not only enables a new compilation and a new organization of the traditional myths, even when a genealogical framework is preserved, but it also means a distancing of the writer, and of his readers, from the tradition. The traditional myths are becoming an artifact.

In the Hellenistic period the forms of mythography proliferate, as Pàmias explains. The handbook arrives. The two culminating expressions of this form, in antiquity, come in the Roman period: the *Fabulae* of Hyginus (in the time of Augustus, 33 B.C.E.–14 C.E.) and the *Bibliotheca* of Apollodorus (probably 1st–2nd c. C.E.). Over the centuries, countless others followed, and probably someone somewhere is now writing a new handbook of Greek myth. It is not a waste of time. Those who want to study Greek myth, especially beginners, do not go through all of Greek and Roman literature and abstract a Greek mythology; they

rely on an already established corpus, in the form of a handbook or textbook, or, if they are given a set of readings from ancient poets and writers, they rely on commentary, oral or written or both.^a In any case, the commentary comes from the same mythographical tradition that began in antiquity. Specialists, too, use handbooks, lexica, and encyclopedias, but ones with titles like *Lexikon Iconographicum Mythologiae Graecae* or *Thesaurus Cultum et Rituum Antiquorum*.

The Hellenistic period is also a turning point in the history of Greek mythology in the sense of the scholarly study of myths. Once it has happened, as in the *Catasterisms* of Eratosthenes (3rd c. B.C.E.), that the patrimony of Greek myths is something simply of the past, so that it can be exploited for literary purposes, the question arises: what do the Greek myths mean? A severely reductive answer came from Euhemerus of Sicily (3rd c. B.C.E.). He held that the gods of Greek myth were in origin human persons and that mythical events were at bottom historical. His approach had tremendous success in antipagan literature that he could not have foreseen, that is, in Christian apologetics and on into the Middle Ages. But the uptake began earlier, as fragments tell us, in the (now lost) sixth book of Diodorus's *Bibliotheca* (1st c. B.C.E.) and in a translation (also lost) of Euhemerus by the Roman poet Ennius (3rd–2nd c. B.C.E.).

The other great technique of interpretation was allegory, the decoding of a myth to reveal an underlying moral or other kind of truth.^b It is said to have begun with Theagenes of Rhegium (6th c. B.C.E.), who interpreted the strife of the gods in Homer (*Il.* 20) as the “strife” of the natural elements (D-K 8.2). As Pàmias shows, it had great staying power, lasting down to the time of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) and his new doctrine of myth as symbol.^c But the symbol was to have a shorter life. Change in mythology in the second sense begins to accelerate in the nineteenth century. Pàmias brings the story up to the beginning of the twentieth, when it is clear that no one approach will ever hold the field again, as euhemerism and allegory did for many centuries. It became, and it still is, necessary to use the plural and to speak of approaches to Greek myth.

The Reception of Greek Myth

JORDI PÀMIAS

Reception and Myth

The first edition of this book did not include a chapter on the reception of Greek myth. In the decades following its publication, the theory revolution—which had a strong impact on all fields of the humanities, including Classics—introduced reception as one of the most successful of the new approaches. Unlike the terms *tradition*, *inheritance*, or *influence* (implying a projection from past to present) and *survival* or *Nachleben* (implying historical continuity), *reception* implies “the active participation of readers . . . in a two-way process, backward as well as forward, in which the present and past are in dialogue with each other.”¹ This kind of participation will entail serious consequences for the understanding of ancient texts. If the reader participates in the construction of meaning, interpretation will emanate not solely from the original meaning but also from new readers in new contexts. None of the various readings of a classical text, over time, will be fundamentally wrong.

But the reception of myth assumes that the reader is in possession of a substantive notion of the object myth—that is, a kind of traditional story defined by characteristics peculiar to it. The research of some specialists in Greek myth, however, precisely during the final decades of the past century, raised the suspicion that this notion is unfounded. According to these critics, the modern concept of myth has no equivalent in ancient Greece. Myth would thus be nothing but a modern construction, projected onto Greek antiquity only after the fact. In other words, the forms of appropriation and study of ancient myths, as first practiced in the eighteenth century, would have led to the concept of myth itself: it is only reception that creates myth.

Indeed, Claude Calame, who takes as a starting point that ancient Greek does not have a term for “myth,” comes to the flat conclusion that myth is not an “indigenous” category in Greece. Only from an ethnocentric perspective did Western historiography endeavor to establish such operational concepts as myth and logos in Greco-Roman culture, confident that “the categories so designated find their origin there or, further, that they correspond to an institutional reality there.”² Calame follows in the footsteps of Marcel Detienne, according to whom

we have to trace the origins of “myth” to the Enlightenment, that is, to the scientific study of myth, beginning with Bernard de Fontenelle’s *De l’origine des fables* (1724). For Fontenelle, fables reflect the history of the errors of the human mind from its primitive beginnings. In its origins, then, mythology, emerging against the background of a “progressive” concept of history and in the rationalist context of the Enlightenment, is the science created to explain the scandalous—everything that is the “other” of religion, civilization, and reason. In short, mythology, understood in the etymological sense of “science of myth,” would have given rise to the modern concept of myth, and not vice versa, and myth would be “a fish soluble in the waters of mythology.”³

The term *mythology* can also have, however, from a strictly etymological point of view, a second meaning: collection or organized corpus of myths.⁴ Given the absence of myth in ancient Greece, there would not have been a mythology in this second sense, either. Again according to Detienne, mythology as a system would also be a byproduct of the science of myth and its taxonomic zeal. For him and those who followed him, myth is, in short, an illusion, existing only in the controversy about it.⁵

Antiquity

The contemporary scientific study of myth, however, has achieved a victory that, in my view, ought to be reckoned an accepted truth: the twentieth century was able to recognize in myth an autonomous form of thought, with a meaning that goes beyond the textual support by which a particular myth has survived. Myth, according to the famous proposal of Claude Lévi-Strauss, is not so much an object as an instrument of reflection. What I think is essential, in any case, is the distinction between myth and its particular expression in poetic, choral, dramatic, and visual form. This contrast is the basis of the definition of myth proposed by Fritz Graf:

A myth is a peculiar kind of story. It does not coincide with a particular text or literary genre. For example, in all three major genres of Greek poetry the story of Agamemnon’s murder and of Orestes’ subsequent revenge is told: in epic (at the beginning of the *Odyssey*), in choral lyric (e.g., in Stesichorus’ *Oresteia*), and in the works of all three tragedians. A myth is not a specific poetic text. It transcends the text: it is the subject-matter, a plot fixed in broad outline and with characters no less fixed, which the individual poet is free to alter only within limits.⁶

It is possible to take the view that Homeric epic is already an early form of the reception of myth in the sense of a kind of story that transcends the text. Variation of the same story in the same text is a symptom of the text's relation to its antecedents.⁷ Thus, for example, the *Iliad* includes two very different variants of the fall of Hephaestus from Olympus. Toward the end of Book 1, Hephaestus turns to his mother, Hera, with these words:

"However grieved I might be, I could not help for there is no standing against Zeus. Once before when I was trying to help you, he caught me by the foot and flung me from the heavenly threshold. All day long from morn till eve, was I falling, till at sunset I came to ground in the island of Lemnos, and there I lay, with very little life left in me, till the Sintians came and tended me." (*Il.* 1.588–94 [Samuel Butler])

On the other hand, in Book 18, Hephaestus addresses the goddess Thetis with these words:

"Then it is indeed an august and honored goddess who has come here; she it was that took care of me when I was suffering from the heavy fall which I had through my cruel mother's anger—for she would have got rid of me because I was lame." (*Il.* 18.394–97 [Samuel Butler])

If we do not blame this inconsistency on the distraction of the poet ("Even good Homer sometimes nods," as Horace says), which is improbable, given that it is not a minor inconsistency, we have before us variants, on different occasions, of a traditional story.⁸ Each of the performances, if one thinks of performance as having generated the variation, would constitute a distinct reception of this myth.

If this kind of reception shows diachronic activity, at the same time a pressure in the opposite direction can be observed in the epic tradition, this time synchronic, toward stability of the system. Systematic organization of the mythological corpus adopted a format enormously popular throughout the history of Greece: genealogy. The most complete genealogies are, as we shall see, in the late archaic prose writers. But a first example of monumental genealogical literature (although it includes narrative and descriptive sections) is the epic poetry of Hesiod, above all in the *Theogony*. This is not a mere collection of myths and mythological characters, but as Jean-Pierre Vernant stressed, the *Theogony* is a complex and rigorous system of thought: it is nothing less than a general, ordered vision of the divine universe from the time of its origins, comparable to a philosophical system.⁹ As for the *Catalogue of Women*, preserved in fragments and attributed

to Hesiod, the vast genealogical structure of five families that the catalogue presents seems to resemble the genealogies of tribal societies but, unlike them, does not explicitly extend to the present.¹⁰ This catalogue is presented as the organic continuation of the Hesiodic *Theogony*. It starts in a first moment of humanity, with Prometheus, Deucalion, and Pyrrha, and covers all of heroic time, reaching to the beginning of the Trojan War. In this way, the destruction of the race of heroes is accomplished, according to the plan of Zeus.¹¹ Such an ambitious synopsis of genealogical traditions—an epic of universal history—presupposes the use of writing, although the Hesiodic epic contains many typically oral elements.¹²

As a matter of fact, a key episode in the history of the reception of ancient myth begins with the rapid spread of a new technology: alphabetic writing, especially from the sixth century B.C.E. But let's be precise: although writing no doubt exercises a strong impact on the ability to store human memory, many scholars now suspect that writing is not enough in itself to modify human cognitive capacities—as Jack Goody and Ian Watt believed, trusting optimistically in the technological determinism of “graphic reason.”¹³ Be that as it may, what is beyond question is that the shaping of a myth in writing, and, as the case may be, by iconographic means, frees it from performance, from the religious and ritual here and now, and emancipates it from its institutional matrix. From this point of view, transcription involves the reformulation of the myth as a narrative, written with new functions (ethical, aesthetic, religious, institutional, political). Abstracting from the conditions of oral communication, the narrative repertoires of the early logographers become “autonomous intellectual objects.”¹⁴ Writing is, for Hecataeus of Miletus, Pherecydes of Athens, and Hellanicus of Lesbos, a means to address an abstract public, independent of particular places or times.

These collections of stories, as “autonomous intellectual objects,” are equidistant from the reading public and from the mythical traditions that the logographer draws upon. Writing has opened a gap, forever impassable, between the author and his mythical heritage, which will generate many opportunities for its appropriation and reception. In this context, the prologue of Hecataeus of Miletus, which for some represents nothing less than the inaugural act of historiography, is often cited:¹⁵

Hecataeus of Miletus speaks thus: I write the following [τάδε γράφω] as it seems to me to be true, for the stories [λόγοι] of the Greeks are, as they seem to me, many and laughable. (*FGrH* 1 F 1 = fr. 1 Fowler)

In this programmatic statement, Hecataeus does not limit himself to criticizing the content of the tradition, but, as Robert Fowler suggests, “[he] comes close to problematizing stories *qua* stories.” At the dawn of historiography, Hecataeus of Miletus, in his methodological program and also in practice, proves to be already in possession of a category of story that corresponds to the notion of myth in the sense of traditional story—regardless of the term he uses to refer to it. Indeed, analysis of the various names (historian, logographer, mythographer, etc.) that ancient authors applied to Hecataeus of Miletus shows that the use of one term or another, as in our case, “myth,” is not neutral but tends to emerge in a context of controversy and often appears in a contrastive relation to another term.¹⁶ Thus, for example, the word *mythography* could not come into existence until the distinction from the term *historiography* was possible.¹⁷

Because Hecataeus must accommodate his λόγος, “written story,” to objective criteria, external to the discourse itself, such as likelihood or plausibility, various kinds of purification will, from now on, be tirelessly applied to the reception of myth. This process is often called “rationalization,” because the intent is to reintegrate myth into the sphere of logos. Indeed, if the terms μῦθος (*muthos*), λόγος (*logos*), or ἔπος (*epos*) appeared in archaic epic to be used interchangeably to describe what the poet sang, with the advent of new subject matters—of philosophical discourse with the “pre-Socratics” and, above all, of historical discourse with the logographers—these terms tend to be specialized semantically.¹⁸ In the fifth century B.C.E., μῦθος (*muthos*) is equivalent to fictitious and false speech, to be rejected, while λόγος (*logos*), as written story, indicates true and real speech.¹⁹

The reception of the mythic tradition, marked by ironic and methodological detachment in the case of Hecataeus of Miletus, can take several forms. The *Histories* of Pherecydes of Athens seem to me a new case. Like the other late-archaic logographers, he adopts a genealogical stance in the organization of mythical material. But the surviving fragments show that often he, unlike them, introduced the origin of a place name (or ethnonym) by showing that it went back to a character of heroic mythology:

Elatos, son of Icarius marries Erymede, daughter of Damasiclos. From them Tainaros is born [τῶν δὲ γίνεταί Ταίναρος], from whom the city is called Tainaron [ἀφ’ οὗ Ταίναρον καλεῖται] and also the cape and the harbor. (*FGrH* 3 F 39 = fr. 39 Fowler)

In the connection of myth with place name, we can perceive the will to make clear the truth of the story, in that the author refers to a concrete geographical

space.²⁰ But further employing a well-codified formula (ἄφ' οὗ καλεῖται), Pherecydes establishes a link between the two names, that of the hero and that of the place, whose relationship is not one of identity but one of nominal derivation (cf. Ταίναρος and Ταίναρον). His consciousness of detachment from the legendary heritage allows the logographer to draw upon the inexhaustible repository of local and Panhellenic traditions to anchor a physical reality, which he knows from his own experience, in a reality different from and alien to it: that of myth.

It is unnecessary, however, to see in this connection “a logical operator between two universes considered as heterogeneous, a bridge between two worlds,” as will be typical of etiological explanation (of Eratosthenes of Cyrene, for example; cf. below).²¹ Rather, Pherecydes appropriates the myth in order to accommodate it without rupturing his own temporal dimension. The use of the same verb form (the present tense of the indicative: γίνεται . . . καλεῖται) to describe both the time of myth and phenomenal time, present and stable, is significant. It suggests that the author does not need any grammatical element to mark a heterogeneity of the two statements. Indeed, it has been noted that for the logographers, there is no qualitative difference between a *spatium mythicum* (mythical space) and *spatium historicum* (historical space). Not even for Herodotus is the distinction between *temps des dieux* (the time of the gods) and *temps des hommes* (the time of humans) clear, as Pierre Vidal-Naquet held, except that what the father of history does is to distinguish between the stretch of time for which he has reliable, first-hand information and the one that is inaccessible. That which opposes one time to the other is not, ultimately, a qualitative difference but an epistemological criterion.²²

This temporal continuity is evident in a well-known, full genealogy of Pherecydes, allowing him to bridge the gaps in memory separating the heroes of the Bronze Age from the recent past, the time of the *polis*. Through the parent-child relationship, the Athenian logographer declines the thirteen generations of offspring that separate—or, perhaps we should say, that bind—the epic hero Ajax and Miltiades the Elder, the colonizer of the Chersonese in the mid-sixth century B.C.E.:

Philaeus, the son of Ajax, dwells in Athens. From him is born Aeclus; from him Epilycus; from him Acestor; from him Agenor; from him Oulius; from him Lyces; from him Tophon (?); from him Philaeus; from him Agamestor; from him Tisandrus; in whose archonship in Athens . . . [lacuna in the text]; from him Miltiades; from him Hippoclides, in whose archonship the Panathenaea

was founded; from him Miltiades, who settled the Chersonesus. (FGrH 3 F 2 = fr. 2 Fowler)

Thus, in relation to the mythical tradition proper to epic poetry in genealogical format (such as in the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*), the genealogical writing of the logographers, like Pherecydes', is not so much a break but rather "a loom of continuity."²³

In fact, scholars have pointed out the striking similarities between the *Catalogue of Women* and the genealogies of the logographers, which are indistinguishable at the level of their material. In addition, if we accept the late date for the *Catalogue* proposed by West (ca. 540–520 B.C.E.), it would be practically contemporary with the logographers.²⁴ The Hesiodic poem seeks to go beyond the framework of epic narrative—limited to particular autonomous cycles that cover a single generation (Trojan War, Returns of the Heroes)—to display a general structure in which the heroes and their exploits, of diverse and heterogeneous provenience (local traditions, epic), are incorporated in a fixed and homogeneous system. Genealogy becomes an intellectual pattern that imprints coherence onto the traditional mythical material.

Versified or in prose, genealogy has to deal with an ambitious challenge: how to combine the linearity of the story with the family trees and the succession that the genealogical scheme imposes.²⁵ A discontinuity of the narrative logic, here and there, is entailed, to thread together a set of kinship relations. The unstructured traditional material is constrained to fit an abstract principle of organization: the genealogical system. With their eagerness for organization and compilation, the logographers of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C.E. thus continued the Hesiodic shaping of the patrimony. In short, our investigation into the logographers' reception of myth has shown that not only were they already in possession of a category comparable to myth (for Hecataeus of Miletus, cf. above),²⁶ but they must also be considered the inventors of mythology—understood as an organized collection of myths, a system.

The founding of the Library of Alexandria marks the beginning of a new epoch. The work on myth that goes on here and in the other libraries of the Hellenistic period (331–323 B.C.E.)—exegetical commentaries, manuals, collections of metamorphoses or conversions into constellations, collections of poetic plots—seems to have as its main purpose scholarly consultation. This cumulative product, Hellenistic mythography, would be, in the words of Albert Henrichs, "a handmaiden of mythology."²⁷ Although the first collections of myths, as we have

seen, are older, it is certain that the extraordinary number of books stacked in libraries such as the Museum of Alexandria prompted new ways of handling and processing information. As Christian Jacob has shown, these activities turn out to be much more complex than they seem. They include processes of deconstruction, extraction, decontextualization, and redistribution, which “reabsorb the dispersal of books in intertextual mechanisms that reorganize exact information for the reader desirous of making use of it.”²⁸ The reading and consulting of this literature of lists—manuals that crystallize data of different forms and sources in a new format that might remind one of a modern hypertext—is not necessarily or only linear and sequential but may take discontinuous or open forms.

A good example is the *Catasterisms* of Eratosthenes of Cyrene, a textual crossroads where mythographical, astronomical, and iconographic materials converge. As for the strictly mythographical part, each of the forty-four chapters includes, first, a few episodes from the traditional mythology of a hero, an animal, or a mythical object, for which the author usually refers to the authority of an archaic or classical work. This traditional myth is then completed with an astral extension or appendage, a catasterism properly speaking, which tells how the character (or its image) is projected into the sky as a constellation. The time of myth and phenomenal time (the constellation placed in the sky), unlike in Pherecydes of Athens (cf. above), are distinguished by grammar. For example, the mythical story is reproduced in an infinitive of indirect statement (with the subject in the accusative), after invoking the name (in the nominative) of the author who is the source (e.g., Hesiod). After this authorized myth, the catasterismic appendix appears in a simple sentence.²⁹ This second statement does not depend on any authority:

Ταύτην Ἡσίοδος φησι Λυκάονος θυγατέρα ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ οἰκεῖν, ἐλέσθαι . . . ὁ
 Ζεὺς διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν αὐτὴν ἐξείλετο καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀστροῖς αὐτὴν ἔθηκεν. (Eratosth. *Cat.* 1 Pàmias)

[Hesiod says that this person, the daughter of Lycaon, lived in Arcadia, was seized . . . Zeus, because of his kinship with her, seized her and placed her among the stars.]

Apart from these grammatical markers, Eratosthenes has another way to indicate the heterogeneity of his statements, not based on grammatical discontinuity. It is an expression that inaugurates a new temporality separating mythical time from the phenomenal present: the phrase διὰ τοῦτο, “because of this.” The myth

of Perseus, for example, provides the reason for the presence in the starry sky of the constellation of the sea monster (Cetus):

Perseus killed him (sc. the sea monster) and for this reason [διὰ τοῦτο] the latter was placed among the constellations, to perpetuate the memory of the exploit of the hero. (Eratosth. *Cat.* 36 Pàmias)

In the *Catasterisms*, Eratosthenes expressed an etiological curiosity about the causes of phenomena, a typically Alexandrian obsession. A past event, in a mythical tale about a hero, heroine, animal, or object, is invoked as the cause of a phenomenon in the sensible world, in this case a constellation. With the expression διὰ τοῦτο (“for this reason”), Eratosthenes establishes a causal relation between a heroic deed and the presence of stars in the sky.³⁰ In short, the catasterism is a type of discourse that opposes a story of the past to a description of the present. As he extends the episodes of a traditional and authoritative myth through an episode foreign to it (the astral denouement) and also leaves linguistic traces of the separation of mythical time from the phenomenal present, Eratosthenes is treating the patrimony of myth as a body that is closed, objective, and foreign to him—a textual corpus on which to project a literary-historical scheme. In short, in the heart of this “world of libraries, official texts, and institutionalized research” that is the Library of Alexandria, the reception of Greek mythology has arrived at a conscious conversion into literature.³¹

If the Greek mythological patrimony can become a literary corpus, a mythographical manual—a toolkit for reading—will aspire to be the compendium of and substitute for an entire mythology library: in fact, the work known as the *Library*, attributed to Apollodorus (1st–2nd c. C.E.).³² Indeed, among the post-Hellenistic collections and repositories, we can emphasize this manual as the main mythological text we have inherited from antiquity. It has served as the primary model for countless modern collections of Greek myths and as a source for the study of ancient mythology. Thanks to its totalizing character, with its endless accumulation of mythical characters and references to now missing sources, the *Library* invites consultation on particular matters, which can obscure its coherent character and internal logic. In its genealogical arrangement by broad mythical families, it echoes the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*, often considered its main structural source.³³ But far from paraphrasing the genealogical poem, the author combines different and disparate sources in a single text. Myth, which has been losing its social and political efficacy, no longer serves the propaganda of the Greek cities or of the aristocratic families who asserted their mythical an-

cestors. Emancipated from local and ideological implications, the genealogies of Apollodorus move in a homogeneous and systematic time, clearly distinguished from the time of the *polis*.³⁴ In a moment in which knowledge of mythology has been converted into a crucial element in the definition and identity of the Greco-Roman elites, a function of the *Library* is to put an artificial memory at the disposal of the Greek-reading public.³⁵ In this context, the reception of myth, the common cultural memory, has come to be a “practice compensating for and complementing Roman domination.”³⁶

Middle Ages and Renaissance

Scholarly collections, produced in the great Hellenistic libraries as toolkits for reading, will become, from the imperial period into the Middle Ages, the main vehicle of the reception and transmission of Greek myth. Ovid occupies a special position in this process. In his *Metamorphoses* it seems clear that he used various Hellenistic collections, as Alan Cameron has emphasized.³⁷ But at the same time, this very poem, whose innovation was to string together all the stories of transformation—over two hundred of them—in a continuous narrative, itself served as a repository of ancient mythology as well and was received as such in the Middle Ages (see below). From its programmatic opening, *ab origine mundi . . . ad tempora mea* (“from the origins of the world . . . to the present time”), Ovid built a cosmos—from the primordial chaos to the principate of Augustus—based on an encyclopedic conception of the mythological tradition. It would become, for many centuries, the “Bible of the pagans.”

But the history of the reception of myth is also the history of the transmission of texts. In addition to the collections of myths conceived as independent books intended for a wide audience (whose most ambitious representatives are the *Fabulae* of Hyginus and the aforementioned *Library* of pseudo-Apollodorus), a large bulk of mythographical tradition, both Greek and Latin, was remodeled in a new book format and absorbed into the comments and glosses on the great poets.³⁸ It is the codex, emerging between the second and fourth centuries C.E., a true technological breakthrough, by which the book as papyrus roll will be progressively replaced. The old monographs, manuals, and commentaries (such as ὑπομνήματα of Alexandrian grammarians) on the great poets (Homer, Pindar, the tragedians, but also the Hellenistic poets Apollonius of Rhodes, Theocritus, and Lycophron) will be reorganized and converted into the marginal notes, or scholia, that occupy the margins of medieval manuscripts.³⁹

The so-called *Mythographus Homericus* is an excellent example of this phe-

nomenon. Originally a collection of mythological stories designed to accompany and explain the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, it circulated as a separate book from the early imperial era and left its mark on the scholia of medieval manuscripts of Homer.⁴⁰ The *Phaenomena* of Aratus is another case of tradition that has come to be rearranged in the changed textual format. This astronomical and mythological work had tremendous success in imperial Rome.⁴¹ When, in the second and third centuries C.E., a new edition of Aratus comes out, accompanied by ancillary texts to explain its complexity, extracts of Eratosthenes' *Catasterisms* are included as commentary, and it is only in this way that this work has reached us. When a little later, in the third century, an edition of the Latin translation of Aratus's poem by Germanicus (15 or 16 B.C.E.–19 C.E.) is published, the extracts of Eratosthenes that accompanied the earlier edition are also translated into Latin. The result is the so-called *Scholia to Germanicus* (actually, the Latin translation of the scholia to Aratus). These scholia become crucial for the medieval heritage of mythological and astronomical lore about the constellations. Indeed, as in the Greek East so in the Latin West, the mythographical commentaries on the poets are the means of conservation of much of the Greco-Roman mythological patrimony. The commentaries on Virgil (by Servius), on Statius (by Lactantius), on Horace, on Persius, and on Lucan stand out.

In the third century, as in the example of the *Scholia to Germanicus*, Latin is becoming the language in which Greek mythology is transmitted. Knowledge of ancient Greek begins to die out in the Roman Empire, disappearing first in the provinces. Already in the fourth century C.E., Greek ceases to be the language of the liturgy in the Western church and is replaced by Latin. Hilary of Poitiers and Ambrose of Milan write the first Latin hymns in this century. Augustine describes how painful it was for him in his school days in North Africa to study Greek grammar, and he never became proficient in this language. He had to rely on translations of the Greek Christian authors.⁴² With the barbarian invasions of Italy and the removal of the last Roman emperor (476 C.E.), the school system collapsed, and the study of Greek came to an end. From the fifth century onward, even the Latin writers who exhibited a good knowledge of Greek texts may not have read them in the original. For about a thousand years, no one in Western Europe, except in isolated pockets, read Greek texts.⁴³ Knowledge of ancient Greek did not return to Western Europe until the fifteenth century. It returned via Italy, which, especially through the Venetians, had extensive contacts with the Greek-speaking Byzantine empire.⁴⁴

Medieval mythology is usually described as a mere line of transmission

of the ancient heritage, fatally deformed with respect to the “original” by ignorance and by rupture of the tradition. The truth is that some variants of the ancient myths are simply the result of textual corruption or alteration. A good example would be the god Demogorgon, converted by Boccaccio into the ancestor of the divine genealogies. The origins of this figure seem to go back to a corrupt reading in the manuscripts of Lactantius (Demogorgon for the Platonic δημιουργός, *demiourgos*).⁴⁵ Other innovations, as Ernst Curtius suggested, arose from false interpretation of ancient documents and might be considered deformations.

I would add that sometimes new myths were born as a result of the creative force latent in the process of reception itself. In the preceding section I mentioned that in the earliest reception of mythology in the archaic period, various possibilities of purification opened up—that is, in general terms, of the reintegration of myth into the realm of logos (“rationalization”). Two of the oldest and most enduring strategies are euhemerism and allegory. From the distant precedent of the Homeric exegesis of Theagenes of Rhegium (6th c. B.C.E.), allegory (physical or moral) assumes that myth conveys a truth, deep and universal, wrapped in decorative imagery.⁴⁶ In this way, myth is saved by philosophers, rehabilitated in the medium of allegory, by which the most unlikely and scandalous stories reveal fundamental truths.⁴⁷

As for euhemerism (after Euhemerus of Sicily, 3rd c. B.C.E., one of the first Greek authors to be translated into Latin), this doctrine postulated that the gods of mythology were in reality and in origin human persons, whose deeds, with the passage of time and the eroding of the transmission, were altered to the point of converting them into gods. Euhemerism experienced an extraordinary revival with the apologists and the church fathers, who used it to attack pagan polytheism. These Christian apologists transmitted euhemerism to the Middle Ages, but, as noted by Jean Seznec, the character of this tradition changed radically. The human origin of the gods ceased to be a weapon against pagan polytheism and a reason for scorn and, instead, paradoxically granted protection and the right of survival and ended up conferring the title of nobility on the pagan gods.⁴⁸ Turned into a mere literary convention, these gods posed no threat. Their worship was long since extinct.

An example of these operations of “rationalization” can be seen in the interpretation of the myth of Perseus by Fulgentius (5th–6th c. C.E.). Citing a certain Theocnidus, otherwise unknown, he begins with a version, in euhemerist style, of the episode in which Perseus slays Medusa:

Theocnidus antiquitatum historiographus refert Forcum regem fuisse, qui tres filias locupletes derelinquit. Quarum Medusa maior quae fuerat locuples regnoque colendo fructificandoque ampliauera—unde et Gorgo dicta est quasi georgigo; nam Grece georgi agricultores dicuntur.

[Theocnidus, a historiographer of antiquities, reports that Forcus was a king who had three wealthy daughters. Of these, Medusa, the most powerful, increased her wealth by cultivating her realm and making it productive, whence she was also called Gorgo as if *georgigo*, for in Greek farmers are called *georgi*.]

Medusa increased her wealth through agriculture, earning herself the name Gorgon, modeled on the Greek γεωργός, “farmer,” which in the transliterated plural is *georgi*. But at a certain point, Fulgentius turns to allegory to explain what the Greeks, always inclined to embroider, meant by “this finely spun fabrication”:⁴⁹

Gorgonas dici uoluerunt tres, id est tria terroris genera; primus quippe terror est qui . . . Hos ergo terrores Perseus adiuuante Minerua, id est uirtus adiuuante sapientia, interfecit.

[(The Greeks) called them the three Gorgons, that is, three kinds of terror. The first terror is indeed that which . . . Thus Perseus with the help of Minerva, that is, manliness aided by wisdom, destroyed these terrors.]

Scholars have emphasized the crucial importance of the *Mythologiae* of Fulgentius as a bridge for the transmission of mythographical knowledge from antiquity to the Middle Ages.⁵⁰ Still, in the fourteenth century the so-called *Fulgentius Metaforalis* of John Ridewall pretends to be an updated adaptation of Fulgentius.⁵¹ The chapters on mythology in the encyclopedic *Etymologiae* of Isidore of Seville (7th c.) and *De uniuerso* of Hrabanus Maurus (9th c.), as well as in the textbooks called *Mythographus Vaticanus Primus* (9th c.), *Secundus*, and *Tertius* (both of uncertain date), are based on the work of Fulgentius.⁵² Euhemerist tradition can be clearly perceived in the influential chapter of Isidore’s *De diis gentium* (*Etym.* 8.11): “Those whom the pagans claim to be gods are revealed once to have been men” (“quos pagani asserunt deos, olim homines produntur fuisse”). In the continuators of Isidore, such as Ado of Vienna (9th c.) or Peter Comestor (12th c.), we can detect the footprint of euhemerism. Ado affirms (*Chronicon in aetates sex diuisum*, PL 123.35):

His temporibus, scilicet seruitutis Israel in Ægypto, Prometheus fuisse scribitur, quem figunt fabulae de luto formasse homines. Tunc etiam fratres eius Atlas magnus est astrologus habitus: Mercuriusque nepos Atlantis multarum artium peritus, et ob hoc post mortem uano errore in deos translatus.

[In those times, that is, of the servitude of Israel in Egypt, it is written that there was a Prometheus, whom the fables feign to have formed men from clay. Then also his brother Atlas was held to be a great astrologer; and Mercury the grandson of Atlas, was skilled in many arts and for this reason after his death was raised by vain error to the gods.]

Other compilers who contributed to the transfer of ancient myth are two of the last pagan authors, Macrobius and Martianus Capella (both 4th–5th c.), whose influence will be felt throughout the Middle Ages. As mentioned above, however, Ovid's *Metamorphoses* was the principal conduit of Greek myth in the medieval West and also in the Renaissance. Especially in the High Middle Ages (12th–14th c., sometimes called the Aetas Ovidiana, “The Age of Ovid”), no classical text was as influential. In the words of Ernst Curtius, “The *Metamorphoses* were also a repertory of mythology as exciting as a romance. Who was Phaeton? Lycaon? Procne? Arachne? Ovid was the *Who's Who* for a thousand such questions.”⁵³ But the *Metamorphoses* was used not only as a compendium of information on ancient myths but also as a vehicle for allegorical exposition and moralizing adaptation. Ovid's poem gave rise to a rich tradition of vernacular translations and exegesis, including adaptations, grammatical commentaries, allegories, or mythographical collections that in their structure followed the outline of the *Metamorphoses*.⁵⁴ Indeed, in the study of medieval and Renaissance reception of myth, it would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the intermediary versus the original text. The ancient poets continued to be read in their original language but were transmitted, utilized, and studied through intermediary sources of different formats and design. For a reader, a poet, or a painter, it was often much easier to consult a translation, a version reduced, adapted, or amplified with new exegetical materials, a paraphrase, or an emblematic edition—interpretations of the myths that naturally could incorporate, as already mentioned, meanings that were absent in the original.

While signs of the circulation of the *Metamorphoses* are rather modest from late antiquity to 1100, an Ovidian revival can be perceived in monastic foundations in southern Germany from the end of the eleventh century and especially

in France in the twelfth century, where the province of Orléanais is one of its main focuses. Changes in social and economic conditions and the increasing secularization of medieval Christian culture created a more open climate for the reception of mythological poetry.⁵⁵ Around 1180, Arnulf of Orléans wrote two commentaries on the work of Ovid, which initiated a series of works, of moralistic tendency, whose allegorical reading of the *Metamorphoses* continued well into the Renaissance.⁵⁶ But, as Frank Coulson recalls, the so-called *Vulgate Commentary* on the *Metamorphoses*, written in Orléanais around 1250, is the most authoritative reading of the poem in the High Middle Ages (there is no complete edition of this text so far).⁵⁷ This commentary merges myth and allegory. It combines a number of sources, from authors of late antiquity, such as Martianus Capella, to mythographical manuals current in the Middle Ages, such as Fulgentius, the Vatican Mythographers, Hyginus (cf. above), or the so-called Digby mythographer. This moralizing allegorical interpretation is indebted to the previous tradition, especially of Arnulf of Orléans, although novel allegories are also found, as when the anonymous author interprets the theft of the golden fleece by Jason as the dealings of some clever merchants who benefit from lucrative trade before returning home. Beginning at the point at which Medea drugs the dragon that guards the fleece, the author explains:

Quod draco peruigil mutatus est in sopitum herbarum uiribus intelligitur quod mercatores callidiores etiam uenditis mercibus prauis pro bonis decipiunt. Sic optinet aureum vellus Iason et redit in patriam, id est mercatores multiplicatis eorum diuitiis facti diuites de regionibus aliis ad propria reuertuntur.⁵⁸

[The fact that the watchful dragon is put to sleep by the power of herbs is understood (to mean) that the more cunning sort of merchant also deceives by selling bad wares for good. Thus Jason obtains the golden fleece and returns to his fatherland, that is, merchants, having multiplied their wealth and made themselves rich, return from other regions to their own.]

Other commentaries on and adaptations of the *Metamorphoses* are the *Integumenta Ovidii*, in verse, of John of Garland (13th c.), the allegorical commentary of Giovanni del Virgilio, and the *Moralia super Ovidii Metamorphoses* of Robert Holcot (14th c.).⁵⁹ But the best known example of moralizing is the *Ovide moralisé* (early 14th c.), which, together with the allegories of the *Ovidius moralizatus* of Pierre de Bersuire (ca. 1340–50), would form the basis of the volume *La Bible des poètes* (1484).⁶⁰ The *Ovide moralisé*, the true summa of a tradition, is an excellent

example of versified adaptation, seventy-two thousand verses in fifteen books, consisting of paraphrases with moralizing explanation of the *Metamorphoses*, with material from other sources.⁶¹

Not until the Renaissance will paraphrasing adaptation and commentary take divergent paths.⁶² The medieval commentary is transmitted in either of two ways. One is the kind of gloss called *catena*, in which the gloss is transmitted separately from the text of the poem by a “link”—hence the term *catena*—consisting of the lemma and gloss (common in the 12th c., for example among commentators of Orléanais).⁶³ The other is the commentary organized in series of interlinear and marginal glosses around the commented text. It is the preferred form in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and is found in the *Vulgate Commentary*.

Traditionally considered a transitional work, and a bridge, between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the *Genealogia Deorum* (1350–75) of Giovanni Boccaccio is not really based on any substantial increase in mythographical knowledge. For that, one will have to wait until the sixteenth century, with the rediscovery and first editions of ancient mythographical authors. Renaissance manuals like those of Conti, Cartari, or Giraldis (cf. below) make use of them. It is true that Boccaccio is the first author in Western Europe who seems to have direct access to the works of Homer (and he had a translation in his own handwriting of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*), and, searcher for and copyist of manuscripts, he has more direct access to the classical poets than Jean Seznec says.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, although Boccaccio signals programmatically that “it is foolish to search the rivers for what you can get from the source,” his direct knowledge of Greek authors is limited to Homer and Apollonius of Rhodes.⁶⁵ He cites the rest in Latin intermediaries.⁶⁶ Moreover, faithful follower of the commentators, Boccaccio continues to be immersed in the medieval tradition of interpretation of myth.⁶⁷ Thus, for example, he interprets allegorically the petrification of the enemies of Perseus with the head of Medusa:

Perseum autem hostes et Pritum in saxa uertisse capite Gorgonis ostenso, nil aliud puto, nisi quia uictos diuitiis Gorgonis tacitos illos reddidit et imbelles.⁶⁸

[That Perseus turned his enemies and Pritus into stones by showing them the head of the Gorgon I consider nothing else than that he rendered them, overcome by the riches of Gorgon, speechless and feeble.]

On the other hand, as regards the structure of his mythographical material, Boccaccio departs from the earlier tradition. Now genealogy provides the orga-

nizing and unifying principle for the mythical pantheon.⁶⁹ Moreover, the model is a hermeneutics in itself, as the family tree gives meaning to the reconstruction of ancient knowledge about the origins.⁷⁰ But perhaps the principal model for the encyclopedic *Genealogia* is Ovid, who will remain a fundamental vehicle for the reception of Greek myth in Renaissance Italy.⁷¹ Also organized in fifteen books, like the *Genealogia*, the last of which is the most philosophical, the *Metamorphoses* strung together individual myths into a *carmen perpetuum*, “continuous song,” an organized whole. One can say that the work of Boccaccio is the first encyclopedia, after antiquity, which could claim to be comprehensive.⁷² Nevertheless, unlike Ovid, whose work culminates in the Augustan present, the *Genealogia* emphasizes a historic break with the past, an intimation of the Renaissance, and a discontinuity between myth and the modern reader that precludes dialogue with antiquity.⁷³ Indeed, Boccaccio’s perspective is oriented rather toward the past, toward archaeological reconstruction of knowledge of the theogony and cosmogony of the ancients.⁷⁴

Moreover, to the extent that myth is not invested with sacredness, as Boccaccio sees in it not the testimony of religious experience but the imaginary fictions of the poets, the *Genealogia* itself becomes the literary product of myth, in a manner that will be typical of the Renaissance. Nevertheless, not only does Boccaccio’s exposition of the pagan gods intend to be a work of literature, but his discourse, like that of the later humanist mythographers, is also inseparable, with its physical allegories, from other domains of knowledge.⁷⁵ The division of the disciplines in subsequent centuries will compartmentalize these domains.

From the time of Boccaccio, Humanism bears fruit. Scholars now have the first editions of ancient authors (and, by 1581, practically the entire Greco-Roman literature that we know has come to light).⁷⁶ They also have more reliable philological tools and a knowledge, or at least a notion, of the Greek language. Written in the mid-sixteenth century, three Italian Renaissance manuals will leave their mark on the later European mythographical tradition: *De deis gentium uaria et multiplex historia* (of Lilio Giraldi, 1548), *Imagini colla sposizione degli dei degli antichi* (of Vincenzo Cartari, 1556), and *Mythologia* (of Natale Conti, 1567/1568).⁷⁷ In the work of Conti, notably, over four hundred names are cited, with quotations, which include mythographical variants found in various texts, including Byzantine scholia—amounting to more than four thousand, a huge increase in the volume of this kind of information.⁷⁸

Each of the three mythographers has his distinctive characteristics. To borrow the words of Jean Seznec, “Giraldi, the learned philologist, concentrates upon

names, epithets, etymologies"; "Conti professes himself a philosopher, and takes special interest in a more profound interpretation of the fables"; and Cartari, who writes in Italian in order to be accessible to poets and artists, "is essentially an iconographer."⁷⁹ One wonders, with Rachel Darmon, what common element unites these three mythographers (to whom must be added the German Georg Pictor and his *Theologia mythologica* of 1532) and, especially, what is the peculiarity of this generic category known as mythography, if we compare it with other forms of transmission of knowledge about mythology or pagan religions that Sez nec excludes from mythography—scholarly works such as lexica, antiquarian treatises, or studies of comparative religion.⁸⁰ With its blurred boundaries, the category of mythography seems to be irrelevant, and the term, unknown to the Renaissance, appears, applied to Humanism, only in the twentieth century.

The reception of the myth by these Renaissance "mythographers" is articulated not as a collection of stories but as a collection of divine figures that support encyclopedic knowledge. Their logic is not narrative but seeks to investigate the gods. It is surely significant that the humanist mythographical treatises, until the publication of the work of Natale Conti, do not usually present themselves in their titles as mythology but rather as treatises on the gods. Moreover, in their syncretistic approach to the barbarian and especially Eastern gods (these treatises give extraordinary prominence to Egyptian, Syrian, Phoenician, and Scythian divinities) and in their allegorical interpretations, the humanist treatises follow in the footsteps of Boccaccio.⁸¹ Thus, the trend of Conti to explain the myths from the point of view of moral philosophy and Christian ethics can be seen as a debt to the medieval hermeneutical tradition. His emphasis, however, on the allegorical interpretation of pagan myths could perhaps be equally motivated by the context in which he lived, which included the Wars of Religion, the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and the Council of Trent. In effect, the Reformation insisted on the straight and literal interpretation of the Bible and rejected the tendency of Catholics to allegorize. In spite of the formal proscription, the Counter-Reformation eventually encouraged the renewal of the allegorical interpretation that was habitual in medieval writers.⁸² For example, speaking of Perseus and Medusa and after citing, among others, Pausanias, Ovid, the scholia to Lycophron, Hesiod, and Euripides, Conti concludes in a moralizing tone:

But none of the things that have been said so far seemed to be worthy to be transmitted to posterity, if there was not a more brilliant and more useful underlying opinion. But what is it? Seeing that it was said that Medusa was the

most beautiful of all women, what prevents her being regarded as pleasure or lust? For such is the strength of the pleasures that it makes us forget the worship of the gods, all mankind, mission, all utility, if we surrender to its will. For this reason, seeing that men are made useless for other things, it was brilliantly said they used to be turned into stones . . . So, through this fable, we receive the warning to flee from lust, as it is odious to the gods and finally unpleasant for us.⁸³

Modern Period: Enlightenment and Romanticism

The modern reception of Greek mythology is characterized by the epochal fracture of a two-thousand-year-old tradition of allegorization. Following Andrew Von Hendy, to explain a first weakening of that powerful hermeneutic model it may be useful to consider the work of Francis Bacon, one of the last representatives of the allegorical interpretation of myth. He anticipates its dissolution, even without being aware of it.⁸⁴ Thus, in *The Wisdom of the Ancients* (Latin original, 1609), when he offers his reading of the myth of Perseus and Medusa, he remains strictly in the traditional mode (“The fable seems to have been composed with reference to the art and judicious conduct of war”). The deadly Gorgon, Medusa, represents the war that can be completed successfully. To do so requires speed (the winged sandals), discretion (the helmet of Hades), and espionage (the mirror shield).⁸⁵ As Barbara C. Garner demonstrated, Bacon is, in effect, indebted to the preceding mythographical tradition and specifically to Conti.⁸⁶ In the short preface to *The Wisdom of the Ancients*, however, when explaining the reasons that urge him to continue allegorizing the old stories, Bacon says that the old parables serve not only “as a device for shadowing and concealing the meaning” but, paradoxically, “as a method of making it understood.”⁸⁷ This paradox, which assumes the pristine intuitive wisdom of the ancients, seems to harbor future developments in the concept of myth, namely, in Vico. To the extent that myths reveal “sacred relics and light airs breathing out of better times,” even the old poets like Homer or Hesiod did not come to understand the allegorical expressions that they conveyed in poetic format.⁸⁸

Although the study of mythology underwent no substantive change before the eighteenth century, and the reception of Greek myth continued to impose the filter of allegory, the world did change.⁸⁹ It expanded with the findings of the explorers in America and Africa, who placed within reach of the Europeans a colossal collection of rarities, customs, and stories of the “savages.” The chronicles and reports of travelers, missionaries, and traders often evoke similarities to ancient

texts, which, as a result, will be discredited. The comparison is irresistible: the constant references “au sauvage, à l’Iroquois caché sous l’écorce du Grec” (“to the savage, to the Iroquois hidden under the outward appearance of the Greek”) underscore the conformity between the fables of the Americans and those of the Ancients.⁹⁰ In a context animated by the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns, the comparison of the old myths with new savage ones comes at the right time for the Moderns to challenge the authority of the Ancients. But above all, the conviction that Greek mythology is a collection of absurdities allows the Moderns to attack it in the name of reason, morality, and religion.⁹¹ This would lead to the rejection of the allegorical method, since in the eyes of the enlightened, the ancient myths cannot hide veiled truths about the physical or moral world.⁹² A secular interpretive tradition approaches its decomposition, without, however, erecting a new paradigm.⁹³ And paradoxically, it is in this climate of scandal in the face of the “other” and of perplexity in the face of the savagery that dwells in us and in our cultural heritage that the need to explain myth scientifically has its beginning.⁹⁴

Renouncing the fundamental thesis of the Enlightenment, according to which myth, result of ignorance, is born from the errors of the human mind, Giambattista Vico (*Scienza nuova*, 1725) recognizes in mythology the first science concerning the history of the peoples.⁹⁵ When he asserts that the creatures of the first age were “poets who spoke in poetic characters,” Vico anticipates the Romantic valorization of imagination, while at the same time he refuses to follow Fontenelle’s enlightened rejection of myth.⁹⁶ Persisting into the historical period, the *favella poetica*, “because of those poetic characters [that it contains], can yield many important discoveries concerning antiquity.”⁹⁷ Thus, for example, Draco the legislator

must be one of those snakes of the Gorgon who is nailed on the shield of Perseus, which will be found to signify the rule of the laws; that shield, with terrible punishments, turned into stone those who looked at it . . . and with such a shield Minerva, who was called Ἀθηναῖα, armed herself.⁹⁸

These poetic characters, or *universali fantastaci* (“imaginative universals”), are not the mental abstraction of a sensible particular but univocally communicate the nature of what they represent, because they participate emotionally in its particularities.⁹⁹ In other words, imagination summarizes what analytical reason will eventually separate, so myth expresses a unity between the human being and nature. It is understandable, then, that Vico is considered a forerunner of the

romantic concept of symbol. His ideas are so far removed from his contemporaries that they anticipate a crucial notion of Karl Philipp Moritz (1756–93), for whom “mythological poems must be considered a language of imagination,” and Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854), according to whom myth is tautegorical, that is, self-referential, and eludes allegorical explanation.¹⁰⁰

Although not mentioned by name, Vico also exerted a strong influence on a major figure in the modern scholarly reception of myth: Christian Gottlob Heyne (1729–1812).¹⁰¹ Professor of Greek at Göttingen, Heyne has been considered the first scholar of antiquity to demonstrate the possibilities of a historical anthropology of ancient Greece from a comparison with modern “primitive” peoples.¹⁰² But Heyne is best known for his popularizing of the term *mythus* to define the object of study, thus replacing the word *fabula*, which carried negative connotations of the fictional and the false.¹⁰³ It is not simply a terminological distinction: the new usage acquires a foundational character. With Heyne, one can say, the scholarly study of mythology was born, a study conscious of its proper object.¹⁰⁴

A major contribution of Heyne is the sharp distinction he draws between the original myth of primitive peoples and the poets’ embellishment of it. The primordial thought of the former is expressed by means of a symbolic language. In his historicizing perspective, Heyne opens up a distance, which will be insurmountable, between *sermo mythicus* or *symbolicus* and *sermo poeticus*.¹⁰⁵ One encounters in the origins of the mythological activity of primitive peoples their perplexity in the face of the incomprehensible phenomena that surrounded them. Given that we lack any document of that primordial language of symbolic value, however, the origins of myth are unattainable and remain outside the historical study of mythology, which will concern itself, rather, with the impact of myths in their local and national contexts.

In the context of Romantic Germany, where, from the end of the eighteenth century, Heyne was popularizing the notion of myth as an expressive form of primitive mankind and as a symbolic language, two texts exemplify the theoretical discourse on myth: Friedrich Schlegel’s *Dialogue on Poetry* and Schelling’s *System of Transcendental Idealism*. In his lectures at Jena in 1801, Schelling starts to sharpen the sense of the peculiarly Romantic term, symbol. But there’s more: following the distinction made by Goethe and Schiller, Schelling opposes the symbol to allegory. The result is the disrepute and rejection of allegory and the enthronement of the symbol. Intransitive and irreducible to reason, it is and it means at the same time and should be perceived intuitively. Fundamental to the

future developments of Romantic myth (for example, for Creuzer) is, likewise, the direct relationship that Schelling establishes between the symbol and myth as narrative genre. In the only direct reference to Greek myth in the *System of Transcendental Idealism*, Greek mythology as a whole is considered a single symbol, which merges the act of intuitive perception with the discourse of a narrative.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, a major contribution to the Romantic construction of myth is this relation that Schelling establishes between the symbol and myth, which involves erasing the distinction between the two.

The rupture is complete. Myth no longer has moral or religious aspiration but survives as “poetische Existenz,” poetic existence.¹⁰⁷ And it can be actualized in an aesthetic dimension. To Goethe, for example, the appropriation of myth lies in the emotion that comes from observation of the work of art, which uproots myths from their temporal dimension to become present only in the object’s features, the image. Before the mask of Medusa in the Palazzo Rondanini, Goethe beholds how “in a noble beautiful shape of face, beyond life-size, death’s unspeakably anxious stare is admirably expressed” (“in einer hohen und schönen Gesichtsform über Lebensgröße das ängstliche Starren des Todes unsäglich trefflich ausgedrückt ist”). And before the copy of the sculpture that he receives, he proclaims: “A wondrous work, which, expressing the conflict between death and life, between pain and pleasure, exercises . . . an inexpressible charm over us” (“Ein wundersames Werk, das, den Zwiespalt zwischen Tod und Leben, zwischen Schmerz und Wollust ausdrückend, einen unnennbaren Reiz . . . über uns ausübt”).¹⁰⁸

The new literature needs myths. In the center of ancient poetry there was mythology. The literature of the present suffers from its absence. Hence the need for a “neue Mythologie,” a new mythology.¹⁰⁹ In another fundamental text on myth coming from the Romantic theorists, the “Discourse on Mythology” (in the “Dialogue on Poetry,” 1800), Schlegel puts it programmatically in a famous passage:

Es fehlt, behaupte ich, unsrer Poesie an einem Mittelpunkt, wie es die Mythologie für die Alten war, und alles Wesentliche, worin die moderne Dichtkunst der antiken nachsteht, läßt sich in die Worte zusammenfassen: Wir haben keine Mythologie.¹¹⁰

[Our poetry is lacking, I say, in a midpoint—what mythology was for the ancients—and everything essential in which the modern poetic is inferior to the ancient, can be summed up in the words: We have no mythology.]

Perhaps the Romantic reception of myth acquires its fullest profile with Friedrich Creuzer and his *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker* (1810–12). Indeed, following the path of Schelling, Creuzer explicitly opposes symbol to allegory:

Diese [sc., die allegorische Darstellung] bedeutet bloß einen allgemeinen Begriff, oder eine Idee, die von ihr selbst verschieden ist; jene [sc., die symbolische Darstellung] ist die versinnlichte, verkörperte Idee selbst.¹¹¹

[This [sc. allegorical representation] means simply a general concept, or an idea, that is different from itself, that [sc. the symbolic representation] is the idea itself rendered perceptible to the senses, embodied.]

Coming from a sudden revelation, the symbol survives under the degrading cover of myth, its linguistic expression, as the butterfly retains some of the chrysalis. Irreducible to the historical and critical approach of philological source criticism (Quellenforschung), reception of myth, accessible only to the poet, becomes a fundamentally irrational activity. Eventually it will open the door to the abysmal temptations of Nazi ideology.¹¹² No wonder that the excesses of Creuzer's book, dense and monumental, soon unleashed a harsh "battle over Creuzer's *Symbolik*" ("Kampf um Creuzers *Symbolik*").¹¹³ More telling, perhaps, for an understanding of the Romantic reception of myth and for its historicist and philological criticism is the exchange of letters, originally published in 1818, between Friedrich Creuzer and Gottfried Hermann.¹¹⁴ To Creuzer, whose aversion to the "concept" is emphatic, access to myth is through vision and feeling.¹¹⁵ On Creuzer's assumption that the entire mythical and scientific Greek heritage comes from the East, we can approach the study of myths only through an appropriation of the Oriental way of being.¹¹⁶ In these passages, and others equally vague and crepuscular, we perceive a typically Romantic mania for the East and for India in particular, in which we seem to hear the proclamations of Friedrich Schlegel.¹¹⁷

Especially evocative is the symbolism of nature. It is notable that, before the eighteenth century, the emphasis was on celestial bodies rather than on fertility or sexuality. Not until this moment is sexual symbolism integrated into the category of nature, which also includes astronomy and botany.¹¹⁸ According to Creuzer's theory, for example, Perseus ("the Persian," an early adaptation of the Eastern Mithra) is a solar hero. And in the battle with the Gorgon, Creuzer sees a struggle of sunlight against darkness and in favor of the generative forces of nature:

Wie der Sonnenheld das winterliche Dunkel bekämpft, so vertilgt er auch die Ausgeburten der Sümpfe und die Scheusale der Wüste. Da gewinnt er die Andromeda, und erzeugt mit ihr einen neuen Sonnensohn Perses.¹¹⁹

[As the sun hero battles the winter darkness, so he also destroys the spawn of the marshes and the monsters of the desert. There he wins Andromeda, and generates with her a new son of the sun, Perses.]

Against his correspondent, Gottfried Hermann stands firm on the terrain of history.¹²⁰ Opposed to symbolic and mystical interpretation of archaic epic and, by extension, of Greek mythology, Hermann conceives of it as the scientific study of the ideas and concepts of a people.¹²¹ His approach revolves around two axes, which he formulates programmatically in his third letter to Creuzer. First, for Hermann, who gives allegory restored vigor, the personification of natural elements (or of concepts) is the origin of Greek mythology. Second, without yet having available the achievements of comparative linguistics or the Indo-European hypothesis, Hermann aimed, with etymological interpretation, to complete the exegesis of myth.¹²² This epistolary debate between Creuzer and Hermann occurs at a crucial time in the history of the reception of myth. To the extent that both correspondents take Heyne as a point of reference, whom we place at the beginning of the modern science of myth, this controversy is, in a way, a foundational one for the discipline.¹²³ Mythology is ultimately the battleground on which theological-romantic speculation and historical-critical science face each other.

The future of the study of Greek myth belongs to the latter. In the decades after the final defeat of Napoleon, the academic study of antiquity in Germany received its basic structure. The establishment and institutionalization of classical philology in the new universities defined the identity of the Prussian elite and ensured the model of Greek culture in the emerging German identity. In this atmosphere, the historical-critical method and the longing for scientific respectability permeate the studies of myth—although the discipline of classical philology as such will be directed toward more positivistic domains, such as textual and source criticism.¹²⁴ Creuzer's defeat and the "victory of rationalism over Romanticism" mean that the study of mythology, which must demonstrate its scientific seriousness, will become a strictly historical enterprise.¹²⁵ To do so, as Glenn W. Most notes, it must cease to ask what myths can mean *to us* and focus resolutely on what they meant *to the Greeks*.¹²⁶

Irreversible consequences for the subsequent reception of myth will result. First of all, a divorce will be consummated between the scientific approach to myth by academic professionals and its popularization by writers and artists, who will play the role of mediating between the ancient myths and the religious or aesthetic meanings they can take in our time.¹²⁷ Popularizing mythography will also assume, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, forms such as dictionaries or manuals or retellings—very often disdained by specialists.¹²⁸ Moreover, the strictly historical claim to science of myth can help explain a paradoxical phenomenon: why the Hellenists took up again the two old methods of myth analysis, whose origins lie in ancient Greece, that appeared to be already over—allegory of nature and euhemerism.¹²⁹ Indeed, the assumption about the personification of natural phenomena as developed by Gottfried Hermann has become, in the hands of Friedrich Max Müller (1823–1900), a complete allegory of nature. Starting from etymological interpretation—although this time comparative and based on recent advances in Indo-European linguistics—the exponents of the naturalist-comparative school in the second half of the nineteenth century seek the key to understanding of myth in atmospheric phenomena. (The Indo-European approach has continued up to the present and is represented in this volume by Joseph Falaky Nagy, in chapter 4.) The project of George W. Cox is especially ambitious. It aims to reduce all Proto-Indo-European, or Aryan, as he called it, myths to a story about the sun. Thus it is said of hero Perseus that

from the dawn-goddess, Athene, he receives the mirror into which he is to gaze when he draws his sword to smite the mortal Gorgon, the fiend of darkness . . . and like the sun, he may veil himself in clouds when he wishes not to be seen. But he cannot reach the Gorgon's den until he has first passed the home of the Graiai [Gray Women], the land of the gloaming . . .¹³⁰

One of the legacies of Romanticism was the emergence of nature, which now appears to be at the origin of all myths. In a context of growing urbanization, the interpretation of myths through nature becomes a fascinating attraction, as reflected, for example, in the largest encyclopedic dictionary of Greek mythology, the *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* (1884–1937) of Wilhelm Heinrich Roscher.¹³¹

As for the new “euhemerism,” it has its main representative in Karl Otfried Müller (1797–1840), for whom myths are primarily “narrations in which the deeds and destinies of individual personages are recorded,” belonging to a period before the history of Greece.¹³² Perceived as tribal legends, myths may, to the

extent that they contain factual reminiscence of a distant past, provide valuable information about the early history of the Greek peoples. Moreover, every period of history is reflected in a specific form of the myth. In the attention that Müller gives to local political conditions, we may, perhaps, see a concern for Germany's division into numerous separate states and a desire for unification.¹³³ When he proposes the interpretation of the myth of the Argive Perseus, for example, he states that an unavoidable condition is to identify "what circumstances, relations, and institutions of the ancient Argives, gave rise to the mythus, or coöperated in its creation."¹³⁴

The most lasting contribution of Karl Otfried Müller will represent a phenomenal achievement for the subsequent reception of Greek mythology. It is his insistence on myth as narrative. (In this respect, the legacy of the Brothers Grimm is relevant. In their studies of folklore, they established the notion of myth as a narrative type distinct from the folktale.)¹³⁵ According to Albert Henrichs, the reception of Greek myth in the twentieth century is characterized precisely by a "growing interest in myths as coherent narratives." The decade of the 1890s saw the emergence of two of the theoretical schools that would dominate the twentieth century: the ritual theory (discussed by H. S. Versnel in chapter 2) and psychoanalysis (discussed by Robert Segal in chapter 8).¹³⁶ To these must be added, a half century later, structuralism (discussed by Claude Calame in chapter 6).¹³⁷ That myth means narrative will not be apparent to the neoromantic and transcendentalist trend, which assumes the central Romantic claim that myth is the vehicle of insight into a timeless realm of transcendental values that go beyond the contingences of history. This trend, however, has had an indirect impact on the reception of Greek mythology.¹³⁸ Indeed, in the twentieth century the main orientation, and the most fruitful one, in the study of Greek myth has combined attention to the narrative and to the relation of its components. Thus, despite differences between the dominant schools, Hellenists "have approached each mythical narrative as a cohesive and organized whole composed of constitutive elements which contribute to its overall structure and which are designed to bring out its inherent meaning."¹³⁹

NOTES

a. For a survey of encyclopedic works on Greek myth published in the past sixty years, see Bettini 2012, iv–v.

b. Trapp 2012 is an excellent overview.

c. For the allegorical interpretation of Greek myth in medieval and Renaissance literature, see Brumble 2007, with extensive bibliographical discussion under “Further Reading” (419–23).

I am most grateful to Lowell Edmunds for his criticism and queries. His translation, as well as discussion on several particular issues, has improved on the original Spanish text. I want to express my debt to Frank Coulson (on Ovid in the Middle Ages), Francesc Gómez, María Consuelo Álvarez, and Rosa María Iglesias (on the Middle Ages and Renaissance), Rachel Darmon (on mythography in the Renaissance), and Sotera Fornaro (on Heyne and Romanticism).

1. Martindale 2007, 298. The term *reception* does not have the connotations of conservatism and elitism inherent in *classical tradition*, according to Budelmann and Haubold 2008, 14.

2. Calame 1991, 180.

3. Detienne 1981, 238.

4. The etymological ambiguity of the term *mythology* (cf. *LSJ*⁹, s.v. λέγω, “gather, pick up”; cf. ἀνθολογία, “bouquet of flowers, anthology”) might have contributed to some modern confusions concerning myth. For the two acceptations of mythology (as “science of myth” or as “collection of myths”), see Bies 1999, 1073–81. This double definition goes back to the μυθολογεῖν of the Greeks (cf. Brisson 1994 [1982], 186–95). However, at certain times this distinction has resulted in different terms, such as in France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: *fable* and *mythologie* (cf. Starobinski 1989, 233).

5. Saïd 1993, 7; Delattre 2005, 6.

6. Graf 1993b [1987], 2.

7. Edmunds 2005, 31–32: against the notion of myth as a collective expression of the beliefs of a society “must be set the consideration that a traditional story can survive only if it can be retold, and it can be retold only if it can be applied to new circumstances.”

8. Edmunds 1997, 420–22.

9. Vernant 1990 [1974], 215–17.

10. Hirschberger 2004, 65–68. It is clear, however, that in its historical development, the catalogue was adapted to various social and political contexts and is a good example of how social groups explain the present through stories about the past (cf. Fowler 1998). In addition to Hirschberger’s (2004) annotated edition of the *Catalogue*, the critical edition of Merkelbach and West (1967) is fundamental; cf. Most 2007 in the Loeb Library, in effect a new edition. For commentary, in addition to Hirschberger 2004, see West 1985.

11. Tosetti 2006, 117–18.

12. Cf. Thomas 1989, 180–95; Fowler 1998, 17–18; 2001, 103–4; Hirschberger 2004, 68.

13. Goody and Watt 1968 [1963].

14. Jacob 1994a, 172–73.

15. Hartog 1990, 181.

16. Cf. Alganza 2012. The names given Hecataeus are: ιστορικός, ιστοριογράφος, συγγραφεύς, λογοποιός, λογογράφος, μύθων συνθέτης, and μυθογράφος.

17. Cf. Fowler 2006, 35: “The name *myth-ography* could not exist before the distinc-

tion with *historio-graphy* was possible, that is, before ‘myth’ was distinguished from ‘history,’ however problematic the distinction remained throughout the rest of antiquity and remains so today.” Cf. n. 26 below.

18. Graf 2002, 2.

19. Cf. Vernant 1990 [1974], 203–8.

20. Dolcetti 2000, 30–31.

21. Delattre 2009, 288–89.

22. Saïd 2007, 79. Cf. von Leyden 1949–50, 95: “It is this criterion of knowledge that determines the definition of a *spatium historicum* introduced by Herodotus in his historiography.” See Vidal-Naquet 1986 [1981], 39–60.

23. Hartog 1990, 184.

24. West 1985, 136. Cf. Fowler 1998, 1 n. 4.

25. Jacob 1994a, 176.

26. For reasons of space, I cannot discuss other genres. For example, that the plots of the tragedians refer, practically without exception, to the mythical period suggests that the bulk of the stories that we recognize as myths were recognized in the fifth century B.C.E. as a clearly delimited category. In a refreshing and fundamental article, Robert Fowler (2011) has defended the correspondence between *mũthos* and myth and questions the current consensus that tends to deny the relation between the two terms. This unanimity, which seems to be an established truth (cf. Struck 2009, 25: “It is commonly understood that the Greek term *mythos* means something entirely different from modern definitions of ‘myth’”), is a product of the twentieth-century critique of enlightened rationalism.

27. Henrichs 1987, 243.

28. Jacob 1998, 27.

29. For grammatical indicators that distinguish one kind of statement from another, see Darbo-Peschanski 2004, 10.

30. Compare the preposition used by Eratosthenes (διά) with the one used by Phercydes of Athens (ἀπό, cf. above) or the one used by Hesiod (ἐκ) to indicate that the practice of blood sacrifice goes back to the primordial sacrifice of Prometheus (Hes. Th. 556).

31. Fowler 2000, xxxiii.

32. The most recent editions are Cuartero 2010 and 2012; Papathomopoulos 2010.

33. West 1985, 44–46; Carrière 1998, 49; Hirschberger 2004, 32; Tosetti 2006, 125. An exception is R. Fletcher (2005, 299–303), who challenges the circular logic consisting of taking the *Library* as a basis to restore the *Catalogue*.

34. Jacob 1994b, 423.

35. If we accept that the *Library* was composed in the first to second centuries C.E., this was a period of time in which Greek mythology was the cultural currency of even the remotest corners of the Roman world (Cameron 2004, 221), often recently Hellenized, as in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire (see Jacob [1994b, 428], who sees these regions as “exclues des traditions et du ciment social qui se perpétuaient comme en témoignent Pausanias dans les cités de la Grèce continentale”). Cf. K. Fletcher 2008, 88.

36. Mactoux 1989, 248. In general, for the relationship between the Greek past and the present in the Second Sophistic, see Swain 1996, 65–100.

37. Cameron 2004, 261–303.
38. The most recent edition of Hyginus is Soler 2011. Other manuals, organized around a uniform theme (cf. Henrichs 1987, 243), are those of Parthenius of Nicea, Palaephatus, Eratosthenes of Cyrene, Antoninus Liberalis, Conon, and Heraclitus the Paradoxographer. An overview can be found in Alganza 2006.
39. Wilson 1967, 246: “Few if any ancient monographs survived the dark ages as independent books in the physical sense.”
40. Edition of the *Mythographus Homericus* in Pagès 2007.
41. Cf. Possanza 2004. The poem of Aratus was translated into or adapted to Latin at least six times.
42. For the liturgy, see Palmer 1989, 58; for Augustine, see Brown 2000, 268–70, 415.
43. These sentences are adapted from Edmunds 2006, 64.
44. See Reynolds and Wilson 1991, 118–21 (on the knowledge of Greek in the West in the Middle Ages) and 146–49 (on the revival of Greek in Renaissance Italy). On learning Greek in the Renaissance, see, in general, Ciccolella 2008.
45. Solomon 2012. Another example is the name of the mother of Myrmidon, Eury-medusa, converted by the false reading of a medieval codex into Corymosa in Boccaccio’s *Genealogia deorum* (11.13) (Álvarez and Iglesias 2001, 230–31). For Epytropus, see Álvarez and Iglesias 2001, 234–36.
46. It is uncertain whether Theagenes personally developed the principles of physical and moral allegory or, rather, his contribution should be analyzed as a starting point (Lamberton 1989, 31–32; Brisson 2004 [1996], 36).
47. Brisson 2004 [1996], 1.
48. Seznec 1953 [1940], 12–13.
49. It is true, however, that in the folk-etymological interpretation of the name “Gorgon” one can also perceive the impact of the tradition of Palaephatus and its trivialization of myth (Ogden 2008, 132). Thus, Fulgentius combines three possible orientations of the formulas for the rationalization of myth (allegory, euhemerism, trivialization) that modern studies do not always distinguish with clear criteria (so, for example, Brisson sees in Euhemerus the initiator of realistic allegory; Brisson 2004 [1996], 48).
50. Guthmüller 2008, 753: “The *Mythologiae* should be considered as the fundamental mythographic text and the basis for the mediaeval ideas about the ancient deities.” Heinze 2006, 469: “The *Mitologiae* of Fulgentius was the defining work of early medieval mythography.”
51. On Ridewall, see Smalley 1960, 109–32; Rivers 2010, 209–15, 218–22, 242.
52. The date of *Vaticanus Primus* is ca. 875–1075, according to Guthmüller 2008, 753. On the manuscript tradition of the *Mythographus Vaticanus Secundus*, see Jakobi 2008.
53. Curtius 1953 [1948], 18.
54. For the translators of Ovid, to translate “c’est non seulement commenter le texte original, mais c’est également compiler les gloses déjà élaborées autour de l’ouvrage” (Viel 2004, 28).
55. On the “renaissance” of the twelfth century, see Reynolds and Wilson 1991, 110–14.
56. For editions of Arnulf of Orléans, see Ghisalberti 1932; Gura 2010.

57. Cf. Coulson 2011b, 65–70. As many as twenty-two manuscripts of this commentary have been discovered. It had a wide diffusion, and not only in France and Italy. Some philologists have even postulated that this is the commentary with which Dante read Ovid.

58. Quoted from Coulson 2011a.

59. Editions: Ghisalberti 1933a, 1933b. On Holcot, see Smalley 1960, 133–202; Rivers 2010, 215–18, 240–46.

60. Viel 2004. On Bersuire, see Smalley 1960, 261–64; Rivers 2010, 255–62. As for the *Metamorphosis Ovidiana moraliter explanata*, attributed to the English Dominican Thomas Waleys (cf. Seznec 1953 [1940], 93), in reality it is a first version, although more reduced, of the *Ovidius moralizatus* (Moss 1982, 23; Guthmüller 1997 [1995], 47–48).

61. Dimmick 2002, 279. For the different sources (amongst them the *Heroides* of Ovid himself) used by the author of the *Ovide Moralisé*, see Álvarez 1977.

62. Stillers 2006, 24.

63. For the *catena* commentary, see Coulson 2010.

64. Seznec 1953 [1940], 221. Cf. Álvarez and Iglesias 2001, 216–17.

65. Cf. *Genealogia deorum* 15.7: “Insidium est ex riuulis querere, quod possis ex fonte percipere!”

66. Cf. Iglesias and Álvarez 1998, 87–88.

67. Thus, for example, Boccaccio (*Genealogia deorum* 4.14) attributes to Ovid, by confusion, the episode that tells how Circe punished Picus because he loved Pomona—a detail in fact extracted from Servius’s commentary on Virgil (*Aen.* 7.190). Cf. Álvarez and Iglesias 2001, 226–27.

68. *Genealogia deorum* 12.25.

69. Cf. Hyde 1985, 737–40.

70. Graziani 2006, 203–4.

71. See the works collected by Guthmüller (1986; cf. Guthmüller 1997 [1995], 37–40).

72. Guthmüller 2008, 752.

73. Hyde 1985, 741; cf. Guthmüller 1997 [1995], 54.

74. Graziani 2006.

75. Cf. Darmon 2012, 143: “L’écriture mythographique de la Renaissance utilise ainsi la mythologie pour produire un discours à la fois physique et poétique, pour intégrer diverses méthodes explicatives et différents régimes discursifs dans une même démarche d’apprentissage. La mythographie du XVI^e siècle est en cela l’héritière d’une tradition encyclopédique et naturaliste antique, qui livre aux mythographes une mythologie certes fragmentée, mais indéfectiblement liée à la transmission de toutes sortes de savoirs sur le monde.” And Graziani 2006, 207: “. . . bref tout le savoir du monde, condensé dans la perspective synthétique d’une *archaiologia*.” For example, for the relation of humanist mythography to the concepts of natural history and zoology, see Ashworth 2003, 138–39.

76. First editions: Fulgentius, 1498; Stephen of Byzantium, 1502; Cornutus, 1505; *Fabulae* of Hyginus, 1535; pseudo-Apollodorus, 1555.

77. On the date of Conti’s work (the date of 1551, accepted by some scholars, is now rejected), see Ford 1998, 243–45.

78. Iglesias and Álvarez 1998, 97.

79. Seznec 1953 [1940], 233.

80. Darmon 2012, 62–70 (lexica), 274–80 (antiquarian treatises), 379–407 (works on comparative religion).

81. The rejection of allegory as a method of interpretation of myth is restricted to a select group of humanists such as Filippo Beroaldo and Raffaele Regio (Guthmüller 2008, 756).

82. Cf. the *Index librorum prohibitorum* of 1564 (Reusch 1886, 275): “In Ouidii Metamorphoseos libros commentaria siue enarrationes allegoricae uel tropologicae.”

83. *Mythologia* 7.11.

84. Von Hendy 2001, 3–6.

85. Bacon 1861 [1609/1619], 715–16. Cf. Ogden 2008, 134.

86. Garner 1970.

87. Bacon 1861 [1609/1619], 698.

88. Bacon 1861 [1609/1619], 698; Lewis 2010, 378–80, 388.

89. Bremmer 2011, 531.

90. Detienne 1981, 19.

91. Guthmüller 2008, 765–68.

92. For perspective, more nuanced and ambivalent, on the relationship of myth and Enlightenment, see Jamme 1998, 159–62. From the perspective of the twentieth century, the obligatory reference is the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (cf. Horkheimer and Adorno 2002 [1944], xvii–xviii: “Myth was always obscure and luminous at once . . . Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology”).

93. Bremmer 2011, 532.

94. Cf. the opening of this chapter; also Mali 1992, 138.

95. Cf. Vico 1990 [1744], 460–61 [51]. First edition of 1725; third edition of 1744. For a reassessment of Vico’s positive redefinition of myth, see Mali 1992, 135–209.

96. Cf. Vico 1990 [1744], 440 [34].

97. Vico 1990 [1744], 593 [413].

98. Vico 1990 [1744], 597 [423]. Cf. Vico 1990 [1744], 669 [542] and 720 [616].

99. Von Hendy 2001, 11.

100. Moritz 1832 [1791], 1; Schelling 1856, 195–96. Cf. Brandt 2004, 12.

101. Cf. D’Alessandro 1999, 169: “La stessa teoria della mitologia elaborata da Heyne . . . presenta forti analogie con quella delineata da Vico nella *Scienza nuova*”; also Fornaro 2004, 151.

102. Fornaro 2004, 114.

103. Graf 1993a. On the use of the term *fable* in France in the eighteenth century, see Starobinski 1989, 233–50.

104. Graf 1993b [1987], 9–13.

105. Fornaro 2004, 173–75.

106. Cf. Von Hendy 2001, 37.

107. Gockel 1981, 221.

108. Goethe 1981 [1816–17/1829], 151 (December 1786), 546 (April 1788). Cf. Fornaro 2001, 28.

109. For a broader perspective on the German *Sehnsucht* for a mythology, see Williamson 2004.

110. Schlegel 1971 [1800], 497.
111. Creuzer 1842 [1810–12], 540. But the influences on Creuzer's theory of the symbol are various, from Plotinus to the Romantics Brentano and Görres (Fornaro 2008, 61–62). On the other hand, the use of the terms *symbol* and *allegory* is not univocal in the Romantics. On the relation between Creuzer's attempts to clarify symbol and allegory and other contemporary approximations to this antithesis (e.g., Schlegel), see Gockel 1981, 9–14.
112. Fornaro 2001, 39; cf. Williamson 2006, 159.
113. This expression comes from the title of Howald's 1926 book. Cf. Burkert 1980, 162–63; Most 1997, 351–53.
114. The citations of these letters are from the Italian edition of Fornaro 2009.
115. Cf. Creuzer and Hermann 2009 [1818], 108 (sixth letter: Creuzer to Hermann): “Ma il cammino giusto verso l'antichità più remota, e con ciò verso l'ambito del mito, è, dal mio punto di vista, la visione, il sentimento.” (“But the right road toward the most remote antiquity, and thereby toward the ambit of myth, is, from my point of view, vision, sentiment” [*Anschauung* and *Sinn* in the German original].)
116. Cf. Creuzer and Hermann 2009 [1818], 110 (sixth letter: Creuzer to Hermann).
117. Schlegel (1971 [1800], 502) thus laments in his “Discourse on Mythology”: “Wären uns nur die Schätze des Orients so zugänglich wie die des Altertums! Welche neue Quelle von Poesie könnte uns aus Indien fließen . . . Im Orient müssen wir das höchste Romantische suchen.”
118. Cf. Humphreys 2004 [2001], 202.
119. Creuzer 1842 [1810–12], 244. Solar symbolism lingers on in late sources (scholia to Lycophron and John Lydos; cf. Creuzer 1842 [1810–12], 247).
120. See Creuzer and Hermann 2009 [1818], 90 (fifth letter: Hermann to Creuzer): “La mitologia è nel suo compito puramente storica, e non deve essere nient'altro che una storia dei miti, e delle idee che sono in essi contenute.” Cf. Hermann 1819, 11 [= Creuzer and Hermann 2009 [1818], 194]: “. . . daß die Mythologie eine Geschichte der Mythen sein müsse.”
121. Fornaro 2008, 66.
122. Creuzer and Hermann 2009 [1818], 61–69. When it comes to interpretation of the myths themselves, indeed, Hermann reverts to allegorical hermeneutics based on the etymology of proper names, in the footsteps of ancient Stoics (Most 2010, 174–75).
123. Judet de La Combe 1995, 59.
124. Burkert 1980, 163.
125. The phrase “victory of rationalism over romanticism” is a quotation from Burkert 1980, 163, of Howald 1926, 22. Most (1997, 352) emphasizes Creuzer's defeat in the face of the scientific study of myth “based upon rational procedures [that] could widen the possibility of participation in scholarship to include not just poetic geniuses, but professors . . .”
126. Most 1997, 352; cf. Most 1999, 44–45.
127. For a rapid overview of the popularization of myth in the modern world, see Baumbach 2008. Contemporary adaptations and appropriations of Greek myth may take multifarious forms in daily life and in popular culture—from advertising (Hartigan 2002) to comics (Kovacs and Marshall 2011), children's literature (Lovatt 2009), science fic-

tion (Rogers and Stevens 2012), video games (Christesen and Machado 2010), and even bodybuilding (Wyke 1997). On the revival of ancient myths and the use of Greek gods (for instance, Pan or Adonis or Gaia) as an inspiration to revive the old religion among Neopagans, see Pike 2004, 32.

128. Cf. Heinze 2006, 470–71. Sometimes these books bear the stamp of the author and his understanding of the myths: Graves 1955; Calasso 1988. Cf. n. 138 below.

129. Burkert 1980, 162; Most 1997, 352–53.

130. Cox 1882 [1870], 304.

131. Bremmer 2011, 534. Farnell (1896, 8) asserts, apropos of the interpretation of the goddess Athena proposed by Roscher: “One cannot help feeling the unreality of this, which seems the reductio ad absurdum of the physical-allegorical theory.” On the Apollo and the Mars of Roscher as solar deities, see Versnel 1993, 289–92.

132. Müller 1844 [1825], 1.

133. Graf 1993b [1987], 23. That Karl O. Müller was primarily responsible for the destruction of the “Ancient Model” (substituted by the “Aryan Model” in the controversial theory of Martin Bernal) has been severely challenged by Blok 1996. The nationalism of Müller fits better with the project of political liberalism that follows the Napoleonic wars (Williamson 2006, 155).

134. Müller 1844 [1825], 247.

135. Von Hendy 2001, 62; Bremmer 2011, 534. The relationship between myth and folktale is discussed in this volume by William Hansen (chapter 5).

136. Burkert 1980, 161.

137. The foundational article is Lévi-Strauss 1955 (reprinted many times). Still another trend (considered in Csapo 2005, 262–315) is myth as ideology. For myth as ideology in a narrative form, see Lincoln 1999, 147; 2002, 216.

138. Cf. Von Hendy 2001, 154–201. Two of the most popular mythographers of the twentieth century, Mircea Eliade and Joseph Campbell, revert to this assumption.

139. Henrichs 1987, 255.

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2 INTRODUCTION Versnel's chapter in the first edition of this book, reprinted here with a few adaptations, has been called "the fundamental essay on myth and ritual in antiquity."^a While the approach indicated by the expression "myth and ritual" is still often identified with the "Cambridge school" or "Cambridge ritualists," and while James George Frazer (1854–1941) is seen as the fundamental inspiration of this group, Versnel tells a somewhat different story. He gives one of the ritualists, Jane Harrison (1850–1928), an importance at least equal to Frazer's. Her *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens* appeared, he points out, in the same year as the two-volume first edition of Frazer's *The Golden Bough* (1890). In the preface to her book, Harrison says: "My belief is that in many, even the large majority of cases ritual practice misunderstood explains the elaboration of myth." Here is an epochal shift in Greek mythology, as unexpected, against the background of the history told by Pàmias in chapter 1, as the advent of psychoanalytic interpretation of myth ten years later. (Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams*, with his first published statement of the Oedipus complex, appeared in 1900.)

The year before Harrison's book, W. Robertson Smith's *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (1889) had appeared, in which her idea was anticipated. Ritual was already turning up in examination questions at Cambridge University in 1888. The complete history of the idea remains to be written.^b Robertson Smith pointed out the path taken by his student and friend Frazer, and Frazer's annual ritual of the dying and rising sacred king would go into Harrison's and the ritualists' "year demon." And yet, Versnel points out, in Harrison's *Themis* (1927), the relation of myth to ritual is inverted: not, as in Frazer, myth as an account of rituals believed to have magical efficacy, but myths as the products of spontaneous imagination arising from ritual experience. Versnel sees here the point at which a new path in twentieth-century scholarship on Greek religion begins. It will lead to new theorizations by Jean-Pierre Vernant and his school and also by Walter Burkert.

In *Themis* Versnel also finds the beginning of the "initiation complex." He tells the history of initiation studies in the twentieth century (in the substantial section "Initiation: A Modern Complex"), which gathered steam as the sacred king came into disfavor. Here, Harrison's idea of the spontaneous, simultaneous origin of myth and ritual finds its fulfillment in Burkert's work on initiation. "Burkert's synthesis is pure 'Harrison.'" Versnel observes another cycle in research: as anthropology had informed the work of Robertson Smith and of Frazer, once again it contributed to research on ancient religion, this time with the concept of marginality. He sets out the concept and then offers a critique, proceeding to dis-

cussion of the “inherent fatal elasticity” of the initiation form of myth and ritual theory. He focuses on an article that interprets the story of Odysseus in terms of initiation.^c

In conclusion, Versnel argues that this story fits the criteria for both forms of the myth and ritual theory: New Year complex and initiation. Thus “what is sauce [evidence] for the goose [New Year complex] is sauce [evidence] for the gander [initiation].” He then tries to answer the question: why do the same data have this range of fungibility? He opts for Burkert’s explanation: prehistorically rooted sociobiological “programs of action,” to which both myths and rituals are genetically related, at least in their typical features. Versnel’s conclusion is striking for the theoretical boldness just noted and also for practical caution (“by no means true of all myths and rites, and . . . may even hold only for a small minority”).

In support of the boldness of his interpretation of the Odysseus story, one could introduce evidence that he did not use. Although he refers in general to “fairy tales and myths of the *Odyssey* type,” he does not mention the folktale called “The Homecoming Husband.”^d In *The Types of International Folktales* it is summarized thus:

In the absence of her husband . . . who is far away on a journey . . . a woman is forced to choose another husband. The first husband (disguised, as a beggar) returns (with supernatural help, carried during a deep sleep, warned by a dream) on the wedding day and discloses his identity to his wife (by a ring well known to her), is recognized by domestic animals (horse, dog), or answers the woman’s questions correctly (concerning features of the house or birthmarks). The revenge on the rival follows . . .^e

This tale has been found across a vast area of the globe, from Iceland to Indonesia, and has received literary treatment many times. A primary comparandum for classicists is the Serbo-Croatian version.^f The type divides into two subtypes, which can be called compound and simple. The compound subtype has the suitor contest at the beginning: the hero must win the bride, whom he soon leaves to go on a journey that will separate them for many years. The simple subtype, of which the *Odyssey* is an example, lacks this motif and begins with the hero already absent or with the departure of the hero. The simple subtype tends to be Western or European and the compound tends to be Eastern. The most notable representative of the compound subtype is the story of Alamysh, which is found in the forms of folktale and epic song (*dastan*) over the whole territory of the Turkic peoples (the Uzbeks, the Kazakhs, the Karakalpaks, the Kirghiz, and the

Turkmens), from the Altai Mountains and the Urals in the East to the Volga and down through the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union to Turkey. The best known form of the story is the version (of about fourteen thousand lines) recorded from Fazil Yuldashev, an Uzbek singer.⁸

This tale looks like further evidence for the deep-rootedness of the Odysseus story, and, if one follows Versnel in looking for an origin of this phenomenon, one may want to follow him to “the interpretation of this story as a variation on the biological-cultural program of action [as per Burkert], which may have been carried over into both complexes [New Year complex and initiation] and which, *independently*, has become the material from which dreams, fairy tales, and myths of a certain type have been fashioned” (his emphasis).

What's Sauce for the Goose Is Sauce for the Gander

Myth and Ritual, Old and New

H. S. VERSNEL

The primary aim of this chapter is to give the reader some insight into the debate, which is a century old now, on the complex of problems concerning the interrelation of myth and ritual. I have found that it is impossible to gain an adequate impression of the present state of theory in this field if its previous history is overlooked or is sketched along too rudimentary lines. Naturally, a survey of the evolution *in toto* means entering an already well-plowed field. There is no lack of historical and critical surveys of earlier views, and I have made grateful use of them.¹ The emphasis here is on those aspects of the theories of myth and ritual that relate to the ancient cultures of the Mediterranean world, a feature that distinguishes this essay from, for instance, a survey like the one by Kluckhohn (1942) or the papers by Kaberry (1957), Penner (1968), and Segal (1980), all of them studies offering a broader, notably anthropological, perspective. I have tried, moreover, to prevent the critical element from dominating: Bascom (1957) and Fontenrose (1966) contain many valuable thoughts but, because of their strongly negative bias, are not the appropriate tools for an introduction to the subject. In plan and approach my introduction is closest to the survey by Burkert (1980), which does not, however, go beyond a very summary view. Although it

is not my aim here to present a complete bibliography of this much discussed subject, I cannot refrain from mentioning the interesting chapter “La ripetizione mitico-rituale” in A. M. di Nola’s *Antropologia religiosa* (1974), which treats the subject from the perspective of “repetition phenomena.”

What distinguishes the present effort from its predecessors is that it does not stop at those theories that, until now, have been associated with the phrase “myth and ritual” but pays special attention to the newest trends in classical studies (i.e., up to the 1990s). The main task I have set myself is to show where the roots of the recent approach are to be found; to examine to what extent there is a connection between the old and the new points of view; and, finally, to pose the question of whether the gap separating them is as unbridgeable as is commonly believed. The way I have arranged the material is unorthodox, and some aspects of the disposition are no doubt debatable. The two phases are characterized by two names: Jane E. Harrison and Walter Burkert. The overall structure of my approach, moreover, is based on Harrison’s suggestions about the various ways in which myth and ritual may be connected.

The lavish supply of bibliographical notes, finally, has an additional purpose: it is meant to guide interested readers, especially in the study of specific themes in the subject matter treated here. Myth and ritual are, after all, the main materials of religion, and research into them, as we shall see, has been exemplary for the development of the study of ancient religion.

1. Questions

Myth was the dominant factor in nineteenth-century studies of the history of religion until a change took place somewhere in the last part of the nineteenth century. Textbooks that nowadays would carry *Religionsgeschichte*, “history of religion,” in the titles were then regularly classified as mythology, as witness the well-known works by Gruppe, Preller, and Roscher.

Ritual dominates the scene in practically all the textbooks on Greek and Roman religion during most of the twentieth century. This is what M. P. Nilsson says when speaking about H. Usener and A. Dieterich,² the protagonists in this field from around the turn of the century: “Der Umschwung war vollendet: statt der Mythen waren die Riten in den Vordergrund getreten” (“The reversal was complete: instead of myths, rites had come to the fore”). Nilsson, author of the two monumental volumes of *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*,³ “that masterpiece of patient brilliance,” as it has been called,⁴ died in 1967, the year in which the third edition of volume I was published. On the same page I quoted from above,

Nilsson continues: "Seitdem ist keine durchgreifende oder grundsätzliche Änderung der Methode und der Richtung der Forschung eingetreten" ("Since then there has not been any radical or essential change in method and direction of research"). In this nonagenarian's view, then, rite, cult, and ceremonial action had carried the day, once and for all. More recently, nonetheless, an American scholar, B. Lincoln, complained that "ritual [is] a neglected area for study, . . . for most scholars have tended to give far more attention to myth than to ritual," and "there still exists a grievous imbalance in favor of myth."⁵

What actually happened, then, in the interval between Nilsson's complacent statement, dating from the middle of the century, and Lincoln's complaint in 1977? Has the evident shift of interest from myth to ritual around 1900 been followed by a reverse movement in more recent decades? In a way, this is indeed what has happened, as can be seen from a comparison of Nilsson's work referred to above with Burkert's textbook of Greek religion (1985) or his more explicit study of myth and ritual (1979).⁶ Burkert has given myth its due once again. A theory of myth and ritual worthy of the name should focus on myth *and* ritual; it is therefore no coincidence that both the myth and ritual complexes we plan to discuss were discovered at a time when—precisely because of the shift of interest—both elements were topics of debate: the last quarter of the nineteenth and the last quarter of the twentieth century. A qualification might be in order, though: myth, of course, has never been supplanted completely by ritual. Some scholars have set great store by myth, such as Freud, Jung, and Kerényi from a psychological viewpoint; Dumézil, whose comparative mythology, as far as the classical cultures are concerned, focuses especially on Rome—a subject that I shall leave out of account here; and Mircea Eliade, whose phenomenological school includes Lincoln, quoted above. Furthermore, myth takes pride of place in the studies of the Paris school of Vernant, Vidal-Naquet, and Detienne.⁷

It may not be too adventurous to say that the concept of myth *and* ritual was engendered by the tension that sprang from having to choose: myth *or* ritual. That, however, is not the only kind of tension. Here is another instance: in his popular *Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures* (1971), G. S. Kirk states categorically: "Therefore it will be wise to reject from the outset the idea that myth and religion are twin aspects of the same subject, or parallel manifestations of the same psychic condition just as firmly as we rejected the idea that all myths are associated with rituals" (31). Incidentally, both in this book—embodying his Sather lectures—and in his still better known *The Nature of Greek Myths* (1974), one of Kirk's explicit aims is to refute all general theories

of the origin, meaning, and function of myth. One of the five overall theories he eliminates is that there is always (at least originally) a link between myth and ritual—the minimum definition of the myth and ritual theory.

In 1979, however, Burkert's Sather lectures appeared in print: *Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual*. He had certainly read Kirk, but still he states: "And it was in this way that the complex of myth and ritual, though not indissoluble, became a major force in forming ancient cultures, and as it were, dug those deep vales of human tradition in which even today the streams of our experience will tend to flow" (58). This has quite a different ring. Indeed, to refer to the evident contrast between the views of these two scholars as a tension would be rather a euphemism. Both views are discussed later on. For present purposes, it may suffice to ask two obvious questions, to be dealt with consecutively:

1. How and when did the idea arise that myth and ritual might be closely related, a view that was evidently so successful that Kirk thought it worthwhile to oppose it emphatically?
2. How is one to explain the fact that, practically simultaneously, two eminent scholars entertain such totally different views of this interrelation?

2. The Rise and Growth of Myth and Ritual Theory

Interest in ritual in primitive cultures arose in Germany and Britain more or less simultaneously. In a period in which Max Müller's theories reigned supreme and every single myth was thought to be an allegory of meteorological and atmospheric phenomena,⁸ W. Mannhardt dispatched questionnaires all over Europe in search of traces of belief in vegetation, grain, and wood spirits and related manners and customs.⁹ About the same time, E. B. Tylor managed to interest the Anglo-Saxon public in the peculiar features of primitive cultures outside Europe.¹⁰ Darwin published his *Origin of Species* in 1859, and evolution and progress were in the air.¹¹ Might not Mannhardt's rye wolves and stalk hare be the very archetypes from which, much later, the radiant figures of Demeter, Dionysus, or Adonis emerged? Might not religion have had its origin in spirit worship? Tylor himself professed a straightforward evolutionism. Unable to understand nature around him, primitive man tried to influence his environment. To achieve this he practiced magic rites (which did not work, but he did not realize this), and in a later stage he tried to explain this no longer understood ritual and other riddles by means of some myth (which did not fit in, but he did not realize this either)—a twofold misinterpretation, therefore, for which only Germans could

have invented a term such as Urdummheit (“primeval stupidity”), a phrase that did not fail to find a comfortable niche in anthropological jargon.¹²

Certain vague relations between myth and ritual can be glimpsed, but credit for the first clear-cut theory is due to the Scottish Semitist and theologian W. Robertson Smith, whose famous and influential *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (1889) introduced his well-known theory of sacrifice.¹³ His interest in “ritual institutions” as *social* instruments influenced both Durkheim and Freud; of fundamental importance for our subject is the fact that in Robertson Smith’s view, sacrifice as communion—man shares in the vital force of the consumed animal—acquires an additional mythical dimension: as a totem, the sacrificial animal is raised to divine status, so that myth arises from a social rite.

These are the indispensable preliminary stages. It was, after all, Robertson Smith who pointed out the road taken by his student and friend James Frazer.¹⁴ The twelve volumes of Frazer’s *The Golden Bough*—next to the Bible and Kitto’s *The Greeks*—still adorn many a British upper-middle-class drawing room.¹⁵ The work has been praised as “perhaps the greatest scientific Odyssey in modern humanism” (Malinowski) and disparaged as “part of what every schoolboy knows, and what every gentleman must at least have forgotten” (Marett). In a book published in London in 1961 that reported experiences of ecstasy, one person answered the question, “What has induced ecstasy in you?” as follows: “Reading *The Golden Bough* for the first time.” And this informant was not such a fool either, for he had also gone into ecstasies “finding ten chromosomes when I knew they ought to be there.” So it must surely be a marvelous book.

In the definitive version (there had been earlier, shorter editions), the first two volumes are called *The Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings*, and this title provides the code words: magic lay at the roots of religion, and the most important means with which primitive man tried to control nature and vegetation lay in magic-sacral kingship. Just as nature goes through an annual cycle of budding, flowering, bearing fruit, withering, and dying, so each year the “aged” king had to be supplanted by a new, vigorous successor, for it is the king’s magic power that sympathetically influences and even controls vegetative life. Nature’s death has to be overcome by a new, young king who defeats the old one in a ritual fight—or somehow supplants him. *The King Must Die* is the title of a best-seller by Mary Renault, a book one might read as a kind of romanticized “Frazer abridged.” So much for rite. There is, however, also a mythical representation or transposition of the natural cycle, dealt with by Frazer in other parts of his series: in *Adonis*, *Attis*, *Osiris*, published originally in 1906 as a separate volume; in *The Dying God*,

Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild (with thanks to Mannhardt); and in *Balder the Beautiful*. A great many cultures, notably those of the Mediterranean world and the Near East, have their “dying and rising gods.” They represent grain, green plants, and trees. Their myths tell of menace, downfall, sojourn in the Underworld, and death, but also of resurrection. During the annual New Year festivities, lamentations are heard bewailing the god who has died, but it is not long before they are replaced by hilarious joy: the god has risen or has manifested himself again, heralding a promise of new life.

There thus emerges an almost ideal parallelism of myth and ritual, both reacting to or reflecting the vegetative cycle of nature:

Rite	Myth
Sacral year king guarantees fertility of nature; he suffers ritual death; a new, vigorous king succeeds.	Year god represents natural vegetative force; dies, is imprisoned in the Underworld; rises again, is reborn.

This scheme is a fundamental one: it is invoked by all myth and ritual theories of the first phase. As a matter of fact, a substantial part of the twentieth century remained in the shadow of the golden bough. We shall concentrate, primarily, on two schools: the Cambridge school, which in the area of classical studies applied itself above all to the Greek material, and the myth and ritual school proper, which centered on the pattern of the ancient Near East. Before dealing with these schools, however, we must focus on one specific figure, even though she herself, without any doubt, belongs to the former school. The reason for this preferential treatment will soon become evident.

JANE HARRISON

Robertson Smith and Frazer both taught in Cambridge. So did Jane Ellen Harrison.¹⁶ “Bloody Jane” to friends, a “blasphemous Kêr” as she said of herself,¹⁷ and the last living maenad according to many others, she led an unorthodox life, which gave rise to rumors with such standard ingredients as libertinism in matters of sex and religion, more or less pronounced feminism, and the extremes of aesthetic refinement on the one hand and “ye Beastly Devices of ye Heathen” on the other. I note this for the sole reason that later criticism seems to have been inspired, at least partly, by the aversion aroused by these, in themselves, less relevant features of her life. Additional information about her may be gleaned, for instance, from her *Reminiscences of a Student's Life* (1925). From her best-known and most important works, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*

(1903) and *Themis* (1912),¹⁸ she emerges as someone who boasts a vast knowledge of Greek material, above all archaeological (archaeology had been her starting point), who has an unmistakable tendency to follow and practice the most recent trends uncritically (she herself mentions—in chronological order—Frazer, Durkheim, Bergson, and Freud),¹⁹ and who is criticized by Kirk for being “utterly uncontrolled by anything resembling careful logic.” “Her customary lack of consistency” is a virtually unanimous finding.²⁰ Still, I should like to show that at least part of the inconsistencies found in her studies may be caused, to a certain extent, by the unmanageable and intrinsically contradictory subject she chose.

A year after the publication of Robertson Smith’s major work and in the very year (1890) in which the first two-volume edition of Frazer’s *Golden Bough* was published, Harrison’s *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens* appeared. In the introduction she says: “My belief is that in many, even the large majority of cases *ritual practice misunderstood* explains the elaboration of myth” (iii). In the last analysis, even the most beautiful, the loveliest Greek myths derive from “always *practical ritual*.” A quite telling phrase in an 1891 paper—“a solution I believe to be wholly novel”²¹—shows that she expects to be the first to offer this solution. Without doubt, she is being sincere in this respect. Frazer, who, as we have seen, had opted for the same starting point, did not feel any forceful urge to put the presumed interrelation of myth and ritual on a solid theoretical basis, and Robertson Smith was publishing at practically the same time. It just so happened, as is often the case, that either direct or indirect mental contact gave rise, almost simultaneously, to related viewpoints. However, a glance at modern surveys and textbooks of anthropology and the history of religion will show that, in this broad perspective, the other two scholars have ousted Jane Harrison. It is not a matter of giving honor where honor is due or of trying to be original at all costs, but solely in pursuit of my subject, myth and ritual, that I want to show that Harrison, in this domain at least, deserves more credit than she was given and that in her works, *all* the problems were touched upon that later authors dealt with in *their* way.

In the *Prolegomena* Harrison still adheres to the view, quoted above, that myths were created to account for rites. In line with nineteenth-century ideas, the gods are supposed to belong to the domain of myth. They arise as a kind of personification from rites, especially apotropaic ones, meant to protect crops and settlements. These *daimones* are products of an almost intellectual explanatory process, and in *Themis* Harrison systematizes these numerous demons into one prototypical, genuinely Frazerian year god, denoting him, for the occasion, by a homemade Greek term as the *eniautos daimon*.

In the same *Themis*, however, there is a sudden, strong emphasis on the social component of the myth-making process: "Strong emotion collectively experienced begets this illusion of objective reality; each worshipper is conscious of something in his emotion not himself, stronger than himself. He does not know it is the force of collective suggestion, he calls it a god" (46–47). Dionysus, for instance, who was first a typical *eniautos daimon*, is now called "his thiasos incarnate" (38). Here Durkheim has been substituted for Frazer.²²

It is necessary to realize the implications of this step. In the Frazerian scheme, man is the *manipulator*: he believes he can control *external processes* by means of specific, above all magical, methods—rites. Myth, then, is a kind of verbal account of these rituals. In the new interpretation, on the other hand, man is *the one who is manipulated*: however the ritual may relate to external data like fertility of the soil, what counts is *what the participant himself experiences*, his own emotion. The mythical images, therefore, are products, first and foremost, of *spontaneous, collective emotions*.²³ I do not think it an exaggeration to maintain that the seeds of one of the great controversies in twentieth-century approaches to ancient religions can be detected here. The two lines may be illustrated by comparing two types of approach: (1) that of such scholars as Deubner, Nilsson, and Latte, in which rites are studied primarily with regard to their external functions and aims and in which there is hardly any room for myth, except as an etiological explanation of the ritual acts, and (2) the approach of a very disparate group of modern scholars, guided by Vernant and Burkert; here myth and rite are considered to be, in the first place, forms of expression that identify or integrate the cultural community itself. I shall come back to this subject.

Just as the year king–year god scheme represented Harrison's first approach, for which she used the term *eniautos daimon*, so she illustrated her second approach with a hymn from Palaikastro in eastern Crete that had recently been discovered.²⁴ The inscription probably dates from the third century B.C.E., but certain elements of the text indicate a much older period. In this hymn, the *megistos kouros*, identified as the young Zeus, is invited to come to Mount Dikte, heading the *daimones* for this year, and "to spring into the wine vats, the herds, the crops, the cities, the ships, the young citizens and Themis." Here she is at last: Themis. Now, no true Frazerian would hesitate to recognize the year god in this *megistos kouros*, especially not one who accepts the most recent interpretation by M. L. West of a corrupt fragment of the text that says, in his view, that the god first "has gone into the earth."²⁵ Harrison, however, thinks otherwise.

In her view, the hymn points to the mythical Curetes,²⁶ who perform a war

dance at the birth of the Cretan Zeus. As such, it reflects a social event of central importance in all primitive communities: the rite of initiation that turns boys into men, admitting them to the community of adult men. The elements of threat, torture, and death that often play a role in initiatory rites (see below) can be recognized, Harrison believes, in the myth of the Titans, by whom the Dionysus-Zagreus infant (closely related to Zeus Cretagenes) is torn to pieces. They are the mythical reflections of the elder members of the tribe, disguised as spirits of the deceased, who “kill” the initiation candidate, reduced to the status of a baby, so that a new human being may arise. The *megistos kouros* that is invoked “is obviously but a reflection or impersonation of the body of Kouretes” (*Themis*, 27), who in their turn are mythical reflections of the human ephebes. In other words, the mythical characters “arise straight out of a social custom” (28), and this amounts to saying that “the ritual act, what the Greeks called the *drômenon*, is prior to the divinity” (19) (in other words: “myth”).

That much we knew already, but now we are in for a surprise: in a related discussion a dozen pages earlier, Harrison maintained that investigation of the ritual is a primary condition in order to fathom the religious intention of a particular complex. She then continues: “This does not, however, imply, as is sometimes supposed, that ritual is prior to myth; they probably arose together. Ritual is the utterance of an emotion, a thing felt in *action*, myth in words or thoughts. They arise *pari passu*. The myth is not at first *etiological*, it does not arise to give a reason; it is representative, another form of utterance, of expression” (16). When she returns to this relationship at greater length later in the book (327ff.), she describes myth as the words uttered by the participants in a ritual, originally probably no more than cries and interjections. In fact, this explains their simultaneous occurrence: “[myth] is the spoken correlative of the acted rite, the thing done; it is *to legomenon* as contrasted with or rather as related to *to drômenon*” (328).

This may suffice to explain the irritation felt by many a reader used to more consistent reasoning; in particular, the parenthetical clause “as is sometimes supposed” would have given offense. But at the same time Harrison has outlined another serious possibility: that of the simultaneous origin of myth and ritual in certain situations. And she even appears to introduce yet a third possibility when she writes: “When we realize that the myth is the plot of the *drômenon* we no longer wonder that the plot of a drama is called its ‘myth’” (331). Actually, the suggestion that myth can also function as the scenario of a (dramatic) ritual seems to be formulated here *in nuce*. I do not know whether this was her inten-

tion, as she never exploited the possibility that myth may also serve as a model that is imitated in dramatic action. That was done by others, who sometimes used an almost identical terminology.

To sum up: in sometimes rudimentary form and with often dubious argumentation, Harrison offered three suggestions on the interrelation of myth and ritual:

1. Myth arises from rite.
2. Myth and rite arise *pari passu*.
3. Myth is the scenario of a dramatic ritual.

Moreover, she tested these theoretical possibilities in two cases of a specific myth and ritual complex:

- (a) The Frazerian complex of year king, year god, and New Year festival.
- (b) The initiation complex.

We shall now see that for decades to come it was only types 1 and 3 of these theoretical possibilities that attracted any attention and that in the initial phase interest was focused almost exclusively on the New Year myth and ritual complex (a). The remaining two suggestions (2 and b) did not receive much credit or attention before the middle of the twentieth century. As stated earlier, I shall structure my remarks according to the patterns of interrelation put forward by Harrison.

MYTH ARISES FROM RITE: THE CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL

Two genuine classical philologists, G. Murray and F. M. Cornford, each contributed a chapter to *Themis*. In his "Excursus on the Ritual Forms Preserved in Greek Tragedy" (341–63), Murray explains the rise of tragedy from a dancing ritual around the *eniautos daimon* Dionysus. In tragedy, Murray holds, the following underlying pattern may be discovered: (1) *agon*, a fight between the year god and his enemy; (2) *pathos*, the year god suffers sacrificial death; (3) *messenger* arrives, bringing word of the god's death; (4) *threnos*, lamentation; (5) *anagnorisis*, the killed god is recognized; (6) theophany, the god's resurrection and manifestation.

The very next sentence in Murray's chapter is: "First, however, there is a difficulty to clear away" (344), and that is precisely what the reader had already suspected. After all, we are always told that a tragedy that ends well is not a good tragedy and that this is why the rare tragedies with happy endings run the risk of being assigned a place among the satyr plays. To solve his difficulty, Murray assumed that the positive final chords had become detached from the tragedy

proper and ended up as a separate theme in the satyr plays. This is one of the first explicit invocations of the “disintegration of the pattern,” a stereotyped plea in the myth and ritual debate.

In later works Murray repeatedly returned to the myth and ritual notion,²⁷ for instance in the initial chapters of his popular *Five Stages of Greek Religion*.²⁸ He also wrote the preface to T. Gaster’s comprehensive book *Thespis: Ritual, Myth, and Drama in the Ancient Near East* (1950), discussed below. Here at last a connection emerges between Greece and the ancient Near East that had been exploited hardly or not at all in the Cambridge school since Frazer. It was F. M. Cornford who went farthest in this respect. In *The Origin of Attic Comedy* (1914), he held the rather surprising view that comedy, no less than tragedy, arose from a ritual New Year festival around the death and rebirth of the god. He had already adumbrated this theory in his contribution to *Themis*, in which he discussed the origin of the Olympic games: the winner in the contest, the *megistos kouros* of the year, is led in a wild *komos* and celebrates a sacral marriage with the king’s daughter. These, he held, are also the ingredients of comedy. In his later work, however, Cornford extended his vision further: man evolves from the magical (Frazer) through the mythical (Frazer/Harrison) to the philosophical/rational stage, the stage to which Cornford in fact devoted the bulk of his studies.²⁹ The contacts with the cultures of the Near East were specified by Cornford in a posthumous publication, *The Unwritten Philosophy* (1950), in which he linked motifs from Hesiod’s *Theogony* with seasonal myths from the Near East, an initiative that has had a highly productive sequel in subsequent decades.³⁰

This means that the Cambridge school was eventually posthumously freed from a certain Greece-oriented position of isolation,³¹ partly under the influence of another myth and ritual school that—in similar isolation—directed attention to the Near East. I now turn to this other school.

MYTH AS A SCENARIO FOR DRAMATIC RITUAL: THE MYTH AND RITUAL SCHOOL PROPER

In 1933 the Old Testament scholar S. H. Hooke edited a volume of studies to which many scholars contributed: *Myth and Ritual: Essays on the Myth and Ritual of the Hebrews in Relation to the Culture Pattern of the Ancient East* (1933); twenty-five years later he edited another volume, *Myth, Ritual, and Kingship* (1958), in which both opponents and supporters had their say—an ideal state of affairs for later historians.³² It was this school of myth and ritual theorists that gave this complex its characteristic name and content.³³ The titles of these books are pro-

grammatic, pointing as they do to cultures of the ancient Near East, including the Israelite one, and the theme is the interrelation of myth and ritual in a context in which kingship plays an important role. The thesis is that in these areas there existed an endemic, widespread “cult pattern.” What did this pattern look like, and how was the idea conceived?

It all began with the Babylonian New Year festival, the so-called Akitu ceremony.³⁴ All the gods, headed by Marduk, come to Babylon to this festival to celebrate the New Year in ceremonies that include a sacred marriage. The king is subjected to a curious ritual: the insignia of his dignity, his scepter, ring, and crown, are taken from him and laid down in front of Marduk’s statue. The king kneels down, and the priest pulls one of his ears; the king professes his innocence and is given the promise that his kingship will prosper. The insignia are returned to him, and he is struck by the priest, which makes the king cry. From other sources we learn that the king then rides through the city in a kind of triumphal procession, together with Marduk.

That is, in itself, already more than enough for a Frazerian scheme, as Frazer himself had not failed to notice.³⁵ Here we seem to have a variant of the ancient regicide, toned down into abdication, humiliation, and reinvestiture. So much for the rite. As for the myth, the *Enuma Elish*, the Creation Epic, was recited during these New Year festivals. It told how Marduk (originally, of course, an older god) led the gods to war against Tiamat, the chaos monster of the primeval flood; how he defeated Tiamat’s forces, sliced her in two, and fashioned heaven and earth from the two pieces. What we have here, then, is a case of perfect parallelism: the rite performed by the king is a reflection, in human terms, of what happened to the god in primordial mythical times, *in illo tempore*.³⁶ Creation of the cosmos after a victory gained over chaos corresponds to the regeneration of kingship after a period of chaotic anarchy during the king’s absence, a correspondence confirmed by the mention of the king’s sacred marriage.³⁷

For the correspondence to be perfect, the myth would have to start with a description of the god’s downfall, too, as is fitting for a “dying and rising” god and as is told, for instance, of other Near Eastern gods (notably Tammuz). Did Marduk, too, perish first? In the *Enuma Elish* this is not the case, but on a sorely damaged tablet from the sixth century B.C.E. it is recorded that Marduk is imprisoned, beaten, and wounded: “People are looking in the streets for Marduk. Where is he held captive? . . . The *Enuma Elish* they sing in Nisan is about him who is in prison.”³⁸ This, then, completes the myth and ritual pattern, the “cult pattern”:

Rite	Myth
Crisis situation between old and new	Threat by primeval chaos in the shape of a monster
King is dethroned and humiliated	Marduk taken prisoner
King is reinstated	Marduk gains victory, becomes king
Triumphal pageant	Triumphal pageant
Sacred marriage	Sacred marriage (celebrated on New Year's Day)

Numerous scholars, especially in Britain and the Scandinavian countries (for instance, C. J. Gadd, E. O. James, A. R. Johnson, K. I. A. Engnell, and G. Widengren), have tried to discover this New Year complex in other Near Eastern cultures as well.³⁹ According to Hooke and others, his theory is not to blame for the unavoidable problems that arise. In many cultures only the mythic component has been preserved; everywhere we have to allow for disintegration of the pattern due to migration, retouching, or theological intervention.⁴⁰ As for Israel, one could already hark back to the fundamental studies by S. Mowinkel, who had recognized in some psalms mythic-ritual texts accompanying the king's enthronement as Yahweh's representative.⁴¹

As stated earlier, this myth and ritual school had hardly any contact with the earlier Cambridge school.⁴² Frazer, who was honored by the Cambridge group,⁴³ is virtually ignored by Hooke and his followers. One sometimes gets the impression that they feel embarrassed when reminded of the unmistakably Frazerian aspect of their cult pattern. Hooke even strongly opposes Frazer's "non-historical method of the purely comparative approach," and this leads to several other characteristic differences between Hooke and Harrison, to take only these two scholars. As Harrison saw it, in the last analysis everything had started with magic and had developed gradually.⁴⁴ Hooke, on the other hand, was not interested in the magical origins of sacral kingship, if any. Whereas Frazer and Harrison held that, all over the world, rite and myth developed in comparable ways through spontaneous evolution, Hooke was not interested in development but adopted a diffusionist view. He thus betrayed his own origin, the Pan-Egyptian diffusionism advocated by Grafton Elliot Smith and W. J. Perry and the Pan-Babylonian version defended by A. Jeremias and others.⁴⁵ (The strongly astral emphasis in these positions may be considered a late offshoot of Max Müller's astral mythology.)⁴⁶ There are further differences, such as the stronger emphasis on kingship, which is understandable against the background of the culture of the ancient Near East. By far the most significant one, however, is that in the relation of myth and rite the order is reversed, or at least given a slightly reversed bias. Whereas the Cam-

bridge school in general, in spite of variants, believed in the rise of myth from rite, the new Orientalist myth and ritual theorists shifted the emphasis. Hooke did not exactly exclude the rite-myth sequence, but he sidestepped the question of origin. Taking a synchronic viewpoint, he regarded royal ritual as a dramatic representation of the mythical scenario. In his first volume of papers, *Myth, Ritual, and Kingship*, he writes: "In general the spoken part of a ritual consists of a description of what is being done, *it is the story which the ritual enacts*. This is the sense in which the term 'myth' is used in our discussion. The original Myth, inseparable in the first instance from its ritual, embodies in more or less symbolic fashion, the original situation which is seasonally reenacted in the ritual" (3). The passage is not free from ambiguity,⁴⁷ but it does give a clear indication of what the author does and does not accept. It is, at any rate, the shortest statement of this myth and ritual approach,⁴⁸ and as such it is a direct heritage from the Pan-Babylonian Jeremias, who wrote in 1929 that "alles irdische Sein und Geschehen einem himmlischen Sein und Geschehen entspricht" ("everything that exists and happens on earth corresponds with something that exists and happens in heaven") and that the earthly king is an "Abbild des himmlischen Königs" ("an image of the heavenly king").⁴⁹ Thus the flock of the faithful need not worry: whatever was said of Him, God came first and had always done so. Those who preferred to think that He Himself might have arisen from some earlier social ritual were always welcome in libertine Cambridge.

3. The Fuses Blow: Out-and-Out Myth and Ritual Theorists

In one of her later works, with the appropriate title *Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (1921), Jane Harrison threatened to prove that the well-known legend of Don Juan had arisen from a fertility ritual (xlii, n. 1).⁵⁰ Murray had already preceded her by applying the myth and ritual scheme to Shakespeare's works.⁵¹ It was to be expected—why should diffusion be confined to the Near East? Why would evolution obtain only in Greece? *Patet mundus*. One of the contributors to another volume of essays edited by Hooke, *The Labyrinth* (1935), was A. M. Hocart. The final sentences of his essay, which also conclude the book, are: "Thus we have gone round the world in search of the true myth, the myth that is bound up with life. We have found it in India, beneath the Southern Cross, in the plains of North America. We have come to find it at our doors."⁵² We would not be wrong to think of Hocart as the founder of what we might call "out-and-out myth and ritualism." In an earlier work, *Kingship* (1927), he had already discovered a coronation ritual that had spread all over the world, starting from Mesopota-

mia(!). It was based completely on the New Year scheme but consisted of a much greater number of elements, twenty-six in fact, which are consequently arranged from a to z. This opened the floodgates. L. Raglan, in a book that became very popular, *The Hero: A Study in Tradition, Myth, and Drama* (1936),⁵³ maintained that *all* myths in the whole world, without exception, were based on a single primordial rite, sacral regicide, and had their origin in Mesopotamia. And soon Guy Fawkes, William Tell, Robin Hood, and Thomas à Becket came to follow suit.⁵⁴ It looks like a serious application of the witty argument that proved irrefutably that G. Murray himself must be a dying and rising god. Jane Harrison, by contrast, is honest and cautious in her pious wish: "It would be convenient if the use of the word *myth* could be confined to such sequences, such stories as are involved in rites" (*Themis*, 331). S. E. Hyman,⁵⁵ a forceful advocate of the myth and ritual theory and admirer of Harrison's *Themis*, "the most revolutionary book of the 20th century,"⁵⁶ not only asserted that myth was always concomitant with rite, "like a child's patter as he plays," but also showed that Darwin's evolutionary theories followed the myth and ritual pattern: the "struggle for life" is the *agon*, the "survival of the fittest" the theophany of Murray's tragic scheme.⁵⁷

The wildest excesses were due to Murray's namesake, the well-known Margaret Murray,⁵⁸ with her theories about witches as later priestesses of ancient pagan rituals. She demonstrated that "at least in every reign from William the Conqueror to James I, the sacrifice of the incarnate God was consummated either in the person of the king or in that of his substitute."⁵⁹ I prefer the explicitly romanticized fictions of Robert Graves, Shirley Jackson (Hyman's wife), and J. B. Vickery,⁶⁰ who introduced the theme in literature.

When I first became acquainted with myth and ritual theory I had not the faintest notion that I would ever call Gaster's comprehensive work *Thespis* (see above) a moderate book. This study gives a concise survey of what is known about the "seasonal pattern" of the Near East and discusses the related Canaanite, Hittite, and Egyptian myths, with a few excursions into Greek drama and English mummary play. After our voyage across the seething waters of much wilder seas, I am inclined to consider this book a relatively calm and clear fairway and to recommend it—as an introduction to a limited part of the myth and ritual approach—to those interested readers who are firmly resolved not to take the author's word for everything he claims.⁶¹

As far as myth and ritual theory in anthropological literature is concerned, a few remarks will suffice, from which it may become clear that some anthropolo-

gists have not wholly unjustly been included under the heading of out-and-out myth and ritual theorists.

Here we should especially mention B. Malinowski,⁶² who found his source of inspiration in Frazer and Robertson Smith and also quoted Harrison approvingly. A practicing anthropologist himself, he gave a definition of myth as, above all, "charter," an explanation providing legitimation and foundation of customs, rules, moral codes, and rites: "There is no important magic, no ceremony, no ritual without belief; and the belief is spun out into accounts of concrete precedent. The union is very intimate, for myth is not only looked upon as a commentary or additional information, but is a warrant, a charter, and often even a practical guide to the activities with which it is connected."⁶³ This is one of the monolithic theories of myth attacked by Kirk and others. In this respect Malinowski still betrays the influence of his mentors, without being a genuine myth and ritual theorist: other phenomena besides rites also find their legitimation in myths, and he later speaks of "myth as a dramatic development of dogma,"⁶⁴ thus following a different course.

Nevertheless, it is remarkable to see how other anthropologists venture far-reaching statements about the interrelation of myth and rite. Kluckhohn, in his 1942 paper "Myths and Rituals: A General Theory," mentioned above, claims that we cannot speak of priority in the relation between myth and ritual: "The myth is a system of word symbols, whereas ritual is a system of object and act symbols. Both are symbolic processes for dealing with the same type of situation in the same affective mode" (58). That is why they are interdependent, and the task they have in common is to "reduce the anticipation of disaster" (69). E. R. Leach puts it in an even less equivocal way: "myth, in my terminology, is the counterpart of ritual: myth implies ritual, ritual implies myth, they are one and the same."⁶⁵

Such statements can be explained if we think of the functionalist perspective from which these anthropologists operated. Both myth and ritual were considered primarily as symbolic means of giving sense, form, and definition to the social universe within which man functions as a social being. In *Natural Symbols*, Mary Douglas maintains that "ritual is the institutionalized rhetoric of symbolic order,"⁶⁶ an absolute condition for the identification of the group and the integration of the individual in the group. Substitute "myth" for "ritual" in this statement and the truth value remains the same.⁶⁷

Many objections have been raised against the generalizing and totalizing claims of the statements quoted above.⁶⁸ In anthropological circles the discus-

sion is still in full swing, offering many scholars ample opportunity to prove their skills in matters of jargon, analysis, and polemics. Let us hasten back to our own limited territory, where, for that matter, we shall meet with the very same discussion.

4. Criticism

There is a story that Bertrand Russell once proposed to get Jane Harrison a bull on condition that she and her lady friends would demonstrate how maenads managed to tear such a beast to pieces with their bare hands. Russell, the logician, simply could not believe that the unaided human hand was capable of such an act. His proposal is a mild form of criticism, but matters could be different, as witness the judgment of the Plato specialist P. Shorey: "Professor Murray has done much harm by helping to substitute in the minds of an entire generation for Arnold's and Jebb's conception of the serene rationality of the classics the corybantic Hellenism of Miss Harrison and Isadora Duncan and Susan Glaspell and Mr. Stark Young's 'Good Friday and Classical Professors,' the higher vaudeville Hellenism of Mr. Vachel Lindsey, the anthropological Hellenism of Sir James Frazer, the irrational, semi-sentimental, Polynesian, free-verse and sex-freedom Hellenism of all the gushful geysers of 'rapturous rubbish' about the Greek spirit."⁶⁹ That is how "real" classical scholars judged the Cambridge school, and E. R. Dodds, therefore, with his irrational Greeks, was not taken seriously either. Indeed, Cambridge was in such bad odor that M. I. Finley, by far the best-known ancient historian there, saw fit to point out *en passant* that he wrote his *World of Odysseus* before he ever set foot in Cambridge,⁷⁰ and Kirk wrote his *Myth* after he left his Cambridge post for Yale. Both books were said to exude a Cambridge odor. Murray, by the way, was an "unregenerate Oxford Australian."

From all this one can perhaps imagine the emotional responses the other myth and ritual school theorists elicited in contemporary orthodox clerical circles. Robertson Smith had already had to listen to this: "His mind is like a shop with a big cellar behind it, and having good shelves and windows . . . But he doesn't grow his own wool, nor does he spin the thread, nor weave the webs that are in his cellar or on his shelves. All his goods come in paper parcels from Germany."⁷¹ Behind all this is the aversion to ethnological comparativism, especially if this refuses to stop short at *Genesis* 1:1. And Robertson Smith did not stop. A notorious "Robertson Smith case" resulted, partly in reaction to his blasphemous conviction that Moses could never have written the entire Pentateuch. This led to his dismissal from the chair of Old Testament studies at Free Church College

in Aberdeen in 1881. Two years later he moved to Cambridge, where he came to hold a chair of Arabic.

I have not heard about any early retirement among later myth and ritual theorists, but the accusation of having “recklessly imposed their pattern” on Judaism is only a mild version of what has also been voiced in stronger terms.⁷² This kind of emotional criticism is highly interesting from the point of view of cultural history, but it does not allow of any reasonable discussion, in contrast to other forms of critical approach.

For example, the building blocks of a theory can be tested for hardness: the tablet on which Marduk's downfall is described may be interpreted as Assyrian war propaganda against the hostile supreme deity;⁷³ the hymn of the Curetes itself hardly contains any reference to initiation elements (in many ways it seems rather to refer to the New Year complex);⁷⁴ and in tragedy there are simply no traces of Murray's theophany and resurrection.

Or we can tackle the pillars of the building: P. Lambrechts was the first to aver that some alleged dying and rising gods, such as Attis or Adonis, *did* die in the myth but did not *disertis verbis* rise again.⁷⁵ A similar statement was made about Tammuz by Yamauchi,⁷⁶ and it has been suggested that a christological perspective imposed a pattern upon the gods of the Near East, only half of which has actually been attested. Moreover, it has been pointed out that for Greece we do not know anything about either sacral kingship or coherent complexes of myth and ritual.⁷⁷ Even the actual existence of sacral regicide, so often recorded in anthropological literature, has been questioned. Informants too often refer to former times: “We ourselves do not practise this any more, but our grandparents chopped up a king.”⁷⁸ We might consider introducing a category, “mythic ritual,” to describe this frequent and highly interesting phenomenon.

Anyone who wants a survey of such instances of specific and detailed criticism should consult J. Fontenrose,⁷⁹ who stated categorically as early as 1959, in *Python: A Study of Delphic Myth and Its Origins*, “The rituals did not enact the myth, the myth did not receive its plot from the rituals” (461–62), and who, responding to opposition from the myth and ritual quarter, devoted a book to *The Ritual Theory of Myth* (1966). The annoying thing is that criticism like Fontenrose's, however useful and even necessary it may be, will never tip the scales. Raglan, Hyman, and Margaret Murray spoke the language of the initiated, which does not require a book to defend or to attack it. There is no convincing the initiated: they see a great light in which all the pieces can be fitted into the big jigsaw puzzle. As for the noninitiated, they thought it all nonsense anyway. And in any

case, even detailed criticism among reasonable people usually has only marginal effects. Even if it is conceded that the tablet recording Marduk's imprisonment has another background—itself an arguable point—there are still masses of data left. It is thus essential to ask how many data we need before we feel justified in speaking of a pattern, and that is where opinions differ widely.

Refuting theories in a genuinely scientific way is only possible when the theories claim to have general validity. As the Dutch essayist Karel van het Reve says, popularizing Popper: if a scientific theory claims that all redheads are alcoholics, we can refute this proposition by pointing to one redhead who is not an alcoholic—and whoever came up with that general proposition simply has to hold his tongue henceforth.⁸⁰ This neatly sums up Kirk's approach in his works mentioned above.⁸¹ In *The Nature of Greek Myths*, he proves that the five monolithic theories of the origin and essence of myth—theories claiming to possess general and exclusive validity—are untenable because we can always find some myth that does not fulfill the conditions stipulated. As regards the interpretation of myth and ritual, he reasons as follows: if an interrelation could be proved, it would not provide the one and only explanation for the rise of myths, for we know many myths that cannot possibly have any ritual connection, such as myths explaining why a snake has no feet and walks on its belly. And insofar as there really are demonstrable relations between ritual and myth, their nature varies widely. There are instances in which the myth arises from the ritual or is invented for the occasion as an etiological explanation—the types we have dealt with, for the most part, so far. Then there are forms in which myth and ritual arose independently but were compounded—for instance, again, as an explanation of the rite. And there are a few myths that generate rituals. Certain dramatic actions in the mysteries imitate the myth of Demeter and Kore, which in turn may have been based on an older rite. And it may also happen—but such cases are extremely rare—that ritual and myth arise simultaneously as parallel responses to some critical situation, in Kluckhohn's words: "to reduce the anticipation of disaster."

We can hardly accept this as the last word on the matter. Kirk's skeptical approach has already provoked serious criticism. Was not the baby thrown out with the bathwater? Moreover, granted that the redhead is not an alcoholic *now*, does that imply that he has never been one? Perhaps he was *forced* in some way to leave the bottle alone? Or, being an alcoholic at heart, did he switch to drugs as a substitute? Is his red hair natural? Or could it be that all redheads were indeed originally alcoholics, but that migration and acculturation have led to the disintegration of their way of life?

It is time, I think, for a brief conclusion. Frazer is a fallen giant: that is the *communis opinio* nowadays. "There have been no answers because there were no questions," says one of his wittiest critics, J. Z. Smith,⁸² thus paraphrasing Gertrude Stein as well as Frazer himself, who in the introduction to the third edition of *The Golden Bough* writes: "It is the fate of theories to be wasted away . . . and I am not so presumptuous as to expect or to desire for mine an exemption from the common lot. I hold them all very lightly, and have used them chiefly as convenient pegs on which to hang my collection of facts"—which we might call the understatement of the century. However, the giant who once wrote in a poetical, visionary vein, "The dreamland world of fancy. There is my own true home,"⁸³ remains a colossus, albeit a fallen one. Evolution of religion from magic is an outdated notion by now. Nor should we, as many epigones used to do, maintain the myth and ritual complex connected with the year king and the year god as a scheme for anything and everything, outside of which there is no salvation. Setting aside, however, such notions as original regicide, we cannot very well deny that in many cultures, the time around the New Year is experienced as a period of transition, of crisis, or of threat. The old must be "finished off," the new joyfully hailed; in between there is no-man's-land. This notion is often represented ritually through signals of anarchy, lawlessness, and *anomia* and mythically as the menace of the chaos from which the cosmos must be created. Mircea Eliade, for one, has given an excellent sketch of all this in *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (1954). Let us leave it at that for the moment.

A farewell, equally, to the monolithic explanation of myth as a stereotyped companion to rite. On the other hand, there *are* certain links, such as Jane Harrison's types 1 and 3, which we have dealt with.⁸⁴ That one variant—very rare, according to Kirk—in which myth and rite emerge *pari passu* (Harrison type 2) we have only *mentioned* so far. Like the specific second myth and ritual complex, the initiation scheme (Harrison type *b*), this variant did not come into the limelight until the second half of the twentieth century.⁸⁵ A name is associated with this combination of initiation and myth and ritual in a new key: Walter Burkert.

5. Initiation: A Modern Complex

Harrison's *Themis*, though valued more highly by the writer herself, was generally much less appreciated than her *Prolegomena*.⁸⁶ There is no need to ask why. The strongly utilitarian and ritualistic approach to the ancient religions in particular might, at a pinch, swallow an occasional *eniautos daimon*—the term is even found once in Nilsson's handbook, and Nilsson was surely not one of Har-

risson's admirers—but could not sympathize with apparently “aimless” myth and ritual complexes in which the much sought-after element of fertility was not paramount. It might appear surprising at first sight that *Themis* was not enthusiastically received in Durkheim's circles either, which took offense—not unfairly—at the erratic, associative, and intuitive nature of the book. Durkheim's maxim that as soon as a psychological explanation is suggested somewhere you may be sure it is a wrong one proved to be ominous in this context.

What we can see now is that as the New Year myth and ritual complex came under ever more violent critical fire, attention switched to the initiation complex: the initiation candidate arose from the dying god's ashes. Before the 1960s, H. Jeanmaire's *Couroi et Courètes* (1939) was the only major study in the classical field in which the initiation scheme was applied to Greek myths and rites in a consistent manner, to which we might add G. Dumézil's *Le problème des centaures* (1929) and L. Gernet's “*Frairies antiques*” (1928). The proviso in the classical field is important, however, for outside that domain, notably in the Germanic and Old Persian contexts, numerous studies were devoted to *Männerbünde*, *Jungmannschaften*, and *Geheimbünde*, which were generally recognized as historical reflections of groups of youths in the initiation phase.⁸⁷ However, contacts between these studies and those dealing with the Greco-Roman field—in which A. Alföldi is the most prominent figure—were not made until later in the last century.

Any attempt to ascertain which scholar might have given the initial impulse to the renewed interest in the initiation pattern is bound to be arbitrary. No doubt A. Brelich may be credited with having encouraged the interest in this subject in the 1960s, with such studies as *Le iniziazioni* (vols. I and II, 1960–61), which remained rather obscure, and above all with *Paides e parthenoi* (vol. I, 1969), which was already in manuscript in 1960 (vol. II was never published). In an extensive introduction, Brelich presents an anthropological typology of initiation customs, which he then applies to Greek situations. It was precisely in this period that anthropological interest in initiatory rites was given a new incentive. Eliade's *Birth and Rebirth* (1958) has done much to make the typical characteristics of initiation more widely known.⁸⁸ In the same decade of youthful elan and student protests, P. Vidal-Naquet published “*Le chasseur noir et l'origine de l'éphébie athénienne*,” a study in which he maintained that not only Spartan but also Athenian youths were subjected to initiation rites of a strongly archaic type, well into historical times.⁸⁹

Initiation was again in the air, and if I insist on choosing Walter Burkert as a

starting point, it is partly because a few younger specialists owe their inspiration primarily to Burkert and partly because, in my view, it was Burkert, more than anyone else, who placed the initiation complex in the context of the myth and ritual approach. Burkert is, after all, the most innovative scholar of Greek religion.⁹⁰ His *Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaus und Platon* (1962) had already drawn attention to initiation symptoms, but a basic application was presented in “Krekopidensage und Arrhephoria” (1966), an ideal case of myth and ritual.⁹¹ The rite prescribes that each year the Arrhephoroi, two girls between seven and eleven years of age, are to be secluded on the Acropolis, where they have to weave the peplos for Athena. They are assigned the task of taking an object, the nature of which must remain unknown to them, to Aphrodite’s garden through an underground passage and returning with an equally invisible object wrapped in cloths. The myth tells of two of the daughters of Cecrops, Athens’ most ancient king, Aglauros and Herse, to whom the goddess Athena gave a *kiste* that they were forbidden to open. However, they disobeyed, and what they discovered inside—(one or) two snakes and the Erichthonius child—frightened them so much that they threw themselves down from the Acropolis. The myth ends halfway—at the tragic low point—whereas the rite ends in a positive way with the girls’ return. The cost in terms of girls would have been prohibitive anyway—respectable girls, too, for they came from upper-class circles. Apart from that, there is splendid parallelism along the lines of a scheme that has been exploited everywhere as a narrative pattern in myths or tales of “the girl’s tragedy”: prohibition, seclusion, violation of the prohibition, girl threatened with punishment or death, liberation.⁹² As a rule, the subject is a virgin, who is enjoined (prohibition) to remain a virgin, is locked in (seclusion) for that purpose, becomes pregnant (violation of prohibition), is threatened with death by a wicked father or relative, but is saved, ultimately, by her son, for instance. This, however, as had long been recognized,⁹³ is the typical pattern of the girl’s initiation, which is supposed to turn the girl at puberty into a young woman. In this process, two components—apart from all kinds of symbols of leave-taking and new beginning, which in the much better-known initiation rites for boys have often been elaborated more fully—play an important role. During the period of seclusion, the girl has to learn to demonstrate the truly womanly skills—the “work-complex,” in the words of a specialist⁹⁴—and her female sexuality will have to be unsealed. Many frightening means are available for this purpose, such as painful circumcision, mass deflorations, sexual humiliations, and so forth.⁹⁵ Fokke Sierksma’s book *De roof van het vrouwengeheim* (1962), which deals with this subject among others,

was renamed *Religie, sexualiteit en agressie*—and justly so—when it was reprinted in an academic edition (1979).⁹⁶ This is the explanation Burkert gave for the secret in the *kiste* that the girls were not allowed to know and yet had to discover: we have here the symbol of woman's fertility, notably the child, which may also be recognized in the object, swaddled in cloths, that is returned after the girls' stay in Aphrodite's garden.

All this started long ago with the research into the better-known boys' initiation. For her theory Harrison could consult *Les rites de passage* (1909) by A. van Gennep,⁹⁷ the first to make a systematic study of rites of transition. The distinction he makes among *rites de séparation*, *rites de marge*, and *rites d'agrégation*, with which the youth took leave of the old situation, went into seclusion for some time, and entered his new status, respectively, is still exemplary. Later anthropologists have added many typical features to the ones gathered by van Gennep, the second stage (the marginal period) having increasingly become the center of interest.

It is not always easy to distinguish the three constituent elements clearly; they tend to merge smoothly. Frequent examples of the elements are: the boy gives up his childhood by withdrawing from his mother, giving up his old name, banishing his origin from his memory, leaving the old status behind by amputation of limbs, having a tooth knocked out, and so forth. As a member of the male community, he is accepted as a new human being. He is often reborn—the mother sometimes being allowed to reappear only once before being consigned to permanent absence—is given a new name, and receives the dignities and insignia of a full-grown man. In between these two situations, his existence as a social being has been suspended. Everywhere, the marginal period is felt to be a period of threat, chaos, and death. The symbol of the labyrinth is often staged literally, as the boy is led around in the labyrinth in the dark or blindfolded, loses his orientation and identity, and has to be aided to escape, the labyrinth being seen as the realm of death but also as the womb: "birth and rebirth." During this time the young boy is in exile, locked in an initiation house or expelled from the tribe into the marginal territories where culture and society are no longer valid and other laws prevail. This is—as in the case of the girls—the time of tests and trials: torture, (sexual) humiliation, trials of strength, matches, the struggle to survive outside the tribal community. It is also the time of instruction: threatened by death—a great god or a monster is coming to devour him, to tear him to pieces, or to roast him, after which he will be restored to life as a new human being—he is taught the secret myths of the tribe, the ritual customs, and the use of men's weapons.

This nonsocial, marginal situation is marked or “signaled” by a great number of external features. Virtually all such marginal signals reflect some opposition to normal social features.⁹⁸ In matters of dress, role reversal is often obligatory, boys having to wear girls’ clothes, or we find status reversal, with clothes being used to mark complete social degradation. In a reversal of food habits, novices may be forced to partake of the very kinds of food and drink that are socially taboo. Communication sometimes takes place by means of a private language, a corrupted form of everyday social language; the boys have their hair shaved off, walk on one shoe, or paint their faces white or black. In other ways, too, the *verkehrte Welt* may become manifest: the boys are permitted to do what is never allowed under normal circumstances. They are free to steal, to demand food under threat, to give the whole tribe a fit by staging night raids and even demolishing the entire roof of a house.⁹⁹ Obviously, there is a resemblance here to other “periods of license” or *legale Anarchien* such as Carnival or Saturnalia, to which I shall return.

Looking for remnants of these initiatory elements is a fascinating pursuit, and Jeanmaire’s book, mentioned above, makes for absorbing reading. In point of fact he already adumbrated virtually all that later scholars were to deal with at greater length and in greater detail, the references to rituals still in use in Greece often being the most convincing part of the argument. That the Spartan *krupeteia*, with all it entails, is a vivid example of an initiatory situation needs no argument, of course.¹⁰⁰ And that forms of pederasty that were found in Crete and Athens are relics of the sexual humiliations mentioned above is also an arguable thesis.¹⁰¹ Sometimes there is also evidence of mythical references to initiatory motifs. In 1893 Crawley had already pointed out that Achilles, who hides in the isle of Skyros disguised as a girl and who has been reared, moreover, outside the domain of civilization by a centaur, represents the typical initiation candidate.¹⁰² The same may be said of Philoctetes, who is banished, with a stinking wound in his leg, to a lonely island.¹⁰³

Once again, it is interesting to find a ritual accompanied by a myth, as was the case with the Arrhēphoria: the Theseus myth and the Oschophoria festival.¹⁰⁴ A characteristic feature of this festival is a procession of young men carrying bunches of grapes from Athens to the temple of Athena Skiras in Phaleron, headed by two boys in women’s clothes; there is a sacrifice accompanied by lamentations. The youths are served dishes, namely beans and greens (the *pyanepesia*), by special cooks or waitresses, the *deipnophoroi*, who also tell them stories (*muthoi*). There is a foot race of the ephebes, the winner being offered a draught of a *panspermia*. Plutarch links this festival with Theseus and his exploits, and the

reader who is prepared to view the Oschophoria as a ritual reflection of the initiation of ephebes might now also follow Jeanmaire when he recognizes in Theseus the mythical reflection of the initiation candidate. Theseus, too, is an ephebe: he puts on girls' clothes, plunges to the bottom of the sea, has to enter the labyrinth, threatens to be annihilated by a divine monster, but escapes and returns to assume kingship. The theory that in the *muthoi* the women tell the boys the seed might be hidden from which these myths finally developed is highly suggestive, and from there, of course, it will not take long before Heracles' labors are interpreted as the mythical reflection of a phase of initiation as well.

We can go even further: just as in the New Year complex king and god are supposed to be one another's reflection in fall and rise, so here the search has been for mythic-divine—and not only heroic—reflections of the initiation candidate. Harrison's *megistos kouros* was an example, but in the Greek pantheon there is another prototypical *kouros*, whose long hair is a signal of the ephebe on the eve of his initiation, to whom the boys dedicate their locks of hair on attaining manhood, and who remains unmarried, an archer, the god from afar. As early as 1895, T. Homolle was aware that the Spartan *apellai*, notably those celebrated in the initial month of the year, *Apellaios*, were the rite during which the young men were admitted into the community of adults,¹⁰⁵ and with thanks to Homolle (and van Gennep), Harrison concludes: "Apellon [this is the older form of Apollon] is the projection of these rites; he, like Dionysos, like Herakles, is the arch-ephebos, the Megistos Kouros" (*Themis*, 441).

As I have pointed out, nearly everything has already been said—often as a brief suggestion—and the reason that many things have been said once again in recent times is twofold. First, they had been brushed aside during several decades, and second, our store of information has increased to such an extent that, thanks to a wealth of comparative material, that which was formerly no more than a hypothesis may be, if not proven, at least made more plausible—hence a paper by W. Burkert, "Apellai und Apollon,"¹⁰⁶ followed by another by one of his pupils, F. Graf, about Apollo Delphinus,¹⁰⁷ the god that is more immediately concerned with the young man's admission into the official political and social roles. Here and elsewhere a good deal of research remains to be done. Burkert's synthesis is pure "Harrison": "Achilleus, fast ein Doppelgänger Apellons" ("Achilleus, almost a double of Apellon").

In the instances mentioned above, it is always a matter of ritual relics,¹⁰⁸ mythical references to evident initiatory elements, or in the most interesting cases, longer mythical-narrative sequences, where the ritual counterpart has been given

by the ancient authors themselves, the protagonist is at least a typical ephēbe, or several elements refer unmistakably to initiation. A case in point is the Theseus myth, which seems to satisfy all three requirements. Apart from that, however, we can make a great stride forward through research in myths and legends that do not so evidently and immediately fit into this frame, in order to see whether they do not go back, after all, to a similar initiation scheme. There are precedents in various fields; certain fairy-tale types were believed to contain recognizable initiation elements. Tom Thumb and Snow White, for instance, turn out to be something quite different from what some of us believed in, even up into old age. Robin Hood once more puts in an appearance, not as a year king or year god this time, but as the leader of a *Jungmannschaft*, and in the classical field Odysseus, the Argonauts, Oedipus, and others have long preceded him.¹⁰⁹

What we perceive here is the shaping of a pattern, a process that may be compared, fundamentally, to the former myth and ritual approach. Instead of the “dying and rising” complex of gods and kings around the New Year festival, the frame of reference is now the initiation candidate, banished, sorely tried, sometimes doomed to death, coming off triumphant, returning. With Frazer and his followers, the myth and ritual complex had its function within the larger frame of vegetative fertility, which could be influenced by means of magic. The initiation complex has been embedded in a wider frame, too, that of “marginal existence.” We have thus left the realm of nature and have entered upon the domain of culture and society. An evaluation of the most recent myth and ritual explorations in the classical field is incomplete without first taking a critical glance at modern anthropological research on marginality, by which classical studies have been decisively influenced. I do this first, briefly adding a few examples of significant applications of marginality theory to classical problems. With the help of another example I go on to show that the methodological dangers we find looming here are comparable to—and no less impressive than—those that were inherent in Frazer’s theory.

Anyone coming across terms such as “marginal” or “liminal” nowadays should know that van Gennep’s scheme underlies these concepts, but that in more recent studies, notably under the influence of the anthropologist V. W. Turner, these terms are taken in a much wider sense.¹¹⁰ It was found that the eccentric existence in the margin of society, the asocial or antisocial way of life, is marked by a whole range of phenomena. In this context we may distinguish, in a purely systematic fashion, *marginal groups or individuals*, which find themselves in the eccentric situation either for some considerable time or permanently, from *mar-*

ginal situations, in which individuals or groups withdraw from social pattern temporarily, often by way of ritual demonstration. In either case the atmosphere of marginality is marked by *stereotyped marginal signals*.¹¹¹ A few examples follow.

Marginal groups or individuals that have their whereabouts, literally, on the outskirts of society are—apart from the juvenile groups of the *Jungmannschaft* type—monks, anchorites, pirates, bandits, as well as, in a sense, animals, and from a certain point of view also the gods and the dead.¹¹² In this context, those people who have a more than normal contact with the gods, the dead, or animals also rank as marginal: the possessed, lunatics, godly men, prophets, seers, shepherds. Also included are groups that, socially speaking, live in the margin of society without taking part in the social process: beggars, cynics, hippies, tramps; and groups that oppose society above all in a political sense: anarchists, revolutionaries, millenarians, messianists. Strangers are fundamentally marginal, especially when of a different color, but also groups within a society that nonetheless are felt to be strange somehow: migrant workers, metics, immigrants, slaves. Also marginal are groups or individuals that do not function fully in society: children, adolescents, sick, poor, unemployed, and those that, while functioning fully, do so within some specific area only—women, priests, kings.

Marginal situations are situations that tend to remove individual persons or groups temporarily from a normal social existence. Initiation—and in particular the period of the “margin”—is the example we have discussed, but no less exemplary are festivals of an exceptional character, during which things that normally are forbidden are tolerated, roles are reversed, and people generally kick over the traces.¹¹³ Instances of such *Ausnahmefeste* are the Carnival and its predecessors such as the Saturnalia and the Kronia,¹¹⁴ but also women’s festivals such as the Thesmophoria, Dionysiac festivals, and the Roman festival of Bona Dea, giving women in seclusion an opportunity to indulge in excesses in their own way. Other marginal situations are periods of mourning, disease, especially epidemics, or famine, and social phenomena of acculturation and disintegration accompanied by crises of identity.¹¹⁵

Obviously, there are a great many cross-relations and overlaps between the groups and situations mutually, as well as between the concepts of “marginal group” and “marginal situation”: members of messianist movements or utopians may be viewed, of course, as temporary marginals but also as groups “in permanent transition.”¹¹⁶

People in marginal situations are outside normal society; they are asocial, but that does not imply that they necessarily lead a totally atomized existence. On the

contrary, more often than not, a new, different, nonstructural relationship develops, for which V. W. Turner coined the term *communitas*. There is a feeling of fellowship, of solidarity, that distinguishes this group from the structured society. This communication is brought about by, among other things, *marginal signals*, which, as a rule, are nothing but opposites to the current cultural signs.¹¹⁷ People in liminal situations shave off their hair or, on the contrary, wear it long; paint their faces, wear a felt hood or women's clothes, or dress in a strange, eccentric way; abstain from sexual acts or, just the reverse, indulge in perversions or abolish sex distinctions. They speak a different language or remain totally silent. They follow deviant habits in matters of food and drink, change their names, perform acts of self-mutilation or tattooing, and so forth.

Let us now, with the help of a few examples, demonstrate how this concept of marginality can be used to elucidate puzzling problems in the ancient religions. For this purpose I select some suggestions from studies by F. Graf and J. N. Bremmer, who both, more than others—and following in Burkert's footsteps—use the concept of marginality as a tool in their research.

The ancient libation (Gr. *spondai*, Lat. *libatio*), a drink offering that is poured out on the ground or on an *eschara*, may consist of the following basic ingredients: milk and honey, wine, water, oil. In a paper entitled "Milch, Honig und Wein," Graf made a study of the frame of reference of these ingredients.¹¹⁸ He found that milk and honey, in particular, are the liquid signals of marginal and unusual situations and groups.¹¹⁹ According to the Hellenic conception, Greek men drink wine mixed with water. Milk and honey, on the other hand, are characteristic of women and children, of marginal groups such as the Pythagoreans, but also of barbarian nations, which are typified as milk drinkers (Teutons, Scythians), and of utopian, "natural" man of both prehistoric and eschatological times.¹²⁰ Graf's thesis is fully demonstrable: "Honig und Milch . . . waren also abnorm, marginale Flüssigkeiten" ("Hence honey and milk . . . were abnormal, marginal fluids"). With a little more trouble a case could also be made for water, oil, and even wine, if undiluted, but if this *libatio* wholly consists of ingredients that refer to the margin, the question arises of why. The answer is that the *libatio* of this composition is itself used specifically in marginal situations, for instance in contacts with the dead, with heroes, with the Underworld: in the liminal sphere, therefore, between death and life. There is an ideal correspondence here between *signifiant* and *signifié*.

In a paper on the Greek *pharmakos*, Bremmer sheds new light on the scapegoat and the related rites from the point of view of "the margin."¹²¹ The fact, for

instance, not understood hitherto, that the *pharmakos* is beaten with “squills or twigs of the wild fig tree” is convincingly explained by the fact that these plants, being sterile, belonged to the “marginal” sphere. He can easily interpret the persons who served as *pharmakoi* in historical times as marginal because, on the whole, it was marginal characters such as criminals, paupers, and riffraff generally that were cast in that role. Here too, therefore, there is an excellent correspondence between *signifiant* and *signifié*, both clearly belonging to the margin. When, however, Bremmer also defines the kings who acted as scapegoats in the myths as “the lonely marginal at the top,” we see tension looming ahead between these two categories of *signifiant* and *signifié*. This is one of the dangers inherent in a general sense in the theories of marginality described so far. These dangers might be classified as follows:

1. There is no need to be a structuralist to conclude that within any conceivable society, it must be possible to point to binary oppositions in which one member is unusual or marginal as compared with another, central or normal member. It is a well-known fact, moreover, that people tend to declare their own group the center and all others outsiders. If we take the—very incomplete—list of imaginable marginals listed above, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that virtually everybody, depending on the comparison, is or may be marginal, with the exception of a roughly forty-year-old, diligent, healthy, native, non-hunchbacked man with close-cropped hair, entitled to carry arms and in possession of full civic rights, wife, and children. That I am not exaggerating may be apparent from the results of a study in astrology and marginality by R. Wuthnow, which concludes that “it was the more poorly educated, the unemployed, non-white, females, the unmarried, the overweight, the ill, and the lonely, who were most taken with astrology.”¹²²

Even those who hold that this statement does prove something will understand that, at the same time, it verges dangerously on tautology. Armed with such a definition, you could take practically any category of person and prove that it is a marginal one, with the exception of the “normal” family man with all the normal characteristics mentioned above. A criminal as a marginal *pharmakos* is not a debatable point: any criminal is marginal by definition. A king as a scapegoat is much more interesting but, at the same time, less easy to explain if you start from the margin model. In my opinion, the power and the tragedy of the ultimate sacrifice, in this case, are effected not because the king is a marginal person but because the king as the *center* of society is *made* a marginal person, through his expulsion from what society considers the position of highest prestige. It is un-

derstandable, therefore, that the king as scapegoat belongs virtually exclusively to the mythical imagination.¹²³

Nearly all (groups of) people, then, are marginal in some respect or another, or are potentially so, and so also are most situations. In various studies that I consulted, the following ancient peoples and territories were labeled "marginal": Scythians, Teutons, India, Southern Italy, Thracia, Lemnos, Troy, Lycia, Scheria, Ithaca, Skyros, Boeotia, Euboia, and certain regions in Attica. True, such statements will always be tenable with regard to a certain period and a carefully selected center, but there is an obvious danger of arbitrariness and generalization. The same applies to gods and demigods discussed in these various studies, such as Apollo, Dionysus, Hermes, Pan, Poseidon, Athena, Artemis, Heracles, and Theseus, who are either called marginal in a more general way or labeled outright "initiation gods."¹²⁴

2. Whereas we can try to escape the preceding danger by using precise definition and careful argumentation, the following objection cannot be met successfully, because it does not depend on the researcher's skill: the marginal signals are seldom specific. An exemplary illustration of this phenomenon is found in the *libatio* signals, which, as we have seen, implied *general* references to highly divergent marginal situations and groups and could only be specified thanks to the fact that the context referred to was *known to us*. In my country, when you see a man in an entirely black suit, you at once assume that he is in a marginal situation. Which situation that is, however, requires additional information: he is walking behind a coffin, he carries a prayer book (on Sunday), or he is serving refreshments. When you observe a man wearing a long white or orange robe, with a curious hairdo or a clean-shaven head and a painted face, you have to pay attention to the context before you can tell whether this is a religious marginal or someone from the sphere of Carnival or the circus.¹²⁵ In other words, the traffic is unimpeded in one direction only: from the situation to the signals. Only the former (the *signifié*) is specific; the signals (the *signifiant*) usually are not, and cannot in themselves, therefore, be related with certainty to any one marginal situation, not even when they seem to fit into an orderly pattern.

3. Here we touch upon a third point. The protagonists of the initiation myth and ritual theory seldom fail to play what they consider their trump card, the "internal coherence" of the pattern in which all the pieces neatly fall into their proper slots. A characteristic passage in Bremmer's argument, for instance, is the following: "In this way all the different motifs which, taken separately, may of course occur in different contexts, are explained by one hermeneutic key which

is, from a methodic point of view, to be preferred to all kinds of supposed influences."¹²⁶ Now it cannot have escaped anybody's notice that the two essential dangers mentioned so far—the *general* applicability of the marginality concept and its inherent fatal elasticity, on the one hand, and the lack of specificity of marginal signals, on the other—are, *mutatis mutandis*, in general a threat to any theory that tries to recognize a pattern within a diversity of phenomena. These objections were raised repeatedly, notably to the old myth and ritual advocates, Frazer among them, not least by those scholars who have since discovered a different pattern.

So let us finally evaluate the "coherence" trump card in this light. In the *Times* (London) obituary, Tylor's work was eulogized as follows: "He held that the enumeration of facts must form the staple of the argument, and that the limit of needful detail was reached only when each group of facts so displayed its general law that fresh ones came to range themselves in their proper niches as new instances of an already established rule."¹²⁷ Those words were written by a believer: automatically all the threads fall just right, weaving the pattern of Tylor's animism. One small matter, though: nobody believes in this pattern any more, no more than anybody believes in Frazer's general theories. And yet the latter had filled many hefty tomes chock-full with "facts, facts, facts," which all—so he maintained—fell exactly into their proper places.¹²⁸ All the same, even if all the pieces were to fit brilliantly in one single pattern, that still would not guarantee the "truth" of that pattern: "The accepted truths of to-day are apt to become the discarded errors of tomorrow," as Dodds once put it.¹²⁹ The researcher is not to blame for this, and fortunately nobody seems to mind this horrible truth too much, for even those who agree with me that "all kinds of supposed influences" as a notion is, in point of fact, an absolutely viable and general factor in constructing cultural realities cannot do without theory, pattern, or scheme if they want to get on with their research.

Bearing in mind the three dangers mentioned, let us now look at a specific theory in which—unlike the case of *libatio* and *pharmakos*, which remained practically entirely within the realm of the rite—our only information derives from a mythical story that, moreover, does not deal at all with a young man and has nonetheless been interpreted as a literary reflection of the ritual initiation scheme.

Bremmer, in a paper entitled "Heroes, Rituals and the Trojan War,"¹³⁰ discusses a number of heroes who figure in the epics, concluding that the traditions "designate their protagonists as young men in the transition from boyhood to adult-

hood" (35). When, in this context, Achilles, Pyrrhus/Neoptolemus, Philoctetes, and Paris are discussed, this will surprise nobody after what we remarked before, but there are already complications. Anyone who writes, "For our purpose we deduce from this interpretation that Achilles' arrival at Troy fell in the ephebic period of his life," must needs keep silence about the equally pseudohistorical context of the equally ephebic son of Achilles, Neoptolemus, who, from the historical point of view, cannot very well have arrived at Troy as an ephebe ten years later than his father. What should worry us much more, however, is that the author includes in his list not only the young men mentioned but also Hector and Odysseus: Hector above all because of his special haircut, the *Hektoreios kome*; Odysseus on account of a number of elements in his history.¹³¹ That Odysseus—on whom we are going to focus from now on—was already a king and had a little son when he sailed from Ithaca may not be a decisive difficulty. All the same, it is apt to rouse the reader's suspicion. The author himself may have had some misgivings, too—witness the fact that, having started out to show that several heroes found themselves "in a transitional state," he finally concludes that all the heroes mentioned, including Odysseus, are described as young men in the transition from boyhood to adulthood (see Bremmer's comment above, from p. 35), whereas, on page 23, he had inferred from Odysseus's tale that his was "an evident case of royal initiation," which, though doubtlessly related, is a different thing.¹³²

What are the narrative elements that turn Odysseus into an ephebe in the initiatory period or, in other words, typify the narrative scheme of Odysseus's wanderings as the mythical reflection of initiation rites? Let me quote Bremmer himself: "What conclusion can we draw? It will be clear that we recognize an evident case of royal initiation in the tale of the prince, who has to leave home, wanders around, is present at cannibalistic activities, visits the underworld, has a wound in the thigh, is an archer, is sexually very active, returns as a beggar, restores the cultural order as a symbolic survivor of the Flood and finally becomes king" (23). In support of this thesis, a number of parallels had been listed before, showing, for instance, that cannibalistic performances, the notion of the primeval Flood, sexual activities, and so forth are typical of the atmosphere of initiation and transitional rites. This is not enough, however, to dispel any doubts we may feel: the presumption that Odysseus is a typical archer is only evidenced by his shot through the axes, whereas everywhere else in the epic he is the adult warrior with the normal equipment; his leg wound is a *scar*, possibly a relic from his time as an ephebe, but only by way of a memento; and as for that sexual appetite, we

are equally justified, or even more so, in maintaining that the texts depict Odysseus, despite his enforced contacts, as a faithful and above all married hero. There are many more details that call for some reservations,¹³³ but that is not what I am concerned with now.

The issue at stake is, rather, the essential dangers, as formulated above, inherent in the method. That the protagonist of the *Odyssey* finds himself in a Turneresque “transitional state” is, in the case of an adventurous wanderer, as yet no more than a tautology.¹³⁴ It is here, therefore, that the problem of the general applicability of the “marginality” concept reveals itself. Now the question arises of whether and how a more specific “transitional state” can be demonstrated. The argumentation needed to turn Odysseus into an initiation candidate has to be based entirely—because there is no ritual counterpart available, and the protagonist, moreover, as a forty-year-old father, cannot very well be depicted as an ephebe—on a bunch of marginal signals, but such signals, in this case too, are practically without exception nonspecific (the second problem pointed out above). In the list of signals quoted above I can detect only one specific initiatory element: the scar on the thigh, but that, of all things, goes back *disertis verbis* to Odysseus’s youth and is as such beyond the scope of the pseudohistorical narrative sequence the pattern is believed to be based on.¹³⁵ All the other signals that have been suggested, such as, notably, the elements of (man-eating) monsters and survival after a primeval Flood—if we may interpret Odysseus’s adventures at sea in this fashion at all—also fit smoothly into other schemes that are not necessarily initiatory. In point of fact, they are the stereotyped elements of this type of adventure story. There is a striking parallel in a debate between A. Henrichs and J. Winkler.¹³⁶ The former, basing himself on, among other things, cannibalistic elements in a recently discovered Lollian fragment, discovers a ritual background in the context of secret cult societies, whereas the latter shows in detail that all the elements belonged to the stock-in-trade of classical fiction. There is some affinity between Henrichs’s approach and that of R. Merkelbach, who defended the theory that virtually all remaining classical novels are based on some initiation pattern, but this time initiation into the Hellenistic mysteries.¹³⁷ Everything fits perfectly: “This book only [!] intends to prove that the novels are really mystery texts” (from Merkelbach’s preface).

This discussion is fully comparable and endless, because the thesis is, at best, plausible but incapable of proof. It could not be proven until an immediate ritual counterpart went with it, the signals pointed specifically to one type of ritual,

or the story could solely and exclusively be interpreted as the reflection of this specific (and not of any other) ritual. That this is not the case as far as the *Odyssey* is concerned is a fact for which, in the nature of things, we cannot blame the interpreter, who is fully entitled to give a maximalist interpretation with the help of his key. He has this right above all because elsewhere and under more favorable conditions he has drawn attention to initiatory elements in later myth or rite more convincingly. Nonetheless, the reader has the right to assess each interpretation critically; I, for one, tend to shy away from reducing the *Odyssey* to an initiatory scheme in such a drastic and rather mechanistic way, for two reasons.

The first reason is that this would mean squeezing a great number of elements into one straitjacket, whereas we have a wider and more natural interpretive model at our disposal.¹³⁸ Nobody, however, should accept this critical remark without having read Bremmer's article itself, in which more arguments are advanced than those briefly quoted here—the wooden horse as the hobbyhorse of initiation rites, for instance. The second reason is that by following this course we might be tempted (once again) to reduce, mechanically, all myths of this genre from the whole world to one relatively narrow ritual scheme. "It would be possible, and indeed easy, to find parallels in myth and ritual for every incident in the *Odyssey*" says Lord Raglan in *The Hero*, referring to sacral kingship. The upshot of such statements and their underlying arguments has been that practically nobody believes in his theory any more. An identical kind of reasoning is now applied to the *Odyssey* and initiation, and now, too, everything always seems to tally. Here, as an illustration, is my contribution: Penelope is a girl in the initiatory phase. As we know, in this period girls are generally locked up in secret rooms to practice, *by night*, women's handicrafts (spinning in the first place). Mythical relics of aggressive men bursting in upon women and destroying their handwork are known from various cultures, prenuptial license occurring as well in this context: the girls are assaulted and have to give in.¹³⁹ Q.E.D. In the same way, however, it might be proved that Alexander the Great is a super initiation candidate: young, unmarried, adventurous journey in far-off lands, homosexual appetite, war, danger, victory, (mass) marriage. And it would be even more perfect if we were allowed to include the Alexander romances with their fairy-tale elements.

Meanwhile a problem comes into view. How *are* we to explain that an "Odyssey pattern" shows itself in so many myths, fairy tales, and stories if we are not prepared to trace this pattern invariably back either to the New Year complex or

to the initiation complex or even to any ritual whatsoever? To look for a tentative answer to this question we now turn to Walter Burkert for the second time. It is he who can guide us, by way of an approach we have not yet discussed.

6. *Eppure Si Muove: Myth and Ritual Pari Passu*

In 1970 Burkert published a paper entitled “Iason, Hypsipyle and New Fire at Lemnos: A Study in Myth and Ritual.” Kirk’s critical studies had not yet appeared at the time, but monolithic myth and ritual theories had already been sufficiently subjected to criticism. Burkert, too, conceded wholeheartedly that there exist myths without a rite, and rites without a myth, that we know of etiological myths of the tritest variety, and that it is out of the question, therefore, that myth should always be connected with ritual. Still, there are complexes—such as the Arrh-e-phoria complex he had discussed before—in which the connection is so close that the observer feels spurred on to consider the matter afresh. One such complex is that of the women of Lemnos.¹⁴⁰ According to myth, Aphrodite afflicted them with an unbearable stench as punishment for some offense. The result was that their husbands refused to have intercourse with them and took Thracian girls as concubines. Not a little vexed at this behavior, the women—all except one—murdered the men in their immediate surroundings. The Argonauts put in at the island on their return voyage and, having met nothing much but dragons for some time, restored order: thereafter, the demographic balance was set right again. The ritual orders all Lemnian fires to be extinguished once a year; during the period of nine days without fire, offerings are to be made to subterranean gods, after which new fire is to be brought by ship from Delos and all fires may be lit again.

A brief note in a later gloss links myth and rite emphatically: once a year the women of Lemnos are said to keep men off by chewing garlic. This is a striking parallel indeed, and the “message” is clear in both: lack of fire means disorganization of social life (no hearth fire, no bread, no work for blacksmiths and potters, no burnt offerings, and, therefore, no communication with the gods); it is a period of standstill and stagnation, typical of the transition to the New Year, and the myth represents this sterile, asocial aspect in its own way. In both myth and ritual there is an atmosphere of menace and death.

How are we to explain this parallelism (which even Kirk was later prepared to acknowledge)?¹⁴¹ What came first, myth or ritual? Burkert refuses to answer this question, since in his words, it “transcends philology, since both myth and ritual were established well before the invention of writing” (“Iason,” 14). In his conclu-

sion, though, he hints more than once that myth and ritual, in the final analysis, derive from one single origin, for instance when he maintains that myth may *become* independent of ritual (14) or when he stresses the importance of myths for the reconstruction of rites: "Myth, being the plot, may indicate connections between rites which are isolated in our tradition" (14). Anyway, rite is considered a necessary means of communication and solidarity within a social group. Feigned fear and aggression may prevent real disaster. Myth, however, does the same with different means. Here, too, the theme is menace and death, but now the victims are human beings, whereas the ritual confines itself to animals: "only the myth carries, in phantasy, to the extreme what, by ritual, is conducted into more innocent channels" (16).¹⁴² This is a theme Burkert has elaborated in a fascinating way in his theory of the origin of tragedy, which I am not going to discuss here.¹⁴³

At the same time and above all, we recognize here guarded, tentative phrases that immediately remind us of Harrison's second myth and ritual relationship—"they arise *pari passu*"—notably in the shape it was given by some of the anthropologists quoted above, Kluckhohn above all. This impression is confirmed when we turn to Burkert's "Griechische Mythologie und die Geistesgeschichte der Moderne," a treatise published in 1980,¹⁴⁴ and find that with regard to the myth and ritual relationship. Harrison and the anthropologists are quoted emphatically and with approval, criticism is relegated to a footnote, and Kirk—in this connection, that is—is not even mentioned. It is a succinct, albeit extremely scholarly and informative survey, and the reader has the feeling that the author has more to say. He did so indeed in the 1977 Sather lectures mentioned above, which were published in 1979 and came on the market more or less simultaneously with this treatise. Here the essence of myth and the essence of rite were investigated and described in a way that had not been pursued in this context ever before.

In dealing with myth, Burkert takes as a starting point the structural approach to the fairy-tale narrative inaugurated by V. J. Propp and simplified and transformed later by others.¹⁴⁵ According to Propp, all Russian fairy tales of a certain category were found to consist of sequences of thirty-one elements (functions, motifs), a number that strikes us as sufficiently arbitrary to have been discovered, not imposed.¹⁴⁶ In point of fact, A. Dundes, in his introduction to the 1973 edition, points out that Propp follows an empirical, inductive method (which Dundes calls syntagmatic) that stands in stark contrast to the speculative, deductive (paradigmatic) approach of the structuralist *par excellence* Claude Lévi-Strauss. Whereas the latter starts from hypothetical polar oppositions, trying to

place everything within this structure, Propp simply describes the *linear* order of narrative elements he perceives again and again. The final twenty elements of Propp's collection have been summed up by Burkert as follows: there is an instruction, a task, to go in search of something (something lost) and to get it; the hero gathers relevant information, decides to set out upon the quest, starts on his way, meets with others, either helpers or enemies; there is a change of scenery; the object is found and taken possession of by force or by cunning; it is brought back, the hero being chased by the adversary; success is there; the hero comes off triumphant.

It is this linear aspect in particular that strongly appeals to Burkert, who has no use for Lévi-Strauss's algebra,¹⁴⁷ and, therefore, does not show any appreciable affinity with the approaches of Vernant or Detienne either. Numerous other schemes have already been suggested as an organizational principle of fairy tales and the like,¹⁴⁸ but none as short as Burkert's proposal. In point of fact, Propp's entire scheme may be summarized in one verb: "to get." What have we got, after all? Nothing but a program of action, elaborated into a narrative and varied through a number of transformations—a program derived directly from life, from biology. For what the hero does in Propp's schema is essentially similar to what the rat does when—driven by hunger—it goes in search of prey and returns with the spoils, having escaped the street urchin's stones, the cat's jaws, and envious fellow rats. The identical pattern may be transposed to the world of the primates in that stage when food could only be obtained by way of long marches, hunting, or gathering, which involved the most horrible dangers outside the relative safety of the settlement. It is not possible, even approximately, to do justice to the very scholarly discourse, which shows a definite receptiveness to the new doctrine of sociobiology. I note the conclusion: "Tale structures, as sequences of motifs, are founded on basic biological or cultural programs of action" ("Iason," 18).

This is only the first chapter. The second deals with ritual. Here Burkert has already been preceded by several others on the road that he wants to take himself and that proves to lead to biology once more. From other scholars, ranging from Julian Huxley to Konrad Lorenz,¹⁴⁹ he borrows the definition of ritual: "Ritual is action redirected for demonstration." With many animal species living socially it has been found that certain types of group behavior possessed an evidently biological function originally but became detached from their origin and acquired a new function: that of a communication signal, the effect of which is binding on the group.¹⁵⁰

These ritual acts are highly stereotyped, repeated and exaggerated, often man-

ifested in theatrical and dramatic forms, and preeminently social actions.¹⁵¹ K. Meuli had already observed that with humans, too, ritual behavior might become divorced from its original roots and acquire some new function fostering solidarity, such as mourning behavior.¹⁵² Sociologists and anthropologists in their turn have said repeatedly and in various contexts that the integration of the group is maintained primarily by ritual means.

A great number of ritual customs are interpreted by Burkert as ritualized, therefore stereotyped and “degenerate” biological actions. We knew that the Olympian sacrifice should be understood as a relic from Paleolithic hunting customs,¹⁵³ but it may come as a surprise to many a reader to learn that the ritual of pouring out oil onto a sacred stone derives, in the final analysis, from the canine habit of demarcating territory. Whether such detailed interpretations are convincing or not, what is interesting is the consequences of these two views for myth and ritual.

If we consider them in the light of Burkert’s recent theories, we soon notice that we are dealing with a single phenomenon with two aspects: both are “programs of action”; both have a biological background involving transformations of action patterns bearing immediately upon the most essential needs, crises, and dilemmas of both animal and primitive human existence; both have become detached from their origins; both now primarily serve communication and solidarization. Myth is the verbal expression, rite a reflection in action, of essentially identical situations and their inherent psychic emotions. For the first time an impressive attempt has been made to underpin Harrison’s second option theoretically. There are myths and rites that are so closely connected that many of us had already been under the impression that these, at any rate, must have originated simultaneously. This is by no means true of all myths and rites, and it may even hold only for a small minority. But where there is such a plausible connection we now have at least a soundly based theory as to roughly how this parallelism might have arisen.

7. Prospects

So far I have essentially done no more than arrange, describe, and, to a lesser degree, evaluate. That the critical aspect was emphasized more forcibly in the latter part of the discussion may be explained by the fact that the first phase of the myth and ritual theory has long been concluded and assessed, whereas the most recent approach is still in full swing. That is why critical observations can certainly be useful, but never definitive. I do not want to conclude, however, without

once more gathering in the lines we have observed so far. The resultant synthesis may no doubt strike the reader as sweeping. To make matters worse, lack of space prevents me from arguing more specifically or illustrating it in greater detail with the help of an extended case such as I have published elsewhere.¹⁵⁴ What I have to offer is thus nothing but a tentative, somewhat intuitive suggestion that enables me to return to those complexes that up to now have been felt, more often than not, to be mutually exclusive: the myth and ritual complex of the New Year—sacral king, dying and rising god—on the one hand, and that of initiation, on the other, in order to view them from the perspective offered by Burkert.

Let us concentrate exclusively on the two complexes we have discussed—we might conceive of others, but not many or such easily recognizable ones—and consider the following questions:

1. What might be the reason that in the head of one person, Jane Harrison, the notions of two complexes could exist, one after or beside the other, the divine protagonists changing effortlessly from one complex into the next (*megistos kouros*, Dionysus)?

2. How can we explain that some enthusiasts trace back the entire worldwide mythology to one myth and ritual complex, whereas others reduce a considerable number of myths to the other complex?

3. How is it that some New Year specialists time and again point out resemblance, affinity, or relation to initiation ideology, and initiation specialists are repeatedly drawing parallels with New Year elements?¹⁵⁵

4. What do we infer from the fact that a myth and ritual theorist of the old stamp, A. M. Hocart, wrote a book about coronation rites of kings, whereas a representative of the more recent trend is seen to waver between boys' initiation and royal initiation?

5. Why is it that both types of approach claim primeval images like the Flood¹⁵⁶ and man-eating monsters,¹⁵⁷ besides numerous other elements such as role and status reversal, experience of anarchy, and so forth, for their own complex?

6. How is one to explain that both can refer to worldwide materials?

7. Finally, how is it that so much attention was and still is paid to these two myth and ritual patterns and relatively little, if any, to others?

Now let's just give specific form to these questions once more. In the sequence of the epic of the *Odyssey* and the story of Troy connected with it, the hero leaves his country, has to wander, has to wage war far from home, takes Troy by means of a stratagem, is threatened by water (sea) and by man-eating and other monsters, returns home, is menaced again, is finally triumphant, and becomes king (again).

If we had been obligated to decide, after reading section 2 of this chapter, which pattern had been transformed into a myth in this case, would not the New Year pattern of fall and return of the sacral king and the battling god have been the obvious choice? It was this choice that was made long ago by Raglan (and others); witness the way he manages to fit all details into his pattern. And if we had been asked the same question after reading section 5, would we not have hesitated to answer the question, because the story, when we come to think of it, fits very well into the initiatory scheme as well?

Meanwhile, the reason for all this has become abundantly clear, and so the questions asked above have been essentially answered. Both situations, that of the New Year and that of initiation, have a firmly related ritual and social function and follow, in essence, identical basic patterns: the old situation has to be taken leave of (symbol of death, fall, farewell: the *séparation*); there is a period of transition between old and new (sojourn in death, Underworld, labyrinth, flood, foreign countries, a monster's belly: the *marge*); the new situation is accepted (rebirth, resurrection, reinvestiture, return and reintegration: the *agrégation*). That one complex shows associations with a process of nature, the other with a social passage, is not immediately relevant. What matters is the relationship in the typically transitional situations and the mythical symbols in which they find their expression.

This argument has its starting point in the similarity of the two myth and ritual complexes. While the old one seemed outdated, the new one is not as new as it seems. Burkert's more recent work has not yet been taken account of in the discussion. So let us now take the ultimate step: suppose we had not been asked the question about the interpretation of the Odysseus story until after reading section 6. Would we not be inclined to class it under the head of Propp's narrative structure and—as the next step—to consider, with Burkert, whether the story reveals references to deep-rooted biological and cultural schemes of action? If one checks it, everything fits. That would mean that we have reached a deeper level of interpretation, which supports and envelops the two other levels. We might conceive of it in this way: the most elementary and primordial scheme of (originally biosociological) functions has been conserved and transformed, in ritualized and mythicized form, at precisely those points where human society still experiences primal crisis most intensely. Apart from incidental calamities like epidemics, wars, earthquakes, and floods, these are precisely the critical and painful moments of transition that are experienced nowhere more keenly than during initiatory periods and the advent of the New Year. In this way the struc-

tural relationship between these two “crises” and their mythical-ritual representation is now placed in a historical evolutionary perspective. This seems to be implied in Burkert’s clearly evolved view.¹⁵⁸ The author of “Kekropidensage und Arrhephoria: Vom Initiationsritus zum Panathenäenfest” now writes: “The pattern called ‘the girl’s tragedy’ can be interpreted as reflecting initiation rituals; but these, in turn, are demonstrative accentuations of biologically programmed crises, menstruation, defloration, pregnancy, birth” (57, emphasis added). Odysseus and the Cyclops no longer have anything to do with initiation. Instead, they are related to very remote reminiscences from even Paleolithic action patterns (cf. the lance tempered in the fire). When Burkert discusses phenomena of role reversal and sexual submission (29–30), initiation is found to play only a marginal role in the predominantly biologically oriented argument (apes also offer themselves in an act of submission).¹⁵⁹

No doubt not everybody who is perhaps prepared to acknowledge the structural affinity of the two complexes is willing to take this ultimate step. After all, it is nothing but a suggestion. Still, there are reasons why it deserves serious consideration. In a book that has come in for a good deal of discussion, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*, J. Campbell deals with a mythical complex, “the adventure of the hero,” whose structure he outlines as follows: (1) departure, (2) initiation, (3) return.¹⁶⁰ This is a familiar scheme by now, but what is interesting is that Campbell proceeds totally independently of the scholars referred to above. He interprets the entire scheme with the help of Freud and Jung, above all in terms of depth psychology, citing material from dreams. How these images get into our dreams is not explained, at least not explicitly, and here the recent movement of sociobiology, despite the criticisms it has received, might well be revelatory.¹⁶¹

As regards our two myth and ritual complexes, we thus find that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, probably because both sauces are prepared by the same cook, who works with only one recipe. His “biodynamic” recipe can be summarized in the verb “to get.” In a given situation, this simple verb is qualified by a number of indispensable, successive actions that are also reflected in our two complexes and in fairy tales and myths of the *Odyssey* type. Equating the sauces of goose and gander does *not* disqualify either of them. Nor does it entail a depreciation of the remarkable progress made in our field through the recent shift in our model of interpretation, as I hope to have made abundantly clear. While in the natural sciences some implications of Kuhn’s concept of “paradigm” are liable to criticism,¹⁶² the concept has proved helpful in analyzing developments in the social sciences. However, it has been pointed out more recently that

in this sector paradigms are, as a rule, not radically exclusive. This tolerance has awarded anthropology the qualification “polyparadigmatic.”¹⁶³ And this is exactly my point.

Though the new paradigm introducing the social interpretation of myth and ritual has cleared the way for explanations that were unheard of in the first half of the twentieth century—I am especially referring to the application of the concept of the “margin,” both in the rites of initiation and in the festivals of reversal—the new model by no means completely eradicates or replaces the old one. First, I would not (and did not) deny that the presence of the two patterns described by the myth and ritual theorists can actually be demonstrated. What I oppose is the totalitarian, one-sided interpretation of such mythical patterns from the point of view of just one of the complexes. Second, I do not doubt that there are myths that, in the final analysis, go back to some New Year scenario, or that there are myths that derive from initiatory schemes. However, I think it unlikely that all the stories with the scenario described above have developed in either one of these ways. Anyone who goes to such lengths, while still acknowledging that everywhere—in both complexes and in a great mass of myths, fairy tales, stories (and dreams) from all over the world—we can discern a more or less identical basis pattern, has the right if not the duty to try to find an explanation for this phenomenon. Perhaps this can be done without the help of recent ethological and biological insights, but it would be better to try to incorporate them. In any case—and that was my chief aim—this phenomenon explains why the champions of the two complexes have so often encroached upon each others’ territories.

To return to the *Odysseus* story, I, for one, think that an origin in some New Year scenario is less plausible than a descent from some initiatory scenario. Much more plausible than either, though, is the interpretation of this story as a variation on the biological-cultural program of action, which may have been carried over into both complexes and which, *independently*, has become the material from which dreams, fairy tales, and myths of a certain type have been fashioned. Of course, whoever thinks all this much too vague and prefers to sit down and reread the *Odyssey* itself is right, too.

In *The Golden Bough* (vol. IV, p. vii), Frazer sighs: “The longer I occupy myself with questions of ancient mythology, the more diffident I become of success in dealing with them, and I am apt to think that we who spend our years in searching for solutions of these insoluble problems are like Sisyphus perpetually rolling his stone uphill only to see it revolve again into the valley.”

This is a pessimistic expression of what I found more hopefully phrased by the

anthropologist E. M. Ackerknecht: “If anthropology returns to the comparative method” (and as we have seen, recent developments in the borderland of anthropology and the Classics tend in that direction), “it will certainly not forget what it has learned meanwhile in general and what it has learned about the limitations of the method in particular. It will return only in that spiral movement, so characteristic of scientific thought, *arriving after half a century at the same point but at a higher level*. It will know better how and what to compare than it knew fifty years ago.”¹⁶⁴

Sisyphus’s stone rolling but landing at a higher level each time? Let us hope so, even if the stone turns out to obey Zeno’s laws.

NOTES

a. Kowalzig 2007, 13 n. 1.

b. On the examination questions, see Bremmer 2011, 536–37. For the history of the idea, the articles in Calder 1991 are important sources. For an annotated bibliography, see Arlen 1990.

c. Bremmer 1978.

d. What follows is partly a summary of Edmunds 2005, 34–36, which itself, as there indicated, is based on material published in 1993. Cf. Hansen 2002, 201–11.

e. ATU 974.

f. Lord 2000 [1960], chap. 8.

g. Zhirmunsky 1967; Reichl 2001.

This chapter, apart from the notes, was translated from the Dutch by Dr. P. P. J. van Caspel, who carried out the difficult job with great meticulousness and intelligence. Professor L. Edmunds and Mr. P. Mason, classicists and native speakers of English, read the first translation and offered many suggestions for improving the text. To all of them I express my sincere gratitude.

1. The following is only a selection of titles on the theory of myth and ritual (for literature on specific myth and ritual complexes, see nn. 15ff. and nn. 32ff. below): C. Kluckhohn, “Myths and Rituals: A General Theory,” *HThR* 35 (1942): 45–79, reprinted in J. B. Vickery, ed., *Myth and Literature* (Lincoln, NE, 1969), 33–44; L. Raglan, “Myth and Ritual,” and S. E. Hyman, “The Ritual View of Myth and the Mythic,” both in Sebeok 1974, 122–35, 136–53; W. Bascom, “The Myth-Ritual Theory,” *Journal of American Folklore* 70 (1957): 103–14; Philip M. Kaberry, “Myth and Ritual: Some Recent Theories,” *BICS* 4 (1957): 42–53; Fontenrose 1966; H. H. Penner, “Myth and Ritual: A Wasteland or a Forest of Symbols?” *H&T Beiheft* 8 (1968): 46–57; and Robert A. Segal, “The Myth-Ritualist Theory of Religion,” *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion* 19 (1980): 173–85. Also important are the relevant passages in Kirk 1971, 8–31; 1974, 66–68, 223–53; Burkert 1979, 34–39, 56–58; 1980, 172–82; and F. Graf, *Griechische Mythologie* (Munich and Zurich,

1985), 43–57. After publication of this chapter in the first edition of this volume, the following books appeared: R. Ackerman, *The Myth and Ritual School: J. G. Frazer and the Cambridge Ritualists* (New York, 1991); Robert A. Segal, *The Myth and Ritual Theory: An Anthology* (Malden, MA, 1998), with a useful introduction and recent literature on p. 13; E. Scapo, *Theories of Mythology* (Malden, MA, 2005) 155–61; and B. Kowalzig, *Singing for the Gods* (Oxford, 2007), 13–23.

2. On Usener, the “*heros ktistes* [“founding hero”] der modernen Religionswissenschaft” (thus his son-in-law, A. Dieterich, in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 8 [1905]: x), see *Aspetti di Hermann Usener filologo della religione*, Seminario della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa (Pisa, 1982). There is a bibliography of Dieterich, “founding father” of the German *religionsgeschichtliche* school, in his *Kleine Schriften* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1911), 11–42.

3. M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, vol. I (Munich, 1967³, 1940¹), vol. II (Munich, 1961², 1950¹). For bibliographies of Nilsson’s works, see E. J. Knudtson, “Beiträge zu einer Bibliographie Martin P. Nilsson,” in *Dragma: Festschrift M. P. Nilsson* (Lund, 1939), 571–656, reprinted in *Scripta Minora* (Lund, 1968), 29–116; and C. Callmer, “The Published Writings of Prof. M. P. Nilsson 1939–1967,” in *Dragma*, 117–39. Cf. Waardenburg 1974, 191–97. Biographical sketches and evaluations of his works are given in E. Gjerstad, “M. P. Nilsson in memoriam,” *Scripta Minora* (Lund, 1967–68), 17–28; C.-M. Edsman, “Martin P. Nilsson 1874–1967,” *Temenos* 3 (1968): 173–76; and McGinty 1978, 104–40.

4. Thus A. D. Nock, who was honored by his fellow students with the proud title of “the greatest living authority on Pauly-Wissowa” and was lauded by Nilsson (GGR Vorwort) as “der bewährteste Kenner der spätantiken Religion.” For an epistolary contact between the two giants, see M. P. Nilsson, “Letter to Professor A. D. Nock,” *HThR* 42 (1949): 71–107; 44 (1951): 143–51. There is a bibliography in A. D. Nock, *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, vols. I and II, ed. Z. Stewart (Oxford, 1972), 966–86.

5. B. Lincoln, “Two Notes on Modern Rituals,” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 45 (1977): 149.

6. Burkert’s *Greek Religion* (1985) and *Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual* (1979).

7. A discussion of Kerényi and Dumézil is beyond the scope of this chapter. For M. Eliade, see J. A. Saliba, “*Homo Religiosus*” in *Mircea Eliade: An Anthropological Evaluation* (Leiden, 1976), and I. P. Culianu, *Mircea Eliade* (Assisi, 1978). For critical views, see G. Dudley, *Religion on Trial: Mircea Eliade and His Critics* (Philadelphia, 1977), and L. Alfieri, *Storia e mito: Una critica a Eliade* (Pisa, 1978). Cf. J. Z. Smith 1978, 88ff. Eliade phrases his own preference for myth above rite, in his “Methodological Remarks on the Study of Religion,” in M. Eliade and J. Kitagawa, eds., *The History of Religions* (Chicago, 1959), 86–107, as follows: “Symbol and myth will give a clear view of the modalities (of the sacred) that a rite can never do more than suggest.” I do not discuss the representatives of the Paris structuralist school, not because their work is of no interest for the study of myths and rituals, but because whenever they try to bring them into a cohesive pattern, they practically never do so in the usual sense of “myth and ritual.” R. L. Gordon, ed., *Myth, Religion, and Society: Structuralist Essays by M. Detienne, L. Gernet, J.-P. Vernant, and P. Vidal-Naquet* (Cambridge, 1981), offers an excellent introduction to their ideas.

8. J. H. Voigt, *Max Müller: The Man and His Ideas* (Calcutta, 1976). Shorter studies include R. M. Dorson, "The Eclipse of Solar Mythology," in Sebeok 1974, 25–63; Van Baal 1971, 20–26; Sharpe 1975, 35–46; and Burkert 1980, 166. Cf. also F. M. Turner, *The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain* (New Haven, CT, 1981), 77–134, on "Greek Mythology and Religion" in this period.

9. See W. Mannhardt's *Roggenwolf und Roggenhund* (Danzig, 1865–66); *Die Korndämonen* (Berlin, 1868); *Antike Wald- und Feldkulte* (Berlin, 1875–77; Darmstadt, 1904–52); and *Mythologische Forschungen* (Strassburg, 1884). On his work and influence, see Frazer 1890–1915, I:xii–xiii, 212–16; and Waardenburg 1974, 173.

10. E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (London, 1871). For an assessment of his work, see Kardiner and Preble 1962, 56–77; F. Gözl, *Der primitive Mensch und seine Religion* (Gütersloh, Germany, 1963), 12–40; Van Baal 1971, 30–44; Waardenburg 1974, 288–89; Sharpe 1975, 53–58; U. Bianchi, *The History of Religions* (Leiden, 1975), 83–86; and Evans-Pritchard 1981, 91–94. There has been a revival of interest in Tylor's evolutionism and its background. See, for instance, G. W. Stocking Jr., "Matthew Arnold, E. B. Tylor and the Uses of Invention," *American Anthropologist* 65 (1963): 783–99; M. Opler, "Cause, Process, and Dynamics in the Evolutionism of E. B. Tylor," *South-western Journal of Anthropology* 20 (1964): 123–44; and J. W. Burrow, *Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory* (London, 1970²), 228–59. Cf. J. Z. Smith 1978, 261 n. 58.

11. G. Himmelfarb, *Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution* (London, 1959). Interesting on the social and mental context is Burrow, *Evolution and Society*; D. F. Bratchell, *The Impact of Darwinism: Texts and Commentary Illustrating 19th-Century Religious, Scientific, and Literary Attitudes* (Amersham, UK, 1981); and R. J. Richards, *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior* (Chicago, 1987). For a full biography, see P. Brent, *Charles Darwin* (London, 1981; Feltham, UK, 1983²).

12. F. R. Lehmann, "Der Begriff 'Urdummheit' in der ethnologischen und religionswissenschaftlichen Anschauungen von K.-T. Preuss, A. E. Jensen und G. Murray," *Sociologus* 2 (1952): 131–45.

13. W. Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (Edinburgh, 1889, 1894²). The German translation, *Die Religion der Semiten* (Tübingen, 1899), was reprinted in 1967. For biographical surveys, see J. S. Black and G. Chrystal, *The Life of William Robertson Smith* (London, 1912), and T. O. Beidelmann, *William Robertson Smith* (Chicago, 1974). Cf. also Van Baal 1971, 45–53; Waardenburg 1974, 265; Evans-Pritchard 1981, 69–81. Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (Harmondsworth, UK, 1970), 25: "Robertson Smith founded social anthropology."

14. "But for Smith," said Frazer, "my interest in the subject [anthropology] might have remained purely passive and inert" (quoted in Kardiner and Preble 1962, 82).

15. Frazer, 1890–1915. An abridged edition appeared in 1922 = New York, 1950. Other revisions and abridged editions include Theodor Gaster, ed., *The New Golden Bough* (New York, 1959), and M. Douglas and S. MacCormack, eds., *J. G. Frazer. The Illustrated Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion* (London, 1978). Biographical works include R. A. Downie's *James George Frazer: The Portrait of a Scholar* (London, 1940), and Frazer and the *Golden Bough* (London, 1970). They are all superseded by R. Ackerman, *J. G. Frazer: His Life and Work* (Cambridge, 1987). Cf. also Kardiner and Preble 1962, 78–109; Sharpe 1975, 87–94; and Evans-Pritchard 1981, 132–52. For a comprehensive list of works on

Frazer, see Waardenburg 1974, 59–60. For a critical account, see M. J. C. Hodgart, “In the Shadow of the Golden Bough,” *The Twentieth Century* 97 (1955): 111–19, and S. MacCormack, “Magic and the Human Mind: A Reconsideration of Frazer’s *Golden Bough*,” *Arethusa* 17 (1984): 151–76. For more criticism, see section 4 of this chapter.

16. Autobiographical data are in Harrison’s *Reminiscences of a Student’s Life* (London, 1925) and *Alpha and Omega: Essays* (London, 1915). For biographical information, see *Folk-Lore* 37 (1926): 180–92; J. G. Stewart, *Jane Ellen Harrison: A Portrait from Letters* (London, 1959), with a full bibliography; R. Ackerman, “J. E. Harrison: The Early Work,” *GRBS* 13 (1972): 209–30; McGinty 1978, 71–103; and S. J. Peacock, *Jane Harrison: The Mask and the Self* (New Haven, CT, 1988). Mary Beard’s *The Invention of Jane Harrison* (Cambridge, MA, 2000) appeared after publication of this chapter in the first edition of this volume.

17. In a letter to G. Murray, in Stewart, *Jane Ellen Harrison*, 113.

18. J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena* (Cambridge, 1903, 1907², 1922³), reprinted New York, 1955, and London, 1961; more recently reprinted by La Haule Press. Harrison, *Themis: A Study in the Social Origins of Greek Religion* (Cambridge, 1912¹, 1927²), reprinted together with *Epilegomena* by University Books (New York, 1962) and Merlin Press (London, 1963).

19. In *Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (Cambridge, 1921), xxii, Harrison formulates her own scientific achievements thus: (1) Totem, Tabu, and Exogamy, (2) Initiation Ceremony, (3) The Medicine-Man and King-God, and (4) The Fertility-Play or Year Drama. This is precisely the reverse order of her *Werdegang* from Frazer via “the genius of Durkheim” (*ibid.*, n. 1) toward Freud. McGinty 1978, 79: “As a result, to read her oeuvre in chronological order is almost like reading a multivolume history of the discipline of comparative religion disguised as a series of histories of Greek religion” (and cf. his n. 35 on p. 213).

20. Kirk 1971, 3; McGinty 1978, 96. W. J. Verdenius, in his review of *Epilegomena* and *Themis*, in *Mnemosyne*, 4th ser. 16 (1963): 434, remarks: “Her principal weakness was the susceptibility which induced her to adopt the latest fashion in philosophy, psychology and ethnology.”

21. J. E. Harrison, *JHS* 12 (1891): 350. Actually, this refers to her interpretation of the Kekropides myth, which she was the first to explain from the perspective of myth and ritual. Burkert (1980, 174), however, points out that previous initiatives in this direction had already been taken by C. O. Müller and Wilamowitz.

22. Humphreys (1978, 96) suggests that her attention was drawn to Durkheim by the lectures of Radcliffe-Brown, which she attended at Cambridge in 1909. Humphreys also gives a good assessment of Durkheim’s work. See also Harris 1968, 464–82; S. Lukes, *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work* (New York, 1972); Kardiner and Preble 1962, 108–33; and Evans-Pritchard 1981, 153–69. The remarkable similarity appears *inter alia* in the following quotations from Durkheim, *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (Paris 1912¹ = 1968⁵): “l’expérience religieuse, c’est la société” (597); “la formation d’un idéal . . . c’est un produit naturel de la vie sociale” (603); “la religion est un produit de causes sociales” (606). On this aspect of Durkheim’s theory, see R. N. Bellah, “Religion, Collective Representations and Social Change,” in R. A. Nisbet, ed., *Emile Durkheim* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1965), 166–72. On Durkheim’s influence on Radcliffe-Brown, see Kuper 1985, 49ff.

23. Harrison herself recognized this evolution: “Primitive religion was not, as I had drifted into thinking, a tissue of errors leading to mistaken conduct; rather it was a web

of practices emphasizing particular parts of life, issuing necessarily in representations and ultimately dying out into abstract conceptions" (*Themis*, xii).

24. See M. Guarducci, *Inscriptiones Creticae*, vol. III, sect. II, no. 2 (Rome, 1935-). Cf. Guarducci's "Antichità Cretesi," in *Studi in onore di D. Levi*, vol. II (Catania, Italy, 1974), 36-37, and *Epigrafi Greca*, vol. IV (Rome, 1978), 128-29.

25. M. L. West, in "The Dictaeon Hymn to the Kouros," *JHS* 85 (1965): 149-59, proposed to replace Harrison's "Lord of all that is wet and gleaming, thou art come" with an interpretation that results in "master of all, who to earth art gone." Later on West recanted his metrical suggestions while maintaining his textual conjectures (*ZPE* 45 [1982]: 9ff.). His reading, which completely ignores Harrison's treatment of the text, seems very improbable to me and, as far as I know, has not provoked much enthusiasm. See Guarducci, *Inscriptiones Creticae*, and J. M. Bremer, "Greek Hymns," in Versnel 1981, 205-6. Cf. also A. Motte, *Prairies et jardins de la Grèce antique* (Brussels, 1970), 56-60.

26. There are also historical Couretes; see S. Luria, "Kureten, Molpen, Aisymneten," *AAntHung* 11 (1963): 31-36; D. Knibbe, *Forschungen in Ephesos*, vol. IX, Fasz. 1, 1: Die Kureteninschriften (Österr. Arch. Inst., 1981).

27. For Murray's scholarly achievements, see F. West, *Gilbert Murray: A Biography* (London, 1984), and D. Wilson, *Gilbert Murray OM 1866-1957* (Oxford, 1988). Murray returned to myth and ritual theories in other works: *Euripides and His Age* (Oxford, 1946²), 28-32, and *Aeschylus, the Creator of Tragedy* (Oxford, 1940), 145-60. For criticism, see A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb, Tragedy, and Comedy* (Oxford, 1927), 185-206. In his re-edition of this book (1962), 126-29, T. B. L. Webster gives a reassessment of Murray's achievement. For other theories on the origin of tragedy, see H. Patzer, *Die Anfänge der griechischen Tragödie* (Wiesbaden, 1962), and G. F. Else, *The Origin and Early Form of Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge, MA, 1965). For recent theories on the ritual origins of tragedy, see Burkert 1966a; F. R. Adrados, *Festival, Comedy, and Tragedy: The Greek Origins of Theatre* (Leiden, 1975); Adrados, "The Agon and the Origin of the Tragic Chorus," in *Serta Turyniana: Studies A. Turyn* (Urbana, IL, 1974), 436-88; and J. J. Winkler, "The Ephebes' Song: *Tragôidia* and *Polis*," *Representations* 11 (1985): 26-62.

28. *Four Stages of Greek Religion* originated as a series of lectures at Columbia University in 1912. It was published as *Five Stages of Greek Religion* (London 1935, 1946³).

29. Remarkably, the leading French structuralist in the classical field, J.-P. Vernant, highly appreciates the works of Cornford, whereas his mentor Louis Gernet, a pupil of Durkheim, had little or no appreciation for the works of Harrison and Cornford. See S. Humphreys, "The Work of Louis Gernet," in Humphreys 1978, 76-106. And cf., on the scholar Gernet, A. Maffi, "Le 'Recherches' di Louis Gernet nella storia del diritto greco," *QS* 13 (1981): 3-54, and C. Ampolo, "Fra religione e società," *StudStor* 25 (1984): 83-89.

30. F. M. Cornford, *The Unwritten Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1950); H. Otten, "Vorderasiatische Mythen als Vorläufer griechischer Mythenbildung," *Forschungen und Fortschritte*, 1949, 145-47; A. Heubeck, "Mythologische Vorstellungen des alten Orients im archaischen Griechentum," *Gymnasium* 62 (1955): 508-20; G. Steiner, *Der Sukzessionsmythos in Hesiods Theogonie und ihren orientalischen Parallelen* (Diss., Hamburg, 1958); P. Walcot, *Hesiod and the Near East* (Cardiff, 1966); M. L. West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient* (Oxford, 1971); Kirk 1971, 213-20; Burkert 1979, *passim*; Burkert, "Die orientalisierende Epoche in der griechischen Religion und Literature," *SHAW*, 1984, 1-135.

31. I leave aside A. B. Cook, with his massive monograph *Zeus*, vols. I–III (Cambridge, 1914–42). He is perhaps the most typical disciple of Frazer, but he did not contribute to myth and ritual theory.

32. S. H. Hooke, ed., *Myth and Ritual: Essays on the Myth and Ritual of the Hebrews in Relation to the Culture Pattern of the Ancient East* (London, 1933); Hooke, ed., *Myth, Ritual, and Kingship* (Oxford, 1958). His earlier collection, *The Labyrinth* (London, 1935), has no bearing on the new ideas. Hooke's tryout was "The Babylonian New Year Festival," *Journal of the Manchester Egyptological and Oriental Society* 13 (1927): 29–38. The most convenient introduction to his ideas is his *Middle Eastern Mythology* (Harmondsworth, UK, 1963). On the scholar Hooke, see E. C. Graham, *Nothing Is Here for Tears: A Memoir of S. H. Hooke* (Oxford, 1969).

33. Several studies have been devoted to the myth and ritual school. In *Myth, Ritual, and Kingship*, Hooke gives a historical survey of this approach, which he refuses to call a school. There is also a critical essay by S. G. F. Brandon in the same collection. Cf. also J. Weingreen, "The Pattern Theory in Old Testament Studies," *Hermathena* 108 (1969): 5–13; E. O. James, *Myth and Ritual in the Ancient Near East* (London, 1958); H. S. Versnel, *Triumphus* (Leiden, 1970), 201–35; J. W. Rogerson, *Myth in Old Testament Interpretation* (Berlin, 1973), 66–84; and literature in nn. 76ff. below.

34. This festival figures in all myth and ritual studies. There is a very circumstantial treatment by S. A. Pallis in *The Babylonian Akitu Festival* (Copenhagen, 1926).

35. In two volumes of Frazer 1890–1915: *The Dying God*, vol. III, and *The Scape Goat*, vol. VI, 354ff.

36. This according to the famous expression coined by M. Eliade. He has certain connections with the myth and ritualists, for instance in his *Le mythe de l'éternel retour* (Paris, 1949), chap. 2, and *Traité de l'histoire des religions* (Paris, 1964²), 335ff.

37. E. D. van Buren, "The Sacred Marriage in Early Times in Mesopotamia," *Orientalia* 13 (1944): 2ff.; S. N. Kramer, "The Sumerian Sacred Marriage Texts," *PAPhS* 107 (1963): 485ff.; W. H. P. Römer, *Sumerische 'Königshymnen' der Isin-Zeit* (Diss., Utrecht, 1965).

38. There are ample commentaries, including H. Zimmern, "Zum babyionischen Neujahrsfest," *Berichte der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften* 70 (1918), and F. Thureau-Dangin, *Rituels accadiens* (Paris, 1921), 127ff. S. H. Langdon, in *The Epic of Creation* (Oxford, 1923), 20ff., provided another edition under the title "The Death and Resurrection of Bel-Marduk."

39. Most enthusiastically in K. I. A. Engnell, *Studies in Divine Kingship in the Ancient Near East* (Uppsala, 1943), and G. Widengren, *Sakrales Königtum im Alten Testament und im Judentum* (Stuttgart, 1955).

40. This is the most conventional—and convenient—escape for desperate defenders of a pattern, exploited by Murray as well as by the "Pan-myth and ritualists" (see below).

41. S. Mowinckel, *Psalmstudien*, vols. I–IV (1922–24), II: *Das Thronsbesteigungsfest Jahwäs und der Ursprung der Eschatologie*.

42. S. A. Hooke gave one of his books, *Alpha and Omega: A Study in the Pattern of Revelation* (Welwyn, UK, 1961), the same title as the one Jane Harrison had chosen for one of her books. In the collections, however, there is hardly any reference to the Cambridge school.

43. Frazer later distanced himself from the Cambridge movement, as is evident from

his correspondence with Marett, in which he also belittles the influence of Robertson Smith. See R. Ackerman, "Frazer on Myth and Ritual," *JHI* 36 (1975): 115–34.

44. McGinty 1978, 79: "Harrison depended so heavily on evolutionism that, the general theory of evolution of primitive religion having been overturned, her analysis has lost most if not all of its cogency."

45. G. Elliot Smith, *The Ancient Egyptians and the Origins of Civilisation* (London, 1911, 1923²); Elliot Smith, *Human History* (London, 1930); W. J. Perry, *The Children of the Sun: A Study in the Early History of Civilization* (London, 1923); Perry, *The Growth of Civilization* (London, 1924). See also A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. I (London, 1955), 424–46.

46. On astral mythology in Old Testament and related studies, see Rogerson, *Myth*, 45–84.

47. To quote from another Hooke collection, *The Siege Perilous* (London, 1956), 43: "the ritual myth which is magical in character, and inseparable from the ritual . . . is older than the aetiological myth which has no magical potency."

48. That this order does indeed occur can be documented by the coronation ritual of the Japanese emperor, in which what happened *in illo tempore* is imitated in a ritual form; M. Waida, "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Early Japan," *ZRGG* 28 (1976): 97–112. M. Eliade has unequivocally opted for this view of the relationship between myth and ritual. A. E. Jensen, in his *Mythos und Kult bei Naturvölkern* (Wiesbaden, 1951), translated as *Myth and Cult among Primitive Peoples* (Chicago, 1963), gives precedence to myth as well. However, his definition of myth is so broad that it practically covers the concept "content of belief."

49. A. Jeremias, *Handbuch der altorientalischen Geisteskultur* (Leipzig, 1929²), 171. His "catechism," *Die Panbabylonisten, der alte Orient und die Aegyptische Religion* (Leipzig, 1907), is still worth reading.

50. A survey of the themes discussed in this section, minus the anthropological data, is given in Hyman, *Ritual View*.

51. G. Murray, *Hamlet and Orestes: The Annual Shakespeare Lecture before the British Academy* (1914).

52. Hocart's contribution is incorporated in A. M. Hocart, ed., *The Life-Giving Myth and Other Essays* (London 1952, 1970²). For a bibliography and assessment, see R. Needham, *A Bibliography of Arthur Maurice Hocart* (Oxford, 1967), and Needham, *Man* 4 (1969): 292. Hocart's most influential books are *Kingship* (London, 1927) and *Kings and Counselors* (Cairo, 1936; Chicago, 1970²).

53. L. Raglan, *The Hero: A Study in Tradition, Myth, and Drama*, reprinted in New York and London, 1979. For a short survey of his ideas, see Raglan, "Myth and Ritual." Raglan was a faithful disciple of Hocart. In the introduction to *The Life-Giving Myth* (xiii), he writes: "Since none of these rites and customs can reasonably be supposed to arise naturally in the human mind, their distribution must be due to historical causes."

54. On Becket and Guy Fawkes, see Fontenrose 1966, 14ff.

55. S. E. Hyman, "Leaping for Goodly Themis," *New Leader* 45 (1962): 25–26 (cited in Fontenrose 1966, 26). Other works by Hyman include *The Armed Vision* (New York, 1948); "Myth, Ritual and Nonsense," *Kenyon Review* 11 (1949): 455–75; and *Ritual View*.

56. In a review of Fontenrose, *Python*, in *Carleton Miscellany* 1 (1960): 124–27 (cited in Fontenrose 1966, 26).

57. S. E. Hyman, *The Tangled Bank: Darwin, Marx, Frazer, and Freud as Imaginative Writers* (New York, 1962).

58. M. A. Murray's *The Witch-Cult in Western Europe* (Oxford, 1921, many reprints), and *The God of the Witches* (London, 1933 = Oxford, 1981). For a short account of Murray, her followers, and her critics, see K. Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (Harmondsworth, UK, 1973), 614ff. For a more recent, though quite different, theory on the relationship between witches and Diana, see H. P. Duerr, *Dreamtime: Concerning the Boundary between Wilderness and Civilization* (Oxford, 1985).

59. M. A. Murray, *The Divine King in England* (London, 1954), 13. For an assessment of these and similar theories, see E. Rose, *A Razor for a Goat* (Toronto, 1962).

60. Robert Graves, *The White Goddess* (New York, 1958); S. Jackson, in *The Lottery* (I owe this information to Burkert 1980, 181–82); J. B. Vickery, *The Scapegoat* (New York, 1972), 238–45. More data in Hyman, *Ritual View*.

61. Theodor Gaster is perhaps the last true Frazerian. Besides the abridged *New Golden Bough*, he also edited *Myth, Legend, and Custom in the Old Testament: A Comparative Study with Chapters from Sir James Frazer's "Folklore in the Old Testament,"* vols. I and II (1969; New York, 1975²).

62. Malinowski's most famous book, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London, 1922; New York, 1961²), contained a preface by Frazer. See, on this work, M. W. Young, ed., *The Ethnography of Malinowski: The Trobriand Islands 1915–1918* (London, 1979). On Malinowski's place in anthropology, see R. Firth, ed., *Man and Culture: An Evaluation of the Work of Bronislaw Malinowski* (London, 1957); Kardiner and Preble 1962, 160–86; Harris 1968, 547–67; Waardenburg 1974, 169–72; M. Panoff, *Bronislaw Malinowski* (Paris, 1972); S. Silverman, ed., *Totems and Preachers: Perspectives on the History of Anthropology* (New York, 1980); and Kuper 1985, 1–35.

63. B. Malinowski, *Magic, Science, and Religion and Other Essays* (Glencoe, UK, 1948), 85. *Explanation* used this time not in the intellectualist sense used by Tylor and Frazer.

64. The essay under this name appeared in B. Malinowski, *Sex, Culture, and Myth* (London, 1963).

65. E. R. Leach, *The Political Systems of Highland Burma* (London, 1954), 13. Although Kluckhohn, contrary to the tendency of functionalism, paid due attention to the needs of the individual, and Leach, later on, dissociated himself from functionalism and embraced structuralism, in this case the functionalist background is clear. This is convincingly shown in Penner, "Myth and Ritual," 51: "They share one basic assumption. This is the assumption that myths and rituals are to be explained by reference to their function for the solidarity or unity of society and the psyche." In this context Penner refers to Harrison, Hooke, Gaster, Malinowski, Kluckhohn, Spiro, and Leach. His criticism of this approach, which more often than not confuses goal with effect, is refreshing.

66. M. Douglas, *Natural Symbols* (1970, 1973²). The phrase quoted is from an anonymous reviewer in *TLS* (1970): 535. Segal, in "Myth-Ritualist Theory," 181, rightly points out the difference between Douglas and her predecessors: "The real difference between Douglas and her antagonists is that she concentrates on the meaning, not the effect, of ritual, if not myth. For Harrison and Hooke, Durkheim, Malinowski, and Radcliffe-Brown, the meaning of myth and ritual is secondary. Its effect, on either society or the individual, is primary. The meaning is at most a means to that effect. For Douglas the reverse is true."

67. Cf. Leach, *Political Systems*, 15: "ritual action and belief alike [are] to be understood as forms of symbolic statement about social order."

68. In addition to the works cited in n. 1 above, I mention H. Baumann, "Mythos in ethnologischer Sicht I, II," *Studium Generale* 12 (1959): 1–17, 583–97; P. S. Cohen, "Theories of Myth," *Man* 4 (1969): 337–53; and J. A. Saliba, "Myth and Religious Man in Contemporary Anthropology," *Missiology* 1 (1973): 282–93.

69. Quoted in Clyde Kluckhohn, *Anthropology and the Classics* (Providence, RI, 1961), 20.

70. M. I. Finley, "Anthropology and the Classics," in his *The Use and Abuse of History* (London, 1975), 105, where the preceding quotation appears again.

71. J. S. Black and G. Chrystal, *The Life of William Robertson Smith* (London, 1912), 401.

72. Thus H. Frankfort, *The Problem of Similarity in Ancient Near Eastern Religions*, Frazer Lecture (Oxford, 1951), 8—an important criticism.

73. W. von Soden, "Gibt es ein Zeugnis dafür dass die Babylonier an die Wiederaufstehung Marduks geglaubt haben?" *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*, NF 17 (1955): 130–66. Very skeptical also is J. Z. Smith, in "A Pearl of Great Price and a Cargo of Yams: A Study in Situational Incongruity," *History of Religions* 16 (1976): 1–19, reprinted in revised form in his *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown* (Chicago, 1982), 90–101. He argues that the New Year complex was the product of Hellenistic apocalyptic ideas (cf. J. Z. Smith 1978, 72–74). J. A. Black once more explored the whole Akitu complex, in "The New Year Ceremonies in Ancient Babylon: 'Taking Bel by the Hand' and a Cultic Picnic," *Religion* 11 (1981): 39–59. Although Black rejects the idea of a dying and rising god, he accepts a parallelism between the enthronement rites of Marduk and those of the king. Cf. also Z. Ben-Barak, "The Coronation Ceremony in Ancient Mesopotamia," *OLP* 11 (1980): 55–67, with new evidence.

74. See West, "Dictaeon Hymn"; Fontenrose 1966.

75. P. Lambrechts, "Les fêtes 'phrygiennes' de Cybèle et d'Attis," *BIBR* 27 (1952): 141–70; Lambrechts, "La 'résurrection'd'Adonis," in *Mélanges I. Lévy* (Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire orientales [Brussels], 13, 1955), 207–40. Cf., more recently, D. M. Cosi, "Salvatore e salvezza nei misteri di Attis," *Aevum* 50 (1976): 42–71; U. Bianchi, "Adonis: Attualità di una interpretazione religionsgeschichtlich," and P. Xella, "Adonis oggi: Un bilancio critico," both in *Adonis: Relazioni del colloquio in Roma 1981* (Rome, 1984); and S. Ribichini, "Salvezza ed escatologia nella vicenda di Adonis?" in U. Bianchi and M. J. Vermaseren, eds., *La soteriologia dei culti orientali nell' impero Romano* (Leiden, 1982), 633–47.

76. E. M. Yamauchi, "Tammuz and the Bible," *JBL* 84 (1965): 283–90. C. H. Ratschow, in "Heilbringer und sterbende Götter," in R. Stiehl and G. A. Lehmann, eds., *Antike und Universalgeschichte: Festschrift H. Stier* (Münster, 1972), 398ff., argues that the act of dying itself is the symbol of salvation. See also C. H. Talbert, "The Myth of a Descending and Ascending Redeemer in Mediterranean Antiquity," *NTS* 22 (1976): 418–40. There is a reassessment of the problems in S. Ribichini, *Adonis: Aspetti 'orientali' di un mito greco* (Rome 1981), 181–97. An entirely different position has been taken by Burkert (1979, 99ff., 129ff.); and cf. Burkert, "Literarische Texte und Funktionaler Mythos: Zu Istar und Atrahasis," in J. Assman, W. Burkert, and F. Stolz, *Funktionen und Leistungen des Mythos: Drei altorientalische Beispiele* (Göttingen, 1982), 63–82.

77. H. J. Rose, "Myth and Ritual in Classical Civilisation," *Mnemosyne* 3 (1950): 281–87; M. P. Nilsson, *Cults, Myths, Oracles, and Politics in Ancient Greece* (New York, 1951), 10–12. On the supposed cohesion of myth and ritual, M. Eliade, in *Antaios* 9 (1968): 329, says: "Dass wir nicht einen einzigen griechischen Mythos in seinem rituellen Zusammenhang kennen." Cf. S. G. Pembroke, "Myth," in M. I. Finley, ed., *The Legacy of Greece: A New Appraisal* (Oxford, 1981), 301–2: "A one-to-one correspondence between myth and ritual is not to be found in Greece." For a similar discussion on sacral kingship and the myth and ritual theory in the Israelite context, see N. Snaith, *The Jewish New Year Festival: Its Origins and Developments* (London, 1947); H. Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods* (Chicago, 1948); J. de Fraine, *L'aspect religieux de la royauté israélite* (Rome, 1954); A. R. Johnson, *Sacral Kingship in Ancient Israel* (Cardiff, 1955); K. H. Bernhardt, *Das Problem der altorientalischen Königsideologie im A.T.* (Leiden, 1961); and J. Eaton, *Festal Drama in DeuteroIsaiah* (London, 1979).

78. Thus, for instance, Fontenrose 1966, 8ff., but see my remarks in the next note. Moreover, Fontenrose utterly fails to recognize the importance of what I call "mythic ritual." For a short discussion of the implications of this phenomenon, see J. Van Baal's "Offering, Sacrifice, and Gift," *Numen* 23 (1976): 161–78, esp. 176–77, and *Dema: Description and Analysis of Marindanim Culture* (The Hague, 1966), 540–41. The question of whether the rituals as related in literature were ever actually performed becomes pressing when we have to evaluate the well-known charges against Christians and other sects. See A. Henrichs's, *Die Phoinikika des Lollianos: Fragmente eines neuen griechischen Romans* (Bonn, 1972); "Pagan Ritual and the Alleged Crimes of the Early Christians," in P. Granfield and J. A. Jungmann, eds., *Kyriakon. Festschrift J. Quasten*, vol. I (Münster, 1970), 18–35; and "Human Sacrifice in Greek Religion: Three Case Studies," in *Le sacrifice dans l'antiquité*, *Entretiens Hardt* 27 (Geneva, 1981), 195–235. Cf. R. M. Grant, "Charges of 'Immorality' against Various Religious Groups in Antiquity," in R. van den Broek and M. J. Vermaseren, eds., *Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions Presented to G. Quispel* (Leiden, 1981), 161–70. And cf. the long lists of "cannibals" among Western European sectarians in N. Cohn, *Europe's Inner Demons* (St. Albans, UK, 1976), 16ff. For a different approach, see J. Winkler, "Lollianos and the Desperadoes," *JHS* 100 (1980): 153–81. There is a remarkable variant in the early rabbinical laws that provided detailed prescriptions of rituals without ever assuming that they would be performed in reality. Here a system of ideas is expressed not in a mythical but in a ritual literary form. "The ritual is myth"; J. Neusner, "Ritual without Myth: The Use of Legal Materials for the Study of Religions," *Religion* 5 (1975): 91–100.

79. Fontenrose does not excel in anthropological knowledge, however. There is an abundance of evidence on sacral kingship, which clearly proves that ritual regicide is (or was) a common feature in not a few African cultures. I mention only several here: T. Irrstam, *The King of Ganda: Studies in the Institution of Sacral Kingship in Africa* (1944, reprinted 1981); P. Hadfield, *Traits of Divine Kingship in Africa* (1949, reprinted 1979); L. Mair, *African Kingdoms* (Oxford, 1977); and M. W. Young, "The Divine Kingship of the Jukun: A Re-evaluation of Some Theories," *Africa* 36 (1966): 135–53. Recently, African sacral kingship, including the issue of regicide, has drawn much attention; see A. Adler, *La mort est le masque du roi: La royauté sacrée des Moundang du Tchad* (Paris, 1979); L. De Heusch, *The Drunken King, or the Origin of the State* (Bloomington, IN, 1982); De Heusch,

Rois nés d'un coeur de vache (Paris, 1982); G. Feeley-Harnik, "Issues in Divine Kingship," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 14 (1985): 273–313; and J.-C. Muller, *Le roi bouc émissaire: Pouvoir et rituel chez les Rukuba du Nigéria central* (Quebec, 1980). The discussion on the meaning of regicide has received a fresh impulse from the provoking theories of René Girard. See S. Simonse, *De slaperigheid van Koning Fadyet: Regicide en het zondebokmechanisme in de Nilotische Soedan*, in W. van Beek, ed., *Mimesis en geweld: Beschouwingen over het werk van René Girard* (Kampen, Netherlands, 1988), 172–208. Cf. also the balanced discussion of the pitfalls of terminology in S. Price, *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor* (Cambridge, 1983), 235–39.

80. K. van het Reve, *Een dag uit het leven van de reuzenkoeskoes* (Amsterdam, 1980²), 117.

81. Kirk 1971, 1–31; 1974, 223–53; G. S. Kirk, "Aetiology, Ritual, Charter: Three Equivocal Terms in the Study of Myths," *YCLS* 22 (1972): 83–102. His skeptical approach has, in its turn, provoked critical reactions; see *TLS*, Aug. 14, 1970, 889–91 (the anonymous author is the same as the author of *New York Review of Books*, Jan. 28, 1971, 44–45—namely, E. Leach); J. Culler, *Yale Review* 60 (1970): 108–14; and J. Conradie, "The Literary Nature of Greek Myths: A Critical Discussion of G. S. Kirk's Views," *A Class* 13 (1977): 49ff. For a balanced account, see R. Ackerman, "Writing about Writing about Myth," *JHI* 34 (1973): 147–53. For a structuralist view, see C. Calame, "Mythologiques de G. S. Kirk: Structures et fonctions du mythe," *QUCC* 14 (1972): 117–35.

82. J. Z. Smith, in "When the Bough Breaks" (in J. Z. Smith 1978, 208–39), dismantles the enormous structure of *The Golden Bough* piece by piece. Other important criticism includes Fontenrose 1966, and E. R. Leach, "The Golden Bough or Gilded Twig," *Daedalus* 90 (1961). On Frazer's literary influence, see J. B. Vickery, *The Literary Impact of the Golden Bough* (Princeton, 1974).

83. From Frazer's poem "June in Cambridge."

84. Of course, there is room for numerous refinements of the various kinds of relationship between myth and ritual. D. Richard, in "Tolerance and Intolerance of Ambiguity in Northern Tai Myth and Ritual," *Ethnology* 13 (1974): 1–24, demonstrates that ritual may function in a conservative fashion while myth may be tolerant toward modern ideas.

85. Of course, there are exceptions. A typical *Einzelgänger* like Walter Otto makes the "Zusammenfall von Kultus und Mythos" the central doctrine of his most celebrated book, *Dionysos: Mythos und Kultus* (Frankfurt, 1933). This founder of (another) Frankfurter school eschewed any contact with anthropological theory or comparativist trends in the history of religions and by no means borrowed his ideas from Jane Harrison. He was strongly influenced by Wilamowitz. See W. F. Otto, *Das Wort der Antike* (Darmstadt, 1962), 383–86 (bibliography); McGinty 1978, 141–80; A. Henrichs, "Der Glaube der Hellenen: Religionsgeschichte als Glaubensbekenntnis und Kulturkritik," in W. M. Calder III and H. Flashar, eds., *Wilamowitz-Symposium* (Darmstadt, 1984); and H. Cancik, "Die Götter Griechenlands 1929: Walter Otto als Religionswissenschaftler und Theologe am Ende der Weimarer Republik," *AU* 27 (1984): 71–89.

86. For Harrison's own opinion, see *Arion* 4 (1965): 399. M. R. Nilsson (*Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, vol. I [Munich, 1967³], 11, 64), was very reserved. For criticism from the side of the school of Durkheim, see *L'année sociologique* 12 (1909–12): 254–60. See, generally, G. Murray, *Jane Harrison Memorial Lecture 1928*, reprinted in *Epilegomena*

and *Themis* (New York, 1962), 559 ff.: "I think there was also, in conservative or orthodox circles, rather more dislike of *Themis* as a 'dangerous book' than there had been of the *Prolegomena*." Murray himself was reproached for being "etwas zu entgegenkommend gegenüber manchen Ideen Jane Harrisons"; O. Weinreich, in his review of *Five Stages of Greek Religion* in *Philologische Wochenschrift* 46 (1926): 643ff. = *Ausgewählte Schriften*, II:205–6.

87. Jeanmaire 1939; G. Dumézil, *Le problème des centaures: Etude de mythologie comparée indoeuropéenne* (Paris, 1929); Gernet 1928. A selection of literature on Männerbünde: H. Schurtz, *Altersklassen und Männerbünde* (Berlin, 1902); L. Weniger, "Feralis Exercitus," *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 9 (1906): 201–47; 10 (1907): 61–81, 229–56; L. Weiser, *Altgermanische Jünglingsweihen und Männerbünde* (Bühl, 1927); H. Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies: A Study in Early Politics and Religion* (New York, 1908, 1932²); O. Endter, *Die Sage vom wilden Jäger und von der wilden Jagd* (Diss., Frankfurt, 1933); O. Höfler, *Kultische Geheimbünde der Germanen*, vol. I (Frankfurt, 1934); G. Widengren, *Hochgottglaube im alten Iran* (Uppsala, 1938); S. Wikander, *Der arische Männerbund* (Diss., Lund, 1938); J. Przylusky, "Les confrères de loups-garrous dans les sociétés indo-européennes," *RHR* 121 (1940): 128–43; W. E. Peuckert, *Geheimkulte* (Heidelberg, 1951); J. de Vries, *Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte* (Berlin, 1956²), 1:454–55; G. Widengren, *Der Feudalismus im alten Iran* (Cologne, 1969); G. Dumézil, *The Destiny of the Warrior* (Chicago, 1970); O. Höfler, *Verwandlungskulte, Volkssagen und Mythen* (Österr. Ak. Wiss. Phil-Hist. Kl. Sitz. Ber. 279, Vienna, 1973); Alföldi 1974, esp. 107–50; J. N. Bremmer, "The Suodales of Poplios Valesios," *ZPE* 47 (1982): 133–48; Bremmer 1987, 38–43.

88. Brelich 1960–61; 1969; Eliade 1975. The amount of literature on initiation is overwhelming. Besides the works of Brelich and Eliade (and of van Gennep, discussed below), I single out the following: M. Zeller, *Knabenweihen* (Diss., Bern, 1923); A. E. Jensen, *Beschneidung und Reifezeremonien bei den Naturvölkern* (Stuttgart, 1933); J. Haeckel, "Jugendweihe und Männerfest auf Feuerland," *Mitteilungen der Oesterreichischen Gesellschaft für Anthropologie* 43–47 (1947): 84–114; V. Popp, ed., *Initiation. Zeremonien der Statusänderung und des Rollenwechsels* (Frankfurt, 1969); A. Droogers, *The Dangerous Journey: Symbolic Aspects of Boy's Initiation among the Wagenia of Kisangani (Zaire)* (The Hague, 1980); U. Bianchi, ed., *Transition Rites: Cosmic, Social, and Individual Order* (Rome, 1986). F. Sierksma, *Religie, Sexualiteit en Agressie* (Groningen, Netherlands, 1979), 260ff, has a rich bibliography. A particularly interesting methodological approach to the application of classification and definition in the study of ritual, especially initiation, is J. A. M. Snoek, *Initiations* (Diss., Leiden, 1987). Cf. also J. P. Schojdt, "Initiation and the Classification of Rituals," *Temenos* 22 (1986): 93–108. For girls' initiation, see below.

89. Vidal-Naquet, "Le chasseur noir et l'origine de l'éphébie athénienne," *Annales ESC* 23 (1968): 947–64, reprinted in Vidal-Naquet, *Le chasseur noir: Formes de pensée et formes de société dans le monde grec* (Paris, 1981), 151–74; English version in *PCPhS* 194 (1968): 49–64, and Vidal-Naquet 1986. Reconsiderations and answers to critics in Vidal-Naquet, "The Black Hunter Revisited," *PCPhS* 212 (1986): 126–44.

90. On W. Burkert and the significance of his work, see L. J. Alderink, "Greek Ritual and Mythology: The Work of Walter Burkert," *Religious Studies Review* 6 (1980): 1–14. The most important review of his handbook I have seen is the one by B. Gladigow, in *Göttinische Gelehrte Anzeigen* 235 (1983): 1–16.

91. W. Burkert, *Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon* (Nuremberg, 1962); English edition, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge, MA, 1972); Burkert 1966b.

92. On this scheme, see Burkert 1979, 14ff. The scheme was already detected by J. G. von Hahn in *Sagwissenschaftliche Studien* (Jena, 1876); see Bremmer (1987, 26), who gives a survey of the classical instances of the "mother's tragedy" on pp. 27ff. He disputes Burkert's interpretation of this motif as a reflection of girls' initiation on the grounds that, in some cases, the mother of the hero is already married. One may grant him this point, but he does not solve the enigma of the origin of the motif. His solution, "Apparently, great heroes come into being during periods of intense crisis and transition in their mother's lives and they become the more extraordinary thanks to their mother's hardships" (Bremmer, in Bremmer and Horsfall 1987, 30), though obviously true, fails to do justice to the *stereotyped* nature of the mother's particular hardships. We shall see below that Burkert later changed his frame of interpretation. On the myth of the bad father, see also the literature in Alföldi 1974, 104 n. 147, and D. Briquel, in R. Bloch, ed., *Recherches sur les religions de l'Italie antique* (Paris, 1976), 73–97.

93. This was not the first time that the Arrhephoria were explained as a relic of initiation ritual. See Jeanmaire 1939, 264ff.; Brelich 1961, II:123–26; cf. Brelich 1969, 231–38. I can neither entirely grasp nor, as far as I can grasp them, accept the recent views of N. Robertson, in "The Riddle of the Arrhephoria at Athens," *HSCPh* 87 (1983): 241–88, any more than I can fathom other myth and ritual interpretations by this author, such as "The Origin of the Panathenaea," *RhM* 128 (1985): 231–95, and "The Ritual Background of the Dying God in Cyprus and Syro-Palestine," *HThR* 75 (1982): 313–59.

94. H. E. Driver, "Girl's Puberty Rites in Western North America," *University of California Publications: Anthropological Records* 6 (1941–42): 21–90, see 61.

95. Besides the works of Brelich, Eliade, Jeanmaire, and Burkert, there is a vast literature on girls' initiations and their possible relics in women's festivals. See, for instance, A. Winterstein, "Die Pubertätsriten der Mädchen mit deren Spuren in Märchen," *Imago* 14 (1928): 199–274; R. Merkelbach, "Sappho und ihr Kreis," *Philologus* 101 (1957): 1–29; J. Gagé, *Matronalia* (Brussels, 1963), passim; J. K. Brown, "A Cross-Cultural Study of Female Initiation Rites," *American Anthropologist* 65 (1963): 837–53; J. Stagl, "Die Frauensuque und ihre Stellung zu den anderen Melanesischen Geheimbünden," *Wiener Völkerkundliche Mitteilungen* 14, no. 5 (1967–68): 69–104; B. Lincoln, "The Religious Significance of Women's Scarification among the Tiv," *Africa* 45 (1973): 316–23; J. Prytz Johansen, "The Thesmophoria as a Women's Festival," *Temenos* 11 (1975): 78–87; G. E. Skov, "The Priestess of Demeter and Kore and Her Role in the Initiation of Women at the Haloa at Eleusis," *Temenos* II (1975): 136–47; D. Visca, "Le iniziazioni femminili: un problema da reconsiderare," *Religione e Civiltà* 2 (1976): 241–74; N. J. Girardot, "Initiation and Meaning in the Tale of Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs," *American Journal of Folklore* 90 (1977): 274–300; C. Calame, ed., *Rito e poesia orale in Grecia* (Rome, 1977); C. Calame, *Les chœurs de jeunes filles en Grèce archaïque* (Rome, 1977); B. Lincoln, "Women's Initiation among the Navaho: Myth, Rite and Meaning," *Paideuma* 23 (1977): 255–63; Graf 1978; B. Lincoln, "The Rape of Persephone: A Greek Scenario of Women's Initiation," *HThR* 72 (1979): 223–35; B. Lincoln, *Emerging from the Chrysalis: Studies in Rituals of Women's*

Initiation (Cambridge, MA, 1981); and J. N. Bremmer, "Greek Maenadism Reconsidered," *ZPE* 55 (1984): 267–86.

96. Fokke Sierksma, *De roof van het vrouwengeheim* (1962), reprinted as *Religie, sexualiteit en agressie* (Groningen, 1979). This book also has an extensive bibliography on initiation. Cf. also B. Bettelheim, *Symbolic Wounds, Puberty Rites, and the Envious Male* (London, 1955).

97. A. van Gennep, *Les rites de passage* (Paris, 1909), translated as *The Rites of Passage* (van Gennep 1960). Bibliography of van Gennep in Waardenburg 1974, 85–89, and K. van Gennep, *Bibliographie des oeuvres d'Arnold van Gennep* (Paris, 1964). For scholarly biography, see N. Belmont, *Arnold van Gennep, le créateur de l'ethnographie française* (Paris, 1974), translated as *Arnold van Gennep, Creator of French Ethnography* (Chicago, 1979), and H. A. Senn, "Arnold van Gennep: Structuralist and Apologist for the Study of Folklore in France," *Folk-lore* 85 (1974): 229–43.

98. H. Kenner, *Das Phänomen der verkehrten Welt in der griechisch-römischen Antike* (Klagenfurt, Austria 1970), with too much emphasis on reversal as a symbol of death. See Versnel 1981, 582ff.

99. These raids have been treated by K. Meuli in a series of studies on masks, Carnival lore, and *charivari*, collected in his *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. I (Basel-Stuttgart, 1975). Cf. also Eliade 1975, 83, with nn. 9, 10, 11. Comparable rites can be found in women's initiation; see R. Wolfram, "Weiberbünde," *Zeitschrift für Volkskunde* 42 (1933): 143ff., and M. Eliade, "Mystère et régénération spirituelle," *Eranos Jahrbuch* 23 (1955): 81ff. For the continuity in *charivari* ritual, see J. Le Goff and J.-Cl. Schmitt, eds., *Le charivari* (Paris, 1981), and H. Rey Flaud, *Le charivari: Les rituels fondamentaux de la sexualité* (Paris, 1985).

100. On *krupeteia* as a relic of initiation, see Brelich 1969, 113–207, with a vast bibliography. But Nilsson had already seen the essential, in *Klio* 12 (1912): 308–40 = *Opuscula selecta*, vol. 2 (Lund, 1952), 826–69. For more emphasis on initiatory elements, see H. Jeanmaire, "La cryptie lacédémonienne," *REG* 26 (1913): 121–50. Cf., generally, J. Ducat, "Le mépris des hilotes," *Annales ESC* 29 (1974): 1452–64.

101. On pederasty as an act of subjection during initiation, see van Gennep 1960, 171; Jeanmaire 1939, 455–60; Brelich 1969, 84–85, 120–21; and J. N. Bremmer, "An Enigmatic Indo-European Rite: Paederasty," *Arethusa* 13 (1980): 279–98. Cf. Burkert 1979, 29–30; H. Patzer, "Die griechische Knabenliebe," *Sitzungsberichte der Wissenschaftliche Akademie Frankfurt* (1982). On skepticism, see F. Buffiere, *Eros adolescent: La pédérastie dans la Grèce antique* (Paris, 1980), 55–59. For a serious refutation of homosexual practice as part of Greek initiation, see K. J. Dover, "Greek Homosexuality and Initiation," in Dover, *The Greeks and Their Legacy: Collected Papers*, vol. II (Oxford, 1988), 115–34. Various forms of temple prostitution are also explained as (relics of) initiation ritual in Graf 1978, 73.

102. E. Crawley, "Achilles and Scyros," *CQ* 7 (1893): 243–46, whose views are generally accepted; see Bremmer 1978, 7 n. 12.

103. On Philoctetes as the image of the initiate/ephebe, see P. Vidal-Naquet, "Le 'Philoctète' de Sophocle et l'éphébie," in J.-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Mythe et tragédie en Grèce ancienne* (Paris, 1973), 159–84, and the literature in Bremmer 1978, 9 n. 33.

104. On Theseus and the Oschophoria, see Jeanmaire 1939, 243–45, 338–63; additions in Brelich 1969, 444ff. When Graf (1979, 17 n. 137) suggests, "Im einzelnen freilich

wären seine Analysen nochmals zu überprüfen," it would be wise to pay special attention to the Salaminioi inscription. Cf. Vidal-Naquet, *Le chasseur noir*, 164ff.

105. T. Homolle, "Inscriptions de Delphes," *BCH* 19 (1895): 5–69.

106. Burkert 1975, with the remark on p. 11: "Es ist erstaunlich wie diese These, kaum beachtet, aus der Diskussion unversehens wieder verschwunden ist." Cf. also the good discussion in Burkert 1985, 160–64. I added some observations in Versnel 1986.

107. F. Graf, "Apollon Delphinios," *MH* 36 (1979): 2–22.

108. Cf. also the recent attempt to trace back the Lupercalia to initiation ritual in C. Ulf, *Das Römische Lupercalienfest: Ein Modellfall für Methodenprobleme in der Altertumswissenschaft* (Darmstadt, 1982). Cf. the attempts by M. Torelli to explain the archaeological finds in Lavinium as elements of initiation ritual, in *Lavinio e Roma: Riti iniziatici e matrimonio tra archeologia e storia* (Rome, 1984).

109. Generally, on initiatory evidence in fairy tales and elsewhere, see V. Propp, *Le radici storiche dei racconti di fate* (Turin, 1946, 1972²); A. Fierz-Monnier, *Initiation und Wandlung: Zur Geschichte des altfranzösischen Romans im 12. Jhd.* (Bern, 1951); J. de Vries, *Betrachtungen zum Märchen besonders in seinem Verhältnis zu Heldensage und Mythos*, F. F. Communications 150 (Helsinki, 1954); *Enzyklopädie des Märchens*, s.v. "Archaische Züge" (735), "Brauch" (692), and "Brautproben" (953); Eliade 1975, 124ff.; and Eliade, "Wissenschaft und Märchen," in F. Karlinger, *Wege der Märchenforschung* (Darmstadt, 1973), 311–19, the sole contribution in this collection that connects the fairy tale with initiation. Nor is there any emphasis on initiatory elements in the rich and balanced account in J. L. Fischer, "The Sociopsychological Analysis of Folktales," *Current Anthropology* 4 (1963): 235–95. On Tom Thumb, see P. Saintyves, *Les contes de Perrault et les récits parallèles* (Paris, 1923); Propp, *Le radici storiche dei racconti di fate*, 362; and G. Germain, *Essai sur les origines de certains thèmes odysseens et sur la genèse de l'Odyssée* (Paris, 1954), 78–86 (Odysseus, too, was a dwarf). On Snow White, see Winterstein, "Die Pubertätsriten der Mädchen," and Girardot, "Initiation and Meaning." On Robin Hood, see R. Wolfram, "Robin Hood und Hobby Horse," *Wiener Prähistorische Zeitschrift* 19 (1932): 357–74. On Odysseus, particularly the episode with the Cyclops, see Germain, *Essai sur les origines*. On the Argonauts, see R. Roux, *Le problème des Argonautes: Recherche sur les aspects religieux de la légende* (Paris, 1949); on the initiatory references of the Symplegades, see Eliade 1975, 64ff. On Oedipus, see M. Delcourt, *Oedipe, ou la légende du héros conquérant* (Paris, 1944, 1981²); V. Propp, *Edipo alla luce del folclore* (Turin, 1975); and J. N. Bremmer, "Oedipus and the Greek Oedipous Complex," in Bremmer, ed., *Interpretations of Greek Mythology* (London, 1987), 41–59. F. Crevatin, in "Eroe," *RSA* (1976/77): 221–35, even contends that the term *heros* originally denoted a youth as member of a *Männerbund* or *Jungmannschaft*.

110. See the following works by V. W. Turner: "Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage," in J. Helm, ed., *Proceedings of the American Ethnological Society for 1964* (Seattle, 1964), 4–20; *The Forest of Symbols* (Ithaca, NY, 1967): 93–111; *The Ritual Process* (Harmondsworth, UK, 1974²); "Comments and Conclusions," in B. A. Babcock, ed., *The Reversible World* (Ithaca, NY, 1978), 276–96; "Process, System, and Symbol: A New Anthropological Synthesis," *Daedalus*, 1977, 61–80; and *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society* (Ithaca, NY, 1974), chap. 6. See also M. Gluckman, "The Licence in Ritual," in Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict in Africa* (Oxford, 1955); Gluckman,

Rituals of Rebellion in S. E. Africa, Frazer Lecture 1952 (Manchester, 1954); I. M. Lewis, *Social Anthropology in Perspective* (Harmondsworth, UK, 1976), 131ff.

111. The concept of marginality had already been exploited by E. V. Stonequist, in *The Marginal Man* (New York, 1937).

112. I am aware that this is a very rough presentation that requires refinements in many respects. In his *Dramas*, V. W. Turner makes a distinction between "liminality," "outsiderhood," and "structural inferiority." However, the characteristics of these different categories largely concur.

113. On these periods of license see, besides the literature in nn. 87 and 99 above, V. Lanternari, *La grande festa* (Bari, 1976²).

114. On the Kronia as a carnivalesque festival, see Versnel 1987. The present chapter is incorporated in my book *Transition and Reversal in Myth and Ritual (Inconsistencies in Greek and Roman Religion, vol. II [Leiden, 1993])*, which also contains a study of Saturnus and the Saturnalia.

115. In Versnel 1981 I paid attention to the anomic aspects of liminality. I noted there that mourning as a period of liminality for the relatives had scarcely been investigated in modern scholarship. In the meantime, several monographs have appeared: R. Huntington and P. Metcalf, *Celebrations of Death: The Anthropology of Mortuary Ritual* (Cambridge, 1979, 1980²), which, however, concentrates on the dead, not on the living; L. M. Danforth, *The Death Rituals of Rural Greece* (Princeton, NJ, 1982); S. Humphreys and H. King, eds., *Mortality and Immortality: The Anthropology and Archeology of Death* (London, 1981); and G. Gnoli and J.-P. Vernant, eds., *La mort, les morts dans les sociétés anciennes* (Paris, 1982). On Rome, J. Scheid, in "Contraria facere: Renversements et déplacements dans les rites funéraires," *Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli (Archeologia)* 6 (1984): 117–39, has demonstrated the essential meaning of death ritual.

116. I borrow this concept from C. H. Hambrick, "World-Messianity: A Study in Liminality and Communitas," *Religious Studies* 15 (1979): 539–53.

117. For the adoption of signals of poverty by modish marginal groups, see V. W. Turner, *Dramas*, and the discussion of the felt cap in Bremmer 1978, 19–20.

118. F. Graf, "Milch, Honig und Wein: Zum Verständnis der Libation im Griechischen Ritual," in G. Piccaluga, ed., *Perennitas: Studi in onore di A. Brelich* (Rome, 1980): 209–21. Cf., however, A. Henrichs, "The 'Sobriety' of Oedipus: Sophocles OC 100 Misunderstood," *HSCPh* 87 (1983): 87–100.

119. On various diets as signals of segregation, see M. Douglas's *Purity and Danger* (London, 1966; Harmondsworth, UK 1970²), passim, and *Implicit Meanings* (London, 1975), 249–75.

120. On specific types of food as characteristic of marginal civilizations and barbarians, see also J. N. Bremmer, *ZPE* 39 (1980): 33. In his comprehensive book *Le barbare: Recherches sur la conception romaine de la barbarie et de la civilisation* (Brussels 1981), Y. A. Dauge does not pay attention to this aspect.

121. J. N. Bremmer, "Scapegoat Rituals in Ancient Greece," *HSCPh* 87 (1983): 299–320.

122. R. Wuthnow, "Astrology and Marginality," *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion* 15 (1976): 157–68.

123. Albeit "egregious," the king is first and foremost the symbol of the center of so-

ciety. See Lewis, *Social Anthropology*, chap. 9, "The Power at the Center," and Clifford Geertz, "Center, Kings and Charisma," in J. Ben David and T. N. Clark, eds., *Culture and Its Creators* (Chicago, 1980), 150–71, with the king as "the center of the center" (157). Cf., for the Greek imagination, J.-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Mythe et tragédie en Grèce ancienne* (Paris, 1972), 99–131, and H. S. Versnel, "Self-Sacrifice, Compensation and the Anonymous Gods," in *Le sacrifice dans l'antiquité*, Entretiens Hardt 27 (Geneva, 1981), 135–85.

124. I have been so bold as to add the god Mars; see Versnel 1986, where one can find literature on the other "initiatory" gods. For Heracles, see also F. Bader, "De la préhistoire à l'idéologie tripartite: les travaux d'Héraklès," in R. Bloch, ed., *D'Héraklès à Poseidon: Mythologie et protohistoire* (Geneva, 1985), 9–124.

125. A good example is in A. Droogers, "Symbols of Marginality in the Biographies of Religious and Secular Innovators: A Comparative Study of the Lives of Jesus, Waldes, Booth, Kimbago, Buddha, Mohammed and Marx," *Numen* 27 (1980): 105–21, where it appears that liminal signals such as "nature (versus culture), travelling and provisional lodging (versus sedentary life), nonviolence and solidarity" (the same as Turner's *communitas*) are characteristic both of (religious) innovators "who prosper in the margin of society" and of initiates. Numerous, too, are the similarities with the behavior of people in mourning; see Versnel 1981. All this does not exclude derivation: sacral kings from central Asia have borrowed their initiatory rites from shamanistic initiations. See M. Waida, "Notes on Sacral Kingship in Central Asia," *Numen* 23 (1976): 179–90, and K. Czeglédy, "Das sakrale Königtum bei den Steppenvölkern," *Numen* 13 (1966): 14–26.

126. Bremmer 1978, 23. Cf. also Graf 1978, 67: "Dass diejenige Deutung eines Rituals der Wahrheit am nächsten kommt, welche möglichst alle Einzelheiten geschlossen erklären kann, ist eine Binsenwahrheit"; and Burkert 1966b, 14: "Betrachtet man die *Arrhēphoria*—Riten . . . als Mädchenweihe, so wird das Ganze von Anfang bis Ende durchsichtig, sinnvoll und notwendig." But cf. his reconsiderations, as in my discussion in section 6.

127. Quoted in Kardiner and Preble 1962, 63.

128. On this methodological principle, see J. Z. Smith 1978, 240–64.

129. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968⁶), viii.

130. Bremmer 1978. In some respects he was preceded by Germain (*Essai sur les origines*, 78–86). I am happy that Bremmer, in *Lampas* 17 (1984) 141 n. 49, has largely accepted my criticism of his interpretation of the *Odyssey*.

131. On the whole, Bremmer's interpretation of the Homeric *kouroi*, with their long hair, as a reflection of youthful warriors is liable to serious criticism. See, for instance, H. W. Singor, *Oorsprong en ontwikkeling van de hoplietenphalanx in het archaische Griekenland* (Diss., Leiden, 1988), II, chap. 6, which argues that the term *kouros*, like *iuvenis*, denotes the age group between twenty and forty-five or fifty. Matters are highly complicated, of course, by the nature of our "historical" source. Homer freely used such techniques as condensation, displacement, and figuration (*Verdichtungsarbeit*, *Verschiebungsarbeit*, *Darstellung*, according to Freud). See P. Wathélet, *Les Troyens de l'Iliade: mythe et histoire* (Diss., Liege, 1986). F. Hartog, in *Le miroir d'Hérodote* (Paris, 1980), 59–79, has made the revealing discovery that Herodotus understands the Scythians as cunning ephebes, and P. Vidal-Naquet, in "Black Hunter Revisited," to whom I owe these references, infers that

ephebeia has become a semantic category by the fifth century, working as a “symbolic operator.” The problem, however, is that the Homeric descriptions of the *kouroi*, being the normal warriors, precisely lack explicit references to the ephebic situation, in contradistinction to the scarce references to actual initiatory scenes, as for instance the story of Odysseus’s hunt with the sons of Autolykos in *Odyssey* 19.

132. See, e.g., A. Alföldi, “Königsweihe und Männerbund bei den Achämeniden,” *Schweizerisches Archiv für Volkskunde* 47 (1951): 11–16; Widengren’s *Hoch-gottglaube im alten Iran* and *Der Feudalismus im alten Iran*; and Wikander, *Der arische Männerbund*.

133. Such skepticism is expressed, for instance, in A. Heubeck, “Zur neueren Homerforschung,” *Gymnasium* 89 (1982): 441–42.

134. Consequently, C. Segal, in “Transition and Ritual in Odysseus’ Return,” *PP* 22 (1967): 321–42, has not the slightest difficulty in interpreting motifs such as sleep, purification by baths, the threshold, or, if necessary, the total *Odyssey* as one great “transition” from death to life—though, for that matter, without any reference to initiation.

135. On the wound of the thigh as an initiatory signal, see, in particular, G. J. Baudy, *Adonisgärten: Studien zur antiken Samensymbolik* (Frankfurt, 1986), 50ff. There are more initiatory signals in connection with Odysseus’s youth; see Bremmer 1978, 15–16. And the same for Nestor: Bremmer, “The Suodales of Poplios Valesios” *ZPE* 47 (1982): 143 n. 43. On Odysseus’s initiation through hunting probes, see N. F. Rubin and W. M. Sale, “Meleager and Odysseus: A Structural and Cultural Study of the Greek Hunting-Maturation Myth,” *Arethusa* 16 (1983): 137–71, with a reply to criticism in *Arethusa* 17 (1984): 211–22.

136. See Henrichs’s *Die Phoinikika des Lollianos*, “Pagan Ritual,” and “Human Sacrifice,” and Winkler’s “Lollianos and the Desperadoes.”

137. R. Merkelbach, *Roman und Mysterium in der Antike* (Munich, 1962). Previous attempts in this direction include K. Kerényi, *Die griechisch-orientalische Romanliteratur in religionsgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung* (Tübingen, 1927; Darmstadt, 1962²). For a different, but not preferable, approach, see G. Wojacek, *Daphnis* (Meisenheim, Germany, 1969). For excellent critical discussions, see A. Geyer, “Roman and Mysterienritual: Zum Problem eines Bezugs zum dionysischen Mysterienritual im Roman des Longos,” *WJA* 3 (1977): 179–96, and G. Freimuth, *MH* 21 (1964): 93ff. An interesting attempt at mediation between the extreme points of view is R. Beck, “Soteriology, the Mysteries and the Ancient Novel: Iamblichus *Babylonica* as a Test-Case,” in U. Bianchi and M. J. Vermaseren, eds., *La soteriologia dei culti orientali nell’ impero romano* (Leiden, 1982), 527–46.

138. One might, for instance, understand the adventures of Odysseus as expressions of his temporary sojourn outside the boundaries of normal time and place, an “eccentricity” marked by both utopian and dystopian imagery. On this ambiguity, see Versnel 1987. As R. Scodel has shown in “The Achaean Wall and the Myth of Destruction,” *HSCPh* 86 (1982), 33–50, the Homeric poems contain quite a few references to the “predeluvial” era, and she even argues that the story of the Trojan War itself may have originated in Zeus’s wish to destroy the race of the *hemitheoi*, as the episode of the destruction of the Achaean wall certainly does. In the context of “eccentric” experiences, there is quite a difference between the statement that Odysseus represents a youth during his initiation and the well-known theory that both fairy tales and (a specific type of) myths, including the one of Odysseus, go back to shamans’ tales—the records of their ecstatic experiences in the other world. See L. Frobenius, *Kulturgeschichte Afrikas* (Frankfurt, 1933 = Zurich, 1954),

306; K. Meuli, "Scythica," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, II:835ff.; F. von der Leyen, "Mythus und Märchen," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschr. für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 33 (1959): 343ff.; M. Eliade, "Les savants et les contes des fées," *Nouvelle revue française* 3 (1956): 884ff.; and M. Lüthi, *Das europäische Volksmärchen* (Munich, 1978⁶): 105. On the *Odyssey* in this perspective, see H. Petersmann, "Homer und das Märchen," *WS* 15 (1981): 43–68.

139. On handworking during the night and male aggression, see A. Slawik, *Wiener Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte und Linguistik* 4 (1936): 737ff., and Peuckert, *Geheimkulte*, 253. On license, see D. Zelenin, *Russische (Ostslawische) Volkskunde* (Berlin, 1927): 337ff., and E. Gasparini, *Nozze, società e abitazione degli antichi Slavi* (Venice, 1954), 22–23. Cf. Eliade 1975, 46. Generally, see H. Rey-Flaud, *Le charivari: Les rituels fondamentaux de la sexualité* (Paris, 1985). Bremmer reminds me that Burkert (1966b) has indeed, in an aside, suggested a connection between the handwork of the Arrhéphoroi and the peplos of Penelope.

140. Here, too, a predecessor had noticed the essentials: G. Dumézil, *Le crime des Lemniennes* (Paris, 1924). Cf. M. Detienne, *Les jardins d'Adonis* (Paris, 1972), 172–84, which, from a structuralist point of view, arrives at comparable conclusions. For some recent reconsiderations on the Lemnian fire, see P. Y. Forsyth, "Lemnos Reconsidered," *EMC* 28 (1984): 3–14.

141. Kirk 1974, 246: "It stands out, then, as the one clear case in the whole range of Greek heroic myths—with the Cecropides tale as a weaker ally—in which the myth-and-ritual theory is vindicated."

142. Cf. G. S. Kirk, *Gnomon* 44 (1972): 227: "Rituale, dramatisch theatralische Mitteilung im Spannungsfeld biologisch sozialer Antinomie So tritt eine tiefere Parallelität zum Mythos zu Tage."

143. Burkert 1966a; 1983. Independently, J.-P. Guépin, in *The Tragic Paradox* (Diss., Amsterdam, 1968), had arrived at comparable conclusions, although there are important differences as well.

144. Burkert 1980.

145. See V. J. Propp's *Morphology of the Folktale* (Austin, TX, 1973²); *Le radici storiche dei racconti di fate*; and *Edipo alla luce del folklore*. I can give only a rough summary of Burkert's ideas, and he does not follow Propp in every respect.

146. And, indeed, provided one skips some doublets, the Russian alphabet appears to consist of thirty-one letters. Even in the original Russian edition, however, the thirty-one motifemes are not indicated with letters.

147. See, for instance, his very amusing treatment of this type of structuralism in Burkert 1979, 10ff. For a recent attack on the imposition of modern Western binary classificatory principles on anthropological data, especially ritual, see S. Tcherkezoff, *Dual Classification Reconsidered: Nyamwezi Sacred Kingship and Other Examples* (Cambridge, 1987).

148. For example, G. Dundes, *The Morphology of North American Indian Folktales* (Hel-sinki, 1964): Lack–Lack Liquidated; Task–Task Accomplished; Deceit–Deception; Inter-diction–Violation–Consequence–Attempted Escape.

149. K. Lorenz, *Das sogenannte Böse: Zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression* (Vienna, 1963, 1970²); English translation, *On Aggression* (New York, 1966). See also Burkert 1979, 35ff.,

and Burkert, "Glaube und Verhalten: Zeichengehalt und Wirkungsmacht von Opferritualen," in *Le sacrifice dans l'antiquité*, Entretiens Hardt 27 (Geneva, 1981), 91–125.

150. Douglas, *Natural Symbols*; K. Lorenz, "A Discussion on Ritualization of Behaviour in Animals and Man," *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London*, Ser. B, 251 (1966): 247–526; J. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *Der vorprogrammierte Mensch: Das Ererbte als bestimmender Faktor im menschlichen Verhalten* (Vienna, 1973, 1976²).

151. Repetition is one of the most essential principles. See J. Cazeneuve, "Le principe de répétition dans le rite," *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie* 23 (1957): 42–62, and A. M. di Nola, *Antropologia religiosa* (Florence, 1974): 94–144.

152. Especially in K. Meuli, "Entstehung und Sinn der Trauersitten," *Schweizerisches Archiv für Volkskunde* 43 (1946) = *Gesammelte Schriften*, I:333–51.

153. K. Meuli, "Griechische Opferbräuche," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, II:907–1021.

154. Versnel 1987. Cf. also Versnel 1986.

155. For these associations, see, for instance, Burkert 1966b, 25: "In den Initiationsriten erneuert sich das Leben der Gemeinschaft, in den daraus gewachsenen Neujahrsriten erneuert sich die Ordnung der Polis." Cf. Burkert, in *Historia* 11 (1962): 356ff., on the legend of Romulus; Bremmer 1978, 33–34, on elements of lustration as features of New Year festival and initiation; Eliade 1975, passim, esp. chaps. 12, 13, and p. 48; Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (New York, 1954): 62–73; and Eliade, "Nouvel an, peau neuve," *Le Courier* 8 (1955): 7–32. In Egypt the coronation (initiation) of the new king is seen as the beginning of a new eon and a new year. See J. Bergman, *Ich bin Isis* (Uppsala, 1968), 212ff.

156. There are relatively few examples of the primeval Flood as a signal of initiation. Generally, the deluge theme is preeminently the image of chaos, seen as the obstacle to *kosmos*. The latter can come into being only after the victory over the chaotic deluge, a victory that is generally celebrated on New Year's Day. K. Meuli, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, I:283–99, concludes: "Jene *régénération totale du temps* ist von alten Völkern begriffen und dargestellt worden als das Auftauchen einer neuen, reinen Welt aus den Wassern der Sintflut," and he gives a substantiation of this statement in *Gesammelte Schriften*, II:1041ff. The same ideas already appear in H. Usener, *Sintflutsagen* (Bonn, 1899), 36ff. Cf. also G. Piccaluga, *Lycaon* (Rome, 1968), 69; Burkert 1983, index, s.v. "Flood"; J. Rudhardt, "Les mythes grecs relatifs à l'instauration du sacrifice: Les rôles corrélatifs de Prométhée et de son fils Deucalion," *MH* 27 (1970): 1–15; and Rudhardt, *Le thème de l'eau primordiale dans la mythologie grecque* (Bern, 1971). The theme has a central function in Near Eastern mythology; see J. G. Frazer, *Folklore in the Old Testament*, vol. I (London, 1918), 104–360, and in the revised edition by Theodor H. Gaster, *Myth, Legend, and Custom in the Old Testament*, vol. I (New York, 1969 = 1975²), 82–130; A. J. Wensinck, *The Ocean in the Literature of the Western Semites* (Amsterdam, 1918); O. Kaiser, *Die mythische Bedeutung des Meeres in Ägypten, Ugarit und Israel* (Berlin, 1962^a); and J. P. Lewis, *A Study of the Interpretation of Noah and the Flood in Jewish and Christian Literature* (Leiden, 1968, 1978²). On the symbolism of the Flood generally, see H. Gollob, *Chrysaor. Mit einem Anhang über die Sintflutsage* (Vienna, 1956). Cf. also the literature cited in J. Z. Smith 1978, 98.

157. On man-eating monsters and anthropophagy as symptoms of initiation, see Bremmer 1978, 16–17. On cannibalism as a sign of (recurrent) periods of chaos and disturbance of order, see A. J. Festugière, *Études de religion grecque et hellénistique* (Paris, 1972), 145ff.; M. Detienne, *Dionysos mis à mort* (Paris, 1977), 135–60; C. Grottanelli, "The Enemy

King Is a Monster: A Biblical Equation," *SSR* 3 (1979): 5ff.; and Versnel 1980, 591. On the historicity of cannibalistic rituals, see W. Arens, *The Man-Eating Myth: Anthropology and Anthropophagy* (Oxford, 1979). Nor can it be said that the fairy tales in which persons are swallowed up by a whale or dragon are necessarily connected with initiation ritual. For the widespread occurrence of this motif, see W. Fauth, "Utopische Inseln in den 'Wahren Geschichten' des Lukian," *Gymnasium* 86 (1979): 49ff.; U. Steffen, *Das Mysterium von Tod und Auferstehung: Formen und Wandlungen des Jona-Motivs* (Göttingen, 1963); and Steffen, *Drachenkampf: Der Mythos vom Bösen* (Stuttgart, 1984).

158. And indeed, one perceives traces of a shift in the frame of interpretation in later works of Burkert. In Burkert 1980, 184, he discusses the overtly Freudian theory of O. Rank, *Der Mythos der Geburt des Helden* (Vienna, 1909), in which the *Aussetzung-und Rückkehrformel* is traced back to the father-son conflict. Burkert considers this "eine der solidesten Leistungen" and states: "dies leuchtet weithin ein." The implications of this assessment are crucial: one of the traditional ingredients of the initiation theory has been detached from this context and is now exploited in a different type of interpretation.

159. Quotations from Burkert 1979. The marginal role played by initiation appears to be in accordance with recent theories on the social function of "institutionalized homosexuality." Though no doubt often connected with initiation ritual, its application generally exceeds the strict boundaries of the period of initiation. Homosexual subjection seems to have a broader function as a powerful component of social hierarchy: it supports the status and position of older men over and against women and young men. See G. W. Creed, "Sexual Subordination: Institutionalized Homosexuality and Social Control in Melanesia," *Ethnology* 23 (1984): 157–76, and bibliographical references therein, and G. Herdt, ed., *Ritualized Homosexuality in Melanesia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984).

160. J. Campbell, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (New York, 1949; London, 1975²).

161. M. Eliade (1975, 128, with a very hazy note on p. 165) suggests that the initiation scheme was prior and landed in dreams and myths, whereas, at the same time, he nevertheless concedes that "every human life is made up of a series of ordeals, of 'deaths' and of 'resurrections.'" But if this is so, it is far more likely that these ordeals common to human life have given shape to both the initiation scenario and—independently—the materials that dreams and myths are made of. On this and similar questions, see H. von Beit, *Symbolik des Märchens: Versuch einer Deutung* (Bern, 1952), and *Enzyklopädie des Märchens*, s.v. "Aufgabc," where, conversely, the unfeasible assignment known from fairy tales is seen as the reflection of *Alptraumerfahrungen*. Nor is it very likely that Snow White has borrowed her seven dwarfs from initiation ritual; see H. Bausinger, "Anmerkungen zu Schneewittchen," in H. Brackert, ed., *Und wenn sie nicht gestorben sind . . . Perspektiven auf das Märchen* (Frankfurt, 1982³), 39–70.

What Campbell omits has been made up by G. J. Baudy, in *Exkommunikation und Reintegration: Zur Genese und Kulturfunktion frühgriechischer Einstellungen zum Tod* (Frankfurt, 1980). He offers a psychoethological explanation of deep-seated fears, for instance the fear of voracious monsters, interpreting them as relics of primates' primordial fear of the *Artfeind* (the praedator). On pp. 33–34, Baudy juxtaposes the initiate, who is in danger of being swallowed up, and the fairy-tale hero in the same situation, as I have done, but he does not suggest an evolutionary link between the two. On pp. 250ff., however, he wishes to trace the fairy-tale motif back to initiation (specifically, the shamanistic sce-

nario), which seems unnecessary to me. Obviously, similar problems of origin emerge in different fields: it is *the* problem of Freud's Oedipus theory. It plays an important role in the discussion between Henrichs and Winkler (see n. 136 above), where the latter—I think convincingly—refers to “patterns of narrative, the basic plots and formulae of popular entertainment,” without, however, inquiring into the origins of these patterns. It also figures in the discussion between F. Ranke (*Kleinere Schriften* [Bern and Münster, 1971]), who explains the popular fancies of the *Wide Heer* as “innerseelische Vorgänge des numinösen Erlebniss” (esp. as manifest in hysteria, epilepsy, and so forth), and his fierce opponent O. Höfler (*Verwandlungskulte, Volkssagen und Mythen*, SAWW 279 [1973]), who traces this “wild army” back to historical, cultic *Jungmannschaften*. And it is also present in the discussion on the origins of the Eleusinian and other mysteries. For instance, on the ambivalence of human initiation and agricultural fertility as the ultimate background of the mysteries, see G. Casadio, “Per un’indagine storico-religiosa sui culti di Dioniso in relazione alla fenomenologia dei misteri,” pt. I, SSR 6 (1982): 209–34.

162. T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, 1970²). He has revised his ideas in *The Essential Tension* (Chicago, 1977). For criticism, see I. Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge, 1970), 91–196, and P. Feyerabend, *Against Method* (London, 1975).

163. For application of the concept of “paradigm” to social theory, see B. Barnes, *T. S. Kuhn and Social Science* (London, 1982). On “tolerance,” see S. Seiler, *Wissenschaftstheorie in der Ethnologic: Zur Kritik und Weiterführung der Theorie von Thomas S. Kuhn anhand ethnographischen Materials* (Berlin, 1980), and P. Kloos, “Culturele antropologie als polyparadigmatische wetenschap,” in A. de Ruijter, ed., *Beginnelsen in botsing* (Utrecht, 1981).

164. I found this quotation in J. Z. Smith 1978, 264, a book from which I have learned more than I have been able to account for within the scope of this chapter.

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3 INTRODUCTION Ancient Greece has come to look more and more like part of a larger Mediterranean commercial and cultural network, and since the first edition of this book, the comparison of Greek with ancient Near Eastern myth has grown in importance for classicists. Martin West's *The East Face of Helicon: West Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry and Myth* (1997) manifests the development. Although such books will not come in large numbers from Hellenists, the output of scholarship has been large, as Carolina López-Ruiz's survey shows. Specialists in one or another of the ancient Near Eastern disciplines have done much of the comparative work. With the decentering of ancient Greece, however, classicists will not seem like renegades if they acquire one or more of the relevant languages and undertake comparison from their side: for Anatolia (modern Turkey), Hittite, Hurrian, and Luwian; for Syro-Palestine, Ugaritic, Phoenician, Aramaic, and Hebrew; for Mesopotamia (modern Iraq), Sumerian and Akkadian; for Phoenicia (modern Lebanon), Phoenician; for Egypt, the relevant stages of Egyptian (especially Late Egyptian and Demotic).^a

The two largest questions raised by López-Ruiz are: what is appropriated or adapted by the Greeks, and how? As for the first question, Robert Mondi, in his contribution on Greece and the ancient Near East in the first edition of this book, spoke of "mythic ideas." He proposed that we think of myths not primarily as narratives but as conceptual foci that may be, but are not necessarily, expressed in narratives. (One sees a comparable distinction between narrative and "mythic ideas" in Dumézil's Indo-European tripartitism, discussed and illustrated by Joseph Nagy in chapter 4.) Although López-Ruiz does not argue for one side of this opposition or the other, her list of examples of narratives, in the section "Some Areas of Comparison: An Overview," is considerable. (And to refer again to Indo-European myth, no one would deny that there are narratives that have come into Greek myth as well as the ideology of tripartitism.) Greek mythology shares narratives with all of the places listed above, including Egypt, for which the "Potiphar's wife" story is attested. It corresponds in Greek myth to the story of Phaedra and Hippolytus (a woman tries to seduce a man, fails, and then accuses him of having tried to seduce her). For that matter, it is an international folktale.^b

As for the question of how, part of the answer is straightforward. In the Late Bronze Age (1550–1200 B.C.E.), trade opened paths of contact between Greece, Greeks on Crete, and various places in the Aegean.^c Sometimes a so-called cultural *koinē*, or "common language," involving two or more peoples was the result. Later came colonization (by Greeks on the islands and the coast of western Asia

Minor) and, in the “orientalizing” period (8th–7th c. B.C.E.), the immigration of Eastern craftsmen into the Greek cities in the homeland.⁴ The other part of the answer, the medium, is less clear. Was it writing or was it oral communication or was it both? If it was both, can this answer be refined? The undoubted parallels of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* with the Gilgamesh epic (discussed by López-Ruiz under “Homer and Gilgamesh: The Weight of Mesopotamian Epic Tradition”) provide a test case. The Gilgamesh epic is attested in writing already at the end of the third millennium; it was translated into Hurrian and Hittite by the end of the second millennium. As for Homer, on the one hand, there could not have been written texts of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* until after the beginning of the eighth century B.C.E., when the Greeks began to use an alphabet; on the other hand, Homeric epic can be seen as the Greek reflex of Proto-Indo-European epic, and at least some of its narratives can be seen as prototypical.⁵ An oral Greek epic tradition, brought by the Greeks in their migration to the Balkan Peninsula in the early second millennium, would have led a parallel existence to the Gilgamesh epic. The numerous similarities of this epic to the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* would, on this view of the matter, reflect a long period of contact. The Hurro-Hittite *Song of Release*, dated to the fifteenth century B.C.E., provides, with its extensive similarities to the *Iliad* (López-Ruiz’s section “Other Epic Themes: The Anatolian Connection”), a comparable example of how Near Eastern epic elements could move into Greek (assuming that this was the direction of the movement).⁶

The Gilgamesh epic was itself absorbing variant traditions reflected in the Standard Version that was forming at the end of the second millennium.⁷ It is not the fixed point of reference that it often seems to be when discussed in relation to Homer. On the contrary, it begins to seem to be more appropriately placed in the “eastern Mediterranean mythological *koinē*” that López-Ruiz proposes in her conclusion. This large *koinē*, going back in time to the Late Bronze Age and resurgent in the orientalizing period, would also include the other standard bodies of comparative myth, even if they are often assumed to have had the same fixity that they now have in the material texts in which they happen to survive.

Greek and Near Eastern Mythologies

A Story of Mediterranean Encounters

CAROLINA LÓPEZ-RUIZ

The amount of scholarship devoted to the intersections of Greek and Near Eastern literatures and mythologies has exploded in the past twenty years and tantalizes us with the possibility of an apparently inexhaustible line of research. Texts from the Near Eastern cultures have become more familiar through new translations and general studies.¹ As a result, the comparative perspective has not only proliferated in specialized publications but has increasingly made its way into mainstream publications in the classics (encyclopedia entries, chapters in companions, and notes in commentaries). The challenge now is to frame the copious evidence within analytical categories and interpretive methodologies that make the comparative work meaningful for the understanding of Greek literature, myth, and thought. By understanding Greek culture in its broader Mediterranean context, we will be better equipped to situate it in discussions of cultural contact and exchange taking place in fields other than Classics.

This chapter, therefore, does not contain extensive discussions of particular myths and their Near Eastern counterparts. Rather, it engages with the state of this approach to mythology, the main challenges that scholars engaging in comparative research face, and possible avenues for growth in this subfield of classical mythology. It also offers a synthetic overview of the main genres and important thematic clusters in which Near Eastern and Greek myth overlap, with further bibliography for the reader to pursue.

Greek and Near Eastern Myth, Twenty-Four Years Later

The more *and* less evident correspondences between Greek and Babylonian, Egyptian, Hittite, Ugaritic, Hebrew, Phoenician, and other mythologies are no longer curiosities that hint at mysterious and exotic intrusions in an otherwise impermeable, marmoreal, and “monolithic” Greek culture, as they once were perceived. But comparison is not a threat to Greek culture’s “integrity” or originality either.

We have instead uncovered a broader connectedness, which authorizes a

greater scope for comparativist interpretation. As Mondì effectively expressed it twenty-four years ago, in the first edition of this book:

Like its counterpart in comparative Indo-European studies, comparison of Greek myths with Oriental analogues can help uncover ideological structures and conceptual relationships otherwise latent in the Greek mythological sources by making possible the study of Greek myth not only within the confines of its own closed system, but also in a more extensive nexus of mythic themes and ideology common to Greek and Near Eastern thought. In essence, it increases for our consideration the number of realizations of a mythic idea. (1990, 144)

A comment is necessary on the defensiveness that sometimes marks these discussions. If Near Eastern texts can provide such an illuminating context for Greek mythology, why is it a relatively young subdiscipline in classical studies, even perceived among traditionalists as somewhat intrusive? There are historical and ideological reasons. The first one has to do with transmission of texts. The legacy of classical literature and the cultures it represented enjoyed, for centuries, a relatively uninterrupted (if selective) manuscript tradition. The “classics” remained a staple of European education even after the appearance of vernacular literatures. Greek and Latin cultures provided the ideological foundation for “the idea of the West” as something essentially different from “oriental” cultures (a complex issue, on which see Saïd 1978; Arvidsson 2006; López-Ruiz 2010, introduction). Near Eastern texts, by contrast, had a somewhat paradoxical fate: their literary traditions died out with the respective cultures that produced them, as they were absorbed by Hellenistic, Roman, and later, Muslim empires. On the other hand, the extensive inscribing of texts on indestructible clay tablets and stone inscriptions, together with dry climates, allowed an extraordinary amount of text (including papyri in Egypt) to be preserved *in its original form* for millennia. With the explosion of archaeological exploration in the nineteenth century came the discovery of the ancient Near East (then part of the Ottoman Empire) and the decipherment of its languages, first Egyptian (1820s) and Akkadian (1850s), then others during the twentieth century (such as Luwian, Hittite, Ugaritic). Near Eastern art started filling the halls of new national museums in Europe beside classical objects, and Assyriology and Egyptology joined the ranks of academic disciplines, even if at first as branches of biblical studies, with which they are still strongly associated (see Trolle Larsen 1996).

As soon as the so-called Chaldaean Flood story appeared in the first deciphered cuneiform tablets, or the castration of the Sky God in the Hittite texts, to mention two milestones, it became clear that comparison would have important implications for the contextualization of both the biblical and the classical traditions. At the same time, Michael Ventris's decipherment of Linear B as a very old form of Greek in the 1950s situated the Greek tradition among the densely interconnected networks of the eastern Mediterranean in the Late Bronze Age, opening up another avenue of research for Greek and Near Eastern interactions and their impact on Greek mythology, religion, and culture in general.

Certainly, Greek and Near Eastern myths had been compared before the nineteenth century. But the sources were miniscule in comparison with what we have today, limited to references in classical authors (e.g., Herodotos, Pausanias) and quotations or paraphrases of Near Eastern authors who had written in Greek in Hellenistic and Roman times (such as Manetho and Philon of Byblos), as well as highly filtered references to Assyrians, Babylonians, Phoenicians, Egyptians, and others in the Hebrew Bible. In fact, those references in Greek authors to Phoenician Kadmos and Europa, to Egyptian Danaos, and to other characters presented as oriental were taken at face value by nineteenth-century comparativist scholars, as were the ancient historians' assumption that Phoenicians had migrated and founded sanctuaries and settlements in Greece.² But what might have developed into a progressive critical revision of these classical sources, in the light of emerging Near Eastern texts and archaeological discoveries, was truncated by a counter-reaction that rejected oriental "influences" on Greek culture. With Julius Beloch spear-heading a "purist" agenda (esp. Beloch 1894), work attempting to combine oriental and classical studies stalled, and some remarkable exceptions such as Victor Bérard's long treatise on the Phoenicians and the *Odyssey* (1903) were ignored by classicists.

What Martin Bernal denounced in the first volume of his *Black Athena* (1987) as part of the anti-Semitism and racism in which most classicists before and during World War II allegedly partook had already been exposed more discreetly by Michael Astour in the 1960s. As one of the few who tried to break the anti-oriental and anti-comparativist prejudice after the war, Astour prefaced his work on Greek and Semitic mythologies, *Hellenosemitica*, with an account of these dynamics: "The polemic against admitting any Semitic influence upon Greece was conducted with so much passion that its motivation seemed to be derived from external considerations," and "Eastern influences were excluded a priori,

but there was a great predilection for seeking northern (or Nordic) influences on Greek religion and culture” (1967, xii).

But discoveries continued, building increasing numbers of bridges between Greece and the Levant. In 1928 the Canaanite coastal city of Ugarit in northern Syria was discovered, and its excavation has yielded many texts in a North-West Semitic language of the Late Bronze Age (14th–13th c. B.C.E.) related to later-attested Hebrew, Aramaic, and Phoenician. After the swift decipherment of Ugaritic, the mythology contained in its three main epic poems (the *Baal Cycle*, *Aqhat*, and *Kirta* epics), as well as in ritual and other quasi-mythological texts, became the object of study by Hebrew Bible scholars. But these texts, as well as the appearance of new Phoenician inscriptions, some of which bore names perhaps connected with Greek myths (see below), kindled the work of Semitists such as Astour (1967) and Cyrus Gordon (1962) and of classicists such as Peter Walcot, especially in his work on Hesiod and the Near East (1966). This revitalization of comparative mythology was also fueled by the roughly contemporary discovery of the Hittites in central Anatolia (modern Turkey), starting in 1906. The language of the Hittite texts, found in the capital, Hattusa (modern Boghazköy), was soon identified as Indo-European, and as literary texts saw the light, Hittite scholars quickly pointed out parallels between the Greek and Hittite epics, especially the *Kumarbi Cycle* and the *Theogony* of Hesiod (Güterbock 1948).

As things go in academia, the possibilities presented by this new world of Near Eastern texts trickled down into classical scholarship quite slowly, not the least because of the extra effort and difficulty required to become familiar (not to say an expert) with any of the relevant languages. Still, an increasing openness to interdisciplinary education and cooperation between programs has begun to pay off in recent decades.³ This steady progression of *moderate* incorporation of the new comparative material into the study of Greek mythology was overshadowed to some degree by the controversy created by Martin Bernal’s work *Black Athena* on the “Afroasiatic roots of classical civilization” (1987, 1991; a third volume, with much less impact, appeared in 2006). This was an honest attempt to correct the above-mentioned tendency of classicists to turn their back on possible Near Eastern “influence” in Greek culture (defending what Bernal called the “Aryan Model”) and dismiss both ancient sources and modern studies that pointed to such influences. But Bernal fell into the same trap as his targeted purist opponents, that is, of treating Greek culture as a monolithic block that owes its shape to one external source (Egyptian and Phoenician in his case).⁴ In other words,

his unidirectional view of cultural contact relied on a view of “borrowing” that conforms with a traditional view of diffusion, one in which some cultures are viewed as merely derivative from other, dominant cultures. Hence, even though many of his points (especially in volume 1) are useful, his position alienated a field already inclined to be skeptical, forcing other comparativists to defend their more moderate positions anew. Furthermore, he introduced controversies that confused the discussion of cultural exchange with those of race and skin color, which were not central to ancient discourse but, unfortunately, are in our society.

More broadly acceptable, groundbreaking works continued to pave the path for constructive comparison. For decades these works tended to compile and synthesize parallels between Greek and Near Eastern literatures, mythology, and material evidence. The main works involving literature, mythology, and religion include those by Walter Burkert (1979, 1985 [1977 in German], 1992 [1984 in German], 2004); Martin West (from his commentaries on Hesiod’s *Theogony* and *Works and Days* [1966, 1978] to the compendium of literary and mythological parallels in *The East Face of Helicon*, 1997); John Pairman Brown’s three volumes on parallels between Greek and biblical texts (1995, 2000, 2001); and Jan Bremmer’s essays on Greek religion and myth in the light of Near Eastern and biblical parallels (2008). Sarah Morris’s study of Greek orientaling art and culture (1992) included mythological narratives, as have other studies devoted to more specific subjects (e.g., Budin 2003; Finkelberg 2005; Lane Fox 2008).⁵ Furthermore, the framework in which archaic Greek culture and myth are discussed in recent surveys and monographs factors in the interaction with the Near East (e.g., Osborne 1996; Whitley 2001; Hall 2002). Similarly, recent companions to Greek mythology dedicate not one but several sections to Greek and Near Eastern mythologies (e.g., Woodard 2007a; Dowden and Livingstone 2011; López-Ruiz 2014). A recent companion to ancient epic (Foley 2005) consists of roughly equal sections on Greek, Near Eastern, and Roman epics, with numerous essays on their interconnectedness—a feature also of several volumes on Homer (Morris and Powell 1997; Loudon 2006; West 2011; Montanari, Rengakos, and Tsagalis 2012).

At the same time, however, the wealth of new material and overwhelming accumulation of “parallels” (faster than we can digest them) also produced a sense of dissatisfaction, which should be taken as a healthy sign. What to do with this information once the point has well been taken that comparison is legitimate and that there is plenty in common between Greek and Near Eastern mythological traditions? Some even diagnosed a state of *aporia* (Haubold 2002–3, 2), and it is

indeed to be hoped that we will find ways to make comparison meaningful and useful beyond the exposure of the comparison itself. Optimism emerges from recent works that further the comparative field by narrowing the scope of the compared areas so as to allow for a more thorough treatment of the relevant *corpora* and their interconnectedness, in specific historical, archaeological, and functional contexts. For example, in chronological order, López-Ruiz's monograph (2010) zooms in on the patterns of cosmogonic (origins of the cosmos) and theogonic (birth and generations of gods) myth to interpret connections between the Hesiodic and Orphic myths and specific North-West Semitic traditions (Ugaritic, Phoenician, Hebrew). Ian Moyer's book on Egypt and Greece (2011) explores the complex dialogic ways in which the two cultures constructed images of each other and, while not focused on myth, provides a more nuanced framework within which to study the reflections of Egyptian myth in Greek literature. Bachvarova (forthcoming) explores the connections between Hittite myth and ritual and Greek epic poetry. Mesopotamian influence, in turn, has been specifically explored in Penglase's book (1994) on the Homeric Hymns, and two recent monographs by Loudon (2011) and Doak (2013) bring out connections between Greek epic traditions and narratives in the Hebrew Bible.

As this overview shows, the trajectory of the field has been steadily on the rise as new evidence has become available, and comparison no doubt holds the key to many unopened doors. Still, its place is to stand side-by-side with other avenues of interpretation and exploration of Greek myth, well represented in this volume, all of which unveil relevant aspects of Greek mythology. As Mondt put it, "The attribution of oriental provenance . . . is thus never a final explanation of the myths, but merely one piece of the puzzle; comparative study is therefore not properly used instead of the other methodological approaches discussed in this volume, but only in conjunction with one or more of them" (1990, 144).

Methodological Considerations

Before turning to the main fields of comparison and some specific motifs, I will lay out some methodological clarifications. I hope that these condensed points will help the reader place the evidence discussed below and in other works in an appropriate framework and consider the challenges to our understanding of Greek culture that are posed by this approach.

1. *Similarity does not mean simple borrowing (or at least direct borrowing).* Even when two items are similar enough to suggest a genealogical relationship between them resulting from cultural contact (excluding, therefore, an independent de-

velopment), their relationship can take many forms. There might be, in fact, a direct interdependence between the two items, but more often they might both be drawing on a common source or “ancestor” many generations removed within each branch of the two traditions (multiplying the layers of mediation on each side). It is also often the case that myths have a nonrecorded life outside written texts, which can lead to new versions and the “broken telephone” effect (Lane Fox’s “creative mistakes”[2008, 216, 240]). As for the term *borrowing* itself, it has fallen out of favor because of its association with a traditional view of diffusion (cf. comments on Bernal’s position above). On the one hand, ideas, technologies, and stories do “spread” from one place to another, so it is not strictly incorrect to talk about “diffusion” or “influence.” Basic human achievements such as writing and agriculture, after all, developed independently in a few places in the world, whence they spread to other cultures (Diamond 1999). Nonetheless, other terms, such as *adaptation* or *appropriation* (even *emulation* in some cases) better reflect the more subtle ways in which cultural items are transmitted. They force us to regard both sides of the process as participants in a “cultural transaction,” the dynamics of which depend on culture- and time-specific factors. Often these factors and the proximate aim of an adaptation are irretrievable, but we should at least acknowledge that each adaptation is part of a complex process that we ultimately want to understand.

2. *It is not the primary goal of comparison to ascertain “origins.”* It would be disingenuous to deny that comparativism is partly driven by a fascination with origins and the “hidden” history of familiar traditions. There are, however, multiple dimensions of Greek myth and culture that can be unveiled by comparison. Moreover, there is often a discrepancy between the back history of a cultural item as “discovered” through comparison and the meaning, function, and perception of that item in its own day and time. A paradoxical example is the figure of Dionysos, the god of wine and drama, who was traditionally characterized by the Greeks as a foreigner who, whatever his ancestry, arrives from exotic eastern lands to upset the established order in Greek cities. Scholars took this depiction as a sign of the actual foreign, eastern, origin of the god, who would have been imported into Greek in the archaic period. The discovery of his name beside other Olympian Greek gods in the Linear B tablets, however, showed that the god had been with the Greeks since the Bronze Age, and thus his persistent representation as an exotic newcomer had to do with his constructed identity, connected more with his function within Greek religion and society than with the origins of his cult, whatever they were.⁶

3. *Not everything comes from the East.* The dictum *ex oriente lux* is not popular any more. Even though the general direction of transmission (in the nuanced sense proposed above) of ideas and artistic models is from the Near East to the West, more intensive in some periods than others, we should not rule out the circulation of ideas and stories in the opposite direction. In fact, sometimes they moved circularly, for instance passing from the East to Greece and then returning again. Such might be the case, for instance, with the above-mentioned castration myth. A possible scenario is its adoption into Greek mythology from Anatolia, followed by its return to the Levant with the introduction of Hesiod's poems in the Hellenistic period, or earlier, and its eventual shaping of Philon of Byblos's reformulation of Canaanite myth in the early second century C.E. (see also below).

4. *The "Near East" is not unitary and uniform.* Obvious as this statement might be, we are dangerously used to subsuming a vast array of cultures, with their distinct languages and mythical traditions, under the convenient labels "Near East" and (more vaguely) "Orient." Although there are enough reasons for this category (which are outside the scope of this essay), there is also need, as with most scholarly conventions, for a self-conscious alertness when we use the term. When it comes to specific comparison, this broad category will not be adequate, and we will need not only to specify whether the comparison is with Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Phoenician, or other mythologies but to try to understand the dynamics of transmission and adaptation within the historical and cultural relationship between the parties involved. Each Near Eastern culture had its own history and language, although these cultures, too, were connected among themselves in different ways (see more on transmission below).

5. *Myths are not texts, but they are in texts.* Myths, understood as traditional stories, usually about gods and the heroes they interact with, are not *bound to* texts and can be infinitely retold in many different ways (in a song, a vase painting, an epic recitation, or a bed-time story). In these retellings lie their success and survival as "traditional," as Lowell Edmunds puts it (2005, 30): "a traditional story can survive only if it can be retold, and it can be retold only if it can be applied to new circumstances."

The concept of the "floating" myth, however, which works best for anthropological and more theoretical types of analysis (e.g., structuralist, psychoanalytic), is only partially applicable to the task of comparison: we are, after all, comparing myths as they were "captured" in specific literary works. In the case of Homer and Hesiod, one school has famously sought to compare their poems to previous *oral* Greek tradition that is reconstructed largely by inference from the poems.

Near Eastern material, on the other hand, offers the opportunity to compare literary compositions with mythical narratives that were both oral and textual. This is clear, for instance, in the fact “that in the generations before Homer, and in his time, the *Gilgamesh* epic and other Akkadian classic poems might still be heard as well as read, and moreover that they would be heard in much the same form as that in which we read them in the Neo-Assyrian copies” (West 1997, 602). This access to comparative texts does not eliminate the problem of ascertaining the manner and level of contact between Greek and Mesopotamian and other Near Eastern epics. It is possible that the specific versions of the myths we have to compare were not in direct contact with each other (George 2003, 57) and that perhaps they do not represent the closest parallel that might have existed or the missing link that explains the resemblances. In other words, what we find are *usually* not direct parallels and allusions but thematic parallels and distant resonances emanating from long-lived traditions in both cultures, whose points of interference are normally impossible to plot in time and space, given our limited evidence (unlike, say, Virgil’s *Aeneid*, whose interaction with Greek mythic literature, mostly with works we have, is intentional, direct, and traceable).

Note the emphasis placed on the word *usually*, precisely to leave open the cases in which we do in fact come close to direct allusion and emulation of literary techniques, for instance in the case of the *Iliad* and *Gilgamesh* (see below). In fact, it is more accurate and useful to consider the context of both Near Eastern and archaic Greek epic as *mixed* written and oral, as a recent reevaluation argues for South Slavic and Homeric epic (Currie 2012, 577–78). Homer’s environment may have included both fluid oral tradition and fixed Near Eastern texts (including semi-fixed oral versions). We can play with new possibilities here, and new models for the matrix of variants.⁷

6. *Dates of texts can be misleading.* Sometimes comparanda are separated by a considerable chronological gap. Although reconstructing lost intermediaries is risky and hypothetical, to assume that they did not exist because not attested (argument *ex silentio*) is equally dangerous, given the fragmentary state of our records. As there were many more written sources than we have, the exemplars in which we find material to compare may be simply the only survivors. It follows that a later text (e.g., the Orphic Derveni Papyrus) might preserve an older version of a Near Eastern motif (the castration of the Sky God and swallowing of his genitals) than an earlier text (Hesiod’s *Theogony*), even if the latter was traditionally considered a model for the Orphic poems because of its date and canonical status (see more on cosmogonies below).

An extreme example of such a gap is presented by the Phoenician-Roman writer Philon of Byblos, who elaborated a euhemerist version of Phoenician cosmogonic myths, writing as late as the second century C.E. Though for a long time he was thought to be imitating Hesiod (whom he clearly knew) and inventing allegedly local traditions, it has been shown by comparison to Ugaritic narratives that his sources included Canaanite myths that somehow survived in the region for more than a millennium, in a combination of oral and written media.

7. *Language is not culture.* Linguistic lineage (Indo-European vs. Semitic, in our case) does not determine the entire (synchronic) make-up of a culture. The separate language families with their separate histories are modern analytical categories (see López-Ruiz 2010, introduction) and do not necessarily correspond to the divisions between ancient cultures. This point bears on Greece vis-à-vis its Near Eastern and Indo-European “relations,” which maintained contacts with each other over a long period of time. While the importance of Indo-European comparative mythology is beyond doubt (recently, Katz 2005; West 2007; Woodard 2007b; Allen 2011), research into “cultural DNA” of the Indo-Europeans (we are talking about “deep” traits diluted by the separation of the different groups since prehistoric times) should not be understood as an either-or alternative to non-Indo-European features in Greek culture. Both kinds of comparison are legitimate for archaic and classical Greece as (asymmetrical) aspects of its cultural make-up, as is also the poorly documented pre-Greek substratum of the territory that the Greeks occupied when they arrived in the second millennium B.C.E. While the Indo-European heritage lived on mainly through the Greek language itself and its inherited forms and concepts, including poetic and mythological features, the Eastern traits permeated linguistic barriers through the centuries as Greek-speakers came into contact with their neighbors. They shared in and competed with the cultures of the Near East in the eastern Mediterranean, and they were in relative isolation from most other Indo-European off-shoots (save the Anatolian ones, who were also part of this same eastern world).

When looking at Greek mythology, then, we need to distinguish between its *vertical* genealogical relationship to Indo-European, pre-Greek traditions and the *horizontal* axis that links cultures in historical contact (whether or not they are ethnically or linguistically related). These are two of the three methods that Nagy (2005, 71–72) set forth in his discussion of comparative epic. He added a third, *typological* one, in which comparison is between cultures not necessarily related either genealogically (diachronically) or historically (synchronically) in order to elucidate structures and patterns in language and thought generally. While Nagy

considers Greek and Near Eastern parallels to fall within this third, typological category (with an occasional historical contact not excluded; Nagy 2005, 82), it is in fact along the axis of *historical* contact that these connections should be discussed. To give an example of the nonexclusive nature of these parameters, we can consider the Hittites. One of the strongest empires in the Bronze Age Near East, the Hittites spoke an Indo-European language, as did Luwians and others in Anatolia (in fact, they spoke the earliest Indo-European language attested, with texts dating to 16th c. B.C.E. onward). Hittite evidence, paradoxically, is treated as part of the Near East for the purposes of comparison, as its culture not only thrived in that geographical area but was discovered by scholars alongside the other Bronze Age Near Eastern civilizations. The Hittites knew *Gilgamesh*. At the same time, Anatolian languages provide a great source for comparative Indo-European linguistics.

In sum, location is as much a determinant of a “culture” as is its inherited language, and even *within* the Near East, the transmission of ideas and stories required various degrees of multilingualism and deliberate learning, nurtured by continued contact and interest in other cultures.

8. *Authors are not necessarily mouthpieces for their cultures.* This is not to say that authors are not in some ways representative of aspects of their culture or that they might not *become* iconic after they attain fame, turning into “canonical” and inescapable points of reference. However, one must always be wary of assuming that an author speaks for his culture in any kind of straightforward way. This assumption is especially dangerous when we are dealing with authors for whose work we have little background, such as Hesiod and Homer. Authors may or may not conform to assumed cultural categories and stereotypes. At times they may deliberately break from the “tradition” within which they worked, thereby (if successful) creating a new “tradition” for others to follow. For example, in telling his version of the Trojan War, Homer retained the struggle over an abducted woman, but he may have surprised his audience by making it primarily a struggle between two Achaeans over Briseis (who?). Nor is it at all certain that Homer and Hesiod depicted the gods as most of their contemporaries imagined them, but they certainly shaped later representations (cf. Herodotus’s remarks in 2.53).⁸ It is important, therefore, to acknowledge, first of all and whenever possible, the integrity of our texts and the independence of their authors, respecting their capacity for choice and innovation. Our texts are not random collections of inherited motifs but, usually, coherent works of literary art.

9. *Comparison can serve different masters.* Even within the field of comparison,

there are various ways in which the same parallels can be treated, depending on the scholar's lens. To simplify, and following Mondì (1990, 144), the focus can be either more *analytical* or more *synthetic*—and these are not exclusive approaches. The first will break down a myth into elements that can be compared with its Near Eastern analogues and will sometimes be content with the establishment of a plausible connection; it will pay special attention to etymologies, the names of characters, place names, or key objects in the story, and to the way in which the specific narrative can be mapped onto the alleged oriental model. Usually it will be concerned with historical issues such as the areas and paths of transmission (e.g., Burkert 1992; West 1997; López-Ruiz 2010; Louden 2011; van Dongen 2011). The second, more synthetic-comparativist approach is concerned with uncovering ideological structures and patterns of thought within Greek mythology. Burkert pursued this approach in *Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual* (1979), as did Kirk in his work on Hesiod (1962) and on Greek myth more generally (1970), drawing on the French structuralist school.⁹ In this kind of analysis, the bare-bones concepts in specific stories are abstracted and so are key concepts and “conceptual foci” (Mondì 1990, 145), such as the names of gods or basic ideas (e.g., goddesses seducing mortal men), which can be compared even when the stories change in detail. Mondì's critical view of the analytical approach as less relevant to understanding Greek myth per se (1990, 144) overdichotomized the two methods, as analyses of punctual analogies can be and are often discussed as part of its structural logic (as most works cited above show). Both approaches, in any case, help to fill in different shades and colors of the mosaic of Greek mythology.

Some Areas of Comparison: An Overview

Although the body of parallels and their literary “wrapping” is too large to review here, they cluster around certain themes and mythical figures. These, in turn, seem to concentrate in some genres more than in others, which might tell us something about how these stories were transmitted (see the section “The Question of Transmission,” below). The earlier attested myths (those in Homer and Hesiod) are given precedence here, since they fall within the period of heightened impact of Near East models on Greek culture (8th–7th c. B.C.E, or “orientalizing” period) and cannot be read against previous or contemporary Greek texts, while they became points of reference for subsequent artists that “fed from their crumbs,” as Aeschylus reportedly said of the dependence of his tragedies on Homer (*TrGF*, vol. 3, T 112a–b). Also, in accordance with the state-

ment made above that the Near East comprised distinct cultures, which need to be treated separately wherever possible, I organize these examples by geographical contact areas.

THE GREEK PANTHEON: NAVIGATING GREEK AND LEVANTINE ELEMENTS

First, since myths are mostly about gods, I present some thoughts about the Greek gods and their relation to Near Eastern traditions. I then briefly discuss the cases of Zeus and Aphrodite, who offer plenty of opportunity for comparison with Near Eastern deities and their stories.

Both within and outside cosmogonic/theogonic poetry, many of the Greek gods find more analogues in the Near Eastern pantheons than anywhere else. In fact, it has long been noticed that for all the Indo-European origins of the Greek language, only the head of the pantheon, Zeus, bears a name obviously evolved from a Proto-Indo-European ancestor: the god of the sky, the brightness of day. His name stems from the root **diw/djew-*, preserved in the Greek *di(w)os* “bright, divine” (Mycenaean *diwijo/diwija*), and *eudia*, “good day/weather” (cf. the Indic Sky God *Dyaus pitar*, Germanic **Tiwaz*, which lies behind our “Tuesday,” and Latin Jupiter or Diespiter; see Burkert 1985, 125–26; Dowden 2006, 9–10; 2007, 48). For a few others, such as Helios and Eos, there might be comparative Indo-European evidence, while Demeter, Poseidon, and a few obscure local figures might be early Greek or pre-Greek (Indo-European) figures (see López-Ruiz, forthcoming). Other deities have Indo-European names only to the extent that they have straightforwardly Greek names (Aither, Hypnos, Nyx, etc.), which places them at a later stage of formation. The remaining Greek gods have obscure names, reminding us of the long distance separating Greek mythology from its putative Indo-European crucible,¹⁰ as well as of the worlds the Greeks encountered along their way into the Aegean and once they settled there, which must account for many features of their later mythology and religion (Finkelberg 2005; Marinatos 2010).

Moreover, Zeus, the Greek version of the Indo-European Bright-Sky God, is in his Greek incarnation much more of a “Cloudy-Sky” God, represented as a Storm God of the type who also ruled in pantheons throughout the Near East in historical times: Canaanite Baal and his variants (Haddad, Adad), Babylonian Marduk, and the Anatolian variants Teshub (Hurrian) and Tarhunt (Hittite, Luwian) (on Storm gods, see Green 2003). As in the *Theogony* of Hesiod, in the mythologies of these regions the Storm God was enthroned after a series of struggles with his predecessors and against monstrous enemies (in the Ugaritic *Baal Cycle*, Baby-

lonian *Enuma Elish*, Hurro-Hittite *Kumarbi Cycle*), in what has been called the “succession myth” (on which see Mondì 1990; Rutherford 2009; López-Ruiz 2010, chap. 3). This mythology is also reflected in the triumphant figure of Israelite Yahweh and his images as a god of thunder and flood. Significant points of comparison with these other figures are the location of the divine residence on a mountain to the north (Olympos, Ugaritic Mt. Saphon; see J. P. Brown 2001, 47–49; Lane Fox 2008, chap. 15) and the emphasis on thunder as his voice and weapon. Zeus’s epithet “cloud-gatherer” (*nephelegereta*) corresponds nicely with Baal’s “cloud-rider” (*rkb ‘rpt*) in Ugaritic poetry, just as Adad/Haddad is called “lord of lightning” and “establisher of clouds” in Akkadian hymns (West 1997, 115, 295, 400 n. 55; J. P. Brown 2001, 145–47; Wiggins 2001).

Mirroring in part the prominent role of Zeus’s sister Hera, the North-West Semitic War Goddess Anat defends her brother Baal, but she is closer to the role of the War Goddess Athena in Greek epic, especially in the *Iliad* (Louden 2006, chap. 7). On the other hand, in the Near East the figures of the War Goddess and the Sex Goddess are merged in the Mesopotamian Ishtar and North-West Semitic Ashtart (Gr. Astarte), who provided yet another model for an armed aggressive female divinity, often represented as Mistresses of Beasts. These aspects, in turn, correspond with different goddesses in Greek tradition, in the *kourotrophos* and animal-protector Artemis (the Greek Potnia Theron, i.e., Mistress of Beasts) and the sex and fertility goddess Aphrodite, respectively.¹¹ In fact, the Goddess of Love and Sex is in Greek tradition itself associated with the Levant, specifically with Phoenicia and Cyprus. These are areas where the cult of Ashtart thrived and where the Greeks situated the origins of their Aphrodite, whom they readily identified with her Semitic counterpart (Hdt. 1.105.2–3; Paus. 1.14.7). This eastern Mediterranean location of Aphrodite was already established by the time of Hesiod’s *Theogony*, in which she is born on Cyprus (*Th.* 185–206). Some scholars think that her name might have derived from a mispronunciation of that of Ashtart (Dowden 2007, 48; Cyrino 2010, 26) or from some other hypothetical Cypro-Phoenician name (West 2000; Cassio 2012). Despite the (probably folk) etymology that saw in her name the word for “foam” (*aphros*), the story of her emergence from the sea foam that formed around Ouranos’s genitals seems to have been an etiology to explain the name, rather than the other way around.

To top off these eastern associations, her epithet Kythereia, explained by Hesiod and later authors as relating to the island of Kythera, can be explained as a feminine form of the North-West Semitic blacksmith god Kothar/Kuthar, understood as the equivalent of Hephaistos already in antiquity, as related in later lore

about Phoenician mythology, where he appears as Chousoros (sources in Kaldellis and López-Ruiz 2009; López-Ruiz 2009a). This relationship, lost by Hesiod's time, would explain the odd marriage of Aphrodite with Hephaistos in *Odyssey* 8.266–366. Even her common cultic title of Ourania (“Heavenly”) hides more than her mythologized descent from Ouranos, since it has long been noticed that this, too, fits squarely with the title of Ashtart as “Queen of Heaven,” which, again, might have triggered the etiological story in the first place. The case of Aphrodite thus offers a good example of Near Eastern evidence that may help clarify myths of origin, etymologies, and patterns of divine relations and functions within Greek myth.

Other gods share functions and characterizations with their Near Eastern “counterparts,” which caused some of them to be assimilated to non-Greek gods (Demeter to Egyptian Isis, Dionysos to Osiris, Apollo to Semitic Resheph and Egyptian solar gods, Herakles to Tyrian Melqart).¹² There is no room to discuss them here (see López-Ruiz, forthcoming), but this brief mention underscores the point that the Greek pantheon was neither a discrete group nor impermeable and that the gods were as adaptable and shape-shifting as the myths themselves. It is significant that the Dodekathēon, a traditional but somewhat forced reduction of the group to a core of twelve principal gods, is probably based on an Anatolian model (Dowden 2007, 43–44; Bremmer 2010, 6).


HOMER AND GILGAMESH: THE WEIGHT OF MESOPOTAMIAN EPIC TRADITION

We should keep in mind that the legendary world that Homer represents straddles the Late Bronze and Iron Ages and is an artistic re-creation directed at an eighth-century B.C.E. audience. Much of this legendary world reveals affinities with Near Eastern cultures. Leaving aside parallels from the realm of material culture and society (see Morris 1997), the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, as literary artifacts themselves, fit well into the traditions of epic poetry already established in the Bronze Age in Mesopotamia (*Atrahasis*, *Enuma Elish*, *Gilgamesh*), Anatolia (*Kumarbi Cycle*), and Syria (*Ugaritic Baal Cycle*, *Kirta*, and *Aqhat*) (on these, see Sasson 2005). Homer's poems surpassed in length and complexity those earlier eastern epics, a feat that would not have been possible without the aid of writing, precisely when the technology of the alphabetic script spread in Greece (even if the language, style, and mythological background were part of oral tradition).¹³ Homer's poems bear the most striking parallels with the *Epic of Gilgamesh*, which should not be surprising as it was the most popular epic story in the Near East,



with written versions widely copied and translated outside Mesopotamia (George 2003, 54–70; 2007; Noegel 2005; Dalley and Reyes 1998).¹⁴

Gilgamesh shares features with both Achilles and Odysseus, protagonists of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (already in Lord 1960, as noted by Nagy 2005, 75–76; see also Burkert 1983b; West 1997, 336–47 [for Achilles] and 401–17 [for Odysseus]; Abusch 2001; recent analysis in Currie 2012). In broad strokes, Achilles and Gilgamesh are extraordinarily strong demigods, sons of divine mothers, whose character development from arrogance and selfishness is brought about by the death of their companions (Patroklos, Enkidu). In both stories, the inevitability of death looms over the heroes in different ways. Gilgamesh sees his own death in that of his friend, fears it, and tries to attain immortality. Achilles likewise sees his own death in that of Patroklos (who is wearing Achilles' armor), yet he virtually runs towards death, and his demise is foreshadowed repeatedly during the epic, not just through the “surrogate” death of Patroklos. It is in their mourning of their companions that some of the most exceptional parallels occur. For instance, both heroes mourn their beloveds desperately and effusively, as women do, and their restlessness is described with animal images—specifically, they are like a lioness (*Gilg.* tablet VIII, 59ff.) and a lion (*Il.* 18.316ff.) deprived of their cubs. Both try to embrace the shadow of their dead friends (Gilgamesh does embrace it in *Gilgamesh and the Netherworld*, while Achilles tries in vain to embrace it three times in *Il.* 23.99–100),¹⁵ a motif also used when Odysseus encounters



his mother in the Underworld (*Od.* 11.206–8). Both refuse to bury their friends, Gilgamesh “until a maggot dropped from his nostril” (tablet X, 60, trans. George 1999), while Achilles worries that worms will corrupt his friend’s corpse because of his delay in burying him (*Il.* 19.23ff.).

These parallels are perhaps too distinctive to be explained as mere coincidences of formulaic language shared by the two epic traditions. Deliberate emulation of literary techniques can be postulated in the intimation of the heroes’ deaths through the surrogate deaths of their friends, and even the description of the friend’s death is believed by scholars to allude to that of the hero’s own death in other poems known to the original audience, even if these are not always preserved but deduced from fragmentary and later sources.¹⁶

Odysseus resembles, and even perhaps evokes, Gilgamesh as a king who experiences a wondrous trip, after which he regains his position, now filled with wisdom (and humility in the case of Gilgamesh). The main common features of this trip include confrontations with monsters (especially comparable are Humbaba in *Gilg.* tablet V and the Cyclops in *Od.* 11; see Loudon 2011, chap. 8); the incursion into the Underworld or *katabasis* (tablet XI in the Standard Version and the Sumerian *Bilgamesh and the Netherworld*);¹⁷ and the role of divine or otherwise extraordinary women during their wanderings (Calypso and Circe for Odysseus, Ishtar and Siduri for Gilgamesh), who try to retain the hero as a lover or provide him with instructions for the Underworld trip.¹⁸

The attempt by the goddess Ishtar to seduce Gilgamesh in tablet VI, in turn, presents long-noted parallels with the *Iliad*. Specifically, when Ishtar is rejected and insulted by the hero, she flies up to her father, Anu (the Sky God), and her mother, Antu, and complains, asking that the hero be punished, which results in an attack by the “Bull of Heaven,” whom Gilgamesh and Enkidu fight and kill. The episode has long been compared to the scene in *Iliad* 5.370ff., when Aphrodite is physically wounded by the Greek warrior Diomedes (a surrogate of Achilles in that book) and complains to her mother, Dione, consort of Zeus in this scene, who reminds Aphrodite of the outrages that many gods have suffered from mortal men.¹⁹ Not only the general structure of the scene but the rare detail of the involvement of Dione seem close to the Akkadian poem, as the name of Dione is the feminine of Zeus, just as Antu is of Anu.²⁰ For Burkert this is proof of a direct transfer from the Akkadian classic (1992, 96–99). In turn, in accordance with Mondi’s approach of looking at “conceptual foci,” this passage of *Gilgamesh* can serve as a “base camp” from which to explore variant branches of linked and shared motifs: the “sexually aggressive goddess whose human lovers are transformed forever” (or otherwise threatened), such as Ishtar’s former lovers and Circe’s captives, and more indirectly, Eos’s lover, Tithonos, and Anchises in the *Hymn to Aphrodite* (Mondi 1990, 147–48); also, the motif of the powerful woman who is sexually rejected and abuses her position, as in the Egyptian “Tale of the Two Brothers,” the story of Joseph and his rejection of Potiphar’s wife (Gen. 39), Bellerophon and Anteia (*Il.* 6.150ff.), and Phaidra and Hippolytos. In the case of Hippolytos and his rejection of Phaidra, the bull from the sea that attacks Hippolytos might distantly correspond with the Bull of Heaven sent to attack Gilgamesh (Karahashi and López-Ruiz 2006).

OTHER EPIC THEMES: THE ANATOLIAN CONNECTION

Awareness is increasing of the importance of the Anatolian context for understanding “orientalizing” aspects of Greek myth and culture (see Collins, Bachvarova, and Rutherford 2008). As ongoing textual criticism produces new readings and as new fragments surface and already known texts are reinterpreted, more and more links become apparent between Hurro-Hittite literature, on the one hand, and Greek cosmogony and epic, on the other. One such new text is the *Song of Release*, fully edited in 1996, which, though fragmentary, contains an epic song about the destruction of the city of Ebla (Tell Mardikh) in northern Syria, caused by the Storm God in response to a wrongful decision made by the Eblaite assembly: ignoring the advice of their king, Meki, the assembly refused

to release the people of the town called Ikinkalis, against the will of the Storm God (whose reasons for protecting Ikinkalis are unknown). The general plot and especially the assembly scene offer interesting parallels to the *Iliad* (Bachvarova 2005; see Bachvarova's translation of the text in López-Ruiz 2014, doc. 4.2; cf. also translation and notes in Hoffner 1998, 65–80). Not only is the destruction of Troy brought on by the wrongful abduction and retention of Helen of Sparta, but the plot of the *Iliad* is propelled by the assembly scene at the opening of book 1, in which the release of captive Chryseïs is refused by Agamemnon against the counsel of the other Achaeans, which unleashes the wrath of Apollo, protector of her father, Chryses. In a later assembly, Agamemnon, compelled to return the captive, demands some recompense. Quarrelling with Achilles, he is provoked to demand Achilles' own captive woman, Briseïs. Achilles is about to draw his sword against him when Athena appears and counsels restraint. In the end, Achilles "exchanges" Briseïs for Chryseïs and, in anger, withdraws from the fighting. A close reading of the assembly scenes in both poems suggests they are adapting a common Near Eastern epic motif in which "humans debate the release of captives in acrimonious terms and the unwise but powerful speaker prevails . . . A god is angered over the captive who is not freed, and the humans debate in assembly whether the god is in fact angered because of their neglect. The humans in possession of the captives argue that they cannot do without their services, and demand that their opponents do without their own helpers instead" (Bachvarova 2005, 148).

The *Song of Release*, as Bachvarova postulates, belongs to a tradition followed, stylistically and thematically, in other Hurro-Hittite epics. Other Near Eastern parallels are found in the divine assemblies of the Akkadian epic *Atrahasis*, in which the gods decide to destroy humanity; in the Sumerian epic *Bilgamesh and Akka*, where Gilgamesh discusses with his council of elders the oppression of his people by king Akka of Kish; and in biblical passages such as 1 Kings 12.1–20, where Solomon's son Rehoboam follows the bad advice of the more aggressive young men and is punished by Yahweh. Set against the other Near Eastern parallels, however, the *Song of Release* is closer in detail to the *Iliad* than to the others and hence suggests the key influence of the Hittite SIR_3 genre (a type of "song" that also includes the adaptations of Mesopotamian and Hurrian myths into Hittite, e.g., those about Kumarbi, Silver, Gilgamesh, and Keshishi) (Bachvarova 2005, 149, 153).²¹ It is also noteworthy that the tablets of the *Song of Release* also include a set of parables very much in the style of Aesop's fables and those found

in the Hebrew Bible (Bachvarova 2005, 133; translation in López-Ruiz 2014, doc. 4.2; Hoffner 1998, 68–72).

The historical contexts of both these epics are also worth comparing. The *Song of Release* was adopted and performed at Hattusa around the time when its kings were fighting the Hurrians, ca. 1600 B.C.E., and it seems that Hattusili I or his grandson Mursili did perpetrate a destruction of Ebla, although previous recorded destructions could have been the inspiration for the epic. There is little doubt that the *Iliad*, too, was inspired by the historical destruction of a city that was at an important cross-roads in northwest Anatolia, probably a Luwian vassal of the Hittite empire, which suffered several destructions during the Late Bronze Age. The strata of Troy VIh and VIIa (both 13th c. B.C.E.) are leading candidates for a war that included Mycenaean Greeks, as suggested by pottery found at the destruction levels. Moreover, in Hittite documents there is mention of a state called Wilusa (possibly Homer's [W]Ilion), which is said to be the focus of a confrontation between Hatti and the people called Ahhiyawa, a name that appears in other Near Eastern sources of the Late Bronze Age and is likely to be an ethnonym for a Greek group (seemingly corresponding to Homer's "Achaeans").

Although these sources, for the moment, do not amount to unequivocal evidence for the historicity of the Trojan War (Bryce 2010, 479),²² let alone its causes,²³ it is not unreasonable now to accept that a war (or many) in that area, involving Anatolians and Greeks, was the seed of the epic stories we know. As with other legendary traditions that coalesced around a once-living figure (Gilgamesh, El Cid, Roland), the Homeric poems and the Trojan saga are literary conflations of real incidents, character names, and geographical references that end up far removed from whatever historical template they may have, inflated as they are into a heroic and divine narrative. We should not, however, discard the context that historical, archaeological, and epigraphical data can provide, against which we might even better appreciate the mythical and literary elaboration of particular traditions. Is it not remarkable that a ruler of the above-mentioned Wilusa is called "Alaksandu" (Alexander?) in a Hittite treaty of around 1280 B.C.E. and that, according to one possible reading, among his gods there appears one "Appaliunas" (Apollo?) (Bachvarova 2005, 150–51)? Let these puzzling (if not uncontroversial) new pieces of evidence serve as an indication of the potential of interdisciplinary communication and collaboration to shed light on early Greek myths and their background.

Going back to the point that "not everything comes from the East," Greeks

called Ahhiyawa and perhaps also Danuna (cf. Homer's Danaoi) are attested epigraphically in other sources, especially in Cilicia, such as in the long Luwian-Phoenician inscription at Karatepe and in recent shorter testimonies that confirm the reading. Another possible epigraphical witness of a Greek figure in southern Anatolia, who might underlie mythological elaborations, is that of Mopsos, if the name is the same as that in two eighth-century Luwian-Phoenician inscriptions, which contain other names that can also be interpreted as Greek (see López-Ruiz 2009b; 2010, 38–43). These figures, like those that formed the kernel of the Trojan War, might be better considered as part of *legend*, which departs from myth only to the degree that it focuses on stories about human heroes with a real or alleged historical dimension (Edmunds 2005, 31).

MYTHICAL DESTRUCTIONS AND OTHER GREEK, CANAANITE, AND ISRAELITE TRADITIONS

Another area of expansion for comparative study focuses on the Canaanite, Phoenician, and Hebrew sources. This subfield has accompanied the growing awareness of Ugaritic literature and the resulting contextualization of the Hebrew Bible within a Canaanite framework (Cross 1998; Smith 2001, 2002).

Besides common elements present in the biblical creation narrative of Genesis 1 (on which, see below), the theme of the Flood (Gen. 6–9) constitutes a shared narrative of destruction that originated in Mesopotamia (*Atrahasis*, Gilg. tablet XI) and passed to Israel and (in a later version) Greece. The universal Flood is linked to the story of Deukalion and Pyrrha but appears also in philosophical and historical accounts.²⁴ Other myths about the annihilation of mankind, in turn, were taken up in various ways by Hesiod and in the Epic Cycle. According to the *Cypria*, the Trojan War was an attempt by Zeus to erase from the face of earth the oppressive tribes of men (fr. 1.7), and Hesiod points to the great wars of Troy and Thebes as cataclysms that destroyed the Race of the Heroes (perhaps the original Greek alternative to the destruction by Flood, not mentioned in his poems) (*Works and Days* 161–65). The existence of this race of demigods and its annihilation by the gods is mirrored in the annihilation of human beings in the Mesopotamian *Atrahasis* (in repeated attempts, the Flood being last). But it also resembles vividly the race of demigods (“sons of gods”) and giants (Nephilim) mentioned in Genesis 6 in the prelude to the Flood story (Burkert 1992, 100–106; Nagy 2005, 81–83; Doak 2013, chap. 3).

The motif of a gradual or dramatic separation of human beings from the divine presence is, of course, also found in Genesis 2–3, in the story of Eden and the ban-

ishment of Adam and Eve. The theme is shared by Hesiod in his story of the Five Races (or Ages) of Men, which matches each degraded race to a metal declining in value (gold, silver, bronze, the heroes who temporarily interrupt the sequence, and iron). The myth of the Ages as well as the use of a range of precious metals as symbols of decline finds analogues in Indo-Iranian traditions (Woodard 2007b). Closer to home, we find an adaptation of the same theme in the Aramaic book of Daniel (2.31–35), in the vision by the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar of a statue made of degrading metals from top (gold) to bottom (feet of iron and clay), which Daniel interprets as the present and future world kingdoms (West 1997, 312–19). The Hesiodic theme of the creation of the first woman, Pandora, as a punishment of humans by Zeus (*Works and Days* 42–201, cf. *Theogony* 535–616), in turn, mirrors that of Eve in its catastrophic consequences for humanity. The genre of Wisdom Literature, in the service of which Hesiod inserts these myths, has its immediate prototypes in the Near East, with precedents for *Works and Days* in the Sumerian text *The Father and His Misguided Son*, in the Egyptian *Instructions of Ankhsheshonq*, and, in the North-West Semitic world, in the biblical books of Job, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes, as well as the Aramaic *Story of Ahiqar* (see West 1997, 76–78).

Returning to heroic/epic motifs, there is a famous biblical story in which Greek influence might have been at work, namely, the combat between David and Goliath in 1 Samuel 17. First of all, Goliath is a Philistine, which makes him a member of a non-Semitic people of Aegean stock, as is not only indicated in the Bible (e.g., Amos 9.7) but corroborated archaeologically and epigraphically by early Philistine material culture and traces of names that might be Greek or at least Indo-European, the name of Goliath among them. The single combat scene is reminiscent of the combat of young Nestor against the giant Ereuthalion (*Il.* 7.132–60), and the type of bronze armor used by the Philistine warrior has also generated various hypotheses, all connecting it with different types of Greek (even Minoan) armor (Bierling 1992; Finkelberg 2005, 152–60; Doak 2013, 101–9). As part of the Deuteronomistic history, the redaction of the extant text would be deemed by most scholars as late enough (6th c. B.C.E. at the earliest) that the Homeric epics specifically, or heroic tales of that type, could have informed Israelite heroic scenes; these, in turn, might have incorporated earlier traditions about the Philistines.

Recent studies have analyzed other narrative patterns that appear in both biblical stories and Greek myths. Bruce Loudon sees the *Odyssey* and the Hebrew Bible as sharing in a literary subgenre that he classifies as “romance,” featuring

scenes of separation, adventure, and return to the homeland, often climaxing in recognition scenes. Hospitality scenes (*xenia*, including theoxeny, or visits by a god) are central to this genre. Some examples are Athena's visit to Nestor as a companion of Telemachos (*Od.* 1) and Abraham's reception of the angels (Gen. 18); or the violent type of divine visitation as in the angel's incursion at Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 19) and Athena's support of Odysseus in the massacre of the suitors (*Od.* 17–22). Divine councils and premeditated destruction also appear in Ugaritic, biblical, and Homeric narratives (about Troy, Sodom, and the suitors) (see Louden 2011 [*Odyssey*] and 2006, chap. 6 [*Iliad*]; for other studies of biblical and Greek motifs, see articles in J. P. Brown 1995, 2000, 2001; see also Noegel 1998; Naiden 2006; Bremmer 2008).

Ugaritic ritual and epic texts are bearing fruit in the increasing inclusion of comparanda in the work of classicists. In a recent study of the *Iliad*, Louden (2006, chap. 7), dedicates a whole chapter to the roles of Athena and the Ugaritic goddess Anat in battle scenes and in their interaction with "chosen" heroes. Homeric and Ugaritic motifs had been compared previously (Astour 1967; Walcott 1969, 1970, 1972), but the relationship between the North-West Semitic and the early Greek heroic traditions deserves more attention and detailed study, as a glimpse at the Greek and Ugaritic pantheons and divine relations shows (see cosmogonies below).

COSMOGONY AND THEOGONY: WHERE ANATOLIAN AND PHOENICIAN CONNECTIONS MEET

Cosmogony (creation of the cosmos) and theogony (birth and generations of the gods) are in the Greek corpus represented mostly by Hesiod's *Theogony* and the fragmentary Orphic texts, with a few scattered elaborations subsumed in other, not strictly cosmogonic works (e.g., Homer, Aristophanes, Plato, Apollonios of Rhodes). This genre presents the highest concentration of shared Greek and Near Eastern motifs, not only in terms of the similar primordial and creative elements (cosmogony), but in the family relations and dynamics among deities (theogony).

While Mesopotamian and Hittite connections have long been emphasized, the North-West Semitic materials (Ugaritic, Hebrew, and Phoenician) have once again occupied a marginal place in discussion of the Greek pantheon and the succession myth (West 1997, 276–305, includes them to some degree, as does Mondini 1990). In part this may be due to the perceived prestige of the more ancient, imperial Mesopotamian cultures, which may make them worthy peers of the

Greeks. Following recent work that compensates for this general neglect, the following survey highlights relevant North-West Semitic elements, alongside their intersections with Anatolian and other elements (López-Ruiz 2010, chaps. 2–4).

The first element in Hesiod's *Theogony* is the elusive Chaos (chasm, void?), similar to the void and disorder expressed in Genesis 1 through the equally rare *tohu-wa-bohu*. The presence, at the beginning, of dark waters in Genesis 1 (cf. also Prov. 8) seems in turn indebted to the Babylonian cosmogony *Enuma Elish*, where Apsu and Tiamat (sweet and salty waters) precede other gods (see Wyatt 2005, chap. 12). This watery cosmogony, absent from Hesiod, surfaces in the Homeric tradition, where there are three allusions to Okeanos (Ocean) and an otherwise unknown “mother Tethys” as the begetters of the gods (*Il.* 14.201 = 302, and Okeanos alone in 246). This Tethys might or might not be derived from Mesopotamian Tiamat/Tawatu (Burkert 1983b, 54). Moving on, the first primordial couple in Hesiod is Earth (Gaia/Ge) and Heaven (Ouranos), who will begin the reproduction and genealogy of the gods, as the very first elements (Chaos, Gaia, Tartaros, and Eros) just “came about” (*egeneto*), unbegotten.²⁵ At this point a succession of “kings in heaven” begins, leading to the enthronement of the Storm God. It matches closely a common pattern in the Near East, with variants in each tradition (for instance, the Greek and Hittite “succession myths” are closer, while the Mesopotamian tradition only loosely follows this pattern, and the conflict between the Egyptian gods obeys a somewhat different dynamics). The gods that most clearly represent this common pattern (here simplified) are as follows:

- The Sky God (Greek Ouranos, Mesopotamian Anu, Hurro-Hittite Anu)
- A more varied group of gods occupying an intermediate position, characterized as wise/crooked-minded (Kronos, Mesopotamian Ea/Enki), as harvest deities (Kronos?, Hurro-Hittite Kumarbi), and as older gods (Kronos, North-West Semitic Ilu)
- The Storm God (Greek Zeus, Mesopotamian Marduk, Hurro-Hittite Teshub, North-West Semitic Baal)

In the Canaanite, Hebrew, and Phoenician traditions, Earth and Heaven (*shamaim wa 'aretz*) occupy a high position, as illustrated by the Ugaritic pantheon (in the deity lists; see Pardee 2002) and the Hebrew Bible. Even if they are demythologized by monotheistic theology, they appear prominently at the beginning of creation and are frequently called upon (e.g., in oaths and covenants).

Hesiod's “Succession Myth” is analogous to other mythologies in its story of struggle and competition for power between successive generations of gods, cul-

minating in the Weather or Storm God's enthronement as King in Heaven. It is in the details and mechanics of how that succession works that we can see the deep level of interconnectedness between the different traditions. The most striking and seemingly idiosyncratic detail in the first struggle is the castration of Ouranos by Kronos. The motif has only one known Near Eastern precedent, the Hurro-Hittite "Kingship in Heaven" myth narrated in the "Song of Kumarbi" (also called "Song of Going Forth" or "Song of Birth" and part of the *Kumarbi Cycle*), in which Kumarbi castrates Anu, the Sky God, by biting off and swallowing his genitals, thus beginning an artificial pregnancy from which the Storm God (Teshub) will appear (Hoffner 1998, 42–45; Bachvarova's translation in López-Ruiz 2014, doc. 4.2; comparative study in van Dongen 2011).

In the seemingly more "sanitized" Hesiodic version, Sky's genitals fall in the sea and create life (the Erinyes, Giants, Nymphs, and the goddess Aphrodite), but not the Storm God (who is born from Rhea and Kronos). Hesiod's tradition, however, is no stranger to artificial male pregnancies caused by ingestion. Toward the end of the *Theogony*, Zeus gulps down his pregnant first wife, Metis, as a means to prevent the prophesized birth of a threatening offspring, which results in the birth of Athena from Zeus's head.²⁶ The motif appears also in the violence exerted by Kronos on his children, when he swallows them as they are born, through fear that they might overpower him. Only Zeus survives his father's cannibalism, thanks to his mother's astute deceit. The stone that Rhea places in baby Zeus's stead makes Ouranos throw up all of the children intact, as if recreating their birth, now from their father's mouth. As we will see below, the castration and ingestion appear in Orphic cosmogony, in a version closer to the Hittite.

North-West Semitic mythology presents a rather different dynamic among the rival gods. There is no attested castration in the Ugaritic epics, but in the *Baal Cycle* the Storm God (Baal) struggles not only for recognition but for his own life against the Sea God (Yam) and the Death God (Mot) (see the editions of the *Baal Cycle* in Smith 1994; Smith and Pitard 2009; see also Parker 1997). He defeats the first, dies at the hands of the second, and is restored to life thanks to his sister Anat; his acquisition of a proper palace as well as a secure seat on the divine throne depends on the support of the elder god El/Ilu, father of the gods, who oversees what seems to be a precarious balance of power. El is referred to in such positive terms as "benefactor," "creator of all creatures," "eternal king," "father of years," and the like.

Philon of Byblos's Phoenician cosmogony, in turn, follows the Canaanite traditions to a surprising degree. Among many other details, in his euhemerist ac-

count (i.e., in which the gods were historical kings later divinized by tradition), there is a point where he says that “Greatest Astarte and Zeus (Demarous and Adodos), the king of the gods, were ruling the land with the consent of Kronos” (Eusebius *P.E.* 1.10.31). This overseeing role of Kronos (= El) reflects dynamics more similar to those between El and Baal in the Ugaritic epics than to Hesiod’s more clear-cut generational gap between Kronos and Zeus (we will return to Kronos below, with the Orphic cosmogonies). Philon’s inclusion at some point of the castration might be a Hesiodic adaptation (another case, then, of West-to-East influence), given the author’s knowledge of Greek tradition, with which he was in explicit competition.²⁷

The Canaanite legacy can also be discerned in the Hebrew Bible. Even if other gods had been subsumed under Yahweh by that point, many texts preserve narratives of “Chaoskampf” (cosmic struggle between forces of order and chaos), particularly between Yahweh and the Sea and against the monster Leviathan (Job 38; Pss. 29, 74, 104). The fight in Hesiod between Zeus and the monster Typhon/Typhoeus, who is represented as a serpent, belongs to this same tradition of “dragon-slaying” in both Indo-European and Near Eastern mythologies. Tiamat, murdered by Marduk in *Enuma Elish*, is represented as a giant sea snake, and in the Anatolian epics the Storm God confronts the snake monsters Hedammu and Iluyanka, while the Ugaritic Sea-enemy Yam is portrayed in similar ways, even called Litan, an epithet inherited by the Hebrew Leviathan (see Wyatt 2005, chap. 4; on how Chaoskampf narratives reinforce royal authority, see Noegel 2007, 2010).

The contest for power among the Sea, Death, and Storm gods in the North-West Semitic tradition is, in fact, comparable to the triumvirate of Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades suggested in the *Iliad*. In the only other passage in Homer containing cosmogonic references, the three brothers are said to have distributed among themselves the realms of the world by lot (*Il.* 15.187–93; Burkert 1983b, 52–54). But even in Hesiod we perceive glimpses of a different order of things, as there are hints of Kronos’s sustained role as an ambiguous, even benign, elder god, the “father of men and gods.” Although he was imprisoned by Zeus, according to *Iliad* 14.203–4 (the same passage where Okeanos and Tethys are mentioned), and Hesiod places him with the Titans in Tartaros (*Th.* 851), he is associated with the Golden Race in Hesiod’s *Works and Days*. This accords with the motifs preserved in papyri and other sources outside Hesiod, in which Kronos is freed by Zeus and sent to the Isles of the Blessed (*Works and Days* 173a–e), and in which the blessed souls go to the “tower of Kronos” (Pind. *Ol.* 2.70). The equation of Kronos with

the Semitic divine patriarch El in later tradition (Philon) perhaps stems from more than just his structural position as father of the Storm God (Baal, Zeus), but from a shared tradition about the old patriarchal figure who exerts some oversight from the edges of the world and beyond (the realm of the dead souls); this tradition faded in Greek sources but remained alive in Semitic ones. Those limits are, in Greek tradition, marked by Okeanos, just as with the divine El who lives “at the springs of the rivers, among the streams of the deeps” (CAT 1.17, col. VI: 47–49, trans. Parker 1997; see more in López-Ruiz 2010, 115–25, 151–67).

It is time to turn to the Orphic cosmogonies and see where they stand with respect to the Near Eastern materials and Hesiod.²⁸ The Orphic poems depart from the Hesiodic and Homeric cosmogonies in their wide range of first elements. Some postulate Night as the first entity (the Derveni Papyrus, Eudemos, the Orphic Rhapsodies); Hieronymos follows the (Mesopotamian-type) water tradition; while Pherecydes of Syros evokes a trio of Chronos (Time), Zas, and Chthonia. The poems do shed light, however, on the ambiguous figure of Kronos. While in the Orphic texts his position is the same as in Hesiod, between Ouranos and Zeus, the old god appears more prominently and receives epithets that bring him closer to the Semitic El: “holy one,” “pure,” “maker of all,” “all-begetter of time,” and “ever-blooming one,” among others (e.g., in the Orphic Hymn to Kronos). The element of Time, which has precedents in Indian and Iranian mythologies, appears also in the three preserved Phoenician cosmogonies: in the cosmogony by Mochos there is an entity called Oulomos (“eternal”); Chronos (Time) is among the first entities in the Sidonian cosmogony reported by Eudemos; and Aion (“Eternal Time”) appears in Philon of Byblos’s *Phoenician History*. The place of a god of eternity high up in the Phoenician and Orphic schemes is, as I have argued elsewhere, in harmony with the place of El (“father of years,” “eternal king”) in the Ugaritic pantheon. El’s identification with Kronos, in turn, suggests that both gods shared a quality as lords “outside of current time” and overseers of future generations of gods. These aspects of the Titan either caused or reinforced the pre-Olympian god’s conflation with Chronos (Time), beyond the similarity of their names (López-Ruiz 2010, 151–67).

Another striking element that appears only in the Orphic and in the three Phoenician cosmogonies is the cosmic egg, which, in some of these accounts, is generated by the “time entity” and, in turn, produces a typically Orphic divinity called Phanes (from *phaino*, “bring into light”) or Protogonos (“First Born”). West (1994a) saw in these sources a “Time-Egg cosmogony” of likely Phoenician origins and with Egyptianizing traits. This combination, once again, points to a

transmission of ideas via Phoenicia or Anatolia (or north Syria and Cilicia, where the two meet). Two of the Phoenician cosmogonies, in turn, place Eros (Love) and Pothos (Desire) in the first ranks of creation, a feature that brings them close to Hesiod's Eros as a primordial reproductive motor (*Th.* 120). Not by coincidence, in his parody of cosmogonic thinkers, Aristophanes merges elements that appear in Orphic and Phoenician texts, alleging that Night laid an egg from which Eros was born, who hatched the race of birds (*Birds* 688–702).

Leaving other details of this body of texts aside (West 1983; López-Ruiz 2010, chap. 4), an important revelation came from the publication in 1982 of an Orphic cosmogony transmitted in a document known as the Derveni Papyrus. Partly burnt in a funerary pyre sometime in the fourth century B.C.E, this is the only readable papyrus preserved in Greece, containing an exegesis (commentary) on quotes from a cosmogony of earlier date (see Laks and Most 1997; Bernabé 2002; Betegh 2004). The Derveni Papyrus's cosmogony follows the known Orphic pattern that begins the universe with Night, but differs in interesting ways from the other known texts in this tradition. Kronos is here born from the Sun (as part of Sky/Ouranos) and Earth, and the castration of Sky is attributed to Zeus, who swallows the phallus of the Sun (or Sky) and then becomes the re-creator of the universe, if the interpretation of the somewhat ambiguous (euphemistic) wording is correct. The centrality of Zeus as not the final ruler but the creator is characteristic of Orphic cosmogony in general, as well as the appearance, in some versions, of Dionysos as his heir. Something similar is found in the *Orphic Rhapsodies*, where Zeus is said to swallow his ancestor or predecessor Phanes/Protogonos in order to acquire all the primordial elements that he needs to become one with the universe. The Derveni Papyrus castration, in turn, involving both emasculation and the acquisition of fertility, strikingly recalls the Hurro-Hittite myth of Kumarbi's castration of Anu in much greater detail than Hesiod's version of the castration of Sky. These examples show the kinds of twists that any inherited or adapted motif, such as the old "castration of the sky," could undergo to serve specific world-views.

In this brief overview we see the manifold interconnections between Greek and Near Eastern cosmogonies. While the Mesopotamian tradition looms large over most Near Eastern mythologies, given the weight of its ancient and impressive literary production (West 1997, 593–602), we can see that Anatolian and North-West Semitic elements are abundantly present. This observation leads us into some final remarks about the manner of transmission of these mythological motifs.

Timeline of Main Historical Periods and Works Mentioned (in italics), down to the Classical Period (all dates are B.C.E.)

Historical Period	Mesopotamia	Anatolia and Syria-Palestine	Greece
Late Bronze Age 1550–1200	1365–1076 Assyrian Empire <i>Older versions of the Epic of Gilgamesh and Enuma Elish in circulation</i>	Hittite Empire <i>Hittite texts (Kumarbi Cycle, Song of Release, etc.)</i> 14th–12th c. Ugarit flourishes <i>Ugaritic texts (Baal Cycle)</i> Ca. 1200 Destructions of Hattusa, Ugarit, and other Near Eastern city states Troy/Illion destroyed: Homer's Trojan War?	Mycenaean Civilization <i>Linear B tablets</i> 1200–1100 Destruction and abandonment of Mycenaean centers
Iron Age 1200–	10th–7th c. Neo-Assyrian Empire <i>“Standard Version” of the Epic of Gilgamesh and of Enuma Elish (7th c.)</i>	11th–7th c. “Syro-Hittite” states in southeast Anatolia and north Syria (Luwian, Phoenician, Aramaic, and other) <i>Phoenician and Luwian inscriptions</i>	1100–700 Geometric Period or “Dark Age” No written documents; Geometric style in art 1100 Traditional date for “Dorian invasion”

	Israelite and Philistine settlements in Canaan	1050 Greeks settle in Coast of Asia Minor
586–539 Neo-Babylonian Empire	United Monarchy of Israel (Saul, David, Solomon) (10th c.)	750 Adoption of the Phoenician alphabet
	<i>(Part of the Hebrew Bible may have been redacted around this time.)</i>	750–600 Flourishing of the arts, orientalizing phenomenon
	Phoenician colonial expansion in the West begins (8th c.)	750– Greek colonization in Southern Italy and Sicily
	Phrygian empire in central Anatolia (high point 8th c.)	750–700 <i>Homer and Hesiod</i>
		700–479 Archaic Period
		<i>Early 6th c. Lyric poets; beginnings of pre-Socratic philosophy and science</i>
	701 Assyrian capture of Judah	
	586 Babylonian capture of Jerusalem	

(continued)

Timeline (continued)

Historical Period	Mesopotamia	Anatolia and Syria-Palestine	Greece
Persian Period (539–333) in the East and Archaic to Classical Period in Greece	Persian Empire established (Cyrus II “The Great,” ca. 559–530)	545 Lydian empire (Croesus) falls to Cyrus	546–510 Peisistratid tyranny in Athens; 508 Democratic reforms
		538 Israelite exiles return from Babylon <i>(Part of the Hebrew Bible may have been redacted around this time and later)</i>	490 and 480–79 Persian Wars 479–323 Classical Period
		520–515 “Second Temple Period” begins	5th c. Athenian: tragedians (Aeschylus; Sophocles, Euripides) <i>mid-5th c. Herodotos’s Histories</i>
			478 Rise of Athenian Empire; 431–404 Peloponnesian War <i>Late 5th c. Aristophanes’ comedies</i>
			<i>Early 4th c. Plato active in Athens</i>

The Question of Transmission

The connections between Greek and Near Eastern mythologies presented above suggest a type of contact that included encounters at many levels for an extended period of time. If both Near Eastern and early Greek myths were produced in a mixed oral and literary environment (see methodological point 5 above), we must expect the convergence between myths to be the result of contact where both modes of reproduction of myths, oral and written, could take place.

We should imagine conduits for oral transmission, nonformal settings in which Greeks and others shared stories: commercial transactions, marketplaces, but also in contexts of migration or colonial situations, where peoples from the Near East lived beside Greek communities, and vice versa. These contexts in the archaic period (our main concern here) include probable Greek settlements in the Levant (Al-Mina) and Egypt (Naukratis, Memphis); Greek mercenaries and other hired specialized labor attested in Egypt, the Levant, and Mesopotamia; areas where Phoenician and Greek colonial enterprises developed side-by-side (e.g., Pithekoussai and Sicily); and regions where Levantines lived among Greeks (Cyprus, Crete). Also crucial is the migration of Greeks to the coasts of Asia Minor early in the Iron Age (around 10th c. B.C.E.). Greek migrants have also left their traces in Cilicia, as attested by epigraphy and literary sources. In turn, the orientalizing artistic revolution itself, modeled on imports from the Levant, suggests the noncolonial presence of Phoenician and other Levantines in mainland Greece during the eighth to seventh centuries B.C.E., including itinerant artists and small workshops. All of these probable contexts would have required a degree of bilingualism, not only useful for traders and artists, but inevitably emerging in contact areas, where bicultural and bilingual families would have formed (López-Ruiz 2010, chap. 1; cf. Currie 2012, 568, 577; contra the more negative perspective represented in Lane Fox 2008, 221–22).

On a different level, there must have been a more literary and even *literate* type of contact, including not only poets but wise men and “religious specialists” (healers, magicians, initiators), whose activities were probably decisive for the formulation of Orphic and other myths connected to mysteries (Burkert 1983a, 2004). These levels of interaction were not necessarily exclusive: an obvious example is the crucial adaptation of a Phoenician technique, the alphabet. Was it adopted with the initial purpose of writing down epic poetry (Powell 1991) or mainly for practical (e.g., commercial, administrative) reasons?

While some of the most literary-oriented parallels can be seen in the Mesopotamian sources, and there was no lack of contact between the Greeks and Mesopotamia at the time of Homer (see West 1997, 614–18; Dalley and Reyes 1998; George 2003, 54–70), the most intensive contacts in the Late Bronze Age and Iron Age and into the archaic period are with Anatolia and the areas of Syria and Phoenicia, including Cyprus, with an area such as Cilicia as a possible crucial point of cross-cultural encounters (see, recently, Rutherford 2009, 32–34). Greeks and Phoenicians, moreover, were also in contact in multiple areas of the central and even western Mediterranean. The presumed Phoenician connection, it might be argued, seems to contradict the stereotypes already present in Homer, who reduced them to pirates, merchants, and craftsmen (see “Phoenicians” in Finkelberg 2011). Homer’s picture happens to be reinforced by an implicit argument from silence over which the Phoenicians had no control—the total disappearance of their literary (if not epigraphical) records (sometimes famously destroyed, as in the case of destruction of the Library of Carthage by the Romans in 146 B.C.E.). So here is a paradox: the culture that might just have been most crucial in the reception of Near Eastern traditions into Greece has left almost no literary record. While its role as cultural agent is much better attested in the archaeological record (e.g., Aubet 2001; Burkert 2003; Lipinski 2004), its literary legacy can only be inferred from the footprints it left in Greek mythology,²⁹ along with the fortuitous references to and quotations of its writers in classical authors (see Krings 1995; Garnand 2002; López-Ruiz 2008; 2009a; 2010, chap. 1; on Carthage, see Lancel 1995, 356–60; Hoyos 2010, 105–8; and Miles 2010, 12–13, 370–73).

Egyptian contacts with Greece are not lacking either. It is, however, the case that for all the mythological allusion and symbolism embedded in Egyptian ritual, funerary, and other kinds of texts, mythological narratives of the sort we find elsewhere are practically absent from their written record (Shaw 2004, 116; Rutherford 2011). Most parallels between Greek and Egyptian myth belong to the realm of cosmogony and largely coincide with elements that are *also* present in other cosmogonies (e.g., the creator that “mates” with himself, the primordial waters, the emphasis on speaking as an act of creation, the struggle between gods). Therefore, some Egyptian-like elements may arguably have been transmitted through contact with Phoenicians (whose culture was itself strongly Egyptianizing) or other intermediaries.³⁰ In any case, Egypt formed part of the same eastern Mediterranean *koinē* (Rutherford 2011) in which religious and mythical ideas were relatively easily transferred, thanks to the coexistence of “shared taxonomies” (Noegel 2007).

Final Remarks: A Mythological *Koinē*?

There are several ways to disentangle the strands of this complex network of connections. First, we have to fine-tune our understanding of the specific contexts in which myths and their literary versions were created. As Fritz Graf has pointed out, Greek myth and the ways in which it constructed Hellenic identities was “fiercely local and tied to its kaleidoscopic of individual places” (2011, 224). This must be true of both archaic and later mythical elaborations, even if the geographical coordinates of the earlier myths are, for us, more hypothetical because of the lack of external referents, and even if the epic works later acquired a Panhellenic status, overriding their original local scope. Epigraphical evidence, for instance, often provides links between myths and local religions, cults, genealogies, and social institutions. It follows that one way of approaching the connections between Greek and Near Eastern myths is “thinking small,” investigating further what sets of Near Eastern myths might have been in circulation in a particular place and time and how the Greek versions were adapted to speak to specific cultural referents.

Second, attention should be paid to the role played by literary genres. It is evident, for instance, that Near Eastern themes are most abundant in, and deeply integrated in, the genres of epic and cosmogony. This distribution of “orientalizing” features accords with the intensive impact of Near Eastern cultures precisely when Homeric (epic) and Hesiodic (cosmogonic) poetry appeared. But it also matches the prestige and weight of *those* two genres in the Mesopotamian, Anatolian, and Syro-Palestinian worlds. In fact, the influence of Mesopotamian epic and cosmogony was itself enormous in both Anatolia and the Levant: there is a Hittite version of *Gilgamesh*, and it is at least possible that there were Aramaic or Phoenician versions too (George 2003, 56–57). We can also see the indelible mark of Canaanite and Mesopotamian ideas on the biblical narratives. Wisdom literature (the other genre represented by Hesiod) was also a long-lived tradition in the Near East, while the type of hymns and prayers embedded in archaic Greek epic also find Anatolian and Mesopotamian parallels (Bachvarova, forthcoming). This pattern becomes more evident when we consider that later literary genres, such as tragedy and lyric, fundamental conveyors of Greek myths in later periods, do not intersect nearly as much with Near Eastern traditions. Besides falling chronologically either at the later end of the “orientalizing revolution” (lyric) or outside of it (tragedy), these genres developed independently in Greece: tragedy did not exist in any Near Eastern cultures, while lyric finds only distant analogues with poetic forms in some of those cultures.³¹

Finally, specific literary techniques and genres should be discussed more often in the ongoing debate about cultural exchange, and they should be applied to the adaptation of artistic motifs and artifacts in the “orientalizing” period (e.g., Riva and Vella 2006; Gunter 2009; Ulf 2009; Brisart 2011). After all, there is clearly a process by which preferred types of poems and motifs were selected, and these, like nonliterary artifacts, must have been determined by considerations of prestige and desirability, as well as by power dynamics between the exchanging cultures. In the end, we are dealing with a process of “cultural translation” between interconnected literatures that constitute coexisting systems. As a tentative proposal, it might be helpful to see the Greek and Near Eastern mythologies as part of a *polysystem*, defined by Itamar Even-Zohar (father of the polysystem theory of translation in the 1970s) as a network of systems that “intersect with each other and partly overlap, using concurrently different options, yet functioning as one structured whole, whose members are interdependent” (cited by Munday 2012, 166; see Munday’s chap. 7 for system theories).

Was there an eastern Mediterranean mythological *koinē*? If we can talk about an “international style” when it comes to artistic symbols and the exchange of luxury objects (Feldman 2006), we may also talk about a parallel “international mythological language,” going back to the Late Bronze Age and resurgent in the orientalizing period. Never before have we been closer to understanding the implications of what Martin West already saw when he wrote that “Greece is part of Asia; Greek Literature is a Near Eastern Literature” (1966, 31). What we need to understand better is its position within that cultural system.

NOTES

- a. For observations on the decentering, see Burkert 2004, 1–5.
 - b. K2111 in Thompson 1955–58; ATU 318. Cf. discussion of “Potiphar’s wife” in the general introduction to this volume.
 - c. For a short history, see Burkert 2004, 5–15; 2005.
 - d. On Eastern craftsmen, see Burkert 1992, 9–40 and, in the index, s.v. “craftsmen.”
 - e. See Katz 2005 for evidence and bibliography.
 - f. For West-to-East movement in the case of the *Odyssey*, see Loudon 2011, the thesis of which is summarized by López-Ruiz (“Mythical Destructions and Other Greek, Canaanite, and Israelite Traditions”).
 - g. Edmunds 2005, 33–34.
1. Foster 1995; Hallo and Younger 1997; Parker 1997; Hoffner 1998; Watson and Wyatt 1999; Dalley 2000; Simpson 2003; Snell 2005; Leick 2007; van De Mieroop 2007; Ehrlich 2009; López-Ruiz 2014.

2. Some earlier authors who explored Greek and Near Eastern traditions, often focusing on the biblical materials, include Bogan (1658), R. Brown (1898), Gruppe (1887), and Farnell (1911), to mention a few. See Dowden 2001 for other nineteenth- and early twentieth-century sources. Cf. also Astour 1967, xii–xvi.

3. On the disciplinary and institutional challenges, see comments in Morris 1998.

4. See the remarks on this false “paradigm shift” in the review by Hall (1990). Specific responses to different aspects of Black Athena came out in the volume edited by Lefkowitz and Rogers (1996), with a subsequent response by Bernal (2001). On the relationship between Greek and Egyptian mythology, see Rutherford 2011.

5. The list is by no means complete. For a discussion of the state of the Greek–Near Eastern comparative field, with further bibliography, see López-Ruiz 2010, introduction, and additional references provided below in connection with specific topics. See also remarks about method in Doak 2013, 45–50.

6. On Dionysos, see the thorough study in Seaford 2006 and the discussion of previous scholarship therein.

7. Recent dialogue between the defenders of a purer oral-formulaic theory and the so-called Neoanalysis trend is leading to a happy middle; see Montanari, Rengakos, and Tsagalis 2012, and especially Currie 2012 for Greek and Mesopotamian epic.

8. On the issue of the Greek gods’ extreme anthropomorphism, see Burkert 1991 (reprinted in Burkert 2001, 80–94).

9. In the structuralist methodology of Lévi-Strauss and his classicist followers (Jean-Pierre Vernant, Marcel Detienne, and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, to mention the most prominent ones), comparisons might be drawn between unrelated cultures, following anthropological models, in search of universal structures of thought against which the specific features of Greek thought and society might be revealed (Nagy’s *typological* method, mentioned above). In this sense, comparativists such as Mondi who focus on Near Eastern comparanda depart from such a generalist approach to discuss cultures and narratives that *were* in contact and that therefore may illuminate more meaningfully the variants reflected in the Greek material (Nagy’s *historical* method).

10. It should be noted that Greek constitutes its own branch among the Indo-European languages, as do the Anatolian and Armenian branches with which Greek coincides in some ways: for instance, in its use of the same root for “god” (*theos*), diverging from the above-mentioned **diw-/djew* root used in other Indo-European languages (e.g., Lat. *deus*). Their word *theos* (related to “sacred”) has cognates with Western Asiatic languages such as Armenian and with Lycian, Lydian, and Luwian in Anatolia (Bremmer 2010, 1–2).

11. Aphrodite is occasionally represented as Mistress of Beasts as well, as in the *Hymn to Aphrodite* (68–74), and takes part in battle scenes in the *Iliad* (e.g., 5.352–430 and others).

12. Most notably, Herodotos (esp. in 2.43–64) postulates various “foreign” origins of Greek gods and rituals (Egyptian, Libyan, Phoenician, and other), most famously stating that “the names of almost all the Greek gods came to Greece from Egypt.” It is not clear what he meant by “the names” (*ta onomata*). See commentary with references in Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007.

13. Some have argued that it was the writing of Homer’s poems that motivated the

adaptation of the alphabet (Powell 1991). Whether that was the case or not, the Homeric poems assumed a written form very early on, possibly as soon as they were composed (or as they were being composed; see West 2011, 10–11).

14. Beyond *Gilgamesh*, Homer is conducive to more extensive Near Eastern comparison. See Burkert 1983b, 1988; *miscellanea orientalia* in West 1997, 347–401, 417–37.

15. The Sumerian version of the *Gilgamesh* epic (*Bilgamesh and the Netherworld*) is preserved in texts from the early second millennium B.C.E., although it goes back to traditions from the end of the third (the Ur-III period). The Standard Version (*He Who Saw the Deep*) was the more widely known version outside Mesopotamia and closer in time to Homer (it was in circulation during the early- to mid-first millennium B.C.E., although the texts are copies of older ones perhaps dating to the final centuries of the Late Bronze Age).

16. In the case of *Gilgamesh*, scholars refer to the earlier poem *Bilgamesh and the Netherworld*. In the case of Achilles, pre-Homeric traditions about his death can be deduced from the Underworld scene in *Odyssey* 24 and from the summary of the *Aithiopis*. (Note that even if the poems of the Epic Cycle, of which we have only summaries and fragments, are considered later than Homer, they elaborated on older themes.) See Currie 2012, esp. 550–54.

17. The relationship of Achilles to death and the Underworld and its comparison with *Gilgamesh* is worth further research, especially since Priam's visit to Achilles presents many features of a typical *katabasis* (Herrero de Jáuregui 2011), and Achilles' place in both Underworld scenes of the *Odyssey* (books 11 and 24) is remarkable. In turn, *Gilgamesh* is known to have received cult as an Underworld judge (George 1999, 1–li; Dalley 2000, 135 n. 164; cf. Abusch 2001, 3). As for Greek and Near Eastern ideas of the afterlife (in terms of its topography, notions of judgment, and other aspects), there is plenty of common ground. See Marinatos and Wyatt 2011; López-Ruiz 2014, chap. 6.

18. Herakles, not treated here, also shares in this tradition of Underworld journeys (he visits it several times). This central figure in Greek mythology also presents multiple similarities with Near Eastern characters, such as *Gilgamesh*, Marduk (who fights twelve enemies), and especially Nergal, the Mesopotamian god of the Underworld, who is often represented with a lion, bow, and club. (Herakles' name might derive from Erakal, one of the forms of Nergal's name.) See Burkert 1979, chap. 4; West 1997, 458–72. Herakles was also identified with Phoenician Melqart throughout the Mediterranean (both were associated with colonization), and his origins were assumed to be Egyptian or Phoenician (Hdt. 2.43–44).

19. This is not the usual genealogy of Aphrodite; Dione, however, was honored as the consort of Zeus at the sanctuary of Dodona.

20. She is, literally, “Ms. Zeus.” Philon of Byblos (in his version of Phoenician cosmogony) equates Dione with Baaltis, that is, Ba'alat (main goddess of Byblos), the feminine of Baal (P.E. 1.10.35). See Kaldellis and López-Ruiz 2009.

21. In her forthcoming monograph, Bachvarova explores the interconnections between Anatolian epic and hymnic literature and mythology and the Homeric tradition. Other good sources for this are Taracha 2009, for the religions of Anatolia; and Collins, Bachvarova, and Rutherford 2008, for interdisciplinary essays.

22. For a discussion of the evidence with its problems, see Latacz 2004; Bryce 2005,

357–71; 2006; 2010. The conclusion in Heinhold-Krahmer 2003, 165 (reached independently of Hajnal 2003a), is rather pessimistic: “Können wir also von einer gesicherten Identität Wilušas mit Ilios und gleichzeitig mit Hisarlik ausgehen? Die Antwort lautet *nein*” (her emphasis). Cf. also Hajnal 2003b (a brief comment on Heinhold-Krahmer 2003) and Hertel 2011.

23. Based on knowledge of the political dynamics in the Near East, Bryce points out that “Hittite kings were certainly prepared to go to war to reclaim subjects who had been removed, whether forcibly or voluntarily, from their kingdom” (2005, 365), which, as he notes, does not mean *that* was the reason for a Greek-Trojan conflict—an issue that is pending on the more general question of the historicity of such a conflict to begin with and its relation to the Homeric tradition.

24. Plato, *Timaeus* 22b–e, 23b–c, 25d; *Critias* 111a–12a; *Laws*, start of book 3. The idea of the Flood appears also in authors such as Diodorus Siculus, Pausanias, and other historiographers/ethnographers, and Lucian starts his *de Dea Syria* with a Flood account clearly derived from Mesopotamian tradition.

25. For the rhetorical and epistemological function that these first elements serve in the openings of different cosmogonies (Greek, Hebrew, Mesopotamian), see López-Ruiz 2012.

26. For the possible influence of the Egyptian figure and iconography of Maat on this motif, see Faraone and Teeter 2004.

27. The most detailed commentaries on Philon’s *Phoenician History* are Attridge and Oden 1981; Baumgarten 1981. See also commentary and new translation in Kaldellis and López-Ruiz 2009 (BNJ 790).

28. The Orphic poems and their relationship with Greek mythology, religion (esp. mystery groups), and philosophy constitute a whole large subfield in itself. See an overview of the sources in West 1971, 1983; latest edition of Orphic fragments in Bernabé 2004; overview in López-Ruiz 2010, chap. 4; and a range of short studies in Herrero de Jáuregui et al. 2011.

29. Examples are cosmogonic traits, characters such as Europa and Kadmos, Danaos, several Phoinix figures, and probably Melikertes and Palaimon, to mention a few, with other clues that point to Cyprus as an important meeting place between Greeks and Phoenicians (Kinyras, father of Myrrha and Adonis, and Aphrodite herself).

30. The unique case of the parallel between the Demeter and Persephone story and the Isis and Osiris story is an exception. The Egyptian narrative is transmitted most completely by the Greek author Plutarch of Chaeronea in the first to second century C.E., and it is unknown what his sources were and to what degree the narrative was in turn influenced by the Greek myth, although some of the elements are securely identified in older Egyptian allusions. See Pinch 2004, 115–16; Shaw 2004, 115–18.

31. Some examples of comparative scholarship in these genres are West 1994b and sections in 1997; Hordern 2001; Hagerdorn 2003; Hawk 2003; and Bachvarova 2006.

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4 INTRODUCTION The comparative Indo-European (hereafter, I-E) approach to Greek myth is now more than a century and a half old. At first, its method was the same as that used to establish the I-E language in the first place—that is, comparisons of similar elements in historically attested languages. From comparisons at the level of poetic diction, scholars drew inferences concerning I-E myth. This method has never gone out of use. In the years since the first edition of *Approaches to Greek Myth*, it has produced magisterial books.^a Georges Dumézil (1898–1986) took a new direction.^b His method was inspired by the sociology of Émile Durkheim, who held that religion and myth served the practical purpose of reinforcing social stability.^c Dumézil isolated parallel structures, in texts in related I-E languages, at the level of ritual, laws, and social structure. He hypothesized a tripartite I-E ideology expressed in three “functions,” as he called them: sovereignty or religion, force, and fecundity. The representatives of the functions are rulers and priests; warriors; and producers of food, wealth, and valuable artifacts, and women in their sexual capacity. Joseph Nagy, at the beginning of his chapter, provides an introduction to Dumézil’s comparative mythology, explaining more fully the points just made.

I said in my introduction to Nagy’s chapter in the first edition that “[f]or the most part, Greek contributes little to the reconstruction of Indo-European mythology, or, to put the matter another way, returning from the reconstruction to the Greeks, one finds less than might have been expected.”^d This statement has now to be qualified, but first, Dumézil’s own view of the matter is worth recalling. In interviews with Didier Erebou published in 1987, in a discussion of his relation to the Greeks, Dumézil refers to earlier mistakes on his part and to abandonment of this people in his writings after 1938.^e He gives credit to other scholars for the later discovery of the three functions in ancient Greek.^f He goes on to speak of the Greeks in such a way, however, that his interlocutor remarks: “It’s the Greeks that you prefer but they are the ones who favor you and help you the least.” Dumézil’s reply: “It’s true. They are ungrateful lovers (*amants ingrats*).”

For two reasons, the Greeks were going to prove more responsive. One is the addition of a divided fourth function. If the first three are labeled F1, F2, and F3, the fourth is:

F4+, pertaining to what is valued and transcendent

F4–, pertaining to what is devalued (hated, feared, excluded)

In this expansion, the functions amount to five and the schema is called pentadic. It makes possible the detection of the core functions where one of them is missing, such as in a pattern like F4+, F2, F3, and it has led to the discovery of further Greek examples of the I-E ideology.^g The other reason is research on the Greeks by other scholars, keeping to the schema of three functions, already going on in Dumézil's lifetime—notably the work by Bernard Sergent.^h Sergent is a fellow-countryman, but it is not the case that Dumézil had followers only in France.ⁱ The pentadic scheme just discussed comes from an Englishman, who acknowledges Welshmen as his predecessors.^j Nagy is an American.^k One can refer to Dumézilian research in Barcelona, by members of the research project on Greek mythology at the Universitat Autònoma, and also in Valencia.^l In Italy, Dumézil's work on archaic Roman religion has been defended and refined by Enrico Montanari.^m

In 1984, Arnaldo Momigliano, in a rather invidious account of Dumézil's career, remarked, without amplification: "Any unbiased reader of the first edition of . . . *Mythes et dieux des Germains*, which appeared in 1939, is bound to find in it sympathy with Nazi ideologies."ⁿ (The article in which this statement appeared is a critique of Dumézil on the ancient Romans.) Carlo Ginzburg, again in 1984, quoted this sentence in an essay on Dumézil's *Mythes et dieux des Germains*. He reached what he called a "Solomonic and disappointing conclusion" about this book, disappointing in that the expected sympathy with Nazism had not appeared.^o Dumézil replied to Momigliano and to Ginzburg.^p In 1986, in a review of a book by Dumézil in the *Times Literary Supplement* (October 3), Bruce Lincoln entered the debate. He reprinted this review, with footnotes, in 1991, in a book that also includes two more articles about Dumézil.^q In the preface, he recounts his engagement with the question of Dumézil's "fascist leanings." He refers to Dumézil's discussion of his politics with Didier Eribon in the *Entretiens* cited above (1987), which he took to confirm what he had concluded about Dumézil's "early involvement with Maurras and his continuing commitment to many of Maurras's doctrines."^r In 1998, Lincoln published "Dumézil's German War God," a study of Dumézil's study of the German war god Tyr, introduced by seven wide-ranging pages on Indo-Europeanists and their politics and, in particular, on Dumézil and his friends. In his introduction, Lincoln considers the book in defense of Dumézil published by Eribon in 1992, agreeing with Eribon that in the 1930s Dumézil was anti-Nazi and pro-fascist, believing that if France allied itself with Mussolini it might resist Germany. Lincoln shows the political slant in Dumézil's interpretation of Tyr and of other German gods and finds six political subtexts, all relevant

to Dumézil's politics at the time.⁵ If one compares the conclusion of this 1998 article with the preface to the 1991 book, however, one finds a more nuanced view of Dumézil's politics and of bias in Dumézil the scholar.

Several other scholars besides those mentioned here entered the discussion in the 1980s and up until 1998.⁶ The question concerning Dumézil seems to have been, above all, a biographical or political-biographical one, and the answer or answers leave his work untouched. The article by Lincoln just mentioned is an exception. For those interested in Dumézil and Greek myth, it seems safe, even advisable, to read Nagy's chapter here.

Hierarchy, Heroes, and Heads

Indo-European Structures in Greek Myth

JOSEPH FALAKY NAGY

Ever since the pioneering work of the Grimm brothers in the first half of the nineteenth century, the reconstruction of a mythological repertoire of patterns and motifs common to speakers of all or most branches of the Indo-European family of languages (including Greek, Indo-Iranian, Celtic, Germanic, Slavic, and others) has been the goal of numerous scholars in the fields of philology, comparative religion, and folklore (see J. de Vries 1977, 80–90; Vernant 1980, 207–33; Littleton 1982, 32–40; Puhvel 1987, 11–15). These attempts at reconstruction are all grounded in the assumption that groups that speak the same kinds of languages have other cultural traits in common. Unfortunately, most early treatments of “Indo-European myth” were informed by the devolutionary model of cultural history, according to which myths, rituals, and customs that were originally meaningful gradually become prey to misunderstanding and distortion in the course of a people's cultural development. Thus, in effect, scholars engaged in the work of reconstruction would mine the sources for our knowledge of Indo-European mythologies (both ancient literary texts and more recent orally transmitted folklore) for some supposedly coherent original essence and ignore the synchronic realities of the texts and traditions themselves: realities that were viewed not as developments but rather as degenerations. For example, in the thinking of the Indologist and pioneer Indo-Europeanist Max Müller, whose analyses of “solar” symbolism generated great controversy in the second half of

the nineteenth century, myth itself was already a misunderstanding, the result of a so-called disease of language (J. de Vries 1977, 89; see also chapter 1 of this volume). It is not surprising, then, that with the triumph of the evolutionary model in the study of religion around the turn of the century, interest in restoring Indo-European mythological structures waned.

In the twentieth century, the work of Georges Dumézil radically revitalized and reoriented the study of the shared traits of Indo-European mythologies.¹ Unlike their intellectual forebears, Dumézil and those who have carried on his scholarly tradition have not aimed at reconstructing a past religious totality. Rather, they have attempted to identify key ideological structures and social relationships that not only recur in the myths of Indo-European peoples but actually generate new myths and even evolve beyond themselves, under pressure from historical circumstances or the weight of the mythological systems themselves. Thus, Indo-European mythology is no longer approached as an inert treasure encrusted with accretions or corroded by later misunderstandings. It is instead recognized as a dynamic process that produces different results in each Indo-European tradition.

At the heart of a mythology, as Dumézil and his mentors Durkheim and Mauss viewed it, lies a collective view of society. The most pervasive of the structures discerned by Dumézil among Indo-European traditions is the system of the three “functions,” which forms, in effect, a paradigm of a society—one that may have never existed but that, as an ideological reality, has proven for the bearers of these traditions to be “good to think with” or even good to model social life after. The three functions (that is, a tripartite hierarchy of values closely connected with particular classes) consist of:

1. Sovereignty or religion (rulers and priests)
2. Force (warriors)
3. Fecundity (producers/possessors of food, wealth, and valuable artifacts; women in their sexual capacity)

It is important to emphasize that the three functions form a hierarchical whole and that any one function implies the other two. Yet this cohesion does not always imply harmonious relations among them; indeed, there is a productive tension inherent within the system, tending to pit its elements against one another.

An exemplary illustration of the three functions and the way in which the system works (or doesn’t work, in cases of imbalance) is the myth of the judgment of Paris, as it is to be found in both literature and art (*Il.* 24.25–30; Dumézil 1968, 580–86; Richardson 1993, 276–78; Kossatz-Deismann 1994). Each of three

goddesses—Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite—promises a special gift to the Trojan prince in return for his selecting her as the fairest of female divinities: Hera offers kingship over many lands; Athena, conquest and glory in war; and Aphrodite, the most beautiful of women (Helen). Paris's choice, as we know, proves to be disastrous for him and his people. This outcome, the result of setting the tripartite social model on its head, is typical of the function represented in this case by Helen. In Indo-European traditions, the third function characteristically proves unreliable and paradoxically destructive, unless firmly subordinated to the first and second levels of the trifunctional system.

Dumézil's analysis of this *aition* of the Trojan War features key principles of his method that assure both rigor and flexibility.

1. A structure of relations (in this case, among the three goddesses and what they offer) is to be legitimately inferred only when they are found together (in an attested story, a ritual formula, a pictorial representation)—that is, when the relationships are pointedly linked together by the tradition itself (Dumézil 1961, 280–81). It would be simple enough to discern the system of the three functions in any mythology, Indo-European or not, by simply picking and choosing the appropriate mythological terms at large. Unfortunately, some of the scholars who have been inspired by Dumézil's work to look for Indo-European patterns in ancient Greek culture have engaged in precisely such dubious eclecticism (see Sergent 1979, 1158–61).

2. At the same time, our sense of the time frame where we can see “tradition” (the cultural logic behind transmission, selection, and innovation) at work must be kept open. Older, according to Dumézil, is not necessarily better for the purpose of finding and studying the Indo-European reflexes within a particular Indo-European mythology. Although the scene is depicted in vase painting as early as the seventh century B.C.E. (Kossatz-Deismann 1994), the story of the judgment of Paris does not appear in full in the Homeric corpus (*Il.* 24.25–30; see Richardson 1993, 276–78), but traces can be found in it of the trifunctional contrast among Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite (Sergent 1979, 1160; Dumézil 1985b, 16–26). The tale does appear, however, in considerably later literary works, such as Euripides' *Trojan Women* (lines 924–31), among others. In going from Homer to Euripides, we have crossed the boundary between “oral” and “literary” and even, to some extent, the boundary between “traditional” and “individual” expression. Yet Euripides and even much later authors can still represent Greek, or Indo-European, tradition. Such continuity is not necessarily a matter of unreflexive preservation for preservation's sake. In the case of Plato, for example,

Dumézil and others have argued that the trifunctional ideal society described in the *Republic* is the result of Plato's innovative recycling of traditional concepts (Dumézil 1968, 493–96; Sergent 1979, 1173–76; 1980, 256–72; Pralon 1981).

3. The mythological terms arranged in a “meaningful” system in one particular case (such as that of the myth of the judgment of Paris) do not necessarily adhere together in a similar way elsewhere, nor do they necessarily convey the same messages from appearance to appearance, although such consistencies are possible and, when they occur, can helpfully affirm the mythologist's hypothesis. Structures are more important and lasting than the individual components arranged in and through them. Dumézil (1968, 585–86) emphasizes that the three goddesses featured in the Paris myth, given their names of probably non-Indo-European origin and the variety of characteristics they exhibit in Greek religion, are not survivals of the Greeks' Indo-European heritage and that by no means are they fundamentally connected with the three functions they represent in this particular myth. Yet it is significant that other trifunctional configurations involving one or more of the three divinities are indeed attested. And Helen herself, with her three husbands (Menelaus the king, Paris the favorite of Aphrodite, and Deiphobos, a far more active warrior-figure than his predecessor), appears to string together all three functions in the course of her mythological career, as is the wont of the many trifunctional female figures attested throughout the Indo-European world (Sergent 1979, 1169–70). Furthermore, Paris's inability to prioritize the functions properly is echoed in the actions of his ancestor Laomedon, the founder of Troy, who is seen by Dumézil (1985b, 31–37) as another Trojan violator of the hierarchy of the three functions.

4. The presence of trifunctionalism or any other structure underlying Indo-European myth is ascertained and confirmed by means of comparison. Dumézil (1968, 586–601) legitimates and strengthens his claim that the myth of the judgment of Paris was generated along the lines of an Indo-European pattern by setting the story alongside examples from Indian, Iranian, and Germanic traditions, each of which features an analogous narrative situation of a young man's being offered his choice of his future destiny in trifunctional terms. True, the structures and their significance must arise from the individual narratives or other forms of cultural expression themselves; but the structures are not necessarily apparent unless these various data are set side by side. For Dumézil, the limits of this comparability are determined by the historical fact of the existence of an Indo-European group of languages. A linguistic criterion is, of course, not the only legitimate means whereby we can circumscribe cultural materials for the pur-

pose of examining to what extent they can be treated as a resonant whole. Some scholars of myth limit themselves to one society, or one segment or epoch of society, while others have compared the myths of societies sharing basic typological features. Dumézil's Indo-Europeanist comparative approach does not contradict or supersede these other approaches, whether we consider them parochial or cosmopolitan. His is but one way to begin to understand the semantic riches of myth, which, as Dumézil himself emphasized, should be studied primarily within each individual cultural context.

Nowhere does Dumézil's respect for the individual "personalities" of Indo-European cultures appear more clearly than in his judicious studies of ancient Greek tradition.² Greece offers a most conspicuous example of the operations of what Lévi-Strauss has described as *bricolage*,³ whereby the heritage of a relative past continually fuses with the cultural forces encountered in the relative present, and a new synthesis is produced representing a society's choices of terms with which to express itself to itself. One classical scholar following in Dumézil's footsteps has concluded that—as a result of the dramatic disruption of the post-Mycenaean "Dark Age," the seeming absence of a powerful priestly class among the Greeks in whose interest it would have been to conserve tradition, and Greece's perennial openness to "outside" influences—the Indo-European features of Greek culture, and of Greek religion in particular, were transformed on many levels beyond recognition and that these features can be easily discerned, for the most part, only in seemingly "conservative" pockets of the Greek world (e.g., Crete, Boeotia), marginal strands of the Greek tradition (e.g., Pythagoreanism), and minor details of myth and epic, such as episodes of the Homeric poems but not the latter's underlying narrative patterns (Sergent 1979, 1176–79; 1980, 272–73; 1984, 181). It has also been argued that, starting in the eighth century B.C.E., the cultural phenomenon of Panhellenism, which was the driving force behind the ancient Greek epic tradition, reduced the Indo-European element in heroic tales and weakened the functional correspondence between gods and heroes in the process of freeing itself from local cult and isolating the "common denominators" that united the various mythological and religious traditions of the Greek world. Thus, in effect, the Indo-European heritage would have been relegated or reduced to the local level, where, in turn, it was remolded or even dissolved to suit the needs of the evolving political institution of the *polis* (G. Nagy 1981, 138–39).

This impression of the heterogeneous and relatively non-Indo-European nature of Greek culture and myth remains, however, an impression rather than a

fact. Perhaps we know Greece too well and are therefore less likely to characterize it as Indo-European—and more likely so to describe some other culture from which we are distanced or that we are not forced to view in its totality. Again, it should be emphasized that the inconspicuousness of Indo-European patterns (even if we limit ourselves only to those discerned and described by Dumézil) does not necessarily indicate their absence but perhaps only their restricted development, as well as the limits of our knowledge at the present time. In the words of Jaan Puhvel:

Thus Greece in its inimitable way has managed to meld elements that can be rolled back to components only by the kind of scholarly struggle waged in this chapter. This is a task requiring thorough familiarity with both the immense store of Greek myth and the vast secondary literature as well as the external comparands, a combination rarely possessed by either specialists in classical studies or generalists in mythology. Hence Greece remains an extreme challenge to the comparativist, a hard nut that we have merely dented. (1987, 143)

Their protestations of the apparently slim pickings in Greek tradition notwithstanding, Dumézil and other scholars have already built up an impressive dossier of Greek attestations of mythological patterns that can also be found operating in other Indo-European mythologies.⁴ One of the best attested of these patterns in Greek myth is the mechanism of “the three sins of the warrior” as it informs the mythological cycle centered on Heracles, the most popular of Greek heroes (Dumézil 1970, 96–104), whose life in general conforms to an Indo-European “heroic biography” pattern (Dumézil 1983, 123–34; 1985a, 97–105; 1985b, 71–79). The text Dumézil uses as the basis for his analysis of the Heracles myths is the account given by Diodorus Siculus, although key points of the analysis are reflected in other texts as well (see Davidson 1980). Analogous to the lives of certain other Indo-European second-function figures (Starkađr of Germanic epic and Śiśupāla of Indian), Heracles’ life unfolds as follows:

1. He is the product of reproductive “excess” (Zeus’s three nights with Alcmena, during which the hero is conceived).
2. A man of great strength and physical power, he is profoundly affected and driven by the actions of a god who favors him (Zeus/Athena) and those of a god who hates him (Hera).
3. In the course of his heroic career, he violates or offends the principles of each of the three functions in hierarchical succession (he disobeys the

king Eurystheus, treacherously slays Iphitus, and greedily obtains a second wife). Each violation has a significant impact upon his life, and the third terminates it (Heracles is punished for his first two crimes and dies as a result of his last).

4. At his death, however, the hero is “rehabilitated” by being wondrously returned to his divine source and by passing on his martial attributes to a hero who is directly or indirectly responsible for his death (Heracles bequeaths his weapons to Philoctetes, who lights the funeral pyre that translates the dying Heracles onto Mount Olympus).

The story of Heracles, like those of his fellow Indo-European warriors, reflects an ideology within an ideology: the ambiguous position of the second function in society, the tensions inherent in the use of physical power, and the ambivalent attitude of the warrior toward society and its leaders, whom he both serves/protects and threatens.⁵ Warriors are as unreliable and yet as indispensable in their own way as are representatives of the third function.

Not all the heroes of Greek myth are associated primarily with the second function, just as physical force is by no means the only distinguishing feature of Heracles or the only device available to culture heroes in general for balancing (or disrupting) the ideological superstructure. An alternative mode of supernaturally powered action is vividly presented in Lucian’s essay on Heracles, which supplies us with a useful example of mythological comparativism as it was practiced in the classical world. Lucian claims that Heracles, whom the Celts “call Ogmios in their native tongue” (*Heracles* 1, trans. Harmon 1913) is depicted among them as an old man. He describes a particular picture:

That old Heracles drags after him a great crowd of men who are all tethered by the ears! His leashes are delicate chains fashioned of gold and amber, resembling the prettiest of necklaces. Yet, though led by bonds so weak, the men do not think of escaping, as they easily could, and they do not pull back at all or brace their feet and lean in the opposite direction to that in which he is leading them. In fact, they follow cheerfully and joyously, applauding their leader and all pressing him close and keeping the leashes slack in their desire to overtake him; apparently they would be offended if they were let loose! But let me tell you without delay what seemed to me the strangest thing of all. Since the painter had no place to which he could attach the ends of the chains, as the god’s right hand already held the club and his left the bow, he pierced the tip

of his tongue and represented him drawing the men by that means! (*Heracles* 3, trans. Harmon 1927, 65)

Lucian, puzzled by this depiction, is enlightened by a Celt, who corrects the foreigner's false impression that the chains were connected to Heracles' tongue because the artist had nowhere else to attach them. Indeed, this motif, according to the informant, was the very point of the picture:

We Celts do not agree with you Greeks in thinking that Hermes is Eloquence; we identify Heracles with it, because he is far more powerful than Hermes . . . This being so, if old Heracles here drags men after him who are tethered by the ears to his tongue, don't be surprised at that, either; you know the kinship between ears and tongue. (*Heracles* 4–5, trans. Harmon 1927, 65–67)

The surprisingly literal oral/aural chain that forms the focal point of Lucian's lesson in Celtic ideology is indicative of another kind of force in Indo-European mythologies that can be just as constructive, or even destructive, as the martial fury of the warrior: the often magically persuasive power of the spoken or sung word, specifically as it is framed in various traditional forms of verbal expression such as poetry, prophecy, and prayer. This force is by no means inconsistent with that of the warrior, just as the Celtic version of Heracles, as described by Lucian, is not totally inconsistent with the Heracles of Greek myth, a pupil of Orpheus's brother, the musician Linus (Apollodorus, *Bibliothèque* 2.4.8), and an associate of the muses (see Dumézil 1983, 137).

In a study of the god Apollo, Dumézil (1982, 11–108), using Indian, Greek, and Scythian evidence, argues for the existence of an Indo-European ideology of *parole* that reflects the tripartite structure and expresses the importance of speech and other humanly produced sounds for all levels of social action. In the ancient Indian collection of hymns known as the *Rig Veda* (10.125.4–6), we encounter the goddess Vāc, "Voice," declaring herself the patroness of priestly and prophetic utterance (first function), of the bow (a man-made "instrument" of war), and of the well-being of society brought about through verbal communication among its members (third function). In the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* (lines 131–39), the young god, who claims for himself the lyre and the bow (second function) as his emblems, promises to convey the wishes of Zeus to humans through oracles (first function) and gratefully covers the isle of his birth with gold (third function). Dumézil, while emphasizing that there is much more to the figure of Apollo than to the divine personification Vāc, nevertheless would see in this and other de-

scriptions of Apollo's powers an underlying tripartite schematization of the uses to which the human voice and its analogues or extensions are put. Actually, the tripartition blossoms into a quadripartition here, as in other Indo-European conceptualizations of human utterance and its accoutrements (see Dumézil 1982, 43–50; cf. Dumézil 1985b, 201–10; Dubuisson 1985). One of Apollo's domains—music, as represented by the god's lyre—comes to enjoy “independence within the interdependence” (Dumézil 1982, 48) of the ideological schema, although in its religious and ritual dimensions, music maintains its original connection with the first function. Thus, according to Indo-European ideology as reflected in Greek and other traditions, speech in its various forms embodies and holds together the social fabric, and in so doing it paradoxically transcends the ideological schema. This holds true particularly for musically delivered speech, which can appear theoretically apart from the whole or even drop out of the ideological accounting.

Furthermore, as we can see in Lucian's striking image of Heracles/Ogmios leading men by the ears, speech (whether spoken or sung) can be a means of winning or obtaining peacefully, breaking through barriers, and establishing control without bloodshed. In these respects, the power of the speaker/singer paradoxically supplements or even rivals the power of the warrior. Hence it is perhaps not surprising that in Greek mythology, Apollo's most distinguished offspring, the singer Orpheus (see Segal 1988a; Graf 2012), lives out a mythological career that presents some pointed intersections with the exploits of martial figures such as Heracles, who is also said to have been Orpheus's pupil (pseudo-Alcidimas, *Ulix.* 24 [Kern 1963, 37]; see Linforth 1941, 15–16; Schoeller 1969, 41–42). The singer's famed involvement in the Argonaut expedition, alongside Heracles and a roster of warlike heroes, is well established in the epic tradition. There is even a telling of the story that is actually attributed to Orpheus (the so-called Orphic *Argonautica*; see West 1983, 37–38). His participation in this heroic exploit provoked the following comment from one scholiast:

It is a question why a weakling (ἄσθενής) like Orpheus sailed with the heroes. It was because Cheiron with his gift of prophecy told them that if they took Orpheus they would be able to pass the Sirens. (schol. Apollon. 1.23; Kern 1963, 2; trans. Guthrie 1952, 28)

Of course, the peaceable figure of Orpheus—poet and mystic, the putative author of so-called Orphic writings—embodies qualities that make him, in crucial respects, the opposite of the warrior-hunter of myth (Robbins 1982, 18–19).

Especially in his role as the perhaps too-loving husband of Eurydice, Orpheus places himself at the opposite end of the mythological spectrum from devotees of a *männerbund* ethos like the Argonauts, and he poses a risk to the social order with his amorous excess (see Detienne 1981). And yet, in several of the accounts of Orpheus's postmatrimonial life, he turns into a celibate or even a woman-hater (Ovid, *Metamorph.* 10.78–85; see below), comparable in his misogynistic intensity to second-function figures such as the hunter Hippolytus, with whom Euripides pointedly associates Orpheus (see below). The range of Orpheus's audiences and of his mythological repertoire, from the martial to the domestic, is realized in a painting of the fourth century B.C.E., in which “we see Orpheus playing in the midst, with two warriors on one side of him, and two women, apparently with no hostile intent, on the other; beneath him is lying a deer, which has also yielded to the spell of his music” (Linforth 1941, 32). Like Heracles (Burkert 1977, 320), Orpheus is noted for taming wild creatures—although with the power of music, not the power of physical force—and he achieves what we could call the *shamanic* feat of gaining entrance into the world of the dead and, at least according to some strands of the mythological tradition, rescuing the dead (his wife Eurydice) from that world.⁶ Perhaps the clearest indication of Orpheus's mediating identity, reflecting a close ideological link between hunter-warrior and poet-singer, is the tradition according to which Orpheus trained one of the sons of Jason to be a warrior and the other to be a musician (Linforth 1941, 5–7). The proposed etymology for *Oiagros*, the name (according to some sources) of Orpheus's father, “Lone Hunter” (Gruppe 1897–1902, 1112), would appear, if correct, to affirm these second-function connections.

When Orpheus dies—like Heracles and Hippolytus, at the hands of the opposite sex—he is decapitated.⁷ This in fact is the fate we could have anticipated for Heracles, given the Indo-European pattern of second-function biography, adumbrated by Dumézil, to which Heracles' life in the main adheres. (Both Śiśupāla and Starkaḍr, the Greek hero's Indo-European analogues, lose their heads in spectacular fashion [Dumézil 1983, 74, 78]—an ironic end in the light of their having been born with “superfluous” body parts that must be lopped off for their respective heroic biographies to have the chance to unfold.) But unlike the mythological warrior, for whom separation of the head from the body necessarily and naturally entails an end to life and heroic individuality, Orpheus, even after being deprived of his trunk, does not die: he lives on as a singing head.

This striking coda to the Orpheus myth has attracted a considerable body of scholarship, but relatively few scholars have paid more than passing attention to

its Indo-European resonances. The account of Orpheus's demise and emergence in a new, severely truncated form serves as a paradigmatic mythological expression of the power of the spoken word, as it was understood among the Greeks and other Indo-European peoples, whose traditions feature illuminating parallels to the tale of the "death" of Orpheus and its surprising aftermath. To study this myth from a comparative perspective, therefore, is not to lose sight of its uniqueness within its own cultural setting but rather to expand its semantic field and shed light on its internal coherence.

Ovid, in the *Metamorphoses*—reacting specifically to Virgil's telling of the story in the *Georgics* (4.315–527; see Anderson 1982), but in the main echoing other accounts extant in classical literature—tells the following version of the story of the grisly death of the greatest singer of Greek mythology (10.78–85, 11.1–60). Having foresworn women as the objects of both his love and his art after the irreversible loss of his beloved Eurydice, the bereaved yet still-singing poet has the bad fortune to come across a band of maenads (devotees of Bacchus/Dionysus) who, resentful of his scorn for their sex, tear him apart limb from limb and head from trunk. Tumbling into the river Hebrus and floating along with the poet's still-playing lyre, the head makes its way, mourning all the while, to the isle of Lesbos—which, as we learn from a fragment of the Greek poet Phanocles and other sources, owes its wealth of poetic talent to the presence of Orpheus's head (Linforth 1941, 129, 134; Kern 1963, 22–23).

We learn the further history of the head from the second- or third-century Greek writer Philostratus's *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*:

And they tell that it was here [Lesbos] that Orpheus once on a time loved to prophesy, before Apollo had turned his attention to him. For when the latter found that men no longer flocked to Gryneium for the sake of oracles nor to Clarus nor [to Delphi] where is the tripod of Apollo, and that Orpheus was the only oracle, his head having lately come from Thrace, he presented himself before the giver of oracles and said: "Cease to meddle with my affairs, for I have already put up long enough with your vaticinations." (4.14, trans. Conybeare 1960)

Thus even Apollo, said in some sources to be Orpheus's father, ultimately feels threatened by his son's knowledge. Other extant accounts point more explicitly to a rivalry between gods, or between the singer and the gods, as the cause of Orpheus's death (see Friert 1991, 38–43). According to what we are told of Aeschylus's lost play *Bassarides*, Orpheus was slain by female worshipers of Dionysus sent by the jealous god, who was angered by Orpheus's faithful worship of Apollo

(Kern 1963, 34; Radt 1985, 138–40; see Guthrie 1952, 32, 232–33; Detienne 1979, 91–93; cf. Linforth 1931, 11–17; 1941, 9–10; Detienne 1985).⁸ Offering a rather different perspective on Orpheus's relationship with the gods is a tradition recorded by Pausanias, according to which Orpheus was actually slain by a divine thunderbolt in punishment for having divulged divine mysteries to humanity (9.30.3).

There is also, as we have already seen, a prominent “battle of the sexes” aspect to Orpheus's death, in addition to these divine-human tensions. The profundity of the clash is amply attested in the mythographer Canon's version of the death of Orpheus:

He was torn to pieces by the women of Thrace and Macedonia because he would not allow them to take part in his religious rites, or it may be on other pretexts too: for they do say that after the misfortune he had with his own wife he became the foe of the whole sex. Now on appointed days a throng of armed Thracians and Macedonians used to gather at Leibethra, and come together in a certain building which was large and well adapted for the performance of initiatory rites; and when they entered to take part in the rites, they laid down their arms before the door. The women watched for this, and, filled with anger at the slight put upon them, seized the arms, slew those who attempted to overpower them, and rending Orpheus limb from limb, cast the scattered remains into the sea. No requital was exacted from the women, and a plague affected the land. Seeking relief from their troubles, the inhabitants received an oracle, saying that if they should find the head of Orpheus and bury it, then they should have rest. After much difficulty they found it through a fisherman at the mouth of the river Meles. It was still singing, and in no way harmed by the sea, nor had it suffered any of the other dreadful changes which the fates of man bring upon dead bodies. Even after so long a time it was fresh, and blooming with the blood of life. So they took it and buried it under a great mound, and fenced off a precinct around it, which at first was a hero-shrine but later grew to be a temple. That is, it is honoured with sacrifices and all the other tributes which are paid to gods. No woman may ever set foot within it. (*Narr.* 45; trans. Guthrie 1952, 61–62)

Here it seems that the widowed Orpheus attempts to reestablish the distinction between male and female domains (threatened by his previous uxoriousness) with a dangerous zeal. As a consequence of his sexual radicalism, the sexes are polarized; remarkably, their roles are all too easily switched (males lose their

weapons, women acquire them), and disaster results.⁹ With the discovery of the singing head, however, and the head's finding an audience, the continuity of cult (human-divine communication) and the ritual boundary between the sexes are restored: the rites of Orpheus are continued from generation to generation of men, without further female interruption.

Except in Philostratus (see above and also his *Heroicus* 5.3), there is no mention in our sources of the head's serving as an oracle or of any continuation of Orpheus's poetic performance beyond the time when the head was recovered or rescued. In the following local tradition recorded by Pausanias, the head does not appear at all. Nevertheless, here too Orpheus continues to communicate after his death, and he remains an almost natural force to be reckoned with:

The Macedonians of the city of Dion and the country below Mount Pieria say Orpheus was murdered there by the women. Two and a half miles from Dion on the way to the mountain a pillar stands on the right, with a vase of stone on it. The people of the district say this vase has Orpheus's bones in it. The river Helikon runs for a little under ten miles, then its stream disappears underground, but after three more miles the water rises again, changing its name to Baphyra, and reaches the sea in a navigable estuary. The Dionians claim that this river originally ran entirely above ground, but the women who murdered Orpheus wanted to wash away his blood and the river dived down into the earth for fear its water should purify murderers. I heard another story at Larisa about a city called Libethra on the Macedonian side of Olympos with Orpheus's memorial quite close to it. The Libethrans received a message from Dionysos through an oracle in Thrace, that when the sun saw the bones of Orpheus the city of Libethra would be rooted up by a wild boar. They took little notice of the prophecy, thinking that a wild beast could not be big and strong enough to capture the city, and wild boars are more fierce than strong. When the god thought fit, this is what happened to them. A shepherd was lying against Orpheus's grave during the middle of the day, and he fell asleep: in his sleep he sang the poems of Orpheus in a loud, sweet voice. Of course everyone watching their flocks close by, and even ploughmen, abandoned work and crowded to hear the shepherd singing in his sleep. They shoved and pressed to get closer to him and they overturned the pillar. The urn fell and smashed and the sun saw what was left of the bones of Orpheus. At once the very next night the god poured down water out of heaven, and the river Boar, which is one of the winter streams on Olympos, broke the walls of Libethra, overturned the sanctuaries of gods and

the houses of men, and drowned the people and every living thing in the city, all alike. The Libethrans had perished: and so the Macedonians of Dion, according to the story of my friend at Larisa, carried away the bones of Orpheus to their own country. (9.30.4–5; trans. Levi 1971, vol. 1, 372–73)

This manifestation of the still-living voice of Orpheus causes a sensational disruption and elicits unwitting irreverence toward the dead. The bones, as seemingly helpless and inert as a decapitated head should be, bring destruction to the town, just as the neglected head of Conon's account is behind the plague that punishes Libethra. Orpheus demands to be heard, just as his bones are tragically fated to be seen.¹⁰ The ambiguous oracle encourages confusion between the real (a boar) and the metaphorical (a river named Boar), while the musical performance of the possessed shepherd, Orpheus's mouthpiece, generates a breakdown of social decorum (the unseemly jostling at the grave site), not to mention a confusion of the categories of dead and living. The finale, prefigured by the oracle and precipitated by the performance, is a terrible overturning of spatial boundaries: rain from the sky overcomes the earth, and a river floods the land. Speech unheeded (the message of the oracle)—or, in the case of the musical performance, overly heeded—rends the social fabric and creates a cosmic breakdown.

As it does for the above-mentioned warriors Starkaðr and Śiśupāla, the severing of the singer's head from his body creates a supernatural aftereffect of continuity: Orpheus's head, according to some strands of the tradition, continues to sing and becomes an oracle, until it is shut down by Apollo, or a cult object. This posthumous extension of heroic essence, however, does not constitute a return to the divine source (as it implicitly does for Starkaðr and Śiśupāla) or a passing-on of heroic attributes and powers to other heroes (as in the dying Heracles' act of bequeathing his bow and arrows to the young Philoctetes). The singer, rather, continues to live through part of himself—and even through his instrument: Orpheus's lyre is said to continue playing, alongside the singing head, after his death (Ovid, *Metamorph.* 11.51–52; Lucian, *Adv. indoct.* 11). The various modes of final dissolution and reconstitution for the second-function figures (Starkaðr's offering himself to Hoðr/Odin; Śiśupāla's absorption into Kṛṣṇa; Heracles' deification) confirm the existence of a sacred totality into which they ultimately can be subsumed. Orpheus's mode of life after death, however, would seem to indicate that the singer, his performance, and the tradition he represents potentially form a closed system, grounded in an autonomy and invulnerability of music and speech. Orpheus needs no one to revive or succeed him, any more than his

instrument is in need of a player.¹¹ And the head, part of a now absent whole, is almost more effective an exponent of the power of the verbal and musical arts than was the “complete” singer in life. Typologically at least, the power of this singing, self-vivifying head, like that of Orpheus himself, is akin to the power of Lucian’s Heracles/Ogmios, which lies very pointedly in the head—not in the body—and is visually expressed with chains attached not to the limbs but to the heads of those enchained. Free to exist apart from the body, Orpheus oracularly continues to address society, just as the verbal and musical arts can stand apart from the ideological whole and yet embody and serve that whole. Orpheus, once “concentrated” into his head, becomes all the more a mixed, and therefore especially charged, message. He is a source of conjunction—the “chaining together” produced by speech, and the reflection of audience in the person of the performer—and yet also the product and sign of disjunction: the detachment of the singer from society and the head from the body, brought about by alienation between men and women, among gods (as well as the values they represent), and between gods and humans.

The resemblance between Orpheus’s head and a host of other severed heads in Indo-European traditions has been noted before (e.g., Kittredge 1916, 147–94; Deonna 1923; Eliade 1964, 391; Avanzin 1970; Colledge and Marler 1981). It has also been observed that the motif of the “vital head” (as it is dubbed in Thompson’s *Motif-Index of Folk Literature* [1955–57, E783]) is by no means limited to the Indo-European world.¹² There is extensive evidence from all phases of human civilization that a fascination with the head or skull detached from the body is virtually a universal element in religion and folklore (Klingbeil 1932; Meslin 1987). Scholarly assessments of the significance of the many heads that live on in Indo-European myth in particular have drawn on available archaeological and ethnographic data indicating the existence of head cults and headhunting among several peoples, including the Indo-Europeans (Sterckx 1981). And it has been stated often enough that vital heads in narrative are an affirmation of a traditional perception of the head as the seat of intelligence, life, potency, or status—qualities that, in sufficient amounts, can, at least in the world of myth, keep the head alive without the body. Very little attention has been paid, however, to what these heads in Celtic, Norse, Greek, Indian, and other Indo-European mythologies actually *do*—for they are usually more than just “vital.” Often the heads can still talk, and powerfully so, and through the power of the verbal performances emanating from them, they can manipulate the still-attached heads of their audience. As we have already seen in the myth of Orpheus, these severed extremities

are not only long-lived but also persistent, and their “overmarked” personalities entrance or enchain their auditors, like the Heracles/Ogmios of Lucian’s description. It can therefore be argued that the fundamental message conveyed by vital heads in Indo-European mythologies is that oral tradition can preserve and renew the knowledge it is designed to convey, even though the bearers of the tradition, like all mortals, are subject to death.

In Indo-European traditions, heads tend to be severed and rendered miraculously communicative under a set of narrative circumstances that, as we shall see, form a recurrent pattern. One of the best examples of this verbal tenacity as expressed through the bodiless head is to be found in the episode known as the *Sírrabud Súaldaim*, “The Persistent Warning of Súaldaim,” which is contained in the recensions of the medieval Irish *Táin Bó Cúailnge*, “Cattle Raid of Cooley” (O’Rahilly 1976, lines 3410–53 [earlier recension]; 1967, lines 3981–4052 [later recension]).¹³ The great warrior Cú Chulainn’s strength has been depleted in the course of his single-handed defense of the province of Ulster against the combined forces of all the other provinces of Ireland, who are being led by the Connaught queen Medb. The exhausted hero is approached by his father, Súaldaim, who is commissioned by his son to carry word of warning to the Ulstermen in the capital of Emain Macha, where they are recovering from their mysterious debility, the result of a curse laid upon them by a pregnant supernatural female (see Rees and Rees 1961, 58–59). Súaldaim, who is described as only a mediocre fighter (O’Rahilly 1967, lines 3994–97), reaches the men and declares his message to them but is unheeded: the men of Ulster will not speak before the king speaks, the king will not speak before his druid speaks, and the king’s druid declares that someone with so unpleasant a message should be executed. In his frustration, the spurned messenger falls off his horse and is decapitated by his own shield. Despite this setback, Súaldaim’s message is not lost; instead, it gains new force. His head, lying on his shield, which remains on the horse’s back, continues to proclaim the news of impending disaster and finally arouses Conchobar, the king of Ulster, out of his stuporous, druid-ridden hauteur. The head’s terse but persistent warning gives way to a lengthy call to arms addressed to the men of Ulster by their king. Finally, the Ulstermen muster their forces and in an extended battle turn back the invasion of their province.

Like Orpheus, Súaldaim presents an alternative to the hero characterized by physical strength, and he is treated by the conventional representative of the first function, the king’s druid, as a threat (compare Orpheus’s supposedly impious acts of communication that brought divine wrath down upon him). Súaldaim

proves to be of little use for the defense or enlightenment of the province until he is “minimized.” This diminution in effect “turns up the volume” on Súaldaim’s message and highlights his head’s communicative function. Thus the narrative presents us with a direct parallel to the paradoxes of the Argonautic Orpheus (a “weakling” whose verbal powers are essential for the completion of warriors’ tasks), the severed head of Orpheus, and the aged but irresistible Heracles/Ogmios. All of these figures symbolize the same binding power by which Súaldaim’s warning, *rabud*, is indeed *sír*—“long” or “lasting,” even beyond death—and vital to the interests and functions of kings, priests, and warriors, as well as society at large.

The curious placement of the talking head on the back of a horse reflects a theme to be found in the Orpheus tradition as well. In Ovid’s account of the poet’s death, we are told that Dionysus punished his murderous maenads by turning them into oak trees (*Metamorph.* 11.67–84), while Apollo stopped a serpent about to eat Orpheus’s head, beached on Lesbos, by turning the beast into stone (11.56–60). These destinies of immobilization present a stark contrast to the relative freedom and mobility of the severed head, which escapes the scene of the crime and is transported by water to Lesbos. The frantic women and the opportunistic snake are rendered static, or even rooted, entities, while the (one would think) inert head proves to be surprisingly locomotive. This defeat of expectations also appears in the climactic scene of the Súaldaim episode, where a mounted head moves about addressing warriors who are normally active, mobile, and mounted, but who at this time are barely moving or responding. Such ability to move and cross boundaries, including that between life and death, is in fact a typical feature of the vital head as it appears in various mythologies, both inside and outside the Indo-European world. It is yet another sign, operating in another “code,” that connotes the persistence and dynamic of the spoken word as it lives on in tradition beyond the individual performance and the individual performer.

Obviously, vital heads do not just exist a priori but are created by circumstances, usually involving violent hostility between opposed persons and values (cf. Oosten 1985, 62). Súaldaim, not a native of Ulster and hence not afflicted by the Ulstermen’s debility (said to be like the pangs of childbirth), loses his head when confronting the unresponsive Ulstermen, who are still recovering as if post partum, and thereby he (his head, rather) evokes a response from them. The celibate (or homosexual) Orpheus, a devotee or son of Apollo, is attacked and decapitated by female devotees of the god Dionysus, and so Apollo is seemingly deprived of the main exponent of the verbal arts he sponsors. Yet Orpheus’s head

survives and returns, as it were, to Apollo, who becomes the protector or manager of this performing cult object. A similar pattern of hierarchical and sexual tension, underlying a sequence of loss and recovery, and acted out among a cast of cosmic characters, is apparent in the story of another severed but still-alive head, as preserved in Old Norse literature.¹⁴

According to the medieval Icelandic writer Snorri Sturluson's account of the struggles among the Norse gods (in the *Ynglingasaga*, the first part of the *Heimskringla*, 1.12–13), Mímir, a source of wise utterance for Odin and the other gods of the Aesir family, was one of the hostages delivered over to the other family of gods, the Vanir, when the two groups made peace with each other. Along with Mímir went another god, Hœnir, who was elected chief of the Vanir for his great size and beauty. Hœnir, however, proved to be so dependent on Mímir's advice that, unless he were accompanied by his fellow hostage, he could say nothing of interest or value in the assembly. The Vanir grew angry at the Aesir because of Hœnir's apparent worthlessness as a leader and counselor. In their pique they cut off Mímir's head. The greatly bereaved Odin managed to obtain the head and preserve it by means of pickling, and from that time on Mímir's head would speak to Odin whenever he sought its advice.

In this story, a head (or the contents of a head) becomes an object of contention in a conflict between two opposed cosmic forces: the Aesir, who, as Dumézil (1973, 3–25) has convincingly argued, represent the Indo-European second and first functions, and the Vanir, who represent the third. Furthermore, in the light of the previously discussed analogues of the Mímir story, we should note that the Aesir are a notably more “masculine” pantheon than the Vanir, who are sometimes rather markedly represented by their females and characterized as sexually deviant (see Dumézil 1973, 7–8, 24, and the tradition recorded in the *Heimskringla* [1.13] that the Vanir, unlike the Aesir, practiced incest). Here, as in the other myths we have examined, the sexual connotations of the image of the severed yet still-productive head, especially in these various frameworks of male-female rivalry, are quite obvious. But equally important is the fact that Mímir's head, like those of Orpheus and Súldaim, functions as a living and productive reminder of its original owner's wisdom-laden verbal performance. Relevant in this regard is the proposed etymology of Mímir's name, according to which it is cognate with Latin *memor*, “remembering” (J. de Vries 1937, 361; cf. Lincoln 1982b, 28). Equally intriguing are the connotations of the Irish word *rabud*, which appears in the traditional title of the Súldaim episode of the *Táin, Sírrabud Súldaim*. While it is usually translated as “warning,” *rabud* also has the meaning “sign” (Royal

Irish Academy 1983, s.v. *robud*). Hence it may refer to Súaldaim's ominous speech, which lingers after his death, and also to the wondrous epiphany of a talking head: a living memorial that infuses power into the already spoken word.

These three Indo-European stories centered on the vital head construct an opposition between the mortal, normally communicative body, or head attached to the body, and the immortal, abnormally or supernaturally communicative severed head: that is, between an unmarked, vulnerable whole made up of parts that do not “stick together” or cannot communicate adequately (e.g., the unsatisfactory team of Hœnir and Mímir) and a marked, invulnerable part that “sticks with it” and gets the job of communicating done. In Indian tradition, which is replete with severed heads (Coomaraswamy 1944; Heesterman 1967, 23–29; Doniger 1999, 204–59), we find the following story, attested already in the *Rig Veda* (1.117.22), in which the poles of this opposition are shifted onto two alternating heads on the same body.¹⁵

Dadhyañc (a seer, kindler of sacrificial fire, or the son of a priest) is privy to the secret of the whereabouts of mead, or to the esoteric sacrificial technique of reuniting head with body, but is forbidden by the divine warrior-king Indra from imparting this information to anyone: the second-function god (Indra) has assured this first-function possessor of knowledge that if he divulges what he knows, his head—his organ, as it were, of communication and the repository of his wisdom—will be cut off. However, the divine Áśvín twins (characteristically associated with the third function; Puhvel 1987, 58–60), by promising to protect his head, finally prevail upon Dadhyañc to divulge his secret, and they promise to protect his head. They remove it and put a horse's head upon him while he instructs them. (In so doing, the Áśvínā [“Pair of Horsemen”], who themselves have the heads of horses [Puhvel 1970a, 169–70; O'Flaherty 1975, 56; Frame 1978, 145–52], render their teacher an “honorary Áśvín.”) Then, after Indra in his fury cuts off the horse's head (Dadhyañc's temporary head), the twins reinstate their teacher's real head.

The plight of the priestly sage Dadhyañc, which is mirrored in the later myth of Śiva's elephant-headed son Gaṇeśa (Courtright 1985, 62–98), is essentially that of the Norse Mímir, another first-function pawn in another contention between primarily second-function figures and third-function figures. Dadhyañc himself and his restored original head—vital yet not so vital—have no further role to play in mythology, but the horse's head, we are told in later sources, is secreted in a lake and lies dormant until it is found by Indra and used as a weapon to slay Vṛtra or other demons challenging Indra's cosmic supremacy (*Rig Veda*

1.84.13–15; O’Flaherty 1975, 57–58).¹⁶ Furthermore, there is a connection made in later Indian tradition between Dadhyañc (or Dadhīca) of the watery horse’s head and the fiery androgynous horse that will emerge catastrophically from the ocean at the end of the world (O’Flaherty 1980b, 226–33).

Dadhyañc’s temporary head—not just a head on a horse, like Súaldaim’s, but actually a horse’s head—speaks to the Ásvínā in a way that his regular head attached to his body could not. Thus it falls in line with the other vital heads we have examined. After it is taken off the priest’s body, however, the horse’s head apparently grows silent, or we only see it used as a vengeful instrument of violence, not as an instrument of verbal or musical expression.¹⁷ Yet the motifs connected with this disembodied, spoken-out instead of outspoken, head—its residence in water, its fieriness, its value to Indra as a means of affirming his sovereignty—are reminiscent of the Iranian *xvarənah*, the divine essence lodged in the waters that, once obtained, confers kingly prestige upon anyone lucky enough to obtain it (see Puhvel 1987, 108–9, 277–83). As Patrick Ford has demonstrated (1974), this *xvarənah* is paralleled in Irish tradition by *imbas*, “great knowledge,” an essence that resides in an otherworldly spring, inspires poetic utterance, and wells up with destructive force. This perhaps not-so-distant Celtic cousin of the priestly horse’s head of Indian tradition brings us back to the verbal element that is missing from Dadhyañc’s “head for a day” as it exists in its watery semiretirement.¹⁸

The following are the key elements of what would appear to be the underlying narrative pattern common to these four Indo-European mythological recipes for a productive severed head. Each opens on a note of potentially disastrous discord; the three functions, the sexes, or the pantheon are dangerously disunited, and the “whole” threatens to disintegrate:

Greek: Orpheus, seer (first function) and companion to warriors (second function), is tragically separated from his wife, who remains in the world of the dead. He is alienated from women and their sexuality (third function). Or, revealing the secrets of the gods, Orpheus antagonizes them. Or, Apollo and Dionysus are at loggerheads over Orpheus.

Irish: The Ulster warriors and their king (second and first functions, respectively), as a result of the disrespect they showed toward a supernatural female, are rendered helpless in a “feminine” way during a crisis in which their cattle, women, and children are threatened. The avowed purpose of the invaders, headed by a woman (Queen Medb of Connacht), is to steal the Ulstermen’s best bull, for the purpose of breeding,

as well as their other prized possessions (that is, their interests lie in the domain of the third function). The warrior Cú Chulainn, unaided by his fellow warriors, is forced to face the attacking army virtually alone.

Norse: The third-function Vanir, reconciled to the first- and second-function Aesir in a perfunctory manner, are disenchanted with their hostages. Hence the rapprochement of the pantheons is threatened.

Indian: The warrior-king Indra forbids the priestly Dadhyañc to reveal his first-function secrets to the third-function Aśvínā.

The outcome of the problematic situation in each tale is the death of a mediating figure (“mediating” at least in the sense of being caught between the opposing forces), his decapitation, and the survival of his head (or, in the Indian example, the replacement of his head), which proves remarkably mobile and imparts vital information. In each example, this outcome constitutes, in effect, a solution to the original problem of disjunction:

Greek: Orpheus—ambivalent toward women and half divine—is slain by members of the opposite sex and/or a god and treated as a source of fertility (his body is scattered on the ground—a third-function “application”). Apollo and Dionysus, whose followers were at odds (Orpheus versus the maenads), mutually tidy up the loose ends of Orpheus’s murder: Apollo protects the remains, and Dionysus punishes his savage devotees. The slain singer’s head floats away and becomes a valued oracle, serving to maintain communication between the divine and the human. The head-oracle is finally closed down lest the other, divinely sponsored oracles be neglected. Women or those who do not respect the living voice of Orpheus are punished for their impious behavior: the maenads are turned into trees, women are excluded from Orpheus’s rites, or Libethra is destroyed.

Irish: Súaldaim, neither warlike nor subject to the “feminine” condition of the Ulstermen, is ignored by druid, king, and warrior, and he dies. His head continues to communicate his message. Finally, thanks to Súaldaim’s persistence, the Ulster king and his men regroup as an effective social force, and the despoilers of Ulster are driven out of the province.

Norse: The Vanir slay Mímir, who played the role of go-between for the two pantheons. Having thus vented their ire, the Vanir apparently remain at peace with the Aesir. Odin in turn wins back Mímir in the form of his

head, which thus manages to “return” to the Aesir. The head becomes a precious source of knowledge for Odin.

Indian: The Ásvinā “slay” Dadhyañc, the sage whose knowledge everyone wants, after obtaining the desired information from him, and confer upon him a semi-equine identity similar to their own. Indra “slays” Dadhyañc in punishment. But Dadhyañc’s head returns to his body, and he continues his priestly communicative functions, while his temporary head continues to exist on its own, serving Indra as a weapon. Thus the horse’s head becomes emblematic of all three functions and symbolically reintegrates them.

Despite the dichotomous turmoil looming in each myth, the force that impels and speaks through the severed head proves not only indestructible but even salvific. A part that acts like a whole, a product of destruction that lives notwithstanding, the speaking head mediates between the various opposed realities featured in these myths (male-female; human-divine; first and second function–third function; living-dead) and reintegrates the totality that originally threatened to disintegrate. In this mythological complex, therefore, we have yet another expression of the concept of the crucial marginality of speech, separate from but inclusive of the entire ideological system, which is saved and sustained through its reflection in the talking head and its utterance.

In the stories examined, the realm of discourse over which the vital head ranges and rules is limited to the oral, as we would expect of a thematic cluster that stems from the prehistoric and preliterate Indo-European past. There are, however, some instances in Indo-European mythologies where the work of the severed head and the act of writing are contrasted or connected. (Indeed, the very presence of the sign of a talking head in literary texts, such as those on which we based our preceding survey of the motif, draws attention to the tension between the spoken and the written, which we may assume was keenly felt by the scribal bearers of these various traditions.) As we shall see, the symbolic baggage of the severed head, the complex of ideas we have been exploring, can lend itself to an evaluation of the relationship between written and oral communication in those Indo-European cultures where literacy was culturally important enough for there to develop the need for an ideological reckoning of the relationship. This concluding excursion on the “new” applications of the vital head motif in Irish and Greek traditions is conducted in the spirit of Dumézil—that is, the goal is not to retrieve a fossilized *Urmythologie* but to study some of the varieties of

specialization and transformation that sustain a protean ideological heritage in Indo-European cultures.

In the medieval Irish collection of lore known as *Cormac's Glossary*, there appears an account of domestic turmoil that features an act of written communication leading to the creation of a severed, singing head (Meyer 1912, § 1018; see also Dillon 1932, 48–49, 58–61). The story is set in the days before the arrival of Christianity—therefore, before the era of scribes and literary tradition.

Lomna, the fool (*drúth*) of the great warrior-hunter Finn mac Cumail, stays at home one day while his master goes off to the hunt. (Lomna, we are told, was a *midlach*, “weakling.”) Walking about outside, the fool discovers Finn's paramour *in flagrante delicto* with a member of Finn's retinue, the warrior Cairpre. Despite the woman's attempts to dissuade him from giving away her secret, Lomna feels compelled to tell Finn about what he saw. But in order to be as discreet and safe as possible, he gives Finn the message in the form of a cryptic poem written on a stick in ogam, a writing system used by the Irish for inscriptional purposes that predates the coming of Christianity to Ireland. The cuckolded husband deciphers the message and understands the gist of the poem. The paramour, presumably upon being confronted by Finn, instantly realizes who has let the cat out of the bag and instructs her lover to slay Lomna. The fool is killed, and, as an apparent subscriber to the old tradition of Celtic headhunting, Cairpre takes Lomna's head with him on his flight into the wilderness. Finn finds the headless corpse at home, and his men ask him to discover whose it is, through his wondrous power of divination. Finn identifies the body as that of his fool Lomna and goes immediately in hot pursuit of Cairpre. Using his hunting skills, Finn finds his enemy's trail and tracks him to his camp, where he spies on Cairpre and his men as they grill a catch of fish, with Lomna's still-alive head perched on a spit beside the fire. Cairpre proceeds to distribute the cooked fish among his mates, but gives none to the head—an act of niggardliness that, the text informs us, was anathema to Finn and his fellow hunters. Having been thus ignored, Lomna's head utters a poem in which he complains about his ill treatment at the hands of his captors. A second fish course is served, the head is once again snubbed, and so it composes some more plaintive verse. His patience exhausted, Cairpre orders his men to put the head outside the camp—although, he admits, in so doing they will acquire a bad reputation. Even outside, however, the head continues to harangue poetically those within. This all proves too much for Finn, and he surprises his enemy and slays him along with all his men. Unfortunately, we are not told about the fate of what was left of Lomna.

The fool's head is part of an ensemble in this story, which despite its brevity presents us with a virtual inventory of signs, both visual and verbal. (The text of the tale itself is a citation, framed as a glossarial explication of an obscure word—a difficult verbal sign—that happens to appear in one of Lomna's poems.) The opening contrast between hunters and domestics soon becomes a matter of differing objects, and levels, of interpretation: Finn is a successful hunter, presumably because he can read signs in nature that indicate the presence of prey, but an unsuccessful husband, precisely because he is so preoccupied with hunting. The domestic, on the other hand, is a reject from the hunting band, but he is all too aware of the sexual predation that takes place in the camp after the band has left it to find and pursue game. From rather straightforward and easy-to-read signs—animal tracks, a couple making love—the story moves on to the doubly difficult sign of Lomna's warning poem to Finn: words that are hard to understand and that are not even heard but seen, written in the esoteric code of ogam. Finn, however, can read and interpret this sign, and even his paramour can indirectly read it, through its effect on Finn, and identify its author. Curiously, that which proves to be the most difficult sign of all, the one that requires supernatural intervention for its proper reading, is the headless corpse—even though we might think that Finn and his men could easily discern who had been killed. For the solving of this mystery, Finn must use his special divinatory technique. Once this acephalous sign has been properly decoded (the message being that Lomna has been killed and that Cairpre, his slayer, has fled), all falls into place: the disjunction between the knowledge possessed by the hunter-hero and that by the domestic nonhero dissolves. Finn is once again off on a hunt, but this time on the track of the domestic predator now turned prey.

In the heart of the wilderness, having openly discerned and decoded the inert sign of the headless corpse back at the camp, Finn now furtively witnesses and responds sympathetically to the most active, engaging, and persistent sign in the story: the complement to the anonymous headless corpse, the talking head that is indisputably Lomna's. This appendage, demanding to be heard and satisfied, seals the fate of Cairpre the home-wrecker, who in the story had consistently undermined the rules of proper conduct and, along with his mistress, attempted to silence the spoken word. The garrulous head that "roughs it" in the wilderness also succeeds in vindicating the erstwhile homebody Lomna: a seemingly helpless protagonist who, in the tale's final scene, speaks rather than writes, for the first time—an ironic deferral, given that as a *drúth*, he is a member (albeit a lowly one) of the ranks of traditional verbal performers in Irish culture.

Writing is dangerous: the ogam message, written with the best of intentions and meant to defuse the time bomb of infidelity in the domestic realm, instead itself creates a messy explosion. The writer loses his head and his proper sphere of influence (that is, Lomna is removed from his seemingly appropriate milieu). As a head, however, the fool reestablishes the power of the true, specifically spoken, utterance. He reveals the essential unworthiness of his adulterous beheader, thus sealing Cairpre's fate, and effects a balance between the social domains and between man and woman: Finn, the hunter, avenges the domestic insult of adultery. (We have, of course, already seen these tensions, and their resolution, in other narratives featuring the severed head.)

There would seem to be a trifunctional dimension to the Lomna tale. The *drúth* who possesses special knowledge (first function) is caught in a struggle between the hunter-warrior Finn (second function) and the wily Cairpre, who seduces (or is seduced by) the hunter's wife and is marked as niggardly (third-function "sins"). Only when he is decapitated and seemingly rendered helpless does Lomna become powerful or "significant" enough to make a game-changing difference in the story and bring about a culturally acceptable conclusion to it. In many ways, therefore, the story of Lomna falls in line with the other narratives we have considered.

Ogam, the form of writing that plays such a pointed role in this tale, was viewed in medieval Irish literary tradition as a paradigmatic, and by no means outdated, form of written expression, even though nothing approaching our concept of "literature" has survived in ogam script, nor is there any reason to believe that such ever existed. That the visual sign of the carved ogam message is superseded in the story by the more striking, untechnological sign of the living head, which is vocal as well as visible, suggests a nostalgia-tinged hierarchy in the medieval Irish ideology of communication.

Some of the underlying tensions within this hierarchy were uncovered by Dumézil in his study of the continuities and discontinuities between the oral ethos of the Gaulish druids (who, according to Caesar, disdained writing) and medieval Celtic assumptions about writing (Dumézil 1940b; see also Le Roux and Guyonvarc'h 1986, 263–69). In a Middle Irish text that plays a central role in Dumézil's argument (Stokes 1891, 199–202; J. Nagy 1990), a poet's son held hostage in the court of the legendary Irish king Cormac mac Airt loses his costly sword to the royal steward who covets it, after the latter secretly inscribes his own name on its hilt and then claims the sword by virtue of the inscription. And so in this instance, we are told, the dead bore witness against the living, in that the written

word won the case for the devious steward despite the oral protestations of the hostage. Script surpasses utterance in the political arena of Cormac's court, but it is almost inherently devious and a precarious vessel (at best) of the truth. (In fact, the steward does not get to keep the sword but ultimately is forced to return it to the poet's son, who in turn is forced to give it over to Cormac.)

Surely the same invidious comparison underlies the tale of Lomna, with its two strikingly different acts of communication: the delivery of a fateful message in written form, which leads to the revelation (but not the punishment) of wrongdoing as well as to the death of the innocent writer; and Lomna's oral protest that *defies* death and, although seemingly impotent, pinpoints guilt and brings swift punishment upon the story's villain. The ogam inscription is not described as "dead" in this text, but it is doubtless significant that it is contrasted with a bodily part that should be dead and yet is not because it still has something to say.

The paradoxicality of oral "life" and literary "death" is also apparent in the medieval Irish tale of the madman Suibne (O'Keeffe 1913; J. Nagy 1996a), which has already been explored for its use of the Indo-European "three sins of the warrior" pattern (Cohen 1977). Here, we see the career of a king-turned-oral-poet shaped by his relationship with saints who are presented in the text as users or producers of the written word. At the beginning of the story, Saint Rónán calls madness and exile down upon the feckless Suibne after he gravely offends him by, among other things, throwing the cleric's psalter into the water. In his life of banishment to the wilderness, away from the domain of the literary culture of Christianity, Suibne is inspired: he composes poems in which he both laments his loneliness and discomfort and extols his vibrant freedom. Finally, Suibne becomes the friend of another saint, Moling, who convinces the madman to come in from the wild every day so as to give Moling the chance to write down the poems Suibne has composed. However, this voluntary acquiescence to the power of the written word and its bearers brings death to Suibne: he dies, like Lomna, a victim of sexual intrigue within Moling's household, at the hands of a jealous husband.

In one of Suibne's wilder adventures, which takes place before the rapprochement with Moling, he encounters a band of rolling, roaring heads. These recognize Suibne and attack him for no apparent reason, both verbally and physically. In the struggle to escape from them, Suibne leaps and flies as he has never done before (O'Keeffe 1913, §§ 64–66). Such feats of restlessness and superhuman mobility punctuate the madman's fall from grace. That this climactic display of these

qualities is brought about by vital heads—which clearly exist outside the realm of saints, books, and proper social discourse—is a telling reflection on Suibne’s strange fate. Orpheus survives a concerted attack upon him as a mobile, talking head because he still has something important to say; Suibne survives an attack launched by talking heads because he himself is metaphorically a talking head: both dead and alive, putatively “cut off” and silenced yet all the more markedly vociferous. Ironically, the saint’s curse, which removes Suibne from his community and renders him dead to the world, simultaneously gives him the power to survive where other humans would be overcome by the elements: the curse specifically condemns him to the life of a bird in the wilderness (§ 9). Such liveliness, which makes for good poetry and inspired oral performance, gives way to the final utter immobilization of the reformed, transcribed Suibne: he is mortally wounded in the back while he is in a prone position, drinking, as was his wont, his portion of milk out of a pile of cow dung in Moling’s monastic compound (§ 79). To reattach Suibne to the social body is ultimately to deprive him of his unique voice—and his life.

Yet, just as in Indian myth, where the head of Dadhyañc must be detached and replaced in order for knowledge to spread and tradition to grow, we find in medieval Irish narrative a key instance of “head recovery,” in a tale that may have functioned as the *aition* for the scribal tradition itself (see Mac Cana 1970, 62–66; Slotkin 1977–79, 437–40). The warrior Cenn Faelad (“Wolf’s Head”) receives a serious head wound in the Battle of Mag Rath, a conflict involving the major political forces of Ireland. (This, in fact, is also the battle in which Suibne goes mad, after the saint’s curse takes effect.) Hospitalized next door to three separate schools of learning, Cenn Faelad listens to and remembers the instruction given during the day and writes all of it down at night. And so, with this foundational event, the practice of writing down both secular (or vernacular) and Christian (or Latin) learning came to flourish in Ireland. Cenn Faelad’s remarkable powers of memorization are attributed to his battle injury, for it was his *inchinn dermait*, “brain of forgetfulness,” that was damaged and excised. Here too, then, we have a “head” that leaves the body as the result of a bitter conflict beyond the control of the head’s owner: the Battle of Mag Rath, in which Cenn Faelad is only a follower and not a leader. But in this case, the “head” is an eminently forgettable appendage—the mysterious forgetful brain, to which no other reference can be found in Irish tradition. The remaining head, or part of the head, goes on to share in the wisdom and glory of one of the legendary founders of Irish literature. But this

is a silent amanuensis of a head, very much attached to the body and dependent upon its arms and hands for writing. Cenn Faelad's is a vital head co-opted by the new medium of writing. No longer itself a source of original communication, the head has become a conduit and repository for what is orally communicated.

In Greek tradition, the singing head similarly rolls up against the monolithic fact of literacy, but here, too, the scribe and the head live to learn and even benefit from one another. To understand this ideological innovation, it is necessary to explore the murky connection between the figure of Orpheus and so-called Orphism. Perhaps one of the most surprising aspects of this diverse complex of myths, beliefs, and rituals is that it is grounded in the figure of the oral performer par excellence of Greek myth, and yet Orphism is so markedly based on the written word, to the extent that some scholars have argued that there was no such thing in the ancient world as Orphism but only Orphic writings. These were traditionally attributed to Orpheus, who in an epigram of uncertain origin is even credited with the invention of writing (Linforth 1931, 5–11; 1941, 15–16).¹⁹ Devotees of these mystical texts and the ideology behind them were, like the Pythagoreans, a fringe group (see Detienne 1979, 68–94). Followers of the literary Orpheus “chose writing and the book as an effective symbol of their otherness” (Detienne 1987, 113; see also Burkert 1972, 130 n. 55, and Burkert et al. 1977, 2–3, 15). This bookishness is referred to in Euripides' *Hippolytus*, when Theseus denounces his wrongly accused son:

Your current hero is Orpheus,
your days are spent inhaling the holy aroma
from books of arcane absurdity. (LINES 953–54; TRANS. BAGG 1973, 62)

The irony of Theseus's remarks is notable. Hippolytus, as celibate and even contemptuous of women as the bereaved Orpheus ever was (Tierney 1937, 72–73), has just been implicated in his stepmother's death by a written message she held in her lifeless hand. For the young hunter-devotee of Orpheus and reader of Orphic literature, as for the famous poet and the oral tradition he represents, writing is both a bane and a blessing (see Svenbro 1987, 31, 40; Segal 1988b, 355–56).

Ivan Linforth observed that the pointed reference to “books of Musaeus [traditionally Orpheus's son] and Orpheus” in the description of the rhetorical arsenal of itinerant priests in Plato's *Republic* (2.364) sets these poets apart from Homer and Hesiod, also mentioned as sources for these priests' “pitches” to potential clients:

Observe, first, the prominent use of the word βίβλων . . . One might expect the new sentence to begin Μουσαίου δὲ καὶ Ὀρφέως, contrasting these poets with the preceding ones. There seems to be a false emphasis on “books,” because one feels the idea to be already latent in the reference to Homer and Hesiod. What is the cause of this emphasis, which, of course, in the language of Plato cannot be false? Two causes can be discerned. In the first place, whereas the poems of Homer and Hesiod, the great classics, are known to the people by heart or through the recitation of rhapsodes, the works of Musaeus and Orpheus are accessible only to the reader, or to the participant in the teletae [purification rituals, often associated with Orphism], who perhaps heard them read. In the second place, the fact that the persons who conducted the teletae used books in some way means that they depended on the sanctity of the written word. (Linforth 1941, 77–78)

That the books produced by Orpheus and his son were not only read aloud but traditionally understood to be the result of transcriptions of mystically inspired performances is perhaps suggested by Plato’s characterization of this literature as a ὄμαδος βίβλων, “din” or “hubbub of books” (2.364e; Linforth 1941, 78). In Euripides’ *Alcestis* (lines 967–69), the chorus refers to “Thracian boards inscribed by the voice of Orpheus” (θρήσσαις ἐν σανίσιν, τὰς Ὀρφεία κατέγραψεν/γῆρυς). Here again we see a marked, paradoxical juxtaposition of the spoken and the written in connection with this, the greatest of preliterate poets.

Linforth sees a link between Euripides’ curious characterization of Orpheus’s compositional technique and the tradition, attested in both Apollonius’s *Argonautica* and the Orphic version, that Orpheus dictated his poetry to Musaeus. He also draws attention to the scene, depicted in classical art from the fifth century onward, of a severed head speaking or singing to a man who is apparently transcribing the head’s utterances (Linforth 1941, 119–27; Schoeller 1969, 69–71; Graf 1987, 93–94; in one 4th c. scene, the head is identified as that of Orpheus). This tableau, a veritable paradigm of the hypothesis that Greek oral poets dictated their performances to scribes and thus “entered” the literary tradition (Lord 2000, 124–26), may have been a symbol of some kind of continuity between oral and written tradition—the latter represented in the tableau by the shadowy figure of Musaeus, whose name indicates his devotion to the Muses, the oral poet’s sources of inspiration. The conceit of Orpheus’s living, dictating head may also have legitimated the continued production of Orphic writings: just as the severed head lived on and its utterances were recorded, so, too, Orpheus lives

on in the Orphic writer, inspired to write down what he channels from the poet of old (Linforth 1941, 127–28; cf. Detienne 2003, 125–36). Here, as in medieval Irish tradition, the singing head or its “owner,” mediating between the categories of living and dead, and part and whole, assumes the task of mediating between utterance and text as well. Dumézil (1940b, 326–28), in the article referred to above, noted that the same uneasiness about written, as opposed to oral, tradition that is evident in medieval Celtic cultures can also be found in the classical world. He cites Plutarch’s life of the Roman king and religious reformer Numa (22.2), in which we learn that before his death, Numa ordered that the books in which he had written down sacred lore be buried with him, since he had already imparted their contents to the priests, and he would not want such information to be preserved in the form of “dead letters” (ἐν ἀψύχοις γράμμασι). The ideological impulse behind such avoidance of inanimate script, which according to Plutarch was part of the Pythagorean ethos as well (22.3), was perhaps akin to the slightly less reactionary sensibility implied in the image of the singing head performing for the scribe, an icon that preserves the preeminence of the spoken even while recognizing the seemingly decisive victory of the written.

NOTES

- a. Watkins 1996; West 2007.
- b. For a brief history of comparative I-E mythology, with discussion of Dumézil, see West 2007, 1–5. For a vehement criticism of Dumézil, see Schade 2007.
- c. This approach to myth is called “functionalism.” When Dumézil spoke of “functions,” he was not referring to functionalism.
- d. Edmunds 1990, 199.
- e. Dumézil 1987, 157–66 (chap. 3: “Les grecs sont des amants ingrats”).
- f. François Vian, Atsuhido Yoshida, and Bernard Sergent.
- g. I follow Allen (2011, 344–54), who sets out the pentadic theory and gives examples. (I would suggest that in his analysis of the pentadic structure for the Trojan allies as reported in Cyclic Epic, Penthesilea and Memnon [table 18.1 and comment on p. 350] should both go under F4–, which is thus overdetermined. In any case, the structure has blanks.) Sauzeau and Sauzeau 2012 is a study of the fourth function.
- h. See under Sergent in the bibliography in this chapter.
- i. Pace Schade 2007, 3: “Ausserhalb der Frankophonie . . . hat er trotz seiner Lehrtätigkeit (nach seiner Pensionierung) in Los Angeles und Chicago nie überzeugen können; er bleibt eine ‘affaire franco-française.’”
- j. Allen 2011, 344, citing Rees and Rees 1961. Baldick 1994 is a Dumézilian study of Homer by an Englishman.
- k. Also G. Nagy 1981, 1987, 2008. Another important American proponent of Du-

mézil's tripartitism was S. Scott Littleton (1933–2010). For a spirited defense of Dumézil by the American Jaan Puhvel, with, at the same time, a critique of tripartitism, see Puhvel 2002 [1996].

l. Cuartero 1998; Pàmias 2006. On Valencia, see Redondo 2008. Also see Alberro 2003, 2004, etc. (<http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/autor?codigo=144321>).

m. Montanari 2000.

n. Momigliano 1987, 293.

o. Ginzburg 1990, 135.

p. Response to Momigliano: Dumézil 1985b, 229–318; response to Ginzburg: Dumézil 1985c.

q. Review: Lincoln 1991c; see also Lincoln 1991b, 1991e.

r. Lincoln 1991d, xix. Charles Maurras (1868–1952), a right-wing activist, supported the Vichy government; he was arrested in September 1944 and sentenced to life imprisonment.

s. Lincoln 1998, 136; Eribon 1992.

t. The overview provided in Schade 2007, 3–4 and nn. 13–15, does not extend beyond 1998. I have not myself looked further. Arvidsson (2006, 1–3, 239–53), explicitly staying out of the debate over Dumézil's politics, adds to the intellectual-historical context of Dumézil's work in the 1930s.

1. In the opinion of many, the best introduction to Dumézil's method and findings—among his innumerable publications and the many works that have been written about his achievements—remains his *L'idéologie tripartite des Indo-Européens* (1958; see also Desbordes 1981). His published conversation with Didier Eribon, which took place shortly before his death, is a fitting meditation on his life's work (Dumézil 1987). Here, for the last time (199–211), he responded eloquently to the charge leveled in the late twentieth century by Arnaldo Momigliano and Carlo Ginzburg that Dumézil's Indo-European studies were informed by fascist sympathies. The controversy was reignited after Dumézil's death by Bruce Lincoln in his review of Dumézil 1985b, published in *TLS*, Oct. 3, 1986, 1107–8; see the letter written by Puhvel et al. in response to Lincoln, in *TLS*, Dec. 5, 1986, 1375.

2. See Dumézil's 1953 survey and later publications, *passim* (see the bibliography at the end of this chapter). Much of Dumézil's early work, which he later disavowed, centered on Greek myth and religion—for example, 1924a; 1924b (esp. 84–125, 254–64); 1929, 155–93, 241–50. The most sensible survey of Indo-European elements in Greek myth remains Puhvel 1987, 126–43 (see also Burkert 1977, 42–48; Puhvel 1980; and, in general, Hansen 2005; West 2007).

3. "There still exists among ourselves an activity which on the technical plane gives us quite a good understanding of what a science we prefer to call 'prior' rather than 'primitive,' could have been on the plane of speculation. This is what is commonly called 'bricolage' in French . . . And in our own time the 'bricoleur' is still someone who works with his hands and uses devious means compared to those of a craftsman. The characteristic feature of mythical thought is that it expresses itself by means of a heterogeneous repertoire which, even if extensive, is nevertheless limited. It has to use this repertoire, however,

whatever the task in hand because it has nothing else at its disposal. Mythical thought is therefore a kind of intellectual 'bricolage'" (Lévi-Strauss 1966, 16–17).

4. A critical survey of such comparative studies is presented in Sergent 1979; see also Rivière et al. 1979, 103–4; Littleton 1982. Major relevant works published after that date or not covered by Sergent or Littleton are included in the bibliography, below; see especially Dumézil 1983, 1985b.

5. Bernard Sergent perceives an Indo-European significance in the distinction between the "Argive" Heracles, whose twelve labors take place "within the Argive sphere of influence," and the Theban Heracles (i.e., the Heracles narrative cycle before and beyond the labors). The latter figure is a leader of men in war—that is, an example of the more sociable, "chivalric" aspect of the second function—while the former is a lone slayer of monsters in the outlands, who thus embodies the more savage, uncooperative end of the martial spectrum. See Sergent 1986, 140–42. On this distinction within the second function in myth and epic, see also Vian 1968; Dumézil 1970, 53–64; G. Nagy 1999, 322–30.

6. On the traditions concerning the success or failure of Orpheus's mission in the Underworld, see Lee 1965; Graf 1987, 81–82. On the contrast implicit in Euripides' *Alcestis* between Orpheus's musico-poetic methods of persuasion in the Underworld (lines 357–62) and Heracles' more direct, forceful approach, see Sansone 1985. Hultkrantz (1957, esp. 162–271) offers a comparative study of the many appearances of the theme of the rescue of the dead in the world's story traditions.

7. For an accounting of the sources, see Gruppe 1897–1902, 1165–72; Ziegler 1939, 1293–96. The extant literary accounts of Orpheus's death and references to it are collected in Kern 1963, 33–42. On the pictorial representations of his death in classical art, see Schoeller 1969, 55–59; Vermeule 1979, 197; Garezu 1994, 100–101.

8. Scholars have noted the resemblances among the violent manner of Orpheus's death, wherein his limbs are torn apart and scattered on the ground, the *sparagmos* of Dionysian cult (particularly as it is described in Orphic sources), and fertility rituals in other religious traditions. See Frazer 1922, 38–41; Weber 1932, 14–17; Segal 1966, 319; Detienne 1979, 91–92. The motif of Orpheus's animate head has been connected by some to the myths of the Egyptian death-and-resurrection god Osiris, whose head floated to Byblos after he was torn to pieces. See, e.g., Gruppe 1897–1902, 1170–71. There is, however, much more to each myth than the single motif of the head floating in a river. Taken as a whole, the story of Orpheus's death is not traceable to the Osiris cycle. See West's (1983, 140–41) comments on the Osiris material and its connections, or lack thereof, to Greek tradition.

9. An intriguing connection between the tearing-apart of Orpheus and the failure of his attempt to restore his marriage is proposed in Belmont 1985, 78–79.

10. The parallelism of the traditions of Orpheus's singing head and his bones suggests a connection with the "The Singing Bone" oral story pattern, wherein the remains of a wrongly slain victim are made into a musical instrument that proclaims the murderer's guilt; often the instrument is made from a plant that grows on the victim's grave. See Linforth 1941, 134–36; J. Nagy 1986. Clearly of a kind with this tradition is the pattern evinced in the Grimm tale "The Juniper" and elsewhere, in which the murdered human becomes a bird that sings of its fate and thus exposes its enemy (J. Nagy 1986). Not to be

discounted in this regard are the reference in pseudo-Plutarch, *De fluviis* 3.4, to a plant that springs from the blood of Orpheus and produces a lyre-like sound (Kern 1963, 37; see Linforth 1941, 228) and Pausanias's mention of nightingales that hover over Orpheus's grave, singing with a special sweetness (9.30.3).

11. We learn from Lucian (*Adv. indoct.* 11–12) that Orpheus's lyre, which had accompanied (in both senses of the word) the head to Lesbos, received its own cult and that in its temple setting it continued to play beautiful music long after its owner's death. One time, however, the son of a tyrant, with the aid of a corrupt priest, took away the lyre in hopes of becoming a second Orpheus. His wish was ironically granted, for when he struck the lyre, he produced a sound that aroused the nearby dogs to tear him to pieces. Thus the impostor died an Orphic/Bacchic death but, of course, his head did not live on. The intimate link between Orpheus's floating head and his floating lyre, evident in this story concerning the deceased Orpheus's revenge on a wrongdoer by means of his instrument, once again brings to mind elements of "The Singing Bone" (see above).

12. See Grummond 2011. There is, for example, the motif's appearance in the popular African and African American tale known as "The Talking Skull Refuses to Talk," in which the supernatural skull/head's capriciousness often leads to the death of its discoverer. Clearly related to this narrative are others recorded in African oral tradition that tell of talking animals (particularly tortoises) that similarly jeopardize the lives of those to whom they reveal themselves. See Bascom 1977. In North and South American Indian folklore, we find the vital head in the numerous accounts of vengeful, sometimes plaintively verbal "rolling heads." See Thompson 1929, 162–63, 343; Lévi-Strauss 1981, 140–41. Interestingly, Lévi-Strauss finds that in many South American Indian myths, the severed yet vital head is often associated with an "excessive attitude toward marriage," ranging from incest to celibacy (1978, 105–21). As we have seen, Orpheus is the exponent as well as the victim of radical sexual attitudes.

The vital head in the Orpheus myth has been interpreted as yet another indication of the shamanic nature of Orpheus's powers. See Dodds 1951, 147–49; Eliade 1964, 391. On shamanic elements in Greek culture, see Dodds 1951, 135–78; Burkert 1962; West 1983, 146–50. There is, however, nothing intrinsically linking the motif of the vital head to the phenomenon of shamanism. See Bremmer 1983, 46–47.

13. On this episode, see Ó Cathasaigh 2005. The importance of heads in Celtic cults and narrative traditions is discussed in Ross 1960, 1962; Mac Cana 1987.

14. The seemingly contradictory references to Mímr/Mími/Mímir in Scandinavian literature are outlined in J. de Vries 1937, 360–62, and Simpson 1962–65a (see also Simpson 1962–65b).

15. On the rather obscure figure of Dadhyañc/Dadhīca, see Macdonell 1897, 141–42; O'Flaherty 1975, 218–20.

16. This is comparable to a later tradition according to which Indra's weapon was made from Dadhyañc's bones, or from his horse's head. See Bhattacharji 1970, 240. The power to destroy inherent in Dadhyañc's remains brings to mind the revenge exacted by Orpheus's exposed bones (see above).

17. Another mythological head removed by Indra proves to be vocal: that of the demon Nāmuci, which rolls after Indra and accuses him of wrongdoing (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 5.4.1.9–10).

18. It should be noted that *imbas* boils up from its subterranean source and creates rivers or other bodies of water when women attempt to obtain it. See Ford 1974, 69, 72–73. The same effect is achieved in the medieval Irish story of Loch Rí—a well, created by a horse urinating, that overflows spectacularly when a woman neglects to cover it (O’Grady 1892, 1:234, 2:266)—and in the story of Loch Ríach, which threatens to burst after the heads of slain warriors are deposited in it and finally does overflow once it is left uncovered (Gwynn 1913, 326; see R. de Vries 2012, 159–63). Perhaps the frenzied behavior of Irish wisdom-laden waters in reaction to the threat of (mostly female) misappropriation is comparable to that of the river Helicon, which according to Pausanias (see above) went underground in an attempt to escape pollution at the hands of the maenads who murdered Orpheus.

19. Orpheus is indirectly responsible for the presence of “writing” or “prewriting” on the bodies of his slayers: according to Phanocles and Plutarch, the Thracian men punished their women for the crime against Orpheus by tattooing them. See Kern 1963, 23; on the pictorial motif of tattooed Thracian women and its relation to the Orpheus myth, see Zimmerman 1980, 167–88. Perhaps there is a connection between the markings on the Thracian women and the remarkable tattoos or writing said to be on the skin of “fringe” mantic figures such as the Cretan Epimenides and the Thracian Zalmoxis. See Dodds 1951, 141–42, 163–64 nn. 43–44; West 1983, 45–53).

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5 INTRODUCTION The use of folklore in the study of Greek myth is as old as or older than the other two comparative approaches represented in this book. The foundational moment of the folkloristic approach was a paper on the story of Polyphemus (*Odyssey*, Book 9) and its folktale analogues read by Wilhelm Grimm before the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin in 1857 and published in the same year.^a In 1864, Johann Georg von Hahn published a study of Greek and Albanian folktales, along with the first attempt at typology.^b These dates mark not only the beginning of a new subfield of Classics but also a turn in the study of myth. As Jordi Pàmias points out in chapter 1 of this volume, with the advent of comparative folklore comes an interest in myth as narrative (instead of allegory, or symbol, or document of religious belief). The trend toward typology of folktales that began with Hahn provoked the reaction of Vladimir Propp.^c He held that the division of tales into types was fundamentally impossible and offered instead an analysis of a set of Russian folktales that revealed an underlying compositional pattern, or “morphology,” a metaphor that he took from botany.^d Propp’s theory of narrative in *Morphology of the Folktale* provoked, in turn, the reaction of Claude Lévi-Strauss, whose structuralism looked to the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure for a new starting point.^e Lévi-Strauss’s foundational article on the structural analysis of myth, in which the Oedipus myth was one of the examples, has been summarized so many times and has so thoroughly permeated the field of Greek mythology that it did not seem necessary to devote a chapter to it in this book.^f

As for folklore studies as a subfield of Classics, there have been at least a few scholars in every generation who have devoted much time and energy to it. The preeminent work of the present generation is Hansen’s guide to international folktales found in Greek and Roman literature.^g This book takes its place beside the big books on ancient Near Eastern and Indo-European myth published by classicists at around the same time.^h Hansen’s chapter in this volume, on the folktale of the Sailor and the Oar, gives a clear exposition of the comparative method in the study of folklore and Greek myth. This method necessarily relies on typology, whatever the merits of the various more abstract analyses of narrative that emerged in the twentieth century.ⁱ (If overt features of particular narratives, those often called “motifs” in typological analysis, cannot be retained, then useful comparison becomes impossible.) In fact, Hansen’s research on the Sailor and the Oar caused it to be included in the new *Types of International Folktales*.^j

Typological similarity between the target text, in the case at hand the prophecy of Tiresias in *Odyssey* 11.121–34, and the folktale, in this case the story of the

Sailor and the Oar, attested also in lives of St. Elias and of St. Nikolaos, implies that the target text and the folktales on which the type is based have a common ancestor or ancestors.^k This inference presupposes that there were folktales in antiquity, which were transmitted orally down to modern times, when they began to be transcribed and collected. This longevity has been challenged, sometimes from within the field of Classics, as by Detlev Fehling (1929–2008).^l He held that folktales have, in fact, come into existence only in modern times (an argument that, in any case, could not apply to every kind of folktale, because the ancient fable collections were there to contradict him). A debate that went on for decades was summed up by the folklorist Bengt Holbek (1933–92).^m He distinguished four points in the argument *contra* and answered each of them in turn. First, there is no direct evidence for folktales in European literature until the Middle Ages. Answer: Ancient and Late Antique authors had no motive for recording them. Second, folktales as a narrative form represent a degree of literary sophistication unattainable by the folk in antiquity.ⁿ Answer: The concept of cultural evolution is untenable except at the level of material culture and the accumulation of knowledge in writing; it is impossible to show that there has been an evolution of creativity since antiquity. Third, folktales can be disseminated as fast as books can be printed and distributed. Answer: Dissemination, over vast geographical areas, without the benefit of the printed word, is attested; such dissemination will have been slow. To elaborate on Holbek's answer, the argument against the deniers of oral transmission is especially strong when, as in the cases of ATU 1137 (the Polyphemus tale) and many other tales, the tale turns up in places where there is no corresponding written version from which it can have been adapted. In such cases, the deniers have to say that, while the tale stands in a line of written descent from antiquity, it reached these textless (at least as regards the tales in question) places from somewhere else, from some other language, from a remote point at which the transition from written to oral occurred. But if such oral transmission could convey the tales in question over demonstrably long periods of time and vast stretches of space, why could it not have been their mode of transmission already in antiquity, and why could they not have persisted from antiquity down to modern times? Fourth, an oral tale will break down as it moves from one generation to the next.^o Answer: The stability of a tale consists not in exact repetition but in the teller's capacity for the variation appropriate to the circumstances.

The story of the Sailor and the Oar is, on Hansen's account, further evidence for the longevity of folktales. As he says, his examples can hardly derive from

Homer: in them, the narrative is in the past tense (Tiresias's prophecy is in the future tense); the sailor's motive for his inland journey is explicit (Odysseus's is not); the sailor settles down inland (Odysseus does not); the reason for the sacrifice prescribed by Tiresias is not obvious. In short, the folktales could not derive from Tiresias's prophecy, but it can be seen as an adaptation by the *Odyssey* of the type that they represent. Hansen's purpose was not, however, to reopen the debate on the longevity of folktales but to show the usefulness of the comparative approach for the understanding of the Greek myth that it sets out to explain.

Odysseus and the Oar

A Comparative Approach to a Greek Legend

WILLIAM HANSEN

The comparative method, a classic approach to folk narrative (Dégh 1986; Goldberg 2010), is the principal method of inquiry employed in this chapter. But I also draw upon other folkloristic methods, especially contextualism, which has been little used in the study of ancient oral narratives (an exception is Buxton 1994). As I hope to illustrate, these two techniques have the advantage of bringing the investigator very close to the dynamics of the living story and to the people for whom the story has or had meaning, and of avoiding some of the snares that occasionally entangle investigators who employ more speculative approaches to oral narrative.

In applying the comparative method to a traditional narrative, one brings together a particular text or story with as many other texts of the same type as are available and compares their content and structure. Naturally, the comparison is informative only if the comparative texts offer something the target text does not. For instance, one may confront an ancient text with similar texts that are known to derive from oral tradition in order to demonstrate that the ancient text also reflects the same oral story. Wilhelm Grimm compared Homer's narrative of Odysseus and Polyphemus (*Od.* 9.105–566) with nine similar texts from more recent tradition (Grimm 1857), concluding that Homer's account of Odysseus and the Cyclops represents a version of an oral tale that was current in Homer's time and has survived, independently of Homer, in a widespread, international tradition.

The technique of comparing different texts of a tale type was systematized

into the historic-geographic method, a technique employed by folktale scholars in an effort to learn the origin and history of particular oral tales (Krohn 1971; Goldberg 1984). Thus the Polyphemus legend and its analogues were eventually the subject of a historic-geographic study in which more than two hundred texts from many countries were gathered and analyzed (Hackman 1904). The chief monument to the historic-geographic enterprise is Hans-Jörg Uther's *The Types of International Folktales* (2004), conventionally referred to as ATU, which classifies into types a large number of tales in oral circulation from Europe to India. The Polyphemus story, for example, appears therein as ATU 1137, *The Blinded Ogre*.

Another application of the comparative method is to evaluate the treatment of a folk narrative by an ancient author. The comparative texts serve as a control, as when Denys Page and Justin Glenn each draws upon comparative studies of *The Blinded Ogre* in their investigations of Homer's form of the story (Page 1955, 1–30; Glenn 1971). The comparative technique can also be employed to help fill in lacunae of a fragmentary narrative or to clarify the sense of a difficult one, by comparing it with less problematic texts—as, for example, James George Frazer, following Wilhelm Mannhardt, does for the imperfectly known myth of the marriage of Peleus and Thetis (Frazer 1921, 2:383–88).

The Sailor and The Oar

In what follows I draw upon a corpus of around thirty texts of the Sailor and the Oar that I have gathered from published sources and from oral informants. Except for the passage in Homer, all texts were collected in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is uncommon to come upon many early texts of folk narratives, inasmuch as the systematic transcription of oral stories began only in the nineteenth century. (On the Greek collections, see Beaton 1986; Meraklis 1993.) Since the texts are generally short, many of them are quoted in full, although there is insufficient space to print them all. A complete list of the texts and their sources (those quoted from [1–18] and those otherwise referred to in the text) appears at the end of the chapter.

I begin with a sample of nine texts.

1. They say about St. Elias that he was a seaman and served all his life as a captain on ships. He experienced great storms, and in one frightful storm his ship sank and all except for him were drowned. Getting hold then of the oar of a boat, St. Elias managed to reach the mainland. Disgusted, however, with his sufferings at sea, he withdrew far inland. With his oar on his shoulder he

began going forward, and whomever he met on the road he asked, "What is this?" And whenever they said, "An oar," he understood that these people knew of the sea. And he kept moving on in order to go further inland. In this manner one day he reached a little village built on the top of a mountain. He gathered the villagers, showed them the oar, and asked them, "What is this?" With one voice they all answered, "A piece of wood." These people had never seen the sea, ships, and boats. For this reason he remained with them forever. And from that time the chapels of St. Elias have always been built on mountain tops.

2. St. Elias was once a seaman. On account of his endless rowing, the man got tired (rowing while eating, that's the way they had it in those days). He put his oar on his shoulder and left to go to find a place where they didn't even know the name of it. He walks to the village, he asks, "What is this called?" "An oar," they say. He walks to another village, he asks, "What is this called?" "An oar." What the devil! He became desperate. Keeping on with his inquiry he finally asks at one village situated at the very top of the mountain, "What is this called?" "A piece of wood." Thank God! He sets the oar straight up, builds a hut, and resolves to remain there for the rest of his life. For this reason they always put St. Elias on mountaintops.

3. Saint Elias was a seaman and lived a dissolute life. But afterwards he repented of what he had done and detested the sea. Others say that because he suffered much at sea and many times came near to drowning, he became disgusted with his voyages and resolved to go to a place where they did not know what the sea was and what ships were. So he puts his oar on his shoulder and steps out onto dry land, and whomever he met he asked what it was he was carrying. So long as people answered, "An oar," he kept moving higher and higher. Finally he reached the top of a mountain. He asks the people he found there what it is, and they tell him, "A piece of wood." He understood then that they had never in their life seen an oar, and he remained there with them on the heights.

4. Wishing to explain why on almost every mountaintop there stands a chapel in the name of St. Elias, the folk tell different legends. From many such legends we report one unpublished Paxian [that is, from the island of Paxos] legend reported by Demetrios Loukatos from the narration of D. Kontares.

"Are we going fishing?"

"Hey, I'm not going anywhere. I'm going to do what St. Elias did. I'm going to put my oars on my shoulder.

“St. Elias was a seaman and got so tired of the seaman’s life—at that time they did not have engines and sails, only an oar—that he put his oars on his shoulder and said, ‘I’m not coming back to the sea.’ And he went to the highest mountain. For which reason, all the churches of the prophet Elias that exist are also on mountains. (I don’t remember the conversation with the villagers.)”

5. It is said that an English seaman once became so weary at heart from the dangerous uneasiness of his profession that when he returned to his home port he put an oar on his shoulder and wandered inland in search of people who did not know the wild sea. He went from place to place with his burden and lingered nowhere until he came to a village where they asked him what kind of strange implement he was carrying; there he settled down. The parable is found here and there in old sea stories, where shipwrecked persons narrate it to their companions as a consolation, and tormented and discouraged seafolk swear to one another to follow its example if they should ever touch foot again on English soil.

6. The story, as I remember it, goes roughly like this, that there was an old sailor in the United States Navy—presumably, since the story took place on the East Coast of the U.S. He put in his thirty years, and took his retirement option, and set out walking down the gangplank with a gunnysack over one shoulder and carrying an oar over the other shoulder, and headed due west inland, and walked somewhere through New Jersey or so, and happened to pass someone standing along the road who waved to him and said, “Where’re you going with that oar over your shoulder?” And he just nodded, and barely looked at the person who greeted him in this fashion, and marched on heading westward, and traveled further and further inland.

At some point in the middle of, say, Ohio or Indiana, he passed someone else alongside the road who waved at him, greeted him, and yelled as he passed by, “Hey, where’re you going with that rower over your shoulder?” And he just sort of barely met eyes with the person who greeted him in this fashion, and kept on walking.

And sometime further along the way, perhaps around Nebraska somewhere, he passed someone along the side of the road who said to him something to the effect of, “Hey, mister, what on earth are you carrying that piece of lumber over your shoulder for?” And a grin slowly broke across his face, and he stamped his foot and said, “This is where I’m settling down.” And that’s the end of the story.

7. "I've lived here all my life and I've worked on the water and I'm getting kind of sick of it all. When I retire I'm gonna go and go until somebody asks me what that is I've got in my hand. Then I'll say, 'You don't know what an oar is?' And if he says, 'No,' I'm gonna throw my oars away and let that rowboat go with the tide, and then I'm gonna spend the rest of my life right there."

8. "When this hooker gets to port I'm goin' to put an oar over my shoulder and I'm goin' to start walkin' 'way from saltwater. I'm goin' to keep right on walkin' until some hairlegger says to me, 'What's that funny stick you have on your shoulder, matey?' an' right there I'm goin' to settle down and dig potatoes."

9. "I'm gonna put this goddam oar over my shoulder," a weary seine hauler snorts, "and head west, and the first sonofabitch asks me what it is, that's where I stick it in the ground and settle."

The Sailor and the Oar is an international narrative type (ATU 1379**, *The Sailor and the Oar*) that is attested in Europe and North America. In the exemplary modern texts given here, a sailor who is unhappy with the sea takes an oar and walks inland with the oar on his shoulder until he finally meets someone who does not know what it is, and there he settles down. This is the essence of the story. Different tellings, including Homer's from perhaps around 700 B.C.E., are elaborations or abbreviations of these basic events, the result of such factors as the form of the story known to the narrator, the narrator's competence, and contextual conditions. For example, the storyteller's competence is a factor in text 4, in which the narrator knows that he does not recall all the details of the story and acknowledges his omission to the collector.

A close examination of the sample texts reveals that they fall into two groups. On the one hand, texts 1–6 tell of a past event: after suffering at sea, a mariner one day walked inland carrying an oar (or oars) until he encountered a man (or a community) who did not know what the oar was, and there the mariner settled down. On the other hand, texts 7–9 promise a future event: the narrator (who is a mariner) says he will one day take an oar and walk inland until he meets a man who does not know what the oar is, and there he will settle down. Stories in the former group are told in the third person about an event that has already taken place; stories in the latter group are told in the first person, and the event lies in the future.

Since this basic distinction characterizes all the texts of this story, each narrative belonging to either one group or the other, I divide the tale type into two

subtypes, labeling the former as A and the latter as B. Approximately half of my texts belong to each group. Perhaps we can learn something of the historical relationship between the two branches of the tradition from text 4, in which a narration of subtype A is preceded by the following conversation between folklorist and narrator:

“Are we going fishing?”

“Hey, I’m not going anywhere. I’m going to do what St. Elias did. I’m going to put my oars on my shoulder.

“St. Elias was a seaman and got so tired of the seaman’s life . . .”

The narrator’s declaration that he himself intends to follow the example of the protagonist in the legend suggests how a narrative told in the third-person preterite might give rise to one told in the first-person future. Similarly, in another text we read that tormented and discouraged sea folk swear to follow the example of the sailor who went inland, if they themselves should ever reach their homeland again (text 5). So it probably happened that subtype A gave rise at some time in the past to subtype B.

Odysseus and the Oar

The story of the mariner and the oar is first mentioned in a passage in Homer’s *Odyssey* (11.121–34), where Tiresias tells Odysseus about the quest he will undertake after he returns to Ithaca:

10. “Take a well-shaped oar and go
until you reach men who do not know of the sea
and who eat food that is not mixed with salt:
they know neither of red-cheeked ships
nor of well-shaped oars, which are the wings of ships.
I’ll tell you a very clear sign, and you won’t miss it:
when you come across another man on the road
who says that you have a chaff-wrecker on your shining shoulder,
then plant the well-shaped oar in the earth
and perform a fine sacrifice to lord Poseidon—
a ram, a bull, and a boar, moulder of sows.
Then return home and sacrifice holy hecatombs
to the immortal gods, who dwell in the broad sky,
to all of them in order.”

When Odysseus consults the seer Tiresias about his return from Troy to Ithaca, the seer reveals that (1) the god Poseidon is angry with Odysseus and will make Odysseus's return difficult; (2) Odysseus will come to the island of Thrinacia, where he must leave unharmed the cattle of the Sun, else his companions and ships will suffer destruction; (3) if he himself survives, he will find his home beset with suitors, whom, however, he will kill; (4) then he should take an oar and go inland until he discovers men who are unacquainted with the sea, and perform there a sacrifice to Poseidon; finally (5) he will die away from the sea (11.100–137).

Tiresias's speech is an oracular catalogue of important events to follow in Odysseus's life. Accordingly, the seer foretells (with a mixture, as appropriate, of future tenses, conditional sentences, and imperatives) stories that otherwise would be narrated as past events. Several of the same stories (1–3) are subsequently renarrated by the poet in the usual past tense in their proper chronological slots in the epic. The future setting of these stories is therefore an incidental trait of the present passage rather than an intrinsic property of the stories themselves. Consequently, *Odysseus and the Oar* is properly a past narrative that happens to have a future setting in the *Odyssey*. It belongs, therefore, with the stories of subtype A. Transformed back into the past, the Homeric passage would read as follows:

Odysseus took a well-shaped oar and went
 until he reached men who did not know of the sea
 and who ate food that was not mixed with salt:
 they knew neither of red-cheeked ships
 nor of well-shaped oars, which are the wings of ships.
 There was a very clear sign, and he did not miss it:
 when he came across another man on the road
 who said that he had a chaff-wrecker on his shining shoulder,
 he then planted the well-shaped oar in the earth
 and performed a fine sacrifice to lord Poseidon—
 a ram, a bull, and a boar, mounter of sows.
 Then he returned home and sacrificed holy hecatombs
 to the immortal gods, who dwell in the broad sky,
 to all of them in order.

Although the passage can simply enough be put back into its past setting, it is probably not entirely reversible because Homer's recasting the story as a future event undoubtedly involved more than adjusting the tenses. The poet probably

economized on some details of the legend because incidental details that are natural enough in a story of the past can seem awkward when transferred to the future. So Homer mentions no details of Odysseus's quest other than the climactic encounter with the man who mistakes his oar for something else.

Brief though it is, the Homeric passage has proven to be a difficult text to understand. Scholars have wondered why Odysseus must undertake a quest for men who are ignorant of the sea. What, moreover, is the point of their eating unsalted food? Why must Odysseus seek them out by means of an oar? And why must he plant it in the ground? Must the inlander call Odysseus's oar precisely a "chaff-wrecker"? Is the adventure connected with the way Odysseus will die? And so on.

Attaching the story of the Sailor and the Oar to a traditional character whose nature or biography is already established in people's minds inevitably conditions the form of the story that results, if only a little. Because St. Elias is associated with heights, his inland quest regularly ends on a mountaintop. The established traditions that were associated with Odysseus in ancient Greece were more complex than those connected with St. Elias or St. Nikolaos (of whom the story is also told; e.g., text 22) in modern Greece, and their effect upon the form of Odysseus and the Oar was greater. For one thing, Odysseus had a wife to whom he would wish to return and a kingdom that happened to be insular. There could be no inland sanctuary for Odysseus, at least not for the Odysseus of Homer's *Odyssey*.

Furthermore, Homer declines to leave off his poems without reconciliation, or the promise of it, for his principal characters. Odysseus has angered the god Poseidon by blinding his son Polyphemus. If Odysseus were made to escape from the wrath of the sea deity by seeking out and remaining at a community far removed from the sea, Poseidon's hostility would abide, and the tension between the two would remain unresolved. No, the hero and his divine opponent must come to terms.

And yet they must not come to terms immediately. Homer introduces the idea of Poseidon's hostility toward Odysseus because he wishes to exploit the tension of this relationship in his epic; therefore, it would not serve his purpose to permit Odysseus to placate the marine god straightaway. Homer informs Odysseus (in book 11) of the god's hostility toward him and of the eventual necessity of his placating Poseidon, but the poet delays this reconciliation until the end of the epic, when the god's anger has served its purpose. Homer accomplishes this by ensuring that Odysseus cannot meet the necessary conditions at the time when he is informed of them. The obligation of undertaking a major mainland journey, implied by the condition that the god must be honored among a people who are

totally ignorant of the sea, effectively postpones the sacrifice until after the hero's return to Ithaca and the nearby Greek mainland.

So Odysseus will eventually have to make peace with Poseidon and in the end will return to his island kingdom, whereas the mariner in the *Sailor and the Oar* seeks to escape, not to placate, the power of the sea and ultimately remains in his inland sanctuary. It might appear that the strategies of the epic poet together with the established givens of Odysseus's biography would make impossible any use of the story of the *Sailor and the Oar* in connection with Odysseus. But a modification of a single detail in the story is all that is needed: Odysseus's demon takes the form not of the sea but rather of The Sea, personalized as Poseidon, Lord of the Sea. This subtle shift from dangerous sea to hostile sea god is the principal difference between the Odyssean form of the story and the ordinary tradition.

Still, why should Odysseus make a prodigious effort to sacrifice to the Lord of the Sea at a place where men have never heard of the sea or, we assume, of its divine ruler? But that is the very point, as a scholiast long ago observed. He explains that the best way to do honor to a man or a god who is already honored in one place is to bring it about that he also receives honor in another place. Thus, Odysseus brings knowledge of Poseidon, that is, of his cult, to mainlanders who know nothing of the sea, so that Poseidon can also be honored as Poseidon *epeirotos*, "Poseidon of the Land" (schol. V *Od.* 11.121, 130; Eustathius, *ad. Od.*, p. 1675.30–35). It is this gesture that reconciles Odysseus and Poseidon. Having placated the Lord of the Sea, Odysseus need never again fear the sea wherever he may subsequently settle. Like Elias and the rest, Odysseus achieves permanent relief from the threats of the sea, but unlike them he is not bound to his inland sanctuary. Reconciled to the god of sea and storm, Odysseus is free to return home. The consequence of his quest is therefore functionally, but not formally, identical to that of the mariner who settles down away from the sea.

It is then an easy step to infer, as many scholars have done, that what we have here is the foundation legend of one or more inland sanctuaries of Poseidon, an etiological narrative purporting to account for a phenomenon that some might find curious: the existence of shrines of Poseidon out of sight or sound of the sea. And, in fact, the ancient Greek traveler Pausanias (8.44.4) describes the remains of such a shrine, a temple of Poseidon and Athena said to have been built by Odysseus after his return from Troy. It stood atop Mt. Boreium in Arcadia, like the mountaintop chapels that today commemorate St. Elias's inland quest (Hansen 2002, 376). Although ancient tradition identified Odysseus's inlanders with a number of different mainland communities in western Greece, the land-locked

Arcadians, who even had to sail on borrowed ships to get to Troy (Homer, *Il.* 2.603–14), were the inlanders par excellence of the Greek world (Hansen 1977, 32–35).

Subtype A

The texts of subtype A usually begin with the introduction of the protagonist, who in modern Greece is regularly St. Elias or St. Nikolaos and in anglophone countries is an unnamed mariner.

The Cause of the Mariner's Departure. Most frequently, the mariner's departure is motivated by the dangers of the seafaring life. Seven texts mention storms, shipwreck, misfortunes, or fear of the sea (e.g., texts 1 and 3). A couple of texts cite instead the hard work that used to characterize the seaman's trade, especially the incessant rowing (texts 2 and 4), and one text mentions that the seaman had once lived a dissolute life, which he later repented, and as a result detested the sea (text 3). (Since some texts are defective, we are not always given the mariner's motive.) Although it does not matter what precisely the mariner's motivation is, the meaning of his quest is determined by his reason for leaving the sea. Most commonly he wants relief from the dangers of the sea.

Although Odysseus's enemy is not the sea but the Lord of the Sea, the effect on him is the same, since Poseidon expresses his hostility in the form of sea storms. Angry at Odysseus, he creates a terrible storm expressly for him, wrecking his boat and causing him to spend two days and nights amid the wreckage until he manages to come ashore at the land of the Phaeacians (5.282–493). Storms and shipwreck therefore precede Odysseus's inland journey. Perhaps in some versions of the ancient legend they were the immediate cause of Odysseus's quest, but in our *Odyssey* the immediate cause is Tiresias's informing Odysseus of the god's anger and telling him how to deal with it.

The Oar. The sailor then takes an oar (or two oars), which he is usually said to carry on his shoulder, and proceeds to walk inland.

The Mariner's Goal. Usually the narrator makes explicit what the mariner's intent is. The two favored sites for revealing this information are at the onset of the quest and at its conclusion. Texts 2 and 3 exemplify the former: "He put his oar on his shoulder and left to go to find a place where they didn't even know the name of it" (text 2); while in other texts, the storyteller climactically withholds the explanation until the mariner has successfully completed his quest (e.g., text 1). The Homeric text shows the former strategy. Odysseus's intent is given from the first: to locate men who are ignorant of the sea, ships, and oars and eat unsalted

food, which is to say, men who are so removed from the sea that they are ignorant not only of the sea itself but also of things that people commonly associate with the sea, such as ships, oars, and salt.

Particularly interesting in connection with the Homeric version is that narrators occasionally embellish the idea of the inlanders' ignorance of the sea by giving a brief catalogue of things connected with the sea that are unfamiliar to them. Thus, "These people had never seen the sea, ships, and boats" (text 1); "He became disgusted with his voyages and resolved to go to a place where they did not know what the sea was and what ships were" (text 3); and in a comic version, "He wanted to go back in the country and marry a girl that didn't know nothing 'bout saltwater, nor the boat, nor anything like that" (text 21).

From antiquity to the present, commentators on the *Odyssey* have accepted with little or no comment that inland peoples may be ignorant of the sea and ships and oars, but for one reason or another they have felt uneasy about the inlanders' saltless diet. The scholiasts, pointing out that there do exist inland salt mines, explain that Homer means not simply "salt" but "sea salt" or perhaps "seafood" such as fish and oysters (BQ on *Od.* 11.123). Stanford (1961, 1:386) mentions that, according to Sallust (*Bell. Iugurth.* 89), the ancient Numidians did not use salt; that hunting and pastoral peoples are said not to need salt; and that Homer does not take into account the possibility of inland salt mines. Germain (1954, 275–84) rejects suggestions made by various scholars that the saltless diet is either an ethnographic allusion or an interpolation or even a joke, for he himself believes that the people who do not use salt in their food must be a supernatural people, since food offered to the gods was not salted. But the Byzantine commentator Eustathius exhibits good sense when he remarks that it is best to take Homer's salt as referring to ordinary salt; the saltless people are simply so rustic that they know salt in no form whatsoever, either from the sea or from mines or from any other source (*ad Od.*, p. 1676.22–28).

Eustathius's explanation, as the comparative materials show, is substantially correct. The inlanders' saltless diet is only the narrator's elaboration of the idea of a people who are so removed from the sea, so far inland, that they are wholly ignorant of salt, a common item of which the sea is the usual source. When Homer says salt, he is not thinking of inland salt mines or of seafood or of actual peoples who have saltless diets; rather, he means simply salt, and his intent is to illustrate how thoroughly unconnected with the sea the inlanders are.

One must not be misled by the future form of Tiresias's speech into believing that there is a single, unique community that Odysseus must identify, a particular

people who alone can be characterized as being so ignorant of the sea that they know nothing of ships, oars, and salt. Rather, Odysseus, like other heroes of this story, will proceed until he comes upon any community whatsoever that is ignorant of the sea.

The Oar Test. The central part of the tale is the oar test. The seaman travels inland, carrying his oar on his shoulder. In most texts he asks the people he meets what it is, but in a couple of texts (5 and 6) the inlanders take the initiative. Homer does not say whether Odysseus, as he proceeds inland, asks people what he holds, but if Homer were narrating more fully (as in a different context he might), he would probably represent Odysseus as actively inquiring. For there would be little reason for an inland farmer, seeing a man carrying what looks to him like an ordinary agricultural implement (a “chaff-wrecker” is a winnowing shovel), to announce unasked that the stranger has a chaff-wrecker on his shoulder. On the other hand, it would make fine sense for Odysseus to ask, “What do I have here?” and for the rustic to reply, “You’ve got a chaff-wrecker on your shoulder there.”

Narrators differ in how frequently they illustrate the encounter of seaman and landmen, different texts giving one, two, or three encounters, of which only the last, of course, is successful from the viewpoint of the seaman. Poetically most elegant is the gradation from knowledge to ignorance that the inlanders display in a unique text: the first respondent calls the oar an oar, the second calls it a rower (not quite right, but not quite wrong either), and the third calls it a piece of lumber (text 6). Since Homer has recast the story into the future, he provides only the final, successful encounter. That there were fuller ways of telling this part of the story, however, is implied by a line that Odysseus later attributes to Tiresias: Odysseus is to go “to very many towns of mortal men” (23.267) in the course of his quest.

The Ignorant Inlander. Eventually the sailor locates a person (or a community) for whom an oar is a meaningless object. It makes no difference whether the role of the ignorant inlander is played by one person or an entire village, since the individual inlander is only a representative of the local community anyway. This relationship is clear in the Homeric narrative, in which Odysseus searches for men who are ignorant of the sea, but the sign of his having located them is a man on the road who displays the appropriate ignorance. This man should be understood not as a traveler like Odysseus but merely as a local person who is using a public road.

The Inlander’s Error. The inlander expresses his ignorance of the test object

in one of two different ways. Usually he identifies the oar simply as a piece of wood or the like (that is, he does not recognize it as a cultural artifact), as in texts 1–3; more rarely, he identifies it as an implement other than an oar (that is, he mistakes the marine artifact for a terrestrial artifact that it resembles), as in texts 10 (Homer), 11a and 11b (see below), and 21.

A charming instance of the concrete form of the error appears in a Greek version of the story that we know only from two defective and somewhat inconsistent reports.

11a. Mr. Paton tells me that he heard a Folk-tale recounted by a woman from Constantinople with the Odysseus incident included, and in it the *winnowing fan became a baker's peel!* (*phityari tou phournou*). The shift from the country to the town implement is very natural.

11b. In the note in *Folk-Lore* at the reference above, I ventured to dispute the claims of certain modern Greek folk-tales to an ancestry in ancient Greek mythology. Mr. W. R. Paton has since been good enough to draw my attention to an indisputable instance of survival, the case of the sailor who is told to put his oar on his shoulder and march on until he comes to a land where they say that it is a baker's peel. This story Mr. Paton remembers hearing from an old woman in Calymnos some years ago: his notes of it have unfortunately been mislaid.

The baker's peel is a terrestrial isomorph of the sailor's oar, each implement being essentially a wooden tool with a long handle ending in a flat blade.

In Homer, the inlander mistakes Odysseus's oar for a "chaff-wrecker," that is, a winnowing shovel (schol. QBHV *Od.* 11.128). The ancient winnowing shovel (*ptyon*) had a long handle and a flat blade and was fashioned from wood. Its shape was quite similar to that of an oar. The winnower employed the shovel to toss the threshed material into the air, allowing the chaff to be carried away by the breeze while the grains, which were heavier, fell back to the floor.

Unfortunately, most Anglo-American translators of the *Odyssey* ruin the point and flavor of the rustic's mistake here by rendering *athereloigos*, not as "chaff-wrecker" or even as "winnowing shovel," but as "winnowing fan" (*liknon*). A winnowing fan (also called a "winnowing basket") strictly refers to a round, shallow wicker basket, two or three feet in diameter (Harrison 1903–4; White 1967, 32–35; 1984, 62). The incident of Odysseus and the oar depends upon the possibility that a man ignorant of oars might, upon seeing one for the first time, mistake it for a winnowing shovel. Although the fan and the shovel are both winnowing

implements, they are not visually interchangeable, inasmuch as they do not at all look alike. No inlander, however ignorant of the sea, would ever mistake an oar for a basket, and of course, the point of the incident is destroyed if the inland farmer is made to mistake Odysseus's oar for something that has no resemblance to it at all. What is so apt about the winnowing shovel is that, of all the agriculturalists' tools, it is the one most nearly isomorphic to a mariner's oar. Eustathius says as much when he observes that the point of the inlander's misinterpretation is that both implements are called blades: the oar is a marine blade, while the winnowing shovel is a terrestrial blade (*ad Od.*, p. 1675.51–52).

A couple of interpreters have seen the term “chaff-wrecker” as a kind of spell-breaking word that must be uttered in order to disenchant Odysseus and thereby free him of Poseidon and the sea; since the prospect of someone's uttering precisely this word is extremely small, Odysseus's journey may be extraordinarily long (Dornseiff 1937, 353; Peradotto 1986, 438). This interpretation is fallacious because it mistakes the future setting of the Homeric narrative for an intrinsic, rather than an incidental, property of the narrative. Notice that when a past narrative is transformed into a future narrative, unexpected side effects can arise. A detail that is incidental or variable when narrated in the past tense appears to be obligatory when converted into the future indicative or imperative. If one transforms “Odysseus went until he met a man who said his oar was a chaff-wrecker” into the imperative, it becomes “Go until you meet a man who says your oar is a chaff-wrecker.” Taken strictly, the command would require Odysseus to disregard all other expressions of ignorance of the sea and look only for a man who will utter precisely the word “chaff-wrecker.” This condition is virtually impossible of fulfillment and would be pointless.

The noun “chaff-wrecker” is a kenning, a kind of substitute expression (Wærn 1951; West 1966, 89), and the word for which it is substituted—its solution, so to speak—is “winnowing shovel” (*ptyon*). It belongs to the same category of descriptive kenning as *ennosigaios*, “earth-shaker” = “Poseidon,” and other similar compounds that are familiar from Homer and from elsewhere in Greek literature. Homer has the speaker say “chaff-wrecker” in this passage rather than the more straightforward “winnowing shovel”—which the poet does use elsewhere (*Il.* 13.588)—to characterize him as a man of unusual diction. The question then becomes: whose diction is the poet representing here, the seer's or the farmer's? For it is the agriculturalist who mislabels Odysseus's oar, but it is the seer who reports the mislabeling.

The usual assumption is that the allusive term “chaff-wrecker” lends an oracular atmosphere to the seer’s speech (Harrison 1903–4, 23:301–2; Dornseiff 1937, 354; cf. West 1978, 289–90); however, this assumption is not supported by the evidence. Homeric seers do not deliberately obfuscate their meaning with cryptic metaphors; rather, they speak straightforwardly, trying to be understood. Moreover, kennings are actually rare in Greek oracular literature (Wærn 1951, 69, 106). It is therefore more likely that “chaff-wrecker” is an instance of folk speech, a provincialism. The inland farmer is a man who, like Hesiod, uses popular kennings such as *anosteos* (Hesiod, *Op.* 524), “boneless one” = “octopus”; *phereoikos* (*Op.* 571), “carry-house” = “snail”; *hemerokoitos aner* (*Op.* 605), “day-sleeping man” = “thief”; and *pentozos* (*Op.* 742), “five-brancher” = “hand.” Homer characterizes the agriculturalist by making the single sentence he utters one of conventional rustic wit. The charm of the man lies in his ignorantly mistaking an oar for an agricultural tool and doing so with a term country folk might regard as clever.

The Mariner’s Response. When the mariner finds what he has been looking for, he remains there. Except for Odysseus.

Here the Odyssean reinterpretation comes full circle, for just as in the beginning it is the Lord of the Sea rather than the sea itself whose hostility drives Odysseus inland, so also here Odysseus seeks safety from the god of the sea rather than from the sea. In sacrificing to Poseidon at this inland spot that has had no contact with the sea—that is, by introducing Poseidon to men who have never heard of him—Odysseus enhances the renown of his persecutor and thereby wins his goodwill. As a result, Odysseus need no longer fear the sea god or, by implication, the sea; he is free to go. Odysseus’s inland sacrifice is the functional equivalent of the inland haven, the place utterly removed from the sea where, in most versions of the story, the harried mariner settles for good.

The implication of the successfully completed quest is that the mariner will be freed of the problem that originally drove him from the sea. If he was in danger, he is now safe; if he was weary, he will have ease; and so forth. This result is ordinarily left to the hearer’s inference, but in the *Odyssey* the seer makes it explicit in the verses immediately following the oar story proper (11.134–37): Odysseus’s death will be gentle and unconnected with the sea (Hansen 1977, 42–48).

“A very gentle death
will come to you away from the sea and slay you
in a comfortable old age. And the people around you
will be prosperous. This is the truth that I tell you.”

Sometimes narrators elaborate the conclusion of the oar test or its consequences. In three texts (2, 10, and 15 [below]) the mariner is said to stick his oar in the ground, marking the end of his quest and his definitive retirement from the sea (Hansen 1977, 39). Other elaborations are found: the mariner builds a hut (text 2) or founds a church (text 19) or, in a ribald text, marries a girl (text 21).

The detail of Odysseus's planting his oar in the ground has induced several scholars to suppose that the oar was a fetish of the god Poseidon or that it had some other cultic significance (Hansen 1977, 38–42); however, as the comparative data show, the significance of the detail is simply that it marks the end of the mariner's quest and his retirement from seafaring. Although it is natural for the mariner to dispose of the oar once the quest is over, it is just as natural for a narrator to pass over this detail. The comparative texts show that it is not a critical act, one that must be there. The hypothesis of a cultic oar is therefore unnecessary. The planting of the oar in the ground misleadingly takes on an air of importance because the story is told not as it has occurred but as it will occur. An incidental gesture that would ordinarily be related in the narrative past is transferred here to the future, and description is transformed into instruction, thereby giving the impression that the planting of the oar is an obligatory act, a gesture of some unstated importance.

Etiological Coda. Countless mountaintops in present-day Greece are crowned by a chapel dedicated to St. Elias. The reason for this phenomenon is not obvious, and almost without exception, the Greek texts in which St. Elias is made to play the role of the mariner have him conclude his quest and settle down at the top of a mountain, adding that this is why Elias's chapels are always built on mountaintops. However, the texts of the Sailor and the Oar make equally good sense whether an etiological conclusion is present or not, since the story does not require an etiology to be complete or coherent.

No explicit statement in the Homeric passage links Odysseus's task with the establishment of the inland worship of Poseidon, but the Homeric story makes little sense without this connection, for it would be absurd for Odysseus to seek out a community that is ignorant of the sea merely to perform a private sacrifice there. A scholiast shows the way here, explaining that Odysseus's missionary work allows Poseidon to be honored also as a terrestrial god (V on *Od.* 11.130). The extra-Homeric evidence indicates that many communities in western Greece were anciently identified with the sealess inlanders, and in at least one instance, Odysseus is said to have founded a temple to Poseidon on a mountaintop (Hansen 1977, 32–35). Very likely, then, ancient narrations of Odysseus and the Oar some-

times featured an etiological coda of the sort that usually concludes the Elias texts today, alluding to the inland or mountaintop location of a cult site. This unobvious link between the ancient legend tradition and the modern legend tradition suggests that the ancient popular tradition concerning Odysseus is closely related to today's popular tradition about St. Elias.

In any case, the modern tradition can scarcely derive from the passage in Homer, where the narrative is set in the future, the motive for Odysseus's inland journey is not explicit, the point of sacrificing among a people ignorant of the sea is not obvious, the inlander's kenning requires interpretation, the hero does not settle down but returns to his island kingdom, and the cult etiology is not explicit. It would certainly be easier to borrow the fine story of Odysseus and Polyphemus from the *Odyssey* than it would be to borrow the somewhat puzzling narrative of Odysseus and the Oar, and yet even here the consensus of scholars is that the modern analogues of the Polyphemus story are independent of the Homeric poem (Hansen 2002, 292–94). Nor is it plausible that the story of the Sailor and the Oar, which admittedly is fairly simple, has arisen independently at different times in different lands. For if that were the case, we should expect to find the tale here and there throughout the world in no particular pattern, whereas in reality it appears to be a Euro-American story. Consequently, it is best to treat all the texts, including Homer's, as independent realizations of an old story (Hansen 1977, 34–37).

Subtype B

Here our main interest is the evidence subtype B provides for narrative embellishment and for the nature of a narrative set in the future.

Unlike the narratives of subtype A, which, with a few exceptions, are not related primarily for comic effect (though there is possibly a latent comic element in even the least witty of the tales), the texts of subtype B are basically jokes.

The Cause of the Mariner's Departure. In this form of the tale, narrator and protagonist are identical since the raconteur tells the story about himself. The ego-narration, the teller's desire to achieve a comic effect, and the future setting of the narrative condition its realization in several ways. The narrator does not introduce and characterize the protagonist to his listener(s) because he is there before them, a living text. The narrative skips this element, as it were, and goes directly to the cause of the protagonist's quitting the sea. For example, the man is sick of working on the water (text 5).

But even this element may be passed over, in some cases because this informa-

tion has been a part of the conversational context and so is not repeated in the narrative proper (e.g., text 8) and in others because the narrator, in the interest of comic economy, chooses not to dwell on the cause (e.g., texts 6 and 8).

The Oar. As in subtype A, the usual test object is an oar or, less frequently, oars, which are sometimes said to be carried on the shoulder. But there are several curious departures from this norm. We can wish good luck to the narrator who evidently plans to row to a land where the inhabitants are ignorant of oars, saying that once he finds the place he will throw his oars away and let his rowboat go with the tide (text 7). Another says he plans to walk inland carrying an anchor (text 25). As a symbol of seafaring, an anchor will do as well as an oar, but the task of carrying it inland will require a true hero. Both of these oddities probably result from thoughtless narration. More clever is the narrator who declares he will walk inland carrying a binnacle light (text 17, below).

The Mariner's Goal. Almost no examples of this subtype make explicit the mariner's intent. "I'll know I've got to where they don't know nothing about ships or the sea" (text 17, given in full below) is the exception. The reason most versions do not admit this feature is probably that, since subtype B is little more than a witty remark, its tellers strive to recount it as succinctly and quickly as possible, for maximum comic effect.

The Oar Test. The mariner will walk inland with his oar (oars, anchor, binnacle light). He does not take the initiative in inquiring, because it would protract his tale uncomically by requiring an inquiry and a response. And the raconteur illustrates only one encounter of seaman and landsman, the final encounter, which of course takes the form of the landsman's ignorant inquiry. The speaker cannot provide details since he has not yet undertaken the quest: he does not know how many people he will encounter before he finds his man.


The Ignorant Inlander. As in subtype A, the mariner will eventually locate a person for whom his oar (or equivalent) is a meaningless object.

The Inlander's Error. The future setting of the joke conditions the form the inlander's ignorance takes. Since the point of the quest ordinarily is to locate people who are ignorant of the sea, all that is required is that the inlander not recognize the test object for what it is; it is not important that he mistake it specifically for another object. If a narrator tells of this quest as a past event, he may well relate that the inlander either simply fails to recognize the oar or makes the more interesting error of mistaking it for a different object that it resembles. But if the mariner foretells it as a future event, he is likely to content himself with an inlander who simply fails to recognize the oar; he is less likely to demand (except

for comic effect) that the inlander make a particular form of error. In subtype B, then, the inlander typically expresses his ignorance by asking, "What's that funny thing you've got over your shoulder?" (text 23). But one sailor plans to search until someone calls his oar a shovel (text 16, below), and another will keep going until someone calls his binnacle light a flashlight (text 17).

The Mariner's Response. In all but the defective texts, the quester's response is to settle down. As in subtype A, the idea may be elaborated: he will build a house there (text 16), dig potatoes (text 8), raise chickens (text 12).

12.



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The two subtypes employ basically the same narrative ideas: a mariner who is unhappy with the sea takes an oar (or the like) and walks inland with it until he meets someone who does not know what it is, and there he settles down. But they realize the ideas in somewhat different ways. Since subtype A is a third-person story set in the past, as most narratives are, it can be told as an event that actually occurred. In Greece it has regularly been told of allegedly historical persons (Odysseus, St. Elias, St. Nikolaos), and it frequently includes a cult etiology. Elsewhere it is told as a folktale, and the protagonist is nameless. The narrator is

free to draw out the story and usually does so, as when he develops the quest as a succession of encounters.

In contrast to this, the texts of subtype B are ego-narratives, set in the future, and told as witty remarks. Consequently, the narrator does not describe the protagonist, tends not to include unforeseeable details, does not ground the story in history, and aims in general for comic brevity. The result is a quick narrative with relatively spare development.

The legend of Odysseus and the Oar is a form of subtype A, but Homer's treatment of it resembles some of the spareness of subtype B because he transposes the story into the future to permit it to be foretold by a seer. There is no description of the protagonist in the passage itself, no explicit statement of Odysseus's motive, no encounters with inlanders other than the final encounter, no explicit etiology.

The Sense of the Story

All tellings of the story show a strong structural opposition between sea and land: whatever one realm signifies, the other signifies the opposite. The significance, however, is not constant from text to text, for the meanings of sea and land are determined by the sailor's motive for quitting the sea, which varies. When, as most frequently happens, the man rejects the sea because of frightful storms or shipwreck, the sea signifies danger, and land therefore signifies safety. When he rejects the sea because of the unrelieved labor of rowing, the sea means weariness, and land suggests ease. When the sea is associated with immorality, land implies morality. The meaning of the two realms and therefore of the seaman's quest is always a function of the sailor's motive for departure. Even when his motive is not explicit, there is still an implied opposition of sea (bad) and land (good).

The tale chronicles the mariner's complete rejection of the sea, his exchanging one realm for its opposite. Between the realms of sea and land there is an intermediate realm of land that is tainted by its acquaintance with the sea, and the function of the oar test is to distinguish the inhabitants of all these realms from those of the purely terrestrial realm.

Now, the oar test is a curious strategy. If a man really wanted to discover a community that was entirely ignorant of the sea, he would not walk around with an oar on his shoulder; instead, he would probably make verbal inquiries of the people he met as he made his way inland. What we have, however, is not an actual quest but a story about a quest, and the difference is important. The key

to a proper understanding of the oar test is the observation made by folklorist Axel Olrik (1909, 8–9) that, in traditional oral story, the attributes of characters tend to be expressed through their actions more than their speech, since oral story prefers the concrete and the visual. Consequently, in the present tale, the mariner is made to *act out* his quest, walking inland with a concrete symbol of the sea. The oar test is a dramatic and visual expression of the man's search. A man carrying an oar far from the sea is a virtual question: "Do I make any sense to you?" The scene is wonderfully striking and unrealistic. Surely most of the charm of this story resides in the motif of the oar test, the feature that a hearer is most likely to remember (Hansen 1977, 41–42).

The oar is virtually constant as the test object because it is the basic tool of the mariner and also because it is the most common and easily portable symbol of seafaring. It is safe to conclude that a person who does not know what an oar is does not know anything of the sea. If the realm were different, the symbol would be different, as the following two narratives from Whitehorse, Yukon Territory, and Ulvade, Texas, illustrate.

13a. Some of the boys in a saloon here the other night were talking about a local woman who had won \$1,800 in a lottery. The consensus was that her decision to put the money in the bank showed a sorry lack of ambition.

"What I'd do," said one, "is to tie a snow shovel to the hood of my car and drive south until nobody had the faintest idea what the damn thing was."

It is a time-honored sentiment. Robert Service, the gold rush poet, wrote that "some say God was tired" when He made the Yukon, which Service described as "the cussedest land that I know."

13b. A story went around that a person said he was going to put a tortilla on the aerial of his pickup and drive straight north, and when he gets to a place where someone says, "What's that thing?", then that's where he's going to stay and live.

In these variations of subtype B, the hated realm is snow country and the symbol of hardship is the snow shovel, or the realm is Texas communities marked by Chicano activism and the sign of Chicano presence is the tortilla.

In contrast, the form of the landsman's error is variable because it is not crucial for the sense of the story that the test object be mistaken for any particular thing, only that it not be recognized for what it is. Although most often the inlander simply fails to recognize the object as a cultural artifact, several texts have the marine tool mistaken specifically for an isomorphic terrestrial tool, elegantly

symbolizing that, in exchanging physical realms, the mariner also exchanges his means of livelihood: his oar becomes, so to speak, a baker's peel (texts 11a and 11b) or, as Homer has it (text 10), a winnowing shovel.

When the mariner has found his inland haven, the implication is that he has succeeded in escaping from whatever drove him to quit the sea. If he was in danger, he will now be safe; if he suffered from continual labor, he can look forward to rest.

The comparative method can be a productive approach to ancient Greek oral narrative in several ways. In the present case, I employ it to show something that rarely has been recognized, that Odysseus and the Oar is actually a *story* rather than merely the mysterious instructions of a seer, the consequences of which are uncertain, or a strange journey into nowhere, the point of which has been lost. Moreover, I use the method to demonstrate that these events constitute a *traditional* story, because, heretofore, it has not been recognized in classical scholarship that the Sailor and the Oar is an international story. Radermacher (1915) does not mention the story in his standard survey of tales and legends in the *Odyssey*, nor does Page devote any space to it in his *Folktales in Homer's Odyssey* (1973). When researchers have now and then happened upon a text of St. Elias and the Oar, they have usually dismissed it in few words as being of little relevance to the Odysseus tradition.

The comparative method is also a useful device for getting at the content and structure of the folk narrative, showing what are the constants and the variables in the tradition and thereby serving as a control for the study of the Homeric version, with its saltless inlanders, oar planted in the ground, chaff-wrecker, and other snares for scholars. It shows that the story really begins earlier and ends later than is usually thought, for it actually begins with the storm that Poseidon sends against Odysseus and ends with a description of how the hero eventually will die, once he has made his peace with the sea god. The method makes clearer the relationship of the parts of the Homeric narration as well as the coherency of the whole.

But there are some kinds of information that it does not, and cannot, provide. The comparative method divorces narratives from the social situations in which they are employed. Such texts do not reveal to us who tells a particular story and who listens to it, nor do they tell us why narrators relate the story at all. Texts alone do not tell us whose story this is and for whom it has meaning. The message an oral narrator wishes to communicate is often different from the structural message of the narrative itself (Hansen 1982). Oral stories do not exist as isolated

objects but rather as part of social events (Dundes 1964; Georges 1969; Ben-Amos 1971; Bausinger 1980; Holbek 1981; Bauman 1986). Until recently, however, collectors of folk narrative have not been much interested in the social context of narration and so have paid little attention to it.

Context of Narration

Some ancient folk narratives are embedded in real or fictive storytelling contexts that an investigator might profitably examine (Hansen 1988). This is the case, for example, with the mythic novella of Ares and Aphrodite in the eighth book of the *Odyssey*, where Homer represents a character within the story singing this tale for listeners. As it happens, the Homeric account of Odysseus and the Oar is not situated in a storytelling context, nor do we have another ancient source in which the legend is represented as being told by a narrator to listeners. However, since something is known about the telling of this story in our own times, I shall consider representative contexts from the present day.

The following text appears in a thoughtful letter published in the *Times Literary Supplement* in 1919.

14. A naval officer tells me that the boatswain of his ship, in speaking of his future retirement, said that he should walk inland with an oar on his shoulder, and when he met with people who asked him what he was carrying should settle there.

This naturally reminded me of the passage in the eleventh book of the *Odyssey* where Odysseus is told to go inland till he comes to a people which has no knowledge of ships and the sea. The sign of his reaching his destination is to be that a wayfarer meeting him will ask if he is carrying a winnowing shovel on his shoulder. I was also told that the saying was not uncommon with sailors, but I have not had further confirmation of this.

In the excerpt that follows, a classical scholar, W. H. D. Rouse, reports a conversation he had with a Greek skipper, Kapetan Giorgis. The exchange took place one evening around 1905 in the course of a fifty-mile voyage to the island of Astypalaia. Giorgis was, on his own estimation, in his early seventies and had been a skipper for fifty years.

15. "Ah well," says Giorgis, "'tis a poor trade this, as the holy Elias found." "What was that?" I asked. "The prophet Elias," quoth he, "was a fisherman; he had bad weather, terrific storms, so that he became afraid of the sea. Well, so he

left his nets and his boat on the shore, and put an oar over his shoulder, and took to the hills. On the way, who should he see but a man. “A good hour to you,” says he. “Welcome,” says the man. “What’s this, can you tell me?” says St. Elias. “That?” says the man. “Why that’s an oar.” Eh, on he goes till he meets another man. “A good hour to you,” says St. Elias. “You are welcome,” says the man. “What’s this?” says St. Elias. “Why, that’s an oar, to be sure,” says the man. On he goes again, until he comes to the very top of the mountain, and there he sees another man. “Can you tell me what this is?” asks St. Elias. “That?” says the man. “Why, that’s a stick.” “Good!” says St. Elias. “This is the place for me, here I abide.” He plants the oar in the ground, and that is why his chapels are all built on the hill tops. “Well, well, I didn’t know the prophet Elias followed the sea; of course the holy apostles did, we all know that.” “Aye, and so they did. You know why they left it, sir, don’t you?” “Why?” “Well, you see, Christ and the Apostles . . .”

In the final two texts, a listener with training in Classics records his feelings as he hears an uneducated narrator relate the story. First, the conversation of an old sailor and a classical scholar, Cedric Whitman, who rode together on a train (from Boston?) to New York:

16. The old seaman of my story was a U.S. sailor who sat next to me on a train going to New York many years ago. He was reading a comic book and I was reading *Paradise Lost*. Presently he began to read over my shoulder, then nudged me and asked: “Hey, you like dat stuff?” I said I did, and a conversation began. I asked how long he had been in the Navy, and he said something like twenty-five years. I remarked that he must have liked it to have stayed in it so long. His answer was: “Look, when I get out of dis Navy, I’m gonna put an oar on my shoulder and walk inland; and when somebody says, ‘Where d’ya find a shovel like dat?’ dat’s where I’m gonna build my house.” He made no mention of a sacrifice to Poseidon; he was shamelessly secular about it all, but clearly the inland journey spelled release from, and forgetfulness of, the hardships of the sea, peace at last. I didn’t ask him if he’d read the *Odyssey*, but I doubt it; he had not read *Paradise Lost*. He seemed, in fact, pretty nearly illiterate—perhaps a bard? Anyway, that’s all I remember, except that the experience gave me a pleasantly creepy feeling that I was talking to One Who Was More Than He Seemed.

In the following text, the reporter of the incident is an officer in the U.S. Navy who happened to overhear the tale in a neighboring conversation among enlisted

men. The raconteur, as the reporter later ascertained, was a twenty-two-year-old West Virginian who had completed two years of high school before enlisting in the Navy.

17. Although I have long been a Canadian citizen, I was born and raised in the United States, and was a U.S. Navy flier in World War II. Just about this time of year in 1945, I was standing in a queue in Providence, Rhode Island, waiting for a bus to Naval Air Station Quonset Point, where I was then stationed. Most of the people in line were noncommissioned personnel; I had the rank of Lt., USNR . . .

The Japanese had surrendered, and the war was over. Ahead of me in the line, several enlisted men were talking about what they were going to do after their discharge from the Navy. One chap expansively declared, in Appalachian accents: "I'm going to get me a binnacle light off some junked-up boat or ship—they'se lots around—and I'm going to take and carry that son of a bitch straight in away from the god-damned ocean. I'll show it to people and when I get to where they say, 'What is that funny-looking flashlight?' I'll just stop right there. I'll know I've got to where they don't know nothing about ships or the sea."

This is from memory, but I think I have it fairly as given. When I say that I had graduated college with a degree in classics shortly before the war, you can understand the thrill with which I heard these words.

The narrators of texts 14–17 are all males and seamen by occupation. There is a British boatswain, a seventy-year-old Greek sea captain, an old sailor in the U.S. Navy, and a young enlisted man in the U.S. Navy. The educated reporters happen to be familiar with the ancient literary tradition but are not themselves narrators of the oral tale, while the narrators are active transmitters of the story but are evidently unacquainted with ancient literature.

In the present corpus as a whole, the narrator, when known, is always male, with the single exception of the old Greek woman in texts 11a and 11b. He is an adult, young or old: this is not a child's tale. We know the vocation of about eighteen narrators. It always has to do with the sea: he is a skipper, a fisherman, in the merchant marine, in the navy, for example. Often the narrator is an uneducated man, as in two or three of the texts above, but the educated narrator of text 6 actually learned the story from an old chief petty officer who assisted the Naval ROTC lecturer at Columbia University. Even so, when later he read the *Odyssey* for the first time, he did not connect the tale with that of Odysseus and the Oar.

The profile of the narrator's typical audience would probably be very similar to that of the narrator himself, since sea folk, like other people, tend to spend time with others like themselves. It is not surprising, then, that in five of the texts we know that the audience consists of seamen. Special circumstances, however, sometimes bring together persons who would not ordinarily exchange stories, as when a Classics professor and a sailor happen to sit next to each other on a train, or when a folklorist deliberately seeks out a good storyteller, so that some of the texts in the corpus also reflect conversations between persons who would not typically consort with each other.

What prompts a seaman to narrate the story? In text 15 we read: "‘Ah well,’ says Giorgis, ‘tis a poor trade this, as the holy Elias found.’" The skipper illustrates this proposition with a narration of the Elias legend in which the beleaguered Elias reaches the same conclusion about his trade and actually leaves the sea. As raconteurs frequently do, Kapetan Giorgis first announces the point of his story and then tells the story. He continues this train of thought by relating next a story about why the Apostles also left the sea. In the next conversation (text 16), the seaman's narration is touched off by the scholar's remark that the seaman must have liked the Navy to have stayed in it for some twenty-five years. The old seaman's response about what he will do when he gets out is meant to illustrate—seriously or with comic exaggeration—just how much the career sailor *dislikes* his trade. In text 14, the boatswain is speaking of his future retirement. Presumably he will have the option at that time to remain near the sea or go elsewhere, and he states through the medium of the tale that he intends to settle as far from the sea as possible. In text 17, the conversation concerns what the discussants are going to do upon their discharge from the navy, a topic that is similar to the subject of forthcoming retirement from the sea. One young sailor employs the tale to communicate humorously that he will certainly not choose to continue seafaring.

In these four conversations, which are typical of the corpus to the extent that contextual information is available at all, tellers tell the Sailor and the Oar when the opportunity arises of commenting upon seafaring as a trade, of *evaluating it as a way of life*. The teller's evaluation is unambiguously negative. Indeed, several American informants report that seamen frequently complain about the sea. According to the reporter of text 23, a former merchant marine who, like Kapetan Giorgis (text 15), knew different tales about quitting the sea, seamen always say they are going to stop, but rarely do. The narrator of text 26, also a former merchant seaman, describes the life at sea as a lonely life, a cut-off life, saying that the

men are there for the money or because they cannot cope, so that it is fashionable among them to belittle the life at sea. Greek seamen are similarly said to have a love-hate relationship with the sea, cursing it while at the same time being tied to it with more than economic bonds (text 22).

An ambivalent attitude toward the sea as giver both of livelihood and of distress must have been a feature of the mariner's experience from the time of the earliest seafaring careers. The *Sailor and the Oar* expresses in a simple but effective fashion the purely negative side of the seaman's attitude by describing a disgusted sailor who acts out the mariner's fantasy of walking away from the sea for good. It objectifies the fantasy that every mariner must sometimes have: the desire of quitting the sea.

Other texts in the corpus suggest that the story can support other functions and meanings as well. According to a rather vague report, shipwrecked persons are said to narrate this tale to one another as a consolation in certain sea stories, and tormented and discouraged sea folk say they will follow the example of the sailor who went inland, if ever they themselves reach home (text 5). So also in one account, St. Elias, experiencing a rough sea, proclaims that if he ever escapes he will find the highest mountain peak and settle there forever (text 24). So it may be that seafarers in difficulty sometimes employ the tale to console themselves and others with the thought that if they escape their present plight they will never have to face a similar problem again, for they will have quit the sea forever. In two other texts the story is employed to evaluate seafaring in relation to a particular terrestrial vocation, either farming or herding; but the contextual information is of uncertain reliability in one case, since the tale appears in a work of fiction (text 8), and it is inadequate for our purpose in the other (text 24). One version of subtype A, recounted by a retired lobster fisherman in Maine, is a ribald tale of a sailor and a farmer's daughter (text 21).

Surprisingly, the contextual data do not lend strong support to the notion that the main use of the story for some narrators is to provide an *aition* for the mountaintop chapels of St. Elias. Although all versions of the *Sailor and the Oar* can express the mariner's fantasy of quitting the sea, only the *Odysseus* and *Elias* sub-traditions contain the cult etiology, and even so it is not always present (texts 3 and 10). The educated imagination is inclined to accord too much importance to the formal element of the etiological coda and too little importance to the expressive element of the mariner's fantasy. This is nowhere clearer than in text 4, in which a Greek fisherman is trying to communicate that he, like Elias before him, is weary of his trade, whereas the scholar who quotes this conversation does

so in illustration of the fact that the Greek folk tell various legends to explain why chapels of St. Elias stand on nearly every mountaintop. The scholar, who is interested in folk etiology, simply overrides the narrator's message.

Still, a man may include the etiology even when his point is the misery of his work and not the location of Elias's chapels. Although incidental to his message, the feature may lend force and verity to his narration because, as anyone can see, Elias's chapels are indeed found on heights. It would be unwise, moreover, to deny that a narrator's main interest might ever be etiology, since the present corpus may not be representative in this regard. In any case, I can myself testify that in 1986, when I mentioned to two Athenians that on a mountainside near my residence in Ano Glyphada there stood a little chapel of St. Elias, both immediately began to tell me the legend of Elias and the oar. The incident shows how natural it is to recount the story in such a context.


I conclude, then, that seamen constitute the principal conduit (Dégh and Vásonyi 1975) for the transmission of the Sailor and the Oar, which offers them a means of expressing implicitly and cleverly a negative evaluation of seafaring as a way of life. These men are the active bearers of the tradition. Other, lesser conduits also exist, but they are not well documented.

It is frequently stated that the stories in the *Odyssey*, especially in books 9–12, are old sea stories. No one ever presents any evidence for this assertion, probably because it seems like a perfectly safe claim to make; however, I do not believe the claim is accurate, since I doubt that the Polyphemus legend and the Circe legend, to cite two well-known narratives from this part of the poem, are in any true sense old sea stories. Even if it were true, the evidence to prove it would not be forthcoming, since we possess very little contextual information about these stories and their analogues. But the modern contextual evidence does prove that the claim is correct for Odysseus and the Oar, since the Sailor and the Oar is indeed a true seaman's story, a story typically told by adult male seamen to other seamen.

In the absence of earlier contextual information, our only guide to the narrative transmission of this story in ancient times is the evidence of the present day. There is no reason to suppose that the working conditions—danger, hard work, and so on—that make the story meaningful to today's seamen would have made it any less meaningful to yesterday's seamen, whose work was, indeed, even more dangerous and wearisome. Probably the Sailor and the Oar has always been primarily a mariner's story, and its principal function has been to give artful expression to one of the mariner's attitudes toward his profession. As a popular story, it

no doubt circulated in antiquity, as now, primarily among men of the sea, but it has perhaps regularly also acquired a constituency of land folk who were amused or charmed by the narrative and who became mostly passive bearers of the tradition, recognizing it but not often transmitting it, since, in the end, it rarely could be so meaningful to them as to seamen. When the story was drawn into the biographical legend of that most beleaguered of Greek sailors, Odysseus, it was necessarily adapted and somewhat reinterpreted to fit the established givens of the hero's life, and yet it must have remained a familiar sequence of events with a familiar resonance to those Greek sea folk who knew the ordinary seamen's story, just as, today, educated seamen who have heard the oral story of the Sailor and the Oar and subsequently read Homer's *Odyssey* sometimes recognize Odysseus's strange inland quest as a form of the seamen's tale they know.

18.



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NOTES

a. Grimm 1857. Frazer (1921, 404–55) published and discussed a collection of thirty-six tales of this type. On Frazer's kind of comparativism in his analysis of these tales, see Csapo 2005, 57–67. Frazer's assumption of an Urmyth, or original form of the tales, is to be distinguished from typology in folkloristics as now understood.

b. Hahn 1864; Grimm 1990.

c. See my introduction to chapter 3 of this volume.

d. Propp 1968 [1958], xxv (the first sentence of his foreword). Cf. "... at a time when minerals, plants, and animals are described and classified precisely according to their structure, at a time when a whole range of literary genres ... have been described, the tale continues to be studied without such a description" (13).

e. For the intellectual history of the concept of structure in linguistics, see Benveniste 1966.

- f. Lévi-Strauss 1955.
- g. Hansen 2002.
- h. The other big books are cited in my introductions to chapters 3 and 4.
- i. See, again, my introduction to chapter 6.
- j. Type 1379** in ATU. Not long before, Hansen had observed: "This story does not appear in any published index of types or motifs" (2002, 371).
- k. On other stories in Homer, in particular, that have a background in folklore, see Hansen 2011.
- l. The controversy is surveyed in Edmunds, manuscript in preparation, chap. 1.
- m. Holbek 1987, 255–57.
- n. To one's astonishment, this evolutionary point of view is the kernel of the article on the age of folktales in *Enzyklopädie des Märchens* (EM 1977–). See Moser 1977.
- o. Cf. Moser 1977, 414.

SOURCES OF THE TEXTS

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Texts 1–18 listed below are printed in full or in part in this chapter and are listed here in the order in which they appear; the remainder are listed in chronological sequence. I note the subtype in brackets.

- 1. Akas Tamasias, "Laïkes Paradoseis," *Mathetike Hestia* 1 (1951): 129, no. 3 [A].
- 2. N. G. Polites, *Meletai peri tou Biou kai tes Glosses tou Hellenikou Laou: Paradoseis*, (Athens, 1904), 2:801–2 [A].
- 3. *Ibid.*, 1:116, no. 207 [A].
- 4. Christodoulos B. Syrmakeses, *Elias ho Thesbites (me laographiko Parartema) kai ho Mathetes tou Elissaios* (Athens, 1964), 60–61 [A].
- 5. Karl Reinhardt, "Die Abenteuer der Odyssee," in *Von Werken und Formen: Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Godesberg, 1948), 505–6, n. 30 [A].
- 6. Taped interview with Adam Horvath, July 5, 1975, at the time an editor at Indiana University Press [A].
- 7. George Carey, *A Faraway Time and Place: Lore of the Eastern Shore* (Washington, DC, 1971), 111 [B].
- 8. Frank Shay, *Here's Audacity! American Legendary Heroes* (New York, 1930), 20–21 [B].
- 9. Robert Hughes, Review of Peter Matthiessen, *Men's Lives: The Surfmén and Baymen of the South Fork*, *New York Review of Books*, October 23, 1986, 21 [B].
- 10. Homer, *Odyssey* 11.121–37 [A].
- 11a. Harrison 1903–4, 24:246, n. 11 [A].
- 11b. W. R. Halliday, "Modern Greek Folk-Tales and Ancient Greek Mythology: Odysseus and Saint Elias," *Folk-Lore* 25 (1914): 122–23 [A].

12. Jimmy Hatlo, *They'll Do It Every Time*. © King Features Syndicate, World Rights Reserved, date uncertain [B].
- 13a. Douglas Martin, "Wolf at Yukon's Door, in More Ways Than One," *New York Times*, December 21, 1982, 2 [B: snow-shovel version]. For a text of the snow-shovel version recorded in Indiana, see Jan Harold Brunvand's newspaper column, *Urban Legends: "This Tale Calls for a Snow Shovel"* (United Feature Syndicate), December 30, 1991.
- 13b. Written interview with Jane Willingham, English instructor, Southwest Texas Junior College, June 29, 1994. The story was told by Anglos in the context of ethnic activism by Chicanos in the region where Ms. Willingham lived. Chicanos were perceived by Anglos as trying to take over, such as by speaking Spanish in the schools and by saluting the Mexican flag. According to Ms. Willingham, it irritated the Anglos, and in one town every Anglo family moved out [B: tortilla version].
14. J. E. King, Letter in *TLS*, September 11, 1919, 485 [B]. See also the response, in *TLS*, October 2, 1919, 533.
15. W. H. D. Rouse, "A Greek Skipper," *Cambridge Review* 27 (May 24, 1906), 414 [A].
16. Personal letter from the late Cedric Whitman, Professor of Classics, Harvard University, October 13, 1975 [B].
17. Personal letter from Richard Slobodin, Professor of Anthropology, McMaster University, October 11, 1977 [B].
18. Virgil Partch, *Captain's Gig* (1977). ©Field Enterprises. By permission of North America Syndicate, Inc. [B].
19. F. W. Hasluck, *Cyzicus* (Cambridge, 1910), 65 [A].
20. A. Erotokritos, "Threskeutikoi Thryloi," *Mathetike Hestia* 5 (1955): 160, no. 15 [A].
21. Richard M. Dorson, "Collecting Folklore in Jonesport, Maine," *PAPhS* 101 (June 1957): 287 [A]. For a Spanish version, see Kurt Ranke, *European Anecdotes and Jests*, trans. Timothy Buck (Copenhagen, 1972), 28, no. 12; for a French version, see Jean-Paul Clébert, ed., *Histoires et Légendes de la Provence Mystérieuse* (Paris, 1986), 52–54.
22. Irwin T. Sanders, *Rainbow in the Rock: The People of Rural Greece* (Cambridge, MA, 1962), 35 [A].
23. Taped interview with Philip Appleman, Professor of English, Indiana University, Bloomington, April 19, 1972. Excerpt published in Hansen 1976, 226 [B].
24. Nicolas E. Gavrielides, *A Study in the Cultural Ecology of an Olive-Growing Community: The Southern Argolid, Greece* (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, Bloomington, 1976), 167–69 [A].
25. John Gould, "I Name Thee So-and-So," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 9, 1978 [B].
26. Written interview with James M. Patterson, Professor of Marketing, Indiana University, Bloomington, February 25, 1987 [B].

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6 INTRODUCTION Cyrene was a major Greek colony near the Mediterranean coast of Africa. Its rulers, the Battiads (a dynasty of eight generations), prospered, and they excelled in the most costly event in the Greek games: the chariot race. Pindar's Fourth and Fifth *Pythian Odes* celebrate the Battiads' victories in this event and recount parts of the city's foundation myth.^a His Ninth *Pythian Ode* is for a victor in the race in full armor; it tells of the love of Apollo for the eponymous nymph Cyrene. Herodotus, in his account of the Persian campaign in Libya (the purpose of which was to depose the Battiad Arcesilas the Third), gives the history of Cyrene, beginning with its foundation (4.157–67). Claude Calame brings together these and other, fragmentary sources in his analysis of the foundation myth.

He distinguishes three elements in this narrative. The first is its logic, put together from the sources just named, or its syntax; the second, the values that the narrative brings into play, or its “semantics” (what the narrative is saying as distinguished from what it is telling). These two dimensions are captured in Calame's expression “semionarrative approach.” The third element is reference to performance in particular circumstances (the odes of Pindar, just cited, were performed on particular occasions). Syntactic and semantic analysis cannot take place, Calame stresses, without pragmatics, without reference also to those occasions. The semantic elements, invested especially in the actors of the narrative, come from the historical world of the poet and his audience at any given time. The unfolding of the narrative, however, corresponds to a general schema, for which Calame draws on the narrative theory of Algirdas-Julien Greimas (1917–92). Calame explains the schema in the section “Narrative and Figurative Developments: A Question of Method.” In brief, it consists of four phases: “(1) *manipulation* (prompted by a condition of *lack*), (2) *competence*, (3) *performance*, and (4) *sanction* (return to a state of narrative equilibrium).” In the logic of the narrative, a situation of difficulty initiates the action. Then a “sender” (*destinateur*, such as a god) gives (*manipulation*) to the “subject” of the narrative action (the hero) the *competence* for a *performance* (a trial) that the “sender” will then reward (*sanction*).^b In sum, Calame combines a modified or “soft” (as he has called it) Greimasian approach (“semionarrative”) with a pragmatic, anthropological perspective.

Greimas belongs to a larger history of the theory of narrative that goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century. This history is often said to begin with Vladimir Propp (1895–1970). In 1928, Propp published *Morfologija skazki* (“The Morphology of the Folktale”).^c Holding that the typology of folktales practiced by his contemporary folklorists was fundamentally impossible, Propp offered in-

stead an analysis that showed, with symbols, a compositional pattern underlying all of the examples in a set of Russian folktales. He showed that they could all be described as having the same sequence of thirty-one “functions” (one of the members of a family absents himself from home, an interdiction is addressed to the hero, and so forth) or some subset thereof. This pattern is the “morphology” of his title, a metaphor he took from botany.^d Propp’s method is also called *formalist*, and sometimes *structural* is used as a synonym of *morphological*, even though Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009), the great exponent of structuralism in mythology, was a critic of Propp.^e *Morfologija skazki* was translated into French, the language in which Greimas probably read it, in 1965.^f Propp’s work was the starting point for Greimas.

Of the heirs of Propp, it was not Lévi-Strauss but Claude Bremond (1929–) and Greimas (also through collaborators and students) who would refine and generalize his theory so that it explained all kinds of narrative.^g (Propp himself remains influential, as work in the field of Classics shows.)^h It might seem that Greimas, abstracting a narrative syntax from the morphology that Propp had abstracted from his Russian folktales, was moving farther and farther away from the possibility of interpreting any one narrative. As Lévi-Strauss already said of Propp, “Before formalism, we were certainly ignorant of what these tales had in common. After formalism, we are left without any way of understanding how they differ. One has indeed passed from the concrete to the abstract but one can no longer go back from the abstract to the concrete.”ⁱ

The third of the elements outlined above rescues Calame’s adaptation of Greimas from this kind of charge. Calame insists on the pragmatic step that brings interpretation back to the myth as culturally and ideologically determined. In this way, along with interpretation of the foundation myth of Cyrene, Calame also offers readings of the odes of Pindar that are his principal sources.

Narrative Semantics and Pragmatics

The Poetic Creation of Cyrene

CLAUDE CALAME

Contemporary archaeology is agreed: the development of Cyrene, a Greek colony in northern Libya, began in the second half of the seventh century B.C.E.

Doubtless the presence of objects dating from Late Helladic IIIA and IIIB could suggest even more remote contacts between Greece and the Mediterranean coast of Africa. But nothing indicates, before the middle of the archaic period, the development there of a city in the Greek sense.¹ Such, at any rate, is the interpretation proposed by archaeologists in their efforts to reconstruct, from the ruins left by the passage of time, a chronology conforming to our sense of history: an arithmetic time with double orientation, one that sketches out an accumulation of years after the supposed birth of our own civilization's founding hero (Christ) and also the unfolding back of years beyond this date.² Nothing is more foreign, however, to the Greek manner of envisioning what constitutes for us the temporal organization of a historical past.

Self-evident proof of this is the multiplicity of events that one poet is apt to place at the temporal origin of the city whose rulers, his contemporaries, he praises: Apollo's rape of the nymph Cyrene and celebration on the Libyan coast of his union with this young lion-huntress; occupation of the site by the sons of Antenor, accompanied by Helen, following the destruction of Troy; and the transfer of the clod of Libyan earth by a son of Poseidon to another son of the same god and its coming to ground at Thera (Santorini) so as to return, metaphorically, to its land of origin in the colonial expedition of Battus, Cyrene's founder, seventeen generations later. Here, then, is the earliest chronological reckoning, but no indication is given about the number of generations separating Battus's colonizing act from the time and circumstances of its narration.

The poetic performances of the narrated events in this indeterminate past are, however, amenable to precise dating. I have summarized above, in order, fragments of the narratives contained in the Ninth, Fifth, and Fourth *Pythian Odes* of Pindar. The first of these epinicia sings of the victory obtained at the hoplite race in the twenty-eighth Pythian Games by Telesicrates of Cyrene in the year 474 B.C.E. The ode was probably performed in Cyrene at the time of festivities marking the return home of the athlete. The second celebrates the success in the chariot race of the brother-in-law of Arcesilas the Fourth, King of Cyrene, on the occasion of the thirty-first Pythiad, in 462; it was sung in honor of the king's charioteer near the Garden of Aphrodite, perhaps for the festival of the Carneia celebrated in honor of Apollo, the god founder of the colonial city. As for the last of these odes, composed on the occasion of the same chariot victory, it was performed in the king's palace itself, most probably during a banquet celebrating this most prestigious of agonistic and Panhellenic victories.³

This projection of founding events into a chronologically indeterminate past

seems to constitute the touchstone of what we know as myth. These primordial, exemplary events, fixing the ephemeral present into atemporal permanence, apparently furnish us with an ideal means of entry into the very essence of the mythological.

Narrative Forms of an Undiscoverable Mythology

Illusion! What we call myth has no existence in itself, nor does it correspond to any universal cultural reality. In essence, myth is only a concept invented by modern anthropology out of uncertainties gradually recognized by the Greeks themselves as to the historical reality of certain episodes in their own tradition. To this tradition, the epithets “legendary” and “historical” are equally applicable: for the Greeks, a narrative’s credibility lies not so much in its congruence with factual truth as in a judgment about its moral coherence. The Greeks invented a concept called “the mythic” (*muthōdes*) certainly, but their concept differed radically from the version accepted by the *communis opinio* of modern anthropologists. Thus what we call myth has neither essence nor reality apart from a purely Eurocentric perspective; it does not correspond to a (primitive) mode of human thought. Each culture possesses its own taxonomy for the narratives of its historical-legendary tradition. In the central Himalayas, for example, the Pahari culture possesses a rich oral tradition, but even within the local taxonomy, the criteria of classification fail to present any kind of homogeneity: they refer variously to the content of the songs or to the different occasions of their being recited.⁴

A similar situation prevails in Greece. Myth does not exist, except as a general notion of the mythic, which developed toward the end of the fifth century B.C.E., along with the kind of politico-military, anthropological history exemplified by Thucydides. But what we call a legendary history of Greece is made up of a number of narratives, whose contents distinguish them from one another without causing them to be assigned to homogeneous categories: stories of a reigning family in the form of genealogies, narratives dealing with the founding of cities (*ktiseis*), local stories centering on a particular event, biographies of heroically magnified “historical personages.”⁵ Our knowledge of these “historical” genres depends on fragmentary products coming out of the movement to rewrite a coherent legendary past, a movement whose traces can be made out in the fifth century. Thus the history of primitive Greece is created for us in the prosaic labor undertaken by Hecataeus of Miletus to critically systematize epic legends. It can be seen in the attempt by Acusilaus of Argos to inscribe the legends of the

Trojan War and of Heracles in the perspective of a single genealogical line centered at Argos and having its origin in a theo-cosmogony. It corresponds also to the undertaking of Pherecydes of Athens to synchronize the different legendary genealogies that existed in Greece. All these works, constituting the rewriting of legendary history, were entitled by the ancients *Genealogiai* or *Historiai*, and their content is about *ta arkhaia* or *ta palaia*, “the things of old,” and *ta patroia*, “the history of the ancestors.”⁶

Moving back in time from the classical period to the archaic, one becomes aware that legendary history does not exist as a specific genre. It generally gets confused with poetic genres, which are distinguished by the manner of execution. For example, the narratives of Achilles’ anger and of the events leading up to the Trojan War in an *Iliad* or *Cypria* are both designated by Herodotus as *epea*, poems in dactylic verse. The genealogy of Orestes written by the Lacedemonian poet Cinaethon is classified in this same poetic genre, an epic poem in dactylic hexameters. The struggles of the Smyrnan people against Gyges and the Lydians are told in elegiac verse in the *Smyrnēis* of Mimnermus of Colophon. A long narration in melic verse tells of the destruction of Troy in the *Iliou Persis* by Stesichorus, not to mention the numerous legendary narratives in archaic lyric (or rather, melic) poetry presented in bits and pieces to illustrate the proposal of a poet composing for a given ritual or social occasion.⁷

The fifth century still, in large measure, pays tribute to these different modes and forms of configuring history. It is thus impossible to determine whether the Cyrenean narrative of the founding of Cyrene, presupposed by the “oath of the founders,” was written in prose or in verse and, if in the latter, in which meter. As for ourselves, we learn of this narrative—or these narratives—only in works whose end purpose is quite different from that of writing a city’s history: the epinicia of Pindar, which were intended to eulogize the victor in an event at the Panhellenic games, or the *Histories* of Herodotus, seeking to determine the causes of the great and recent confrontation between Greeks and barbarians, not to mention learned works in epic form by the Alexandrian poets Callimachus and Apollonius of Rhodes, with their etiological concerns. Be it melic verse, *logos* in prose, or poems in epic form, the narrative of the founding of the great Greek colony of Libya exists for us solely in the widest variety of (discursive) forms.

There is no autonomous narrative of the founding of Cyrene, just a number of legends, or fragments of legends, in different genres distinguished by their form. Each of these poetic forms is governed by an individual perspective and addressed to a particular audience, in particular circumstances of performance, and

in a specific historical and cultural situation. We shall distinguish systematically between the poetic performance itself and what is performed: a text (or better, a form of discourse) that refers to its own “enunciation,” to take over the concept of *énonciation* coined by the French linguist Emile Benveniste (with the corresponding adjective *énonciatif*, “enunciative,” even if the current meaning of “enunciation” in English refers to the articulation of sound and to pronunciation, which is an important aspect of the verbal performance itself). Thus the following pages do not treat the legend of founding as an abstract narrative entity but follow its development through the principal forms in which it is realized for a particular performance—first by Pindar, then by Herodotus in juxtaposition with Callimachus or Apollonius of Rhodes. Our fragmentary knowledge of the authors of *Lybica* or *Cyrenaica*, works dating generally from the Hellenistic period, condemns them to play merely a supporting role: that of clarifying or completing, through information derived from narratives with historical pretensions, the unavoidable abridgments found in texts that are, properly speaking, poetic (or “poietic,” with an etymologizing allusion to poetic fabrication: *poiein*).⁸

Narrative and Figurative Developments: A Question of Method

The complexity of the enunciative situation in the narratives of Cyrene’s founding may legitimate the semionarrative approach proposed here: logic of the narrative and semantic network with their pragmatics. In confronting elaborate poetic texts, one must first rediscover the thread of a narrative development that is constantly interrupted, confused, or turned from its direction because of particular generic conditions or its own internal logic. This is especially the case with Pindar, past master of the rupture, the condensation, the retrospective digression, and the light allusive stroke.⁹ But beyond reconstituting the logic of the narrative action and the causality linking the individual acts that make it up, we must envisage the values brought into play, which are inscribed in the succession of actions, affirmed or denied by them, or transformed by them into new values: not only the syntax of the poetic narrative that we are used to calling “myth” but also its semantics and, through its enunciative apparatus, its pragmatics referring to the situation of enunciation.

The semionarrative reading of the poems by Pindar proposed here, in partial comparison with Callimachus, Apollonius of Rhodes, and Herodotus, requires a few methodological and theoretical explanations. If not interested in “French theory,” the reader can just jump over these explanations and carry on with the application of the few conceptual tools proposed here. As far as the semantics and

the surface discursive structures of the narrative are concerned, it is essential to pay attention to the different figures embedded in the protagonists of the narrative action, in their actions, and in the space they act in. By “figures” I mean those concrete semantic elements taken from the natural, social, and cultural world in order to give a semantic profile to the actors of the narration, to their actions, and to the spaces in which they evolve, giving rise during the course of the narrative’s development to its “reality effect” (Roland Barthes). Invested in actors, actions, or spatial trajectories (*parcours*), these figures develop in the syntactic dimension that is laid out by the narrative’s linear unfolding. In general, this unfolding corresponds to the structural and “canonic schema” of any narrative, which involves four phases—(1) *manipulation* (prompted by a condition of *lack*), (2) *competence*, (3) *performance*, and (4) *sanction* (return to a state of narrative equilibrium)—hence the causal and temporal logic underlying the unfolding of the narrative. It means that, broadly speaking, in a situation of difficulty, a “sender” (*destinateur*, for instance a god) will give (*manipulation*) to the “subject” of the narrative action (the hero) the *competence* for a *performance* (a trial) that he will then reward (*sanction*). Thus the recurrence in the text of semantic elements leads to the definition of figurative “isotopies” (semantic lines) that ensure the semantic and logical coherence of the narrative and of the poetic discourse.

As for the “semionarrative structures,” the profoundest stage of that semantic and syntactic schematization, an attempt will be made to determine the themes that directly underlie the reiterations of figures building the isotopies. The thematic is then understood as the most abstract semantic level, where the interpreter can situate the concepts underlying the choice, in the natural and social world, of surface figures. It is at this level that a discourse can become the location of a culturally and ideologically determined construction asking for an interpretation of an anthropological and symbolical order, requiring, then, from the modern reader a real effort of transcultural translation.¹⁰

Being culturally determined, these different expressions of the meaning-production process can never take on any value in themselves. It is invariably necessary to relate them to the conditions of performance. Syntactic and semantic analysis cannot take place without pragmatics, without reference to the conditions of the production and reception of meaning; the meaning is inferred particularly through the marks of enunciation inherent in the discourse itself. The values that the text sets into play, and that a semionarrative analysis attempts to track down, are pertinent only in relation to the interpretive community to which the narrative was originally and practically addressed. We cannot accept

the supposed structural closure of the text; any text refers to a form of discourse (text + context, to be schematic). Under the form of an epinicion or praise poem (Pindar), a *logos* of inquiry (Herodotus), a learned epic poem (Apollonius of Rhodes), or a literary hymn (Callimachus), each discourse staging the past of a cultural community is a case of a symbolic representation elaborated within the perspective of a precise situation in which it has a cultural function. Whether historical or legendary, the past that is narratively, semantically, and poetically constructed is always a function of the present.

The Ariadne's Thread in a Narrative Labyrinth: Pindar's Fourth *Pythian*

We begin by interrogating Pindar, the oldest witness to the existence of narratives of Cyrene's foundation. And we begin with the long Fourth *Pythian*, which offers a particularly developed narrative: an exception in what we know of Pindaric production. Here is the beginning of the epinicion:

Today, Muse, you must stand beside a man who is a
 friend, the king of Kyrene with its fine horses,
 so that while Arkesilas is celebrating
 you may swell the breeze of hymns
 owed to Leto's children and to Pytho,
 where long ago (*pote*) the priestess who sits beside the golden
 eagles of Zeus prophesied when Apollo was not away
 that Battos would be the colonizer
 of fruit-bearing Libya, and that
 he should at once leave the holy island to found a city
 of fine chariots on the white breast of a hill,
 and to fulfill in the seventeenth generation that word
 spoken in Thera by Medea which (she) had once (*pote*) breathed forth.

(TRANS. RACE 1997)

At the outset, Pindaric narration centers on the occasion of its recitation: the celebration of Arcesilas the Fourth, King of Cyrene (temporally marked by the first word of the ode: *sameron*; = T 1). Also at the outset, one can designate Apollo the *sender* (*destinateur*) of the king's action, that is to say, the one who has enlisted it (so-called narrative *manipulation*). But then the extraordinary Pindaric time machine sets quickly to work.¹¹ The ode evokes the oracular speech, addressed in an indeterminate past (*pote*, 4; = T 2), to the one who is destined to become

the founder of Cyrene; thus Apollo, through the mediation of the Pythia, is set in relation to Battus, designated from this moment as the “colonizer of fruit-bearing Libya” (*oikistēra karpophorou Libuas*, 6). Whether ode or oracle, a speech of divine origin, put forward by an inspired mediator, brings together the human actor and the divinity who guides his action.

The victory won by the chariot of the actual king Arcesilas then places us at the completion of a narrative program, in its moment of narrative *sanction*; its meaning is in some way inverted because, once incarnated in the poem, it is conceived as an honor paid to Apollo as sender (*destinateur*) of victorious action. In contrast, Battus finds himself at the beginning of a trial into which that same god has enlisted him. This is the initial phase in the narrative program according to the “canonic schema”: *manipulation* of Battus by Apollo, giving to him a heroic *competence* leading to the *performance* of the founding act. The narrative constructed by Pindar thus seems, in its logic, to make the story of Battus, founder of Cyrene, the narrative beginning of the story of the contemporary king of the city. But the temporal structure of the semionarrative action is more complicated and will develop on no less than five temporal and spatial levels, from the present to the most remote “mythical” time:

T 1: time of the performance of the song (Arcesilas IV)—Cyrene

T 2: time of the founding action (Battus)—Thera, then Cyrene

T 3: time of a potential narrative program (Danaeans)—Sparta, then Libya

T 4: time of the prophecy (Medea)—Thera

T 5: time of the main *manipulation* (Euphemus)—Libya

Sanction on the one hand, initial *manipulation* on the other: the narrative is still disarticulated. Now Pindar goes back seventeen generations before the founding act of Battus. Again, it is through the mediation of divinely inspired speech that the narration finally begins to develop, in a prediction articulated by the immortal mouth of Medea, when seized with a prophetic delirium that seems sourceless (*zamenēs*, 10). The first narrative utterance addressed by Medea to the demigod Argonauts on the occasion of their putting in at Thera refers to the route followed by Battus (T 2); but this utterance situates the *parcours* at an entirely distinct figurative level, in that the utterance brings onto the scene actors who are not anthropomorphic: the clod of earth, the wave of the sea. From the insular land represented by Thera, Libya will give root to future cities consecrated to Zeus Ammon. Here one learns, through an implicit reference to the agonal occasion of the poem (the Pythian victory of the chariot of Arcesilas IV; = T 1), that

Theran colonists are destined to become, instead of seafarers, tamers of horses and drivers of chariots.

Medea, the queen of the Kolchians, will finally enunciate the *performance* phase, along with the narrative transformation it signals; at an other temporal level (T 4), she will be prophesying to the future founders of Cyrene more or less the same future that Tiresias foresees for Odysseus during his encounter with the Homeric hero in the Underworld: that he will return to his city to restore order and will journey by foot until the oar he carries is mistaken for a winnowing shovel. A sacrifice to Poseidon will then mark Odysseus's leave-taking from the sea's domain and the beginning of a period of earthly abundance in the midst of his own people. For the descendants of Battus, this prophecy translates as the transition from mastery of the waves to mastery of horses. Even on land, then, one remains in this case attached to a privileged domain of Poseidon.¹²

To complete this narrative transformation, a chronological reckoning is activated by the mention of the seventeen generations that separate Medea's prediction from the founding act of Battus but is carefully effaced by the double *pote*, "once upon a time," of lines 10 and 14: both the speech of the woman inspired by Aietes and the founding event that she announces are situated in an indeterminate past (superposition of T 2 and T 4).

Indeterminate as it might be, this past nevertheless begins to take on the form of a succession of events. Could Thera be considered the capital of a colony? The opportunity arises for Medea to recall an essential precedent, not contemporary with the colonists, but farther back in time, in connection with the clod of earth. Once again in an indeterminate past (*pote*, 20), the narrative action, referred back to its nonanthropomorphic foundation (at an even more remote temporal level, T 5), discovers at last its beginning, anticipating from afar the *manipulation* whose object will be Battus the founder (T 2).

Addressing the Argonauts, Medea sings and prophesizes:

I declare that one day (*pote*) from this sea-beaten land (i.e., Thera)
 the daughter of Epaphos (i.e., Libye)
 will have planted within her a root of famous cities
 at the foundations of Zeus Ammon.
 In place of short-finned dolphins
 they will take swift horses
 and instead of oars they will ply reins
 and chariots that run like a storm.

This sign will bring it to pass that Thera
 will become the mother-city of great cities—the token
 which Euphamos once (*pote*) received at the outflow
 of Lake Tritonis . . . (TRANS. RACE 1997)

Pindaric narration, however, fulfills the canonic schema only in terms of its most formal aspect. First, in place of the condition of *lack* that generally drives every narrative plot by inserting it into a causal sequence, the narrative of Medea creates a situation of paradox. Attempting to reach the Mediterranean Sea from the Ocean, the Argonauts have just pulled their vessel for twelve days “across the back of a barren land” (line 26). They come to the mouth of Lake Triton, that body of water in the interior; Jason’s “chariot”—from “beam” (*doru*, 27), which by synecdoche can mean both “ship” and “chariot”—then reacquires its maritime character, and its “bridle” reacquires its use as anchor.¹³ In this way, the thematic categories of navigation and equitation are mingled, though they are carefully distinguished in the later phase of the narrative. In this singular situation (*pote*, 20; = T 5), Triton-Poseidon appears alone to the Argonauts.

In the absence of a true condition of initial *lack*, the meaning of the *manipulation* phase of the narrative ensemble remains hidden at first. Assuming mortal shape, Poseidon gives to Euphemus, first of the Argonauts to disembark on the shore of Lake Triton, a handful of earth: it is his “gift of hospitality” (*xeinia*, 22; *xenion*, 35).¹⁴ Should this be read as a simple act of welcome? Not at all, since the gift is accompanied by a clap of thunder sent by Zeus himself. Described as *aisios* (line 23), as responding therefore to the will of destiny, the sign from Zeus marks, within the narrative frame of the Argonauts’ expedition, the point of departure for a new narrative action. The new *subject* of the narrative action will not be the Argonauts as a group but Euphemus, king of the holy city of Taenarum, *anax* (45) and *hērōs* (36), the son of Europa and Poseidon, the one who masters horses (*hipparkhos*, 45), the child born in the center of continental Greece, near Cephissus, but who reigns over the extreme reaches of the Peloponnesus. It is definitely to his equal, then, that the god Poseidon, who takes the form of Eurypylus, speaks. Eurypylus himself, the scholia tell us, is the incarnation of Triton; but he is principally another son of Poseidon, of this god who, Pindar says, embraces the earth and has the power to shake it (*gaiaokhos*, *ennosidas*, 33).¹⁵

Insofar as it does not arise from a condition of *lack* and is consequently not the object of a query, the miraculous clod of earth appears as a spontaneous gift, without causal provocation. If the doubly divine intervention could be said to institute

this gesture of hospitality as the *manipulation* phase of narrative action, this first step leads to a *competence* and then to a *performance*, neither of which is realized. As envisaged in Medea's prophecy, the same narrative program would have led Euphemus, on his return to Taenarum, to throw the clod of earth into the mouth of Hades, which was believed to open near the cape of the same name. By the fourth generation; = T 3), the descendants of Euphemus of Taenarum, along with Danaeans emigrating from Sparta, Argos, and Mycenae, would have taken possession (*ke . . . labe*, in the unreal mode; lines 47ff.) of the Libyan continent.¹⁶

At this point, the comparison with an analogous narrative in the fourth book of the *Argonautica* by Apollonius of Rhodes is appropriate. In this epic poem, produced about three centuries after Pindar's, narration finds a temporal unfolding and a linear causality: as we will see, the Argonauts' encounter with Triton-Poseidon now represents nothing more than a stage in the sequence of trials imposed on the voyaging heroes; it corresponds to any one of a number of divine interventions aiming to ensure their return to Iolcus. Even if this encounter is later revealed in the *Argonautica* as assuming the role of *manipulation* phase in the story of the founding of Thera (not of Cyrene), this narrative will hold a position entirely subordinate to the unfolding of the principal plot. Pindar, to fulfill his eulogistic task, has completely reversed this subordination.

Let us just point out the fact that in Apollonius's poem, the *manipulation* phase of this secondary narrative, I would say, is activated by a regular condition of lack. Owing to a lack of *mētis* (line 1539), the Argonauts are unable to find the "passes" (*poroi*, 1538), the likely means, that would lead them out of Lake Triton.¹⁷ Hence the offering that is made—to the gods "of the locality" (*engenetai*, 1549)—of Apollo's tripod; hence also the countergift by Triton of a clod of earth. As ruler of this "littoral," Triton is soon revealed to be not only the avatar of the Eurypylus who is born in Libya (*engegaōs*, 1561) but, most important, the incarnation of Poseidon. Raised by a sacrifice intended for aquatic divinities (1600ff.), the god manifests himself fittingly in a shape at once equine and marine to guide the Argonauts' vessel toward the high seas. In a quest for knowledge, the Greek heroes thus acquire the power that enables them to complete an additional step along the return route out of the "confines" of the Libyan land (*peirata*, 1567). The characteristics of these confines—they nurture savage beasts (1561); terrestrial and aquatic paths intermingle there (1566ff.)—are found also in the Fourth *Pythian*.¹⁸ But Triton's prophetic words, which announce the future stages reached in the Argonauts' success—Crete, the Peloponnesus—do not evoke at any point the coming to ground of the clod of earth at Thera. Furthermore, Apollo and

Poseidon, whose respective interventions the Pindaric legend takes great care to distinguish, now appear together! The syntactic linearity of Apollonius's narrative produces as its corollary a kind of semantic flattening; it aims above all at reintegrating the line of the principal narrative.

REORIENTATION OF THE NARRATIVE

Even while projecting into a later phase of his narration the consequences of the Libyan episode, the Argonauts' tribulations, Apollonius neglects to mention the unrealized narrative program evoked by the Pindaric Medea in the Fourth *Pythian*. Against this program, uttered in the unreal mode, Medea sets the one that will be substituted for it in reality, though some features of the latter appear negative on first inspection. Euphemus, as it turns out, has just lost control of the clod of earth, whose guardians let it fall into the sea instead of bringing it to the mouth of Hades. But this in no way prevents the divine gift from undergoing a change of status: in coming to ground on the island of Thera, where Medea and the Argonauts are presently to be found (*en tāide nasōi*, 42; "upon this island"), it is promised as the eventual "indestructible seed" of Libya. But, for the realization and the *sanction* of this transformation to operate as *performance*, the intervention of an anthropomorphic actor is indispensable.

Through such an intermediary, the negative narrative program, activated by the coming-to-ground of the clod and substituted for the unrealized program, will not delay in taking on a positive inflection. This narrative reorientation is perfectly marked on the temporal level. Granted, the miraculous clod of earth arrives at Thera "out of season" (*prin hōras*, 43); but "now" (*nun*, 50), at the moment of Medea's prediction, an anthropomorphic actor will take the destiny of the divine gift back into his hands, to inflect its course. On reaching Lemnus—a point that Pindar locates, contrary to subsequent tradition, at the end of the Argonauts' expedition—Euphemus and his companions will unite with the women of the island.¹⁹ And in anticipation of the seventeen generations that will pass after the time contemporary with the utterance of Medea's words (T 4), one learns that the *genos* born of this fleeting union will emigrate to Thera, "in this island" (line 52 takes up line 43; = T 2). There, the future lord (*despotas*, 53) of Libya will be engendered. The *performance* resulting from Apollo's *manipulation* of Battus (line 5; = T 2), and the one that results from the *manipulation* of Poseidon (line 37; = T 5), finally reach a complete convergence.

The rectification of the conduct of the narrative program has as its corollary not only the indicated temporal deviation but, more important, a displacement

in the line of descent of Cyrene's founding hero. Battus is not the direct, legitimate descendant of Euphemus, in that his ancestor was born of an extramarital union between the king of Taenarum and a woman from another country. Added to this genealogical displacement, a change in the *sender* (*destinateur*) of the heroic action occurs: it is no longer Poseidon but rather Apollo who, according to the oracular words, is destined to guide Battus toward those regions of the Nile reigned over by Zeus, son of Cronus (lines 55ff.).

Medea's Theran prediction (T 4) situates itself spatially as well as chronologically at the center of the narrative. The phase of Euphemus's *manipulation* by Poseidon (T 5) and of his failed *performance* (T 3) thus actually locates itself beyond the place and before the time of the prediction. The clod of Libyan earth is lost at that time and subsequently reappears at Thera, in the very place of Medea's prophecy. Starting from this point, and extending into the future, the bastard race engendered from the passion of Euphemus and the Lemnian woman is guided from Lemnus to Thera so that it may take charge of its abandoned root—hence the second phase of *manipulation* already mentioned: Apollo presents to Battus, descendant of Euphemus, the oracle that will permit the seed to return to Libya, there to bear fruit. At the realization of this *performance*, there lacks nothing to complete the narrative program but the phase of *sanction*.

Medea the vaticinator is no longer in a position to prophesy the *sanction* of the narrative action, but she is the object of the narration enunciated by the poem itself. Taking up again the prospective narrative of the sorceress, Pindar, on two counts, doubles it even as he completes it (T 1).

First, in an address to Battus, the son of Polymnestus, the narrator insists on the *manipulation* phase of the Theran hero's colonial undertaking by showing that the oracular order from Apollo is the object of a triple repetition. Given in response to a question on an entirely different subject (the stammering that afflicts the future founder), this oracle is additionally said to be "spontaneous" (*automatos*, 60); it makes of Battus a predestined king (*peprōmenon*, 61). As for the *sanction* of Battus's colonizing act, it is not yet made explicit in these lines; but the narrator situates it in the prosperity of Arcesilas, who lives "now" (*nun*, 64),²⁰ in the present of the poem's recitation (T 1), which is also favored by the Delphic god. Such are those lines:

O blessed son of Polymnastos, it was you
whom the oracle, in accordance with that speech, exalted
through the spontaneous cry of the Delphic Bee,

who thrice bade you hail and revealed you to be
 the destined king of Kyrene,
 when you were asking what requital would come
 from the gods for your stammering voice.
 Yes, indeed, now in later time as well,
 the eighth generation of those sons flourishes in Arkesilas,
 to whom Apollo and Pytho granted glory . . . (TRANS. RACE 1997)

Interrupted by the longest narrative attested in a poem by Pindar—a narrative devoted to the adventures of the Argonauts—the address to Arkesilas is taken up again toward the end of the poem, at line 250. It is repeated at the exact moment when the unfolding of actions of which the Argonauts are protagonists begins to become confused with the events leading up to the founding of Cyrene: the Argonauts' diversion by way of the Ocean (and thus by way of Libya) and their lingering with the Lemnian women, who, we learn, have killed their husbands (line 252). The union of the Greek heroes with these homicidal women takes place upon the outcome of a foot race that could be thought of as a premarital trial, despite the fleeting character of the Argonauts' stay in Lemnos.²¹ This union is finally a fortunate one because from it will be born the privileged "race" of Euphemus, destined to rediscover Libyan ground: from Lemnos to Lacedaemonia, whence they will adopt Spartan culture; from there to Calliste-Thera, which they will colonize; and finally, through the intervention of Apollo, to Libya, where they will administer with prudent intelligence (*mētēn*, 262) "the divine city of Cyrene" (*astu theion Kuranas*, 261). The narrative finishes by rediscovering its own logic! With a final address to Arkesilas (298), it turns back to the place and the time of the sung performance of the epinicion composed by Pindar.

A SEMANTIC LABYRINTH

The complexity of semantic development in the Fourth *Pythian* loses nothing in comparison with that of its complex syntactic and temporal articulation. The interlacing of recurrent isotopic figures, which ensures their semantic coherence, is so dense that a commentary on the entire poem would require, from this point on, a book in itself. Now the different semantic strata within the narrative tissue of the Fourth *Pythian* depend intimately upon the enunciative voices that support them. Thus a monograph devoted to this attractive Pindaric poem emphasizes the skillful polyphony that interlaces the voice of the narrator addressing *hic et nunc* King Arkesilas the Fourth of Cyrene, the prophetic words of Medea

reported in direct discourse, and the oracles of Apollo relayed by the voice of the Pythia and cited indirectly, not to mention the individual voices of the Argonauts, protagonists of the narrative, to whom Pindar willingly surrenders the floor, such as Mopsus the soothsayer of Zeus. All of these voices are prophetic in a context in which the clod of Libyan earth itself becomes an oracular portent (*ornis*, 19).²²

Attention has yet to be paid to the hierarchical relations that, from the perspective of the legend of Cyrene, orchestrate the three voices mentioned above. These take shape, at first, through the mediation of the narrative's temporal organization. First (T 4), Medea's prophecy, inspired (*anepseuse*, 11) perhaps by Aphrodite (cf. 216ff.), occurs in the *pote*, the "once upon a time," chronologically the furthest back as far as enunciation is concerned. Seventeen generations later (T 2), one finds the oracles of the Pythia inspired by the god of Delphi. Finally, in the "today" (*sameron*, 1) of the poem's execution (T 1), the narrator is the one who speaks, relayed to Arcesilas's side by the Muse.²³

But, undoubtedly, the spatial arrangement of these different voices is the most important. I have already referred to the central position assured in the narrative itself by Thera, the location of Medea's prediction. To this we can now add Delphi, explicit origin of the Apollonian oracles; yet it belongs to the voice of the poet, from Thebes onward (line 222) and through the mediation of the Muse, to set Delphi and then Thera in relation with Cyrene. The spatial order of the utterance of the poem's different voices ends by inverting the temporal organization of these same voices. The most originary is also the most decentralized, and it is the most recent voice that can designate, after Thebes, the hitherto uncharted course between Thera, Delphi, and the land of Libya. To the temporal mark "today," which opens the poem, there responds the spatial mark that concludes it, closing the poem upon itself to create a ring-shaped structure: *Thebai*. Thebes is the source of ambrosial songs (299), that is to say, songs of divine origin.²⁴

Having considered the narrative's modes of utterance and the homologies that organize its space, time, and shared reference to divine inspiration, we move on to the actual tissue of utterances woven by these voices. Before teasing out the complex spatial image that the narrative constructs, we can try to define the isotopies that arrange its contents. We know that in classical Greece, as in other societies, the moment of matrimonial union is readily compared to labor. The metaphorical relation is frequently between a field made fertile by being plowed and sown and the essential goal of the Greek institution of marriage: the production of handsome children, themselves conceived, in a vegetal image, as offspring or as new shoots. But agricultural activity and, particularly, grain-centered cul-

ture serve, for their part, as the metaphorical expression of the achievement of civilization. Agriculture and the production of grain are situated at the center of Greek representation of social life, while political activity is itself the birthright of offspring born of legal marriage between citizens.²⁵

Precisely upon these three semantic levels and lines—of agricultural production, foundation of a family, and the development of civic life, according to a vegetal isotopy and a doubled human isotopy—Pindar articulates the semantic values of the narrative of founding Cyrene and civilizing Cyrenaica; the poem plays all the while upon their reciprocal metaphorical relations. The clod that Euphemus receives from the hands of Eurypylus-Poseidon as a hospitality gift is, in origin, a handful of earth (*gaia*, 26). But at the very moment when it is presented to Euphemus it becomes a fragment of “plowed earth” (*aroura*, 34), only to transform itself into a “divine clod” (*bōlax daimonia*, 37) when the hero sets foot on the ground of Libya to receive it. Incidentally, this encounter with the human incarnation of Poseidon occurs after the Argonauts’ long journey across a region of earth (*gaia*, 26) that is entirely barren. Arriving in Thera, the clod becomes the “indestructible seed” of Libya (*sperma aphthiton*, 43). Then, Medea’s prediction gives two complementary images of the clod’s return to its land of origin: the return is conceived as an act of transplantation (*phuteuesthai*, 15) by Libya, granddaughter of Zeus, and as the pulling of a root (*rhiza*, 15) from the “land battered by floods” (*haliplaktos ge*, 14) that Thera represents, a root destined to produce the trunk for numerous cities upon ground already prepared for its coming, the land consecrated to Zeus Ammon (*themethla* in line 16 implies in its etymology the founding act expressed by the verb *tithenai*). But the gardener for this transplantation would be Battus, the future master of these plains covered with clouds and rain (*kelainephea pedia*, 52), the fertile territory (*pion*, 56) controlled by the son of Cronus. Like the plays on time, the metaphor drawn from the fecundation of the earth contributes to the conjoining of two acts, the two narrative performances that, at the poem’s beginning, distinguished their respective phases of manipulation. At the beginning of the ode, Libya was already seen as a “productive” land (*karpophoros*, 6), and within this frame, the hill forming the acropolis of Cyrene could be defined as a breast (*mastos*, 8).²⁶ Having served as relay for the fecund clod, Thera can henceforth figure, in the proper sense of *matropolis* (20), as the “mother city.” The fecundation of the soil thus—simultaneously—results from and produces nurturing cities.

But this manipulation of earth is incapable, in its strictly feminine character, of fully accomplishing the act of founding a city. The absent masculine principle

will be supplied by the *genos* of Battus, by way of the narrative displacement described above. This *genos*, conceived in the bed of foreign women (*allodapai*, 50), becomes the object, at the end of the poem, of an important reinterpretation: it becomes a “predestined seed” (*sperma moiridion*; the term *sperma* being a correction by Hermann), planted in “foreign fields” (*arourai allodapai*, 254). Euphemus’s “race” takes on, in turn, a plantlike sprouting (*phuteuthen*, 256).²⁷ Its action bears as much upon the administration of the divine city of Cyrene (261) as upon the mastery and fecundation of Libya’s well-watered plains, which are made to “swell” (*ophellein*, 260) by the god’s benediction. Euphemus’s offspring will end, in fact, by controlling both the city’s political activity and the agricultural production of its *chōra*.²⁸ The success of this transplantation will deploy its full effects at the very moment when the poem by Pindar is uttered, in that its blossoming (*thallei*, 65) is attributed to Arcesilas the Fourth, the eighth offshoot (*meros*, 65) of Battus the founder.

The imbrication of these three metaphorical levels and lines through the Pindaric narrative (agricultural production, foundation of a family, development of civic life), no one of which is hierarchically superior to another, fails, however, to account sufficiently for the specificity of the founding of a colonial city. There is yet missing a properly cosmogonic dimension. The spatial trajectories (*parcours*) followed, respectively, by the clod (the feminine element) and by the race of Euphemus (the masculine), with clear-cut gender roles, are, in this respect, particularly important.

The famous clod issues from the shore of the Libyan Lake Triton. Various described as a lake, a sea, even a river, this strange stretch of water is hemmed in by solid land even while remaining in communication with the sea, but the Argonauts—as has been said—reach it by a land route. Neither sea nor earth, Lake Triton is also distinguished by its shallows. From Herodotus onward, this lake was renowned for the worship the inhabitants of its banks were reputed to offer up to Triton, Poseidon, and, above all, Athena. In point of fact, one of the numerous versions of the birth of Athena locates the event on the shores of Lake Triton; Tritogeneia is one who is “born of the earth” (*gēgenēs*).²⁹

But this terrain—propitious for chthonic births—is not in itself sufficient to ensure the fertility of the clod, hospitality gift of Poseidon. Its first destination, as we have seen, is one of the extremities of the Greek continent, the Peloponnesian Cape Taenarum with its mouth of Hades (line 44) and the sanctuary of Poseidon associated with it.³⁰ Through this opening, explicitly associated with “extremities,” Heracles is said to have dragged Cerberus into the light of day. Bac-

chylides describes the Hades visited by the heroic son of Zeus as the dwelling of Persephone, and Euripides produces a version of the legend according to which Heracles would have been initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries to permit his descent into hell. It is, besides, in the sacred wood consecrated to the chthonian Demeter, next to Hermione, that the hero would have buried the captured canine monster.³¹

To throw the clod of Libyan earth into the mouth of Hades at Cape Taenarum is thus to cause it to reach the kingdom of Persephone; it happens through a gesture of consecration characteristic of communication with the world of the dead. This act is perhaps to reproduce the gesture, made by legitimate wives in Athens, of placing young pigs in pits at the time of the Thesmophoria; the pigs' dead bodies are not intended to remain inactive in the bowels of the earth. Recuperated in the period of plowing and sowing and mixed with crop seeds, these evil-smelling remains represented the promise of an abundant harvest. We know that the exemplary act reputed to legitimate this strange rite is none other than the myth of Core's alternating sojourns in Hades and on the earth's cultivated surface. But the Libyan clod is not destined to know the revivification traced by the myth of Core and Demeter. As there is no fall into Hades, there is no Calligeneia, no "Beautiful Birth." In fact, on the occasion of this ritual, within the frame of the Athenian Thesmophoria, the growth of agricultural products and the generation (*spora*) of men were associated; as Epictetus teaches, the seed (*sperma*) must rest buried for a time in the earth in order to bear fruit.³²

Now, through the neglect of Euphemus and his guards, the clod of Libya disappears into the sea instead of being swallowed up into the bowels of the earth. An island, a bit of anchored earth in the vast stretches of sea, then receives it. The mediating role played by Thera is marked as much by its geographical position midway between Libya and the Peloponnesus as by its hybrid status as island, a status that many Greek insular lands share with Santorini.

Delos, for example, "battered by the waves," like Thera, is itinerant until the moment when the hospitality it accords Leto and Apollo finally fixes it in one place. Asteria becomes Delos in the same way that Calliste becomes Thera, at the moment of its colonization by the descendants of Euphemus (line 258). The civilizing intervention of Apollo becomes all the more indispensable in that, according to the Greek representation, the islands are first the product of a cosmogonic act by Poseidon, who, to form them, threw rugged mountains down into the sea and caused them to take root there, acting at a purely geological level. Thus, before the birth of Apollo, Delos offered a topography more propitious to seabirds

than to horses and is described by the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* as devoid of herds and of vegetation, a stony land threatening to disappear beneath the waves.³³ Rhodes plunges its roots directly into the sea and emerges through the action of Poseidon Genethlius, the “Generator,” to satisfy Helios, neglected by Zeus in the distribution of the honors (*timai*). In contrast to Delos, it is a nurturing land for men and favorable to herds. The reason, Pindar adds in the *Seventh Olympian*, is that it benefited from the shower of gold that Zeus made fall on the occasion of Athena’s birth; for her part, the goddess hastened to grant to Rhodes that it would excel in all artistic techniques. Like Delos, however, Rhodes will know the achievement of urban civilization only when it is colonized by Tlepolemus at the injunction of and under the protection of Apollo.³⁴

A MYTH OF AUTOCHTHONY

For some time, no doubt, the word *autochthony* has been on the reader’s lips. It is a strange autochthony, nevertheless, for these islands, which themselves undergo autochthonous births that generally benefit the founding heroes of continental lands or places (*chorai*). And, again, it is a question of birth out of the ocean depths, not out of the bowels of the earth. So, for example, at Sparta, the very first king of the land, founder of its aboriginal dynasty, was believed to have been born from the earth and consequently to have reigned upon his mother’s ground.³⁵ We know, too, the double myth of Athenian autochthony. The first king of Attica, Cecrops, not only is born from the earth—this is the fate of any number of primordial beings—but issues from the earth belonging to the city over which he will extend his sovereignty. Like Triton, he is *diphuēs*, a being half-man, half-serpent. As with the other colonizing heroes, his intervention signifies a change of name for the land over which he reigns: “Acte” becomes “Cecropia” before bearing the name “Attica.” But, more important, the autochthonous birth of Cecrops coincides with the moment the gods reapportion the Greek cities among themselves, the honors (*timai*) of Zeus, from which each receives, in turn, a share—hence the famous struggle between Athena and Poseidon. Thanks to the olive tree, Athena is able to extend her power over Attica, while Poseidon pretended to the same control by inverting the gesture of founding islands: under the blow of the god’s trident, the sea rises up in the center of Athens, upon the rock of the Acropolis.³⁶ As in primordial Libya, early Attica is marked by a mixture of earth and water.

The second legendary narrative of Athenian autochthony reverses the terms of the vegetal graft metaphor. No longer is the idea of germ and root transposed

into the geological domain to figure the creation of a territory and to anticipate, by this image, the birth of a *genos*. Instead, the sperm of a man is literally planted into an already existing soil to engender the first king of a long dynasty. This marks a reversal, but also an impoverishment: human generation is invested in the vegetal figure, certainly, though it abandons its geological and cosmogonic expression. The reason for these modifications in the functioning of the symbolic process can be sought in two different directions. This first is from the side of an underlying historical reality. According to the evidence, Attica was never founded by a colonizing act and was never so represented. But consideration must also be given to the narrative medium: the rationalized mythological account, attributed to Apollodorus, that gives us the Athenian legend does not lend itself to the constant game of metaphorical cross-checkings proper to the Pindaric epinicion.³⁷

A mythical and metaphorical situation analogous to that explaining the birth of Attica concerns Thebes. The autochthony to which the Cadmeans can lay claim is founded upon the tilling and seeding of the motherland, from which are born the Spartoi, literally the “sown men.” Aeschylus in the *Seven against Thebes* reappropriated this metaphor—of the generation of a *genos*—to illustrate the incestuous act of Oedipus, the parricide who inseminated the sacred furrow of his own mother and inserted there a blood-stained root (*rhiza*). With the dramatic poet, we reencounter the three levels—mineral, vegetal, and human—of the metaphorical expression of a reigning family’s birth, accursed as it might be.³⁸

There are, then, autochthony myths whereby continental cities give root to their inhabitants in the ground of the motherland. But there also exist “marine” autochthony myths that aim to give terrestrial roots to islands floating at sea, before causing continental peoples, capable of founding human civilization, to emigrate there. If Santorini occupies an intermediate geographical position between the continent and Libya, and if its foundation by Theras confers upon it, in all likelihood, the status of a hybrid autochthony like Delos or Rhodes, Libya itself assumes an even more marginal position, exemplifying a third class of possible representations of autochthony. Centered on Lake Triton and placed under the control of Poseidon, Libya is indeed truly neither earth nor sea. To acquire an “autochthonous” value, its roots would most fittingly originate on the outside, in the bowels of the continent, near Cape Taenarum. But in an additional confusion of separate categories, the Libyan earth comes to ground upon the island of Thera and can only there acquire the generative force of a germ; this also is the moment when human actors can intervene in a positive way.

Autochthony, therefore, cannot be realized without anthropomorphic actors. Of course, even before its arrival in Thera, the piece of Libyan earth has been manipulated by Euphemus, but the lack of care taken by the son of Poseidon causes the divine clod to fall short of its original destination. Should we be surprised when Apollonius of Rhodes, seconded by a commentator on Pindar, tells us that Euphemus has precisely the ability to synthesize, through his gift of walking on the ocean waters, the categories of sea and land? Conversely, does he not reach Lake Triton by a land route and yet on a boat? This capacity to confound semantic categories is inscribed even in the genealogy of the Taenarian king. His mother, Europa, is in fact the daughter of Tityus, a Giant born from Earth.³⁹ Doubtless these qualities can make of Euphemus the king of a port city attached to the continent, but not the founder of an essentially continental colony.

Reclaimed by a descendant of Euphemus, the Libyan clod could not have fallen into better hands. Not only has the union of which this bastard is the offspring taken place on an island, but, in addition, the Lemnian woman, the Taenarian king's bride during his stay, has killed her legitimate husband.⁴⁰ However, before establishing themselves at Thera, the descendants of Euphemus and the murderess "mingle" with the Lacedemonians, as in a sexual union (line 257).⁴¹ And the emigration to Thera, for its part, would have as its frame the colonial enterprise led by Theras the Lacedemonian, the eponymous hero of the island.

I will attempt to shed light on the convergence at Sparta between the descendants of Euphemus and the founding hero Theras when I discuss the text of Herodotus. For the moment, I limit myself to filling in the Pindaric allusions by specifying that Theras, Cadmean in origin and consequently from Thebes, comes from a continental city, though he lives as a foreigner in Lacedemonia. He is, in fact, only the maternal uncle of Eurysthenes and Procles, the Heraclids who carry on in Sparta the autochthonous dynasty that founds the two dynasties exercising political power over the city. Like the descendants of Euphemus, Theras is an outsider in relation to the political legitimacy of Lacedemonia. But on the island of Calliste, which his arrival transforms into Thera, he recovers his own. While in search of Europa, Cadmus had left one of his parents there, not without having founded a sanctuary consecrated to both Athena and Poseidon. Hence, explain the scholia, Pindar's qualifier for the island: "holy" (*hiera*, 6). And Hierocles adds—no doubt much later—that the worship of Apollo would have taken root there only consequently, on the occasion of settlement there by colonists originally from Lacedemonia.⁴² The colonial undertaking launched

toward Calliste-Thera thus finds itself in the hands of two lines with ties that are in part continental and with royal ancestry, but both strangers to the *genos* that holds political power in the capital. We rediscover these different aspects in the genealogy of Battus, and we will see that the narrative of the founding of Tarentum inserts its protagonists into much the same kind of ancestry. But in founding a colony of continental character, Battus enjoys an additional quality: he maintains a privileged relationship with Apollo, a point on which Pindar insists in the Fourth *Pythian* (lines 5ff., 50ff., 59ff., 259ff.).⁴³ The *sender* of the narrative action in this respect plays a central role.

NARRATIVE RECTIFICATIONS: APOLLONIUS OF RHODES' *ARGONAUTICA*

Before dealing with the qualities invested in the *senders* of the narrative action accounting for the colonization of Thera, we should compare the lot that the anthropomorphic actors reserve for the clod of Libya in the narrative by Apollonius of Rhodes. Some eloquent variations appear.

Inserted into a simple exchange of hospitality gifts when the Argonauts seek to escape from the shallows of Lake Triton, the clod of earth that Triton-Eurypylus-Poseidon offers Euphemus does not seem destined for any narrative future whatsoever. Only toward the end of the last book of the *Argonautica*, on the occasion of Euphemus's dream on the island of salvation, which Apollo made "to appear" (Anaphē, "Appearance," from *anaphainō*, 1730), is the clod enlisted in a narrative program, one that remains secondary to the principal narrative action of the poem. The reason the secondary program remains unresolved is that, on reaching Anaphē, practically at the end of the Argonauts' itinerary, the point is essentially one of presenting the *aition* of creating the neighboring island of Thera. At this point in Apollonius's scholarly narrative, the founding of Cyrene is no longer pertinent. But this Hellenistic epic poem still, in large measure, particularly in its four interpretations of the colonization process, pays tribute to the classical representation of it.

After they had untied their ropes from that island, blessed with fair weather, Euphemus remembered a dream he had had in the night, as he paid honor to the glorious son of Maia. He dreamed that the divine clod was in his arms, at his breast, and was nourished by white drops of milk, and from the clod, small though it was, came a woman looking like a young virgin. Overcome by irresistible desire, he made love to her, but lamented as though he had bedded his own daughter whom he had nursed with his own milk. She, however, consoled him with gentle words:

"I am of the race of Triton, I, my friend, am your children's nurse, not your daughter, for my parents are Triton and Libya. Entrust me to the maiden daughters of Nereus so that I may dwell in the sea near Anaphe. Later I shall go towards the sun's rays, when I am ready for your descendants." (4, 1731–45; trans. Hunter 1993, 139)

We begin, then, with Euphemus's dream, which substitutes recollection for the forgetting of an object that, in the Pindaric version, is the handful of earth. Divine (*daimoniē*, 1734), as in the Fourth *Pythian*, the clod is nurtured by Euphemus himself; the king of Taenarum is then cast in the role of its mother before becoming a lover when it transforms itself into a beautiful young girl. Through inversion of sexual roles and incest, all family roles are thus confused. But on a second interpretive level, for which the young girl herself is responsible, she reveals herself to be the daughter of Triton and Libya and destined to nurture the offspring of Euphemus, having first been entrusted to the Nereids.⁴⁴ The distinction between the family roles that devolve on each gender is reestablished by negating the incestuous relation and by a woman's assumption of the nurturing function. In addition, the young girl will mediate between the domain of the sea and the surface of the earth, following the same course as the island of Anaphē, which rises from the bottom of the sea at the will of Apollo. Entrusted for her rearing to the sea daughters of Nereus, the young girl will receive the descendants of Euphemus in the light of day. But the oneiric memory of Euphemus has for its double, at a third level, the waking memory of Jason. Thus, Apollo's oracle as given to the leader of the Argonauts at the beginning of the expedition ends up conferring on the dream and its interpretation a third meaning; the oracular speech, even while remaining figurative, transports us beyond the narrative's anthropomorphic surface. Euphemus must throw the clod into the waves so that, with the aid of the gods, it might become the island of Thera, future abode of his descendants: this handful of mud is indeed nothing other than a fragment of the terra firma (*ēpeiros*, 1753), which Libya represents, a gift from Poseidon. Little remains for Apollo's prediction, at this point, but to receive its realization, in a narrative reality that forms a fourth interpretive level. Mineral, anthropomorphic, and divine actors now behave in concert. Euphemus throws the clod into the sea's abyss, whence Calliste subsequently rises. Sacred (*hierē*, 1758), the island becomes nurturer to the children of the Taenarian Argonaut, of whose migratory course we proceed to learn: to Lemnus, whence they are driven by the Tyrrhenians; then to Sparta, where they are accorded the privileges of the city;

and finally to Calliste, to which they are led by Theras, who gives his name to the island risen from the waves—but of Battus, not a word.⁴⁵

The hierarchical inclusion of four enunciative and semantic levels seems to furnish the contemporary interpreter with unexpected hermeneutic confirmations. It is enough to privilege for explication one of the levels that the narrative proposes, so that the psychoanalyst, the narratologist, the theologian, and the historian may each profit. I limit myself here to a brief comparison with the parallel narrative of Pindar, avoiding a reduction to any single level that would become the explicator of the others.

From a syntactic point of view, the narrative of Apollonius, with its etiological aim, no longer presents the deflected program manifested by the Pindaric narration. Memory has replaced forgetting and has made Thera into the direct creation of Euphemus, who is manipulated by Poseidon and enlightened by Apollo. Instead of existing before his arrival, the island is born of the clod and changes its name when the descendants of Euphemus, led by the descendant of Polynices, come from Sparta to colonize it. The convergence, in the generation of Thera, of the explicit course of the clod, the itinerary of Euphemus's descendants, as well as that of Theras, corresponds to the joint interventions of the two divinities that the Pindaric narrative, for its part, works to distinguish. In its syntax, Apollonius's narrative is thus "rectified," as is—we will see—that of Herodotus. From a figurative viewpoint as well, the different enunciative levels of the narrative all tend to deny and to counteract the deviations that are revealed, at the first level, by Euphemus's dream.

On the other hand, Apollonius does not succeed in completely effacing certain figurative values belonging to the Pindaric narrative. The clod retains its generative power; it retains also its metaphorical capacity to be the nurturer of the *genos* of Euphemus. It is, in addition, the locus of the transition between the sea's domain and the terrestrial surface that is characteristic of the cosmogonic aspect of insular myths of founding. Also significant from this perspective is the collaboration between Poseidon's demiurgy and Apollo's founding intervention, even if Apollonius's narrative tends to superimpose them. In its syntactic dimension, the Hellenistic narrative can still be considered a myth of (insular) "autochthony," but its different levels of metaphorical expression are made explicit by the interpretations that have been integrated into the narrative itself to increase its verisimilitude.

THE TRIAD OF FOUNDING GODS

Back to the Fourth *Pythian*. As *senders* of human actions, the gods in the Pindaric version of Cyrene's colonization play precisely the determining role one would expect. The foundation phase, which manipulates even the ground of the colony, is placed entirely under the control of Poseidon—a "terrestrial" Poseidon, let us call him, to avoid the overused term "chthonic"—whose action is indispensable for creating and stabilizing the foundations of any city. Even at Thera, the above-mentioned worship is offered to Poseidon *Gaieokhos*, "who holds the earth." The sons of the earth god are then naturally the first kings of those cities newly established on firm ground.⁴⁶ But on islands and in the colonies, the primordial act of demiurgic foundation accomplished under the auspices of Poseidon remains without effect if it is not followed by an immigration of men originally from the continent and guided by Apollo. Even Delphi does not escape this scenario. Chthonic Gaia and Poseidon are the ones who utter the oracles before Apollo takes the prophetic function back from these primordial divinities. The avowed aim of this divine succession is nothing less than civilization (*hēmerotēs*).⁴⁷

After Poseidon the founder and Apollo the colonizer, we have yet to deal with the third *sender* of Greek civilizing action, as narrated by Pindar, on the Libyan continent: Zeus. Every phase of this action is favored by the presence, albeit discreet, of Zeus, the father of the Olympian gods, who marks by an auspicious clash of thunder (*aision*, 23) the gift of Libyan earth by one son of Poseidon to another. After its diversion through Thera, this terrestrial root will emerge from the ground that already serves as a foundation for the worship of Zeus Ammon (line 16). Beneath the gaze of Zeus's eagles, protectors of the *omphalos* of Delphi, Battus receives from Apollo the oracle enlisting him in the colonizing effort (4).⁴⁸ Apollo alone is capable of ensuring the fertility of Libyan soil, to make of it the "rich sanctuary" that is consecrated to him (56).

This appartenance of Libya to Zeus is not expressed merely in the worship of Ammon but also, in legend, by the ancestry of Libya, the granddaughter by Epaphus (line 14) of the son of Cronus, ancestor of the Danaans, and by the characteristic climate of the region around Cyrene, where black clouds gather to fecundate the ground (56).⁴⁹ Zeus's presence in Libya is required as much because he is the imposer of order over the terrestrial surface as from his being keeper of the fecundating water from "on high." The god of the heights thus orchestrates his action with that of the god of the depths to constitute, through their separa-

tion, the terrestrial surface, the world that nurtures mankind.⁵⁰ But under the control of Poseidon and Zeus, the African continent as yet exists merely as the land of Libya. Only with the foundation of Cyrene under the auspices of Apollo will it be marked by the seal of civilization (Greek, of course!). By simplifying, no doubt in the extreme, we can represent the collaboration of these three divinities in the colonizing act as a distribution of the isotopies and semantic lines that run through the narrative: to Poseidon the mineral, to Zeus the vegetal, and to Apollo the human!

SEMANTIC REVERBERATIONS OF THE ODE

The theme of generation/germination takes upon itself, by turns, figures organized in isotopies: mineral, vegetal, and human; attachment of masculine political legitimacy to an earth-motherland; complementarity of Poseidon, Zeus, and Apollo; and so on. These lines of semantic development ensure the coherence and richness of the Pindaric narrative. Guaranteed by the assimilation of the different enunciative voices that carry the narrative, this play of semantic reverberations and reciprocal metaphors recurs in the two other narrative sections of the Fourth *Pythian* that focus on the Argonauts' expedition and on the fate of Damophilus, contemporary of Arcesilas the Fourth.

Relying on Segal's study, we here need only recall that the Pindaric version of the Argonauts' expedition presents the capture of the Golden Fleece as the root (*phuteuthen*, 69) of fame for the Minyans who accompany Euphemus, the ancestor of Battus. Jason's arrival at Iolcus is predicted by an oracle uttered near the Delphic *omphalos*, "navel," at the center of the earth mother (line 74). Under Apollo's protection, the hero comes to recover the power accorded his great-grandfather Aeolus (107): thus he merely returns to the land of his fathers (97ff., 117ff.), whose rule was overturned by Pelias, son of Poseidon, a descendant, like Jason, of Zeus (138ff., 167). As for the quest for the Golden Fleece, it is placed under Zeus's protection in an episode that inverts the gift of Libyan earth to Euphemus. It is at the stern of the ship, once the anchor has been raised, that Jason receives the favorable sign from the father of the gods (191ff.). Arriving at the Euxine Sea, the Argonauts pass into the domain of Poseidon (204). In this untamed land, Jason succeeds in accomplishing an incredible labor, after having yoked the raging oxen of Aietes and having promised marriage to his daughter Medea (218ff.). Finally, the dragon that guards the Golden Fleece submits under Jason's blows to the same fate as Python beneath the sword of Apollo.⁵¹ As for the heroes' return to Greece, it was anticipated by the adventures of Euphemus,

with which it partly coincides. Pindar, then, breaks Jason's circular course into two segments, whose order of succession he inverts. But, reestablished in its circularity, this itinerary repeats, with the aid of adjacent figures, the course of the miraculous clod that—with its autochthonous value—becomes in Libya the foundation of a city, after its long diversion by way of Thera.

And an analogous course is desired by Pindar for Damophilus, the Cyrenean exiled to Thebes: the same circular scheme, but with its second portion projected into the future in relation to the moment of utterance. After frequenting the palace of Battus (line 280), and although he has learned to hate hubris (284), this just heart lives far from “the land of his fathers” (280). He is at that point compared to Atlas, the son of a Titan and an Oceanid who—other texts add—is banished to the limits of the earth to ensure, from his place at the bottom of the sea's abyss, the cosmological separation of sky and earth. To free the Cyrenean from this assimilation with the quasidemurgic role of the Titanid and to reestablish the order desired by Zeus, Pindar asks Arcesilas, who enjoys the protection of Apollo Paean, to intervene as a doctor would (270). Damophilus hopes, in effect, to recover his “house,” that is to say, the neighborhood of the spring of Apollo, with its joys of the banquet and of poetry amid citizens living in harmony (*hēsukhia*, 296).⁵²

In short, it is always the same passage that is in question, circular yet transformational, from a state in which civilization is merely latent to a state of realized civility, through an intermediate stage in which the protagonist grapples with primordial forces that, once dominated, give rise to culture.⁵³ The terrestrial germ of Libya becomes a Greek city after sinking beneath the ocean waves; Jason, a king in strength, will reign over Iolcus after imposing tillage, yoke, and marriage upon the untamed forces—geological, theriomorphic, and anthropomorphic—of a fringe territory; Damophilus will return to the activities of civilization and of the political community of men after purging his presumption by undergoing the primordial punishment of Atlas. But, in a reversal that belongs exclusively to Pindar, Damophilus's Titanesque sojourn in Thebes is transformed in *extremis* into an initiation into poetry in the vicinity of a welcoming and inspirational spring (line 299, cf. 21ff.). Subtly, the poet inserts into the domain of civilization the place of his enunciation, even while taking up again the poetic itinerary that, leading from Delphi to Cyrene by way of Thebes, opens the poem. The ode hence ends as it began, as the banquet understood as the location of literary inspiration. But this most skillful movement of recuperation belongs to the constraints that the occasion imposes on the Pindaric narrative of Cyrene's founding.

The Syntax of a Divine Biography: Ninth Pythian

The Cyrenean myth told in the Fourth *Pythian* thus takes as its figure the shaping of the earth of Libya, in an action that, through the intermediacy of a vegetal growth gradually humanized, ends by assuming the nearly historical person of Battus, thereafter centering on the city of Cyrene. The Ninth *Pythian* leaves to one side the metaphorical echoes of these three interwoven isotopies of generation (autochthonous) in order to fix the listener's attention on the colonial city. Returning again to metaphorical expression, the foundation narrative builds itself around another theme and, following a completely different isotopy, takes the figure of the biography of the city's eponymous nymph.

It is undoubtedly easier to reconstitute the plot of this version in its narrative logic than that of the previous ode. In the mountainous confines of Thessaly, the young Cyrene guards her father's herds, defending them from the attacks of wild animals. Apollo is taken with the young girl in the course of her athletic struggle against a mighty lion (situation of lack provoked by the desire for amorous fulfillment). The advice asked by the god of the Centaur Chiron with regard to the realization of his desire allows, in a typically Pindaric procedure, the anticipation of the outcome of the intrigue at the same time that the manipulation phase is provided. Paradoxically, it is the wise Chiron who, in revealing the oracular god's future to him, appears as the *sender* of Apollo.⁵⁴ The union of the nymph and the god, probably the latter's first experience of love, will have Libya as its frame. To accomplish the transformation proper to every narration, the *performance* realized in the form of conjunction must be accompanied by a spatial disjunction. The promised *sanction*: the birth of a son destined to reunite divine qualities in his own immortality.

Undoubtedly, the prophetic counsel of Chiron is only a narrative artifice intended to break the linearity of the narrative. In any case, with the *competence* that is his by virtue of his divinity, Apollo immediately realizes in the divine *performance* the Centaur's prophecy. He joins in love with Cyrene in the palace of Libya, which, for this occasion, is also considered as a woman. Reserved exclusively for Cyrene is a second sanction in addition to the promised son: control of a city distinguished by its beauty and excellence in the games. The pretext for the narrator to advert at this point to the occasion of the poem is the brilliant Pythian victory of Telesicrates of Cyrene.⁵⁵ *Epinicie oblige!*

It has often been said that the heart of Pindar's narrative is matrimonial union, doubled by the young couple's transportation to Libya. There has been little anal-

ysis, however, of the figures assumed by this simple narrative transformation. It has been considered a secondary event, and critics have been insensitive to the change in status it implies for Cyrene.

Cyrene is a virgin hunter (*parthenos agrotera*, 7). But, unlike Atalanta, for example, her rejection of labor and of conviviality with her companions (lines 18ff.) is not the corollary of a rejection of marriage. If Cyrene battles with wild beasts, she does so because she is the shepherdess of her father's cattle (21ff.).⁵⁶ Just as the young Theseus fought barehanded the monsters that infested Attica, she struggles with the lion (26ff.). Like that adolescent hero, she is armed with javelins and a sword (20ff.).⁵⁷ These masculine qualities of strength and courage (32ff.) attract Apollo, who is himself represented as an adolescent with long hair (5). In addition, the young woman's genealogy singles her out as being close to the founding gods of the Hellenic cosmos. Her father, Hypseus, king of the Lapiths, issues from the union of the river Peneus, son of Ocean, and the naiad Creusa, daughter of Ge. Their union is sheltered by the dales of Pindus, the great mountain chain separating Epirus from Macedonia and Thessaly to the east.⁵⁸

Cyrene, with Apollo, takes advantage of Aphrodite's hospitality after being transported to Libya in the god of Delos's divine chariot. Soon, she becomes sovereign (*despoina*, 7) of this territory, mistress of a veritable city (*arkhepolis*, 54). When she reaches adulthood, the nymph returns to a protective role in which she is likened to a man. But the fact that the wedding of Cyrene and Apollo marks the installation of the young woman in a political role does not prevent the marriage from assuming its traditional role as a passage to maternity, the function that characterizes the status of the married woman. In Libya, Cyrene gives birth to the son who will be brought up and immortalized by the Seasons, as well as by his great-grandmother Ge. There is nothing surprising in such a destiny for a son who will take up sheep-herding, his mother's former task. He will also assume roles (by way of interposed *epiclēseis*, or "cultic surnames") that will identify him with both Apollo and Zeus: Agreus, "the hunter"; Nomius, "the shepherd"; and Aristaius, the "excellent" or the "benefactor" (65).⁵⁹ Hunting and herding open up the perfect order, established by Zeus.

The contrast between the two poles of spatial displacement accompanying Cyrene's transformation into both an adult woman and a man simultaneously repeats this transformation. Apollo notices the young Cyrene, an inhabitant of "the thickets of shadowy mountains" (lines 33ff.) in the wind-battered Pelion range (5), lying at the eastern limit of Thessaly.⁶⁰ Apollo wants to bring the huntress into the "extraordinary garden" kept by Zeus in Libya (53). It seems, on this occa-

sion, that Aphrodite rules there.⁶¹ So the words addressed by Chiron to the young Apollo:

I will speak. You have come to this glen to be her husband,
and you are about to take her over the sea
to the finest garden of Zeus
where you will make her ruler of a city,
after gathering an island people to the hill of the plain.

But as for now, Libya, mistress of broad meadow,
will welcome your famous bride in her golden palace
with gladness, and there at once she will grant her
a portion of land to hold as her lawful possession,
one neither devoid of plants rich in every fruit,
nor unacquainted with wild animals. (TRANS. RACE 1997)

So, the young woman who had refused to take up domestic chores is conjoined with Apollo in a golden palace (line 56, and again 69). Now sovereign, Cyrene has part of the land at her disposal (*khthonos aisa*, 56). It is a land of “vast prairies” whose produce would still be called remarkable. According to an image used in the Fourth *Pythian*, the land is the “flowering root” (8) of the third continent, as was Libya in the Greek image of the inhabited world.⁶² Libya is not simply *chōra*, “territory,” without an urban center, however. This center, built on top of a hill where Cyrene will assemble “an island people” (54ff.), will be the city that bears her name.⁶³ The Thessalian woman’s reign over this fertile soil in no way prejudges its future colonization by the Therans.

SEMANTIC ISOTOPIES AND NARRATIVE VARIATIONS

The myth of the union of Apollo and Cyrene stages a transformation that assumes the different figures around the theme of matrimonial union. The Ninth *Pythian* reproduces the process that determined the whole narration in the Fourth *Pythian*, renewing the same theme with different figurative variations in different narratives.

The legitimate marriage introduced by the conquest of the fiancée by the young hero (*competence*), which results in sexual union (*performance!*) and procreation (*sanction*), is an isotopy that, far from being reduced to a mere reiterated unity, finds a syntactic articulation in the narrative’s development.⁶⁴ Alexidemus’s marriage with the daughter of the Libyan king of Irasa, modeled on the wedding of Danaus’s forty-eight daughters; the wedding of Telesicrates, the ode’s

addressee, with the young woman of Cyrene; and the usually forgotten union of Alcmene with Zeus and Amphytrion, which produces the hero par excellence, introduced by the evocation of his own nephew Iolaus—all are figurative variations. All these unions have well-marked antecedents and consequences in their narrative development.⁶⁵

Anteus is the king of Irasa and the father of the young Libyan woman offered in marriage. The son of Poseidon and Ge, he is a giant with whom Heracles will do battle, according to Pindar, to prevent him from offering his hostages in sacrifice to his divine father.⁶⁶ The monstrous traits that link this king to a Polyphemus or a Cercyon do not hinder him from organizing races (that most Greek of competitions) to decide among those aspiring to the hand of his daughter. The swiftest, Alexidemus, will enter a just marriage (*gamos*, 112, 114) with this exceptionally beautiful girl. The *xenos* leads his fiancée before the assembled crowd of nomadic cavaliers. Even if some scholiasts hesitate to identify the Anteus of the Ninth *Pythian* with Heracles' adversary, there is little doubt that the union of the Libyan daughter and the noble Cyrenean symbolizes the integration of the indigenous population with the first group of Greek colonists under the sign of patriarchy. Irasa was, of course, the most beautiful region of Libya, according to Herodotus. And in later tradition, Anteus's daughter bears the name "Barce," the name of the city founded under Arcesilas the Second by dissident aristocrats who seem to have depended upon the support of the indigenous population for their political undertaking. This is a discreet Pindaric allusion to the political condition of Cyrene at the time of the poem's performance.⁶⁷

Yet, according to the scholia on this passage, Alexidemus is an ancestor of Telesicrates (line 105), the Pythian victor celebrated by Pindar. During the course of the celebration of different Cyrenean games, the young athlete wins the admiration of young women (99) who dream of making this brilliant conqueror their husband or son, thus becoming women capable of ensuring their city's fame (74). This is a situation that seems to invert the relation between the love-struck Apollo and Cyrene, the admired athlete;⁶⁸ but one must not forget that the suitors' contest (in which Alexidemus, ancestor of Telesicrates, participates) plays a mediating role and acts as a kind of narrative pivot.

Through these interlocking narratives, man progressively becomes the subject of the central action: the feminized Apollo is subjected to the advice of Chiron, eventually kidnaps Cyrene, and takes her to Libya to make her its queen. Alexidemus takes the Libyan daughter of Anteus to Cyrene, thus integrating indigenous legitimacy with Greek power. Telesicrates soon marries—at least, this is what the

imbrication of the three narratives suggests—one of the young Cyrenean women whose admiration and love he has aroused.⁶⁹ Husband or son? This is one way to sum up the twofold narrative consequence, made explicit in the two other narratives, of the conquest of the fiancée (*manipulation* and *competence*) in a single formula. Telesicrates will be the Apollo or the Alexidemus of the chosen Cyrenean woman (*performance*), but he will also be likely to engender a descendant worthy of him (*sanction*), just as Cyrene and Apollo's love produces the immortal Aristeus, and his own *genos* issues from the marriage of Alexidemus and the beautiful native. What varies, on the other hand, is the more remote antecedents and the consequences proper to each of these unions: the transfer to Libya of a Greek woman who fights wild animals and who, under the control of a Greek god, will reign over a city; the transfer to Cyrene of a native woman, belonging to a nomadic people, who will become the wife of a Greek colonist; the union in Cyrene of a Cyrenean woman with a Cyrenean man who has just competed victoriously in games held in honor of the god who initiated the whole series of events.

In these interlocking, echoing actions, each performance becomes the manipulation phase of the one that follows. And each of these transformative matrimonial unions is the site of a modification that tends toward progressive Hellenization and masculinization of Libya. The Ninth *Pythian's* narrative development is hence to be read not only horizontally but also in its vertical dimension.

NATURE AND CULTURE?

Doubled by a spatial transference, these different marriages introduce their respective protagonists to a new status: a passage from nature to culture, as the most recent interpreters (clearly influenced by Claude Lévi-Strauss) have affirmed, moving from the figurative isotopy to the theme of the ode. But things are much more complex, and we must distrust binary logic—too often applied without nuance in the field of anthropology.

It is hardly a controversial point that Pelion, where Apollo falls in love with Cyrene, corresponds to the Greek representations of savagery. But within this framework, Cyrene defends a pursuit that may be said to be the first stage on the road to civilization: the activity of herding. Wild animals (line 21) are contrasted with the “paternal cattle” (23). Without taking fruit production into account (7, 58; cf. *Pyth.* 4.6), this is exactly the activity to which the vast plains of Libya, especially the Cyrenean region, are best suited. Cyrene is said to be “rich in herds” (*polumēlos*, 6).⁷⁰ The installation in Libya of the Greek Cyrene results in the creation of the most beautiful of cities (69), surrounded by a *chōra*,

“territory,” devoted essentially to pasturage, not agriculture. Troy’s founding, as described in the *Iliad*, follows an analogous model. Zeus generally supervises operations, while Poseidon builds the walls of the city, and Apollo opens Ida’s valleys to grazing.⁷¹ When Cyrene enjoys a complementary state of civilization by way of Alexidemus’s marriage with the native king’s daughter, the activities of the natives—those nomadic cavaliers (123)—are integrated into the colonized domain and undergo a transformation. Under the influence of Greek technical knowledge, native equitation becomes the art of driving a horse-drawn chariot, an art destined to bring fame to the city (4).⁷² As for the future marriage of Tele-sicrates, it will plant on the soil of Cyrene one who, as hoplite, is distinguished at the greatest games of Greece. Back to the situation of performance of the Ninth *Pythian*, with a perspective open toward the near future!

HELLENISTIC VARIANTS: CALLIMACHUS’S *HYMN TO APOLLO*

The establishment of this first stage of civilization in Libya corresponds exactly to the function imparted to Apollo in the episode in the *Hymn to Apollo* that introduces the Callimachean version of the founding of Cyrene. The Alexandrian poet, after defining Apollo’s general attributes (archery, song, divination, medicine), specifies his function as “shepherd” (*nomios*): he looks after (*etrephe*, 48) oxen, goats, sheep, and mares. And on this same function of *melotrophia* (cattle-raising) the shepherd-god’s capacity to found cities depends. Apollo “weaves” (*huphainei*, 57) the first foundings (*themeilia*, 57, 58, 64) at Delos by establishing the first altar there; the famous Ceraton is formed by intertwining (*epleke*, 61) the horns of the goats of Cynthus, which were hunted by Artemis, sister of the founding god. The horned altar’s construction, with its foundation (*edethlia*, 62) and the walls that enclose it, appears figuratively to represent the passage from the savagery that reigned in Delos before Apollo’s intervention to the civilized state signified by the god’s edifying weaving. This founding transformation constitutes a supplementary aspect of the Apollonian *tekhnē* (42).⁷³ Such are the lines (71–80) sung by the fictive chorus of young men staged by Callimachus:

But I call thee Carneius; for such is the manner of my fathers. Sparta, O Carneius! was thy first foundation; and next Thera; but third the city of Cyrene. From Sparta the sixth generation of the sons of Oedipus brought thee to their colony of Thera; and from Thera lusty Aristoteles set thee by the Asbystian land, and builded thee a shrine exceeding beautiful, and in the city established a yearly festival wherein many a bull, O Lord, falls on his haunches for the last time, Hië, Hië, Carneius! (trans. Mair and Mair 1955, 55)

Narrating Cyrene's foundation, Callimachus's hymn to Apollo tallies, in its broad outline, with the version Pindar gives in the Fifth *Pythian*, as we will see. Then the poetic narrative goes back in time to deal with an episode predating the installation of the Greeks in Cyrene. In this episode, which already figures in Herodotus's *logos*, the Thera colonists live for seven years on the site of Aziris. This substitutes for the contest for the hand of the king of Irasa's daughter, while still carrying out an analogous intermediary function. Callimachus tells us that under Apollo's watchful eye, the Greek warriors celebrated the Carneia with Libyan women, in this wooded spot, before reaching the waters of Cyre. In this place, intermediate between Thera and Cyrene, the native women's participation in one of the most widespread Apollonian festivals—which become the pivot of Cyrene's future festival calendar—displays the same will to integrate on the part of the autochthonous population as does the wedding of Alexidemus and Anteus's daughter.⁷⁴

Apollo and his consort, without respect for spatial likelihood, admire the Greek dances from the Mount of Myrtes, Cyrene's future center.⁷⁵ This spatial displacement is a pretext for a new leap in temporal origins. The narration becomes that of the rape of Cyrene and of her struggle to defend the herds of the indigenous king Eurypylos, not those of her father. This displacement of the young woman's heroic battle with the beasts, from Thessaly to Libya, has not failed to preoccupy philologists. At least as far back as Acesandrus's *History of Cyrene*, the displacement served simply to situate the exploits of the city's eponymous nymph in a wholly Cyrenean perspective. This manipulation of the founding myth should not be thought surprising, because it brings the triumph of the first state of civilization, represented by the Thessalian's victory over a wild beast, back into Libyan territory.⁷⁶ By making Eurypylos, that hypostasis of Poseidon, the aboriginal ruler of Libya and the lion's head the price of his realm, Acesandrus's version presents Cyrene's great *fait accompli* in Libya as the advent of a new royal power that imposes herding and grazing in a region menaced by savagery. By means of different figures, both Callimachus's and Acesandrus's narratives serve to confirm the underlying theme in the Ninth *Pythian*.

Likewise we can understand the role of mediators, who in this case include Chiron, Aristeus, and Heracles, in the context of the transition from savagery to pastoralism. One recent analysis shows well that Cyrene will excel in precisely those arts that Chiron teaches: hunting and fighting. In his roles as prophet, pedagogue, healer, and cavalier, the Centaur is close to the god he is called upon to advise. No doubt his double nature—human and equine—defines him from the

first as the mediator. Nevertheless, he is a mediator between the wildness of the mountainous forest in which he lives (line 30) and the pastoral domain, guarded by Apollo and Cyrene, not just between “nature” and “culture.”⁷⁷

The hunter and the shepherd are the two poles that designate Aristeus’s *epiclêseis* “surnames,” “Hunter” and “Shepherd” (line 65). The son of Apollo and Cyrene is endowed with these qualities also by Apollonius of Rhodes in the *Argonautica*, in which Aristeus’s brief gesture is not a mere insertion in the Argonauts’ voyage to Libya but the action that explains the origin of the etesian winds. This is proof of the narrative function’s malleability in Greek myths. The Hellenistic version of the legend retains its semantic values and is not hindered by the narrative detour. Aristeus, born in Libya, is brought to Thessaly, where he is handed over to Chiron for his education. Once adult, he becomes Apollo’s double, endowed with the arts of healing, divination, and herding. He tends the herds on the plain of Phthia, between mountains and river. Then he is called to Ceos, where he assumes another of his father’s functions: saving the island from the scourge of drought. The methods Aristeus uses evoke both the moisture necessary to the exercise of his pastoral function and Zeus Icmæus, “the moist,” by offering a sacrifice to him and to the burning Sirius. In answer, Zeus sends the etesian winds to refresh Ceos from that time forward.⁷⁸ Cyrene’s soil similarly owes its fertility to Zeus’s benevolence; he favors the climate by accumulating black clouds above it.

Heracles, Panhellenic in his notoriety, is ably introduced by the evocation of Iolaus, his local homologue. The Theban hero Iolaus, related to Heracles, recalls the place of the poem’s composition and perhaps that of Telesicrates’ victory—Thebes itself. Like Telesicrates and his ancestor Alexidemus, Iolaus and Heracles are athletes. The son of the Theban Alcmene liberates Greece from its monsters in the course of his athletic struggles, so that it can welcome civilization.⁷⁹ His combat with the Nemean lion closely resembles that of the nymph Cyrene, while as the exemplary son (lines 84ff.) he evokes Aristeus. The young woman’s transformation into a masculine, heroic figure might be brought about in this assimilation.

No doubt the different myths in play in the Ninth *Pythian* aim to heighten the praise of Telesicrates’ brilliant victory. This Cyrenean athlete’s force, by a pun on his own name (“who accomplishes by force”), culminates in victory, just as marriage culminates in the birth of a legitimate son.⁸⁰ But through this metaphorical assimilation of agonistic victory and matrimonial union, the legend of Cyrene’s founding gains from Pindar’s echoing play with different legends. Their figures, articulated according to the matrimonial isotopy, show the more abstract the-

matic passage from savagery to herding, which informs the classical representation of the flourishing colony's birth and its singular civilization. This particular civilization developed from three sources of Greek culture: Thessaly, thanks to Apollo; Delphi, thanks to Telesicrates; and Thebes, thanks to Pindar, the composer of the victory song. Here, it is no longer the narrative syntax of the poem but the unfolding of its semantics that leads us back to the situation of enunciation of the song.

The Age of Heroes: Fifth *Pythian*

To sing for a second time the praises of the victory won by Arcesilas the Fourth at the chariot race at Delphi, the Fifth *Pythian* no longer has recourse to the metaphorical entanglements of different isotopies developed in the same narrative, as the Fourth did. Nor does it go back to the overlapping of narrative transformations on the homologous figurative content, as in the Ninth. The ode's development organizes a portrait gallery into a route that advances and then retreats in time, in a constant spatial traffic between different sites in continental Greece and Cyrene itself. The narrative action of the poem consists of these displacements. As for the actors, the sequence in which they appear springs from common enjoyment of the *olbos* (lines 14, 55, 102) given by the gods, a prosperity that always has Cyrene as its setting.

We start with Arcesilas, the victor celebrated at the time of the poem's enunciation. Arcesilas, through the power accorded him by the gods (lines 12ff.), is the just ruler of many cities. Next, there is the narrator, who has confided his song to a chorus of men under Apollo's authority (20ff.; spatial link between Thebes and Cyrene). And Arcesilas's brother-in-law, Carrhotus, the charioteer, artisan of the victory celebrated in Cyrene, consecrated his chariot to the god of Delphi (25ff.; connection of this site with Cyrene). Carrhotus's return to the Libyan plain, in the city of his fathers (*patrōia polis*, 53, recalls the city and the *chora* surrounding it), evokes the memory of the *olbos* of Battus, founder of Cyrene by Apollo's order (55ff.; reiteration of the route from Delphi to Cyrene). Apollo also favored the installation of the Heraclids, founders of the continental Greek cities' definitive state in the Argolid, Messenia, and Laconia (69ff.; route from Thessaly to the Peloponnesus).⁸¹

Having reached back to the most distant point in legendary history, the narrator moves quickly along the chronological line while developing the isotopy of the favorable welcome reserved for all the protagonists who have suffered a spatial displacement. To evoke the work of the city-states' refounding by the

Heraclids is also to recall the itinerary followed by the *genos* of the Aegids, which in its mythical origin traces an opportune supplementary relation between the place of the poem's composition (Thebes) and that of its enunciation/execution (Cyrene). Pindar enumerates the stages of migration, willed by the gods and by destiny (*moira*, 76), of those who are ancestors of both himself (*emoi pateres*, 76) and the Cyrenean colonists: Thebes, Sparta, Thera, and Cyrene, the "well-built" city (*agaktimena*, 72ff.):

And mine (*to d'emon*) it is to proclaim (*garuein*)
the delightful glory that comes from Sparta,
whence men born
as Ageidai, my forefathers, came to Thera,
not without divine favor, but some Fate led them. (TRANS. RACE 1997)

The beginning of the future Aegids' migration is paralleled by the arrival of the Trojans in Libya. Sons of Antenor, they were driven from Troy by the city's destruction and were accompanied in their flight by Helen (lines 82ff.; link between Troy and Cyrene). The coincidence of these two *genē* in Cyrene allows for the effacement of temporal distance that, in fact, separates the Trojans' arrival in Libya from that of Battus. In this respect, repetition of the isotopy of hospitality makes possible a double return to the present and contributes to reinforcement of the impression of the two interventions' simultaneity. In fact, though, they are altogether separate in time. In effect, the evocation of the Theban Aegids' emigration, willed by the gods (*hikonto*, in the aorist, 75), entails that of the present Cyrenean celebration (*sebizomen*, 80; celebration assumed by the narrator) of the Apollonian festival of the Carneia, which was received (*anadeksamenoi*, 78) in the past from these immigrant Spartan heroes. The Carneia's evocation, in turn, recalls the older migratory movement of the Trojan foreigners (*xenoi*, 82) descended from Antenor (*molon*, in the aorist, 85). The Cyreneans now receive and greet this "horse-loving" race, in the time of the poem's enunciation (*dekontai*, in the present, 86), probably on the occasion of the Carneia's celebration.⁸² This double passage from past to present takes the figure of a transition from myth to rite, and everything happens as if it were finally the Theran colonists, descendants of the Aegids, who had received the Antenorids in Cyrene!

From there we have received
the communal banquet with its many sacrifices,
and in your feast,

Karneian Apollo, we venerate
 the nobly built city of Kyrene,
 which the sons of Antenor, Trojan foreigners delighting
 in bronze armor, still hold, for they came with Helen
 after they saw their homeland go up in smoke
 during war. And warmly is that race of chariot drivers
 welcomed with sacrifices
 and greeted with gifts by those men
 whom Aristoteles brought in swift ships,
 when he opened a deep path through the salt sea.

(TRANS. RACE 1997, 317, LINES 77–88)

The movement back in time can occur through the reprise of the isotopy of hospitality, now figured by the honors that proceed from it. Thus Battus, after his founding work, is honored by the people as a hero (lines 89ff.). The same can be said for Battus's successors, the kings of Cyrene, who become "saints" (*hieroi*, 97) in the burial they have received in front of their palace. The succession of Battus's descendants leads us naturally to Arcesilas the Fourth, the celebration of whom represents an offering to Apollo (100ff.). Doesn't he, along with his fathers, benefit from *olbos*, "prosperity," and also from a communal and justified recognition? Hospitality, ritualized, is transformed into honors addressed to a divinity as one moves back into the present, into the time of the performance of the poem. Thus the Ninth *Pythian* is logically dedicated to Battus's *genos* as a whole, in a desire for an Olympic victory by the sovereign act of Zeus. This desire moves the narrative's time, just brought back into the present, into the near future: "I pray (*eukhomai*) that Zeus grant another such prize at Olympia to the race of Battos" (123).

The mythological version of Cyrene's colonization presented by the Fifth *Pythian* complements the one played out in the Fourth. For the purposes of praise, this poem used a narrative of origins and the act of a land's foundation by human manipulators and divine protectors. The epinicion that follows focuses on the ancestry of a *genos* in conformity with the temporal movement and spatial movement that organize the poem. Certainly, in the Fourth *Pythian*, the integration of the magical clod's itinerary with the narrative of the Argonauts already gave precise indications of Battus's family origin, and consequently that of Arcesilas the Fourth, the ode's receiver. The trajectory from Sparta to Cyrene by way of Thera, covered by Battus's ancestors, is already expressed in the Fourth *Pythian*.

In the Fifth *Pythian*, this itinerary no longer starts from the same point—no

longer Lemnus, but Thebes. Profiting from the mixed composition of the Theran founders, widely attested elsewhere, the Fifth *Pythian* has the Aegids, who issue from Oedipus's Theban family, take the place of the bastard descendants of Euphemus's union with one of the homicidal women of Lemnus. As has already been said, the Aegid lineage represents the collateral line of the double family of Heraclid origin that holds royal power in Sparta. Illegitimacy is thus replaced by a matrilineal legitimacy, from a Spartan point of view: Theras, Thera's founder, is Heraclid only through his mother, Argeia, while Autesion, his father, descends from Polynices, King of Thebes, of Cadmean ancestry.⁸³ To refer the *genos* of Arcesilas and Battus to the Theban and Labdacid origin of Thera's other colonizers inserts this family in the age of heroes, and no doubt the much-discussed mention of the Antenorids must be understood in this context. In the Hesiodic myth of the races, the heroic class is defined by two components: those who fought for a share of Oedipus's herds in Thebes, and the soldiers who died under the walls of Troy for Helen's beauty. The Thebaïd and the Trojan War correspond precisely to the content of the heroic poems that form the famous epic cycle.⁸⁴ It should be no surprise, then, to find a myth that tends to attach the Libyan colony not only to the Labdacid ancestors of the Cyreneans but also to the past of the Trojan War. I have just described the play of space and time by which Pindar ably succeeds in making two perfectly distinct colonizing interventions coincide, while at the same time slipping Battus's ancestors into the colonists of Labdacid origin.

Does this mean that, before the arrival of the Therans, Cyrene was the object of a Trojan colonization reaching back to the Mycenaean period? We can imagine that historians have separated what Pindar purposely confused, in order to reestablish the linearity of a legendary chronology meant to be transformed into history: first, in the twelfth century, the Trojans (or another "pre-Dorian" population) arrived; then, in the seventh century, Battus and his companions of Spartan origin.⁸⁵ But a historicist argument of this type does not take into account the heroization process that demonstrates its effects from the archaic period's very beginning. From the end of the eighth century onward, every nascent city tried to attach its present to Greece's legendary past. In a movement of double commemorative manifestation, which tends to establish a bond of continuity between the political reality of the archaic period and that of the heroic age, the traces left by the Mycenaean kingdoms become the places of ritual celebration of these legendary figures, exalted as heroes. Thus they receive the honors of a mixed *mnēma*: the tomb, object of commemorative cult practices, and the epic song, reactivating the memory of their lofty deeds.⁸⁶ The mention of a mound of

the Antenorids, with respect to Cyrene, could attest to the existence of this type of cult, rendered to the Trojan heroes of legend.⁸⁷

THE HEROIZATION PROCESS: FROM PAST TO PRESENT

In the Fifth *Pythian*, the evocation of the Trojan Antenorids' stay in Cyrene opens up into praise of Battus—which, by design, leaves the date of his arrival in Libya extremely hazy. Battus is, above all, the founder of the city; he is its architect; he organizes its space to receive the festivals of Apollo. But the line Battus imposes on the city's central axis is shown to be autotelic, since this Apollonian way leads directly to the stern of the agora, where the founder's tomb stands. Battus is a hero twice over: he lives among men as blessed (*makar*, 94)—that is, like a god—and is also the object of his people's cultic veneration (*hērōs laosebēs*, 95).⁸⁸

The whole semantic articulation of the legend of Cyrene's founding, as presented in the Fourth *Pythian*, developed the theme of the "autochthonous" generation of a foreign soil, destined to become Greek. In the Ninth *Pythian*, the semantic articulation defined the civilization of this land, employing the different figures implicated in the matrimonial transformation. The Fifth concentrates on the founding's different heroic protagonists and on the Cyrenean land's civilization, while displaying the permanence conferred upon their figures by the cult devoted to them.⁸⁹ Its semantic coherence is assured by the theme of heroization.

This perspective clarifies the narrative emphasis placed on the Aegid branch, as opposed to the Lemnic one, of Cyrene's Theran founders. Battus and his colonists are situated in the perspective of the Heraclid ancestry through the intermediary of the Aegids. However, the reigning families who claim Heraclid or Heracleian ancestry are innumerable. They thus attempt to attach their legitimacy either to the Dorians or even to the Achaeans.

Aside from the three regions of the Peloponnesus that are, strictly speaking, Heraclid, the Bacchiads, the great aristocratic family of Corinth, take its origin back to Aletes, a "Dorian" descendant five generations removed from Heracles. In Sicyon, the Dorian and Heraclid dynasty merely substitutes itself for Cacestades, a sovereign whose ancestor is also Heracles. As for the islands, Tlepolemus, founder of Rhodes, is a son of Heracles who claims to have been driven from the continent by Heraclid pressure. The Homeric "Catalogue of Ships" confers Heraclid ancestry upon Cos, through the intermediary of Thessalus. From the Homeric through the classical period, this heroization process is at work: even at the margins of Greece, King Candaules of Lydia linked his *genos* to an eastern

branch of the numerous descendants of Alcmena's son, and Alexander the First of Macedonia, the philhellene, claimed descent from the Heraclid Temenus of Argos.⁹⁰

But in the Cyrenean tradition evoked by Pindar, the Heraclid ancestry is explicitly attached to the figure of Aigimius and, consequently, to the control exercised by the Dorians over the Peloponnesus (line 72) through the intermediary of Theras and the Aegids.⁹¹ This in no way excludes a second lineage, aiming to attach the colony to Greece's Achaean past, especially because the mention of the Trojan line of origin is not explicitly grounded in a genealogical relation. Pindar limits himself to inscribing the Antenorids' arrival in Cyrene in the context of a *nostos*, "return," without directly indicating that the Trojans had founded a family in Libya. Why Trojans rather than Greeks? The colonial city of Cyrene seems to share this peculiar character of its alleged Achaean past with other cities situated at the geographical limits of the Hellenized world. Samothrace refers to Dardanos; Sarpedon, who battles at the Trojans' side, passes for having found Miletus; and in Salaminian Cyprus, from the fifth century onward, Teucus's descendants are mixed up with the Trojans.⁹² No doubt the Antenorids were welcomed all the more warmly into Cyrene because Antenor distinguished himself from other Trojans by receiving the Greeks with all the honors due them as guests; their mention in the Fifth *Pythian* takes part in the isotopy of hospitality that parallels the heroization theme and ensures the semantic coherence of the whole poem.⁹³ In addition, they are accompanied by Helen, whose figure leads us back to the Spartan origins of certain colonists of the Greek city of Libya.

Pindar did not choose the Carneia—out of all the Cyrenean festivals—by chance to reinforce the genealogical and historical bond between the city's present and the heroic Greek past. From remote antiquity onward, the Carneia constituted the most characteristic festival of Dorian cities. Imported by the Aegids, fathers of Pindar and the Cyrenean Greeks, and instituted in the city by the heroized oecist (lines 74ff., 89ff.), the sacrifices of the Carneia were destined for the Trojan Antenorids (85ff.). This path of the rite, with the temporal confusion it masks, is no doubt made possible only by the duplicity of the legend that explains its institution: it is either a ritual expiation of the involuntary murder of Carnus, the soothsayer who accompanied the Heraclids in the conquest of the Peloponnesus, or a ritual expiation to appease the anger of Apollo, whose chosen cornelwood trees (*kraneiai*) had been destroyed to build the Trojan horse.⁹⁴ There is every reason to think that the worship of the oecist Battus, confused with Apollo

in his colonizing and apotropaic (if not his oracular) functions, coincided with the celebration of the Carneia, the greatest festival in those cities whose culture hailed from Sparta.⁹⁵

Whatever the case may be, Battus's heroization, and that of his successor kings of Cyrene, could be accomplished only by the double reference to the Heraclid ancestry and to the heroes of the Trojan War.⁹⁶ This heroization process, through the shift in mythological perspective, as well as by cult acts, left its traces in Cyrene's spatial organization: Battus's tomb, vestiges of which have been found "at the poop of the agora" (line 93), just where Pindar indicated, and perhaps the Hill of the Antenorids.⁹⁷ The circularity of the temporal path sketched out by the portrait gallery in the Fifth *Pythian* and the spatial reciprocity between Cyrene and the Greek continent have as their only goal the submission of Arcesilas the Fourth to the cultic and legendary heroization of the founder of the colony. While waiting to be able to assimilate himself to Olympia with the sovereign qualities of Zeus, Arcesilas, the Fifth *Pythian*'s recipient, appears as a second Apollo through the intermediary of his ancestor Battus. Here, in Pindar's demonstration, the superpositioning of heroic destinies has replaced the play of metaphorical echoes among many intertwined isotopies.

Herodotus and the Chronology of History

The whole of Herodotus's prose narrative of Cyrene's foundation, nearly contemporaneous with the Pindaric version in the Fifth *Pythian*, is imbued with this heroizing aim. After narrating Darius's disappointment in his expedition against the Scyths, Herodotus turns toward the south, to study, in a symmetrical way, the events that determine the history of that part of the world during the same period. The expedition undertaken by the Persian governor of Egypt against Barce, at the request of Arcesilas the Fourth's mother, furnishes Herodotus with a pretext to show, once again, the double perspective, historical and ethnographic, temporal and spatial, of his *Inquiry*.

An exhaustive history of the Greeks' immigration into a land that they believed formed a third continent precedes a long description of the peoples of Libya. There we find all the stages that are dispersed by Pindar ordered in a linear chronological succession. In addition, Herodotus puts the technique of synchronization into motion, while occasionally leaving some incoherencies. This story of the antecedents of the Cyrenaica expedition clearly distinguishes the two genealogical lines that will coalesce at Sparta in the form of the mixed contingent sent from Thera as colonizers.⁹⁸ The first part of Herodotus's narrative is quite



Cyrene and the places in the story of its foundation

compatible with our modern conception of history, inasmuch as it is stripped of all divine intervention: the narrative action's motives are to be found in men, more particularly, in men moved by political considerations.

At the origin are the Argonauts' grandchildren and the women of Lemnus, who have been driven from the island by the Pelasgians (situation of lack). The exiles seek refuge in Sparta, where they claim their Minyan origin (phase of manipulation and competence) in order to demand from the Lacedemonians the rights of the city: cohabitation with the citizens, access to political functions, assignment of portions of land, and repartition among the tribes. The Spartans' acceptance (performance), in the name of the active role taken by the Dioscuri in the Argonauts' expedition, is sanctioned by an exchange of women: the Minyans' descendants marry the citizens' daughters, while the Lemnians are given to the Spartans in marriage.⁹⁹ The Minyans, not content with obtaining citizens' rights, make excessive demands for the royalty reserved to the two dynasties descended

from the Heraclids. This lands them in prison (rupture of the contract and of the narrative equilibrium). A performance that reverses the terms of the matrimonial exchange saves them from prison. The Minyans' wives, daughters of the most prominent Spartan citizens, take their husbands' places at the end of a nocturnal travesty scene, and the Minyans take up their marginal positions on the wild spurs of the Taygetus once again (new situation of lack).

These events coincide chronologically with the (voluntary) marginalization of another clan, which, although possessing the rights of the city, is not authorized to assume royal power. This family's Theban ancestry, however, brings it closer to the two reigning Spartan families: as noted earlier, Theras, their representative, is descended through five generations from Polynices; he is thus the maternal uncle of the Spartan royal families' two Heraclid initiators.¹⁰⁰ After ensuring the regency, Theras prefers exile in Calliste-Thera, an island that, according to Pindar, was colonized eight generations previously by Cadmus, founder of Thebes. Both the Minyans' refuge in the Taygetus and Theras's exile to Calliste allow them to return to their own lands, while not going back to the lands of their ancestors. This common destiny allows a group of Minyans to follow Theras and the group of Spartan citizens he chose and to converge on the neighboring island, which then takes the name of its second founder. Only in this way will the son of Theras who remained in Sparta find himself at the origin of the Aegids, named after his own Aigeus. It is notable that in the heroization process undertaken in the Fifth *Pythian*, Pindar did not hesitate to anticipate this familial denomination. All the same, this influential family will remain marginal in Sparta, marked by the malediction that will weigh on its offspring.¹⁰¹

Compelled to start from the destinies of these two lineages, the history of Thera will be confused in Herodotus with the preliminaries of the legend of Cyrene's founding. I have analyzed the two Herodotean versions of the foundation elsewhere.¹⁰² Here, I limit myself to emphasizing that the first one leaves the initiative with the Therans as much as possible, confining Battus's role to that of executor of orders pronounced by the oracle at Delphi and relayed by the people of Thera. In this Theran light, Battus, as in Pindar's poem, is the descendant of the Argonaut Euphemus, who was widely considered to be a Minyan. The second version is oriented entirely toward Battus, and although it undoubtedly gives him a marginal origin, it no longer marks him as bastard. Battus is, rather, the son of a Cretan sovereign's daughter, who was saved by a Theran merchant, and of an important citizen of the island. Battus, as a political leader, is not the only one to enjoy a double ancestry of this type.¹⁰³ In the Cyrenean version, the Delphic

oracle is consulted directly by Battus, while in the Thera version, the oracle is addressed to the king of Thera, Theras's descendant. The Cyrenean narrative is at pains to erase the Spartan origin of the colonization of Cyrenaica. But the two versions converge as soon as Battus touches Libyan soil, at first the island of Platea, then the continental coast at Aziris; finally, he is led toward the interior by the indigenous people.

The syntactic and semantic contacts between these politicized, if not historicized, versions of Cyrene's founding and the narrative of Tarentum's founding (also of Spartan origin) are striking. The latter narrative, which also goes back to a fifth-century source, places dissensions arising between Spartan citizens and the Partheniae at the origin of the colonists' departure for Tarentum.¹⁰⁴ Whether these were the sons of Spartan traitors, considered to be helots, or descendants of illegitimate unions between female citizens of Sparta and young men, they represent a group denied the rights of the city by Spartans. Their position is all the closer to that of the Minyans in that their aborted attempt at rebellion took place outside Sparta, at Amyclae. The conquest of Amyclae was the appanage not of the Heraclids but of Timomachus, a Theban, who belonged to the *genos* of the Aegids.¹⁰⁵

Thereafter in this narrative, the chief of the Partheniae, like Battus, consults, in the absence of the intermediary Thera stage, the oracle at Delphi, which advises emigration to "rich" Tarentum. Like the Thera colonists, the Partheniae are welcomed there by the native population and by the Cretans, who are supposed to have arrived there during the same epoch that the Antenorids arrived in Cyrene. Unlike the Herodotean narrative of Cyrene's founding, however, the Tarentine legend does not erase the theme of autochthony. The Tarentines find a second oecist, Phalanthus, who is transformed from the negative status of a Parthenian into a true Spartan hero in Tarentum. Taras, the eponymous hero of the city, was believed to be the son of Poseidon and a local nymph.¹⁰⁶ Thus the historicization process of the legend of Tarentum's founding manages to integrate the Poseidon-Apollo polarity, the autochthony theme (as figured in the Cyrenean legend by Poseidon's manipulation of the clod), and the figure of fertilizing moisture (as incarnated in the Cyrenean narrative by the nymph whose name is finally assimilated to that of the spring Cyre).¹⁰⁷

Herodotus does without the marvelous clod, swallowed up by waves only to reappear transformed into an island, and without the hunter-nymph kidnapped by a traveling god to found a Greek city.¹⁰⁸ On the contrary, there is an attempt to develop a new discourse, answering to two of the criteria that, for us, define

historical discourse: the chronological reckoning and the staging of a political action with its protagonists, agents with their often culturally determined reasons, sometimes embodied in peoples or their governments.

First, from a chronological point of view, Herodotus's narrative tries to fill the gaps left by Pindar. The methods of nascent historiography help in this. They keep accounts of generations and their genealogical corollaries, and, when possible, they keep track of years.¹⁰⁹ Computation of generations goes with the coherence of the narrative: Minyan refugees in Sparta and Lacedemonians led by Theras can converge at Calliste, since the former are descended from the Argonauts through an interval of two generations, and the latter go back to Polynices through more than four generations. The island of Thera was colonized by the Cadmeans eight generations earlier. At Thera, the computation of years makes the next shift: seven years of drought after the first oracle, two years in Platea, seven in Aziris, then to Cyrene, where Battus reigns for forty years, thus beginning a new balance that follows the number of years of each king's reign. On the other hand, Herodotus gives no indication of the temporal space separating Theras's arrival in Thera from the first oracle given to King Grinnus, his descendant. Consequently, there is no reference to the Fourth *Pythian*'s unique "historical" fact—that seventeen generations intervene between Euphemus and Battus. This lacuna corresponds precisely to the transition from the Spartan narrative to the narrative, properly speaking, of Cyrene's founding in its two versions.

Second, as for the narrative's protagonists—kings of Sparta, sovereigns of Thera, or chiefs of colonial expedition—they behave like politicians with respect to the people they lead, granting the privileges of the city or establishing their power over new territories. By relying on the legitimacy established by a genealogy, their action casts the civic order into such high relief that Herodotus attempts a rationalizing interpretation of Battus's name. He makes Battus into the "king," *battos*, in the native language of Cyrene, instead of the "stutterer." This is also how one of the essential figurative transformations that manifest Battus's colonizing is projected onto the political isotopy. In the Fifth *Pythian*, Apollo provides Battus with a voice that "coming from across the sea" (line 59) terrified the lions infesting Cyrene's site. This is the realization of the oracle pronounced by the god at Delphi, whose pejorative allusion to the founder's stuttering is silenced by Pindar. What the nymph Cyrene realizes through her athletic struggles, in the tradition after Pindar, Battus obtains through the effect of his refound voice. To drive away the lions infesting Cyrene is, as said earlier, to introduce Greek civilization into Libya. But on the narrative level, Herodotus prefers to abandon the

animal isotopy of the theme of passage to civilization in order to express the same transformation through the figure of royalty, which develops through the political isotopy. Stutterer and bastard, Battus becomes the strong-voiced sovereign of Cyrene. Although earlier he is clothed in the attributes of a tyrant because of his physical deficiency, in Cyrene, Battus takes upon himself the figurative marks of the legitimate king. As they are staged by Herodotus, the vocal figures refer us once again to the political theme of the establishment of Greek civilization through the figure of sovereignty.¹¹⁰ Herodotus's narrative also effaces marriages from the number of figures assumed by the passage to a civilization theme. Furthermore, he silences completely the autochthonous generation theme, with its figurative development in birth from the earth's entrails.

In the Theran and Cyrenean parts of Herodotus's *logos*, the gods' repeated *manipulation* of the human protagonists and agents subsists even though it is absent from the first, Spartan part of the narrative. Battus is led by the founder god Apollo from Delphi. This mythologizing aspect of the historical narrative, frequent in Herodotus, is called upon to double the heroic worship accorded Cyrene's founder. With the gods' intervention we find, once again, the theme of the heroization process. This serves the historian of Halicarnassus as the model for the figure of the narrative's principal protagonist.

Now it is precisely in these injunctions addressed by Apollo to the civic actors, through interposed oracles, that the figures of the Cyrenean land's fertility and the pastoral activity it permits emerge in the Herodotean narrative. Apollo leads the Greek colonists toward Libya, which "nourishes herds" (*mēlotrophos*, 4.155.3, 157.2); toward Aziris, "with beautiful dales" (*napai kallistai*, 4.157.3) bathed by a river; and finally toward Cyrene, with its spring and its "pierced sky" (4.158.3). The drought that struck Thera is thus transformed into moisture that favors herding, by the act of colonization ordered by a god.

We can thus distinguish three semantic levels in the Herodotean narrative. Vegetal and animal figures, which refer to the civilization theme, are limited to the actions of the gods who occupy the position of the *sender* of human action. The same can be said for figures that refer to the heroization theme. On the other hand, in the unfolding of human action itself, the figures set in motion by the narrative constitute the political isotopy that will penetrate the entire history of Cyrene.

We possess indirect testimony to this legendary action, transferred to the political level and at the same time corresponding to our own idea of history, in a summary drawn from the *Libukai Historiai* by Meneclēs of Barce. This third-

century historian finds the cause of the Cyrenean colonial expedition in the sedition at Thera, not in an oracular consultation about the voice of the future oecist. The first oracular response (which, parrying the question posed, leaves all the power to Apollo's intervention) will be situated henceforth in the realm of the "mythic"—the mythic that, from then on, will be the base of our own anthropological concept of myth as fabulous narrative. Opposite the *aitia muthikōtera*, the "mythical motive," we find the *aitia pithanōtera*, "the more persuasive motive," to which we can accord more credence. Indeed, there is interrogation of the oracle in Menecles' version, though in secondary fashion, concerning the stasis. *Apoikia*, colonial expedition, is preferable to political sedition; it is necessary to abandon a maritime (hence unstable) territory to settle on the continent.¹¹¹ With Menecles of Barce's narrative, the political motivation invades the whole causal chain of narration, relegating both the gods and the fertilizing force by which they manifest themselves to the second rank of importance.

Thus the conception subjacent in Herodotus's *logos* covers our modern category of historical discourse as well as our concept of myth. From the historical point of view, nonanthropomorphic figures and isotopies are erased, and the events explaining Cyrene's founding are inscribed in a linear, genealogical chronology, even if the time thus defined is still largely in loose relation to that of the *logos*'s enunciation. From the point of view of myth, the primary role is accorded to oracles and consequently to divine modes of action and intervention in the vegetal and animal domains.

This happens first in Callimachus and next in Apollonius of Rhodes, in texts I have already partially discussed. The foundation narratives of these two Hellenistic poets are inscribed in a larger ensemble, which has its own enunciative objective: first, for Callimachus, an etiological and literary hymn to Apollo; and second, for Apollonius, a learned epic that relates the Argonauts' expedition. Now both poetic narratives follow a chronological development. But the presence of traits proper to the syntactic articulation of historical discourse does not in any way prevent the reappearance of the isotopies put in place by rather "mythic" versions on the semantic level.

From the Legend to the Cult of Apollo: Back to Callimachus

In the *Hymn to Apollo*, the enunciator is not a Theban, like Pindar in the Fifth *Pythian*, but a veritable Cyrenean, as Callimachus seems to claim to be. The address to Apollo and the Cyrenean point of view confer upon the narrative a precisely oriented enunciative conditioning. This explains why the god's

different *epiclēseis* “surnames” are brushed aside through the rhetorical form of *praeambulum* in the Cyrenean part of the *Hymn*, in order to affirm only one; Carnean Apollo is the god of the narrator’s fathers (*patrōios*, 71).¹¹² It is a welcome *epiclēsis* “surname” since it allows the chronological development of the stages of Cyrene’s founding to be linked to Apollo himself, the builder of *edethlia*. As we have seen, the first foundation (*edethlon*, 72) is Sparta, then Thera, and finally the city of Cyrene. The foundation is relayed to Thera by Theras, who belongs to the “sixth generation” from Oedipus; in Cyrene it is relayed by Aristotle the oecist, whose other name has been silenced because it indicates stuttering. This series of founding acts culminates in the construction (*deima*, 77) of a temple dedicated to Apollo the oecist, and it is accomplished in the worship rendered him in this place. There was an earlier celebration in the provisional stage at Azilis or Aziris, which I have already discussed.

If, at the outset of this development, the figure of the profundity and fertility of Cyrenean soil reappears (*bathugeios*, 65), it is to better fix the foundations foreseen there by Apollo.¹¹³ The shaping of the very soil of Cyrene in the Fourth *Pythian* through the legend of the clod is subordinated here to Apollo’s founding activity. The moment of an autochthony’s establishment under Poseidon’s authority is effaced in favor of the civilizing action of the god of Delos and Delphi (lines 80–84):

Hiē hiē Carneius! Lord of many prayers, —thine altars wear flowers in spring, even all the pied flowers which the Hours lead forth when Zephyrus breathes dew, and in winter the sweet crocus. Undying evermore is thy fire, nor ever doth the ash feed about the coals of yester-even. (trans. Mair and Mair 1955, 55)

The figurative isotopy of florescence substitutes for that of germination through the intermediary of the cult devoted to the founder god and expresses itself principally through the ever-favorable seasons. But as in Pindar, henceforth the flourishing seasons attached to the cult of Carneius Apollo in wooded, moist places are simply a metaphor for human sexual fecundity. Thence, retracing time on the path already indicated, come the Dorian dances with the blond natives in Azilis’s wooded dales, and Apollo and Cyrene’s union by the Mount of Myrtes. In addition, this union recapitulates two complementary aspects of the foundational act: Cyrene’s assurance of the protection of the native king’s herds, and Apollo’s construction of a city with walls (*teichea*, 67; *astu*, 73; *polis*, 94). Gender roles are much more clearly separated than they are in Pindar: the woman’s pastoral activity is in the *chōra*, and the masculine god founds the *polis*.

Callimachus abandons Pindar's long sequences of interlaced metaphors in favor of a subtle play of finer touches. Callimachus reformulates the themes developed in the *Pythian* poems, in a narrative with syntax that conforms to the model of historical discourse. The themes correspond to those of the founding of a land and its passage to civilization, but there is also reformulation to the extent that the "mythic" isotopy based on the process of heroization is replaced by the ritual isotopy of cult devoted to Apollo. Callimachus's *Hymn* is clearly no longer destined to vaunt the agonistic exploits of a descendant of Battus.

The figurative continuity introduced by Callimachus allows him to inscribe, in the same perspective, the Theban hero's foundation of Thera, Battus's historical foundation of Cyrene, and Cyrene's "mythic" founding by Apollo and the eponymous nymph, through a repetition of the semantic in the syntactic articulation. The versions Pindar treated separately have become one legend. This is another reason not to take them as historical testimony of the different phases of the colonization process. In the authors of local histories, one already finds traces of this work of setting in perspective the episodes belonging to the legend of Cyrene's founding.¹¹⁴ If Herodotus's politicization of the legend could be connected to the first gestures toward the writing of history, the transfer of the act of foundation from Poseidon to Apollo in the Callimachean legend might have as much to do with the probable addressees of the Hellenistic poet's work—the poets and scholars of the Mouseion created by the Ptolemies in the Library of Alexandria—as with the gradual predominance of the cult of Apollo at Cyrene.

The Alexandrian epic poet Apollonius of Rhodes gives himself over entirely to the same play Callimachus did. He respects the narrative's chronological syntax and some of its figures, but he reformulates them into a single theme. In addition, from the perspective of the Argonaut legend, the foundation narrative—which will end, as we have seen, with Thera's creation—originates in the gift of the marvelous clod, not in Apollo's rape of Cyrene. But the quadruple semantic interpretation of the divine clod carries the most importance. Thus we find human, vegetal, and mineral figures, no longer organized in interwoven isotopies as in Pindar, but rather divided into four interpretive levels expressing the generation theme. The coincidence of the fourth of these levels with that of the narrative's realization specifies the generation theme as a veritable cosmogonic act. The Hellenistic legend of Cyrene's foundation, rationalized somewhat by this reductive operation, paradoxically reveals the subjacent representation better than the different Pindaric approaches had.

From Pindar onward, different versions of the legend of Cyrene's founding set the stage for many cosmogonic acts—cosmogony in the Greek sense, since it culminates in the establishment of civic order in a place whose geology, flora, and fauna are transformed. This order is distinguished from that of the continental Greek cities to the extent that it establishes, under Apollo's supervision, a pastoral civilization that will prolong the monarchic model, already obsolete elsewhere, well into the fifth century.

Thus, in the narratives of the Cyrenaic creation, we find all the traits that characterize the products of the symbolic process. Starting from a more or less locatable historical transformation—the Greek colonization of Cyrene—the narrative borrows figures of different orders from the natural world (mineral, vegetal, animal) to inscribe them in a narrative program of anthropomorphic actions. Regrouped around certain focalizing themes—autochthony as manifestation of the generation of a cultured land, herding as a stage in the civilization process, matrimonial union in reference to the institution of a civic order, and legendary portraits as the incarnation of the process of heroization—these figures, which the syntactic articulation of the narrative disseminates in the linear sequence of its actions, form isotopies, those semantic lines and levels of expression that the play of metaphor puts in reciprocal relations. Hence arise these symbolic products that transfigure reality in the direction of fiction, at the same time manifesting themselves in the most diverse poetic and discursive forms and for different situations of ritual, institutional, and cultural performance; and hence these lines of subtle flavors that vary according to the palaces for which they are destined!

NOTES

a. For a historical overview of the Battiads, see Patzek 2013; of Cyrene, see Reynolds 2012.

b. See also Calame 2009a, 55–56. For an introduction to Greimas's narratology, see Schleifer 1983.

c. The book was first published in English in 1958. Propp (1968 [1958], 13) gives credit to Bédier's work on narrative theory in the 1890s. For other forerunners, see Voigt 1999, 921–22. On the fortune of Propp 1968 [1958] and its place in Propp's career, see Voigt 1999, 922, and Voigt 2002.

d. Propp 1968 [1958], xxv (first sentence of his foreword): "at a time when minerals, plants, and animals are described and classified precisely according to their structure, at a time when a whole range of literary genres . . . have been described, the tale continues to be studied without such a description."

e. Lévi-Strauss's 1955 article, on the Oedipus myth and on the Zuni myth of human origins, was foundational for the structuralism that would be attached to his name.

f. For translations into other languages, see Voigt 1999, 928 n. 14.

g. For a sketch of Bremond's relation to Propp, see Dammann 2007, 1409–10.

h. Burkert 1979, 5–11, and index, s.v. "Propp"; Ruiz-Montero and Sánchez Alacid 2005. Davies's 2011 article is the most recent of this scholar's Proppian analyses of classical myths.

i. Lévi-Strauss 1960, 138. "Avant le formalisme, nous ignorions, sans doute, ce que ces contes avaient en commun, Après lui, nous sommes privés de tout moyen de comprendre en quoi ils diffèrent. On a bien passé du concret à l'abstrait, mais on ne peut plus redescendre de l'abstrait au concret." Lévi-Strauss uses the term *formalism* because Propp was one of the Russian Formalists; the term refers to a movement in literary criticism (1910s–30s) in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

May Claude Bérard, Danielle Maeder, and Manuela Ryter find here the expression of my thanks for their documentary support. A draft of this translation was prepared by Susan Maslan and Samuel Schmidt. The new, revised version has been improved thanks to the relevant and useful suggestions of Lowell Edmunds. For a more developed study of the different versions of the narrative of the foundation of Cyrene, see (in French) Calame 2011.

1. These same rare objects, however, have brought back into consideration the possible validity of the most ancient date attributed by Eusebius to Cyrene's colonization, that is to say, 1336 (as opposed to 761 and 632; cf. *Chron.* VII 52.18; 87.16ff.; 96, 19 Helm); cf. Sandro Stucchi, "Aspetti di precolonizzazione a Cirene," in Musti 1985, 341–47. This thesis was rejected in its time, on the basis of less substantial documentation, by Chamoux (1952, 69–91).

2. This "arithmetic" time, oriented within the perspective of Christian culture, enters into the larger category of "chronical [*chronique*] time" defined by Benveniste (1974, 67–78); Ricoeur (1985, 154–60) takes it up again to make of it a "calendrical" time. But neither of these authors analyzes the material aspect of the time of physical events, and they do not consider the orientation of the chronical time toward the present. See Calame 2009b, 14–24.

3. On the occasion of the Ninth *Pythian*, see Carey 1981, 65–66, 93. On that of the Fifth *Pythian*, see Lefkowitz 1985, 37; Currie 2005, 254–56; and n. 96, below. On that of the Fourth, see Giannini 1979, 35–36.

4. Cf. Marc Gaborieau, "Classification des récits chantés: La littérature orale des populations hindoues de l'Himalaya Central," *Poétique* 19 (1974): 313–32. The situation in archaic Greece is very similar; see my remarks in "Réflexions sur les genres littéraires en Grèce archaïque," *QUCC* 17 (1974): 113–28.

5. See, in this connection, the reflections of François Lasserre in his "L'historiographie grecque à l'époque archaïque," *QS* 4 (1976): 113–42; strangely enough, the author omits from his list the local genealogical history, which is well represented, however, from the archaic period, by the *Corinthiaca* of Eumelus of Corinth; cf., notably, Paus. 2.1.1 = *Cor.* fr. 1 and 4 Bernabé.

6. On this work of systematization of genealogy by Hecataeus, see Lionel Pearson,

Early Ionian Historians (Oxford, 1939), 96–106; see Robert L. Fowler, “Herodotus and His Prose Predecessors,” in C. Dewald and J. Marincola, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Herodotus* (Cambridge, 2006), 29–45. On the later phase of rewriting legend in the form of mythography properly so-called, see Albert Henrichs, “Three Approaches to Greek Mythography,” in Bremmer 1987, 242–77, with the references in his n. 2; and Robert L. Fowler, *Early Greek Mythography* (Oxford, 2000).

7. Hdt. 2.116ff.; Paus. 2.18.6; Mimn. fr. 21 and 22 Gentili-Prato; Stes. fr. 196–205 and S 88–132 Page. On the role of myth in melic poetry, see, for instance, Gentili 1984, 153–202, and Claude Calame, “Referential Fiction and Poetic Ritual: Towards a Pragmatics of Myth (Sappho 17 and Bacchylides 13),” *Trends in Classics* 1 (2009): 1–17.

8. This signifies that one does not, in general, take into consideration sources later than the Alexandrian period. On these texts, see Malten 1911, 26–41, and Chamoux 1952, 78–79.

9. On Pindar’s narrative technique in the perspective of plays upon time, see André Hurst, “Aspects du temps chez Pindare,” in Hurst 1985, 155–97, with the bibliographical references in his n. 1.

10. On these concepts, see the corresponding entries in Algirdas J. Greimas and Joseph Courtés, *Sémiotique: Dictionnaire raisonné de la théorie du langage*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1979); English translation, Greimas and Courtés 1982. Of the critiques presented by François Rastier in regard to certain of these concepts, in his *Sémantique interprétative* (Paris, 1987), 117–19, 172–75, 177–211, I do agree with the vanity of a distinction between “figurative” and “thematic” isotopies, and I would also refuse to introduce a hierarchy among the different isotopies: their metaphorical reciprocities forbid it. Without entering into the subtle distinctions used by Rastier, I have substituted for the notion of “thematic isotopy” that of “generic isotopy,” which rests on the reiteration of general traits such as “animal” or “human.” On the other hand, I have retained the notion of “theme,” even if, not manifested on the text’s surface, it is by definition the object of a reconstruction on the part of the interpreter. Themes seem to be nevertheless at the basis of the particular semantic orientation of each text.

For the (poetic) pragmatics of the Greek myths, I refer the reader to my contribution “Greek Myth and Greek Religion,” in Roger D. Woodard, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Greek Mythology* (Cambridge, 2007), 259–85; see also Calame, “Deictic Ambiguity and Auto-Referentiality: Some Examples from Greek Poetics,” *Arethusa* 37 (2004): 415–443 (along with the other contributions in this special issue of *Arethusa*), and Lowell Edmunds, “Deixis in Ancient Greek and Latin Literature: Historical Introduction and State of the Question,” *Philologia Antiqua* 1 (2007): 1–47. Relying on enunciation and pragmatics, the narratological approach is quite different from the structural approaches proposed, for instance, by the various contributions in Jonas Grethlein and Antonios Rengakos, eds., *Narratology and Interpretation: The Content of Narrative Form in Ancient Literature* (Berlin and New York, 2009).

11. Cf. André Hurst, “Temps du récit chez Pindare (Pyth. 4) et chez Bacchylide (11),” *MH* 40 (1983): 154–68.

12. Hom. *Od.* 11.118ff. (= 23.268ff.), with commentary in William F. Hansen, “Odysseus’ Last Journey,” *QUCC* 24 (1977): 27–48. On the difficulties of close interpretation posed by this complex passage, see Alfred Heubeck, *Omero: Odissea* (Milan, 1983), 3:270–

73. See also chapter 5 of this volume. On Poseidon's modes of intervention in marine and equine domains, see Detienne and Vernant 1974, 176–200, 221–41.

13. Even while designating the wood of a weapon and, consequently, a lance, *doru* refers, in its primary sense, to wood that is squared for construction—whence its triple sense of “frame of a ship” (Hom. *Il.* 15.410 or *Od.* 9.498), or “armature of a chariot” (Hes. *Op.* 456), or a tower (Hom. *Il.* 12.36) and, through synecdoche, “ship” (Aesch. *Pers.* 411 and *Suppl.* 846). The function of dominating the savage forces of the horse assumed by the bit is well defined in Detienne and Vernant 1974, 183–91.

14. It may be observed that the words of hospitality accompanying this gift are explicitly assimilated by Pindar to the banquet offered to a foreigner (lines 29ff.). It is precisely in the frame of a banquet that Arcesilas the Fourth receives Pindar's song (2); the ordinary *xenion*, “gift,” that Euphemus receives from the hands of Poseidon is then nothing other than the prefiguration of the hymn that the king of Cyrene, his descendant, receives from the author!

15. Schol. Pind. *P.* 4.61 (II, p. 105, 20ff. Drachmann); cf. also schol. ad 4.51 (104.17ff.; all scholiasts are cited in this abridged form), where Eurypylos is presented as indigenous king of Cyrene (cf. below). The attribution of this quality of Eurypylos goes back, in any case, to the historiographers of Cyrene: Acesandrus, *FrGHist* 469 fr. 3, cited by schol. A.R. 4.1561c (p. 322.4ff. Wendel); cf. also fr. 4 and Phylarchus, *FrGHist* 81 fr. 15. The scholiasts insist, twice over, on the family tie that connects Eurypylos and Euphemus; cf. also schol. ad 4.36a (102.14ff.). Schol. ad 4.57 (105.4ff.) recall the equivalence that Apollonius of Rhodes (4.1552, 1561) establishes between Triton and Eurypylos; cf. also schol. A.R. 4.1552 (p. 32.21ff. Wendel), who attributes this equivalence to Pindar! The Pindaric scholiasts also cite a fragment of Acesandrus (*FrGHist* 469 fr. 1); according to this fourth-century historian, Eurypylos would be the son of Poseidon and Celaeno, the daughter of Atlas; he would thus be the brother of Triton. On Triton, see n. 29 below. Significantly, the Cephissus near which legend causes Euphemus to be born empties into Lake Copais, a sort of Greek homologue to Lake Triton, near Orchomenus, the capital of the Minyans, with whom the Argonauts had various connections.

16. According to schol. ad 4.85 (109.4ff.), emigration of the Danaans originating from Sparta, Argos, and Mycenae is provoked by the return of the Heraclids, whom one habitually associates with the “Dorian invasion”; cf. Giannini 1979, 41 n. 30. The narrative analysis shows that it is a question, in that case, of the nonrealized program of the same legend, not of a different legend, as affirmed by Burton (1962, 152), following other experts.

17. On the mastery by *mētis*, “cunning intelligence,” of marks that represent the *poroi*, “means of passing,” over an indistinct expanse, see Detienne and Vernant 1974, 140–57.

18. On this type of sacrifice, see the numerous parallels cited in Paul Stengel, *Die Griechischen Kultusaltertümer*, 3rd ed. (Munich, 1920), 135–36. On the reading *thērotrophos* that the manuscript offers to qualify Libya, cf. n. 70 below. In relation to the mixture of earth and sea, note that, if the Argonauts erect the tripod on the earth (*en chthoni*, 1550), Triton will cause it to disappear into the lake (1590).

19. Schol. ad 4.455b (160.25ff.) attribute to the Lemnian woman with whom Euphemus unites the name of Lamache or Malache. The same commentary, relying notably on Didymus (fr. II.5.25 Schmidt), distinguishes four different bearers of the name “Euphemus”: the founder of the *genos* of the Cyrenean colonists and consequently of the Batriads;

the descendant of this first Euphemus, son of Samos; a third Euphemus who would have accompanied Battus in the foundation of Cyrene; and the contemporary of Arcesilas the Fourth, whom Pindar indirectly eulogizes in the Fifth *Pythian*, according to schol. ad 5.34 (175.21ff.) = Theotim. *FrGHist* 470 fr. 1 (cf. n. 89 below). The scholiast designates the first Euphemus with the term *archēgos*, which is as applicable to the author of the act of founding a *genos* as to the oecist of a colonial city; see Casewitz 1985, 246–48. Schol. ad 4.447a (159.6ff.) stresses once again the inversion to which Pindar's poem submits the traditional succession of stages in the voyage of the Argonauts.

20. This *nun* seems to pick up again the *nun* that in line 50, in Medea's prediction, designates the moment of the birth of the race of Battus and thus of Arcesilas.

21. According to schol. ad 4.450a (160.3ff.), it is a question of the funeral games in honor of the missing husbands or of Thoas.

22. Segal 1986, 27, 30–51, 136–45, 171; cf. also 183. A good part of my study, in its first version, was already drafted before I could see Segal's work; its views show a welcome convergence with those I develop here.

23. On this reversal in melic poetry of the traditional roles held, respectively, by the inspired poet and by the inspiring muse, see Calame 1995, 48–52; on the prophecy of Medea, see Athanassaki 2003, 101–5.

24. On the springs that give forth water of divine origin, by which the poet calms the poetic thirst of his patron, see Gianotti 1975, 110–14.

25. These representations of the foundations of civilization have been successively analyzed by Detienne (1972, 215–20) and by Jean-Pierre Vernant, in his *Mythe et société en Grèce ancienne* (Paris, 1974), 148–53.

26. Corresponding to this nurturing *mastos* is the *omphalos* of Delphi, center of a “well-wooded mother” (line 74), that is to say, of a fertile earth. Near this navel of the earth, the prediction is put forward that will be at the vegetal origin (*phuteuthen*, 69) of the honors that will fall to the Minyan Argonauts, but also, through Euphemus, to the ancestors of Cyrene's founders. On the other hand, according to schol. ad 4.14 (98.5ff.), Aristarchus, in his commentary on Pindar, compares the image of the *mastos* to the Homeric expression *outhar arourēs*, which designates “the breast of the field,” that is to say, its most fertile part (Hom. *Il.* 9.14ff.; cf. also *HCer.* 450). Is it also in this sense—of the double fertility, vegetal and civic—that schol. ad 4. 25b and 27 (100.6ff., 22ff.) understand this entire passage? For Malkin (1994, 163–67), the “foundations” of Zeus Ammon correspond to the geography of Cyrenaica, with its different liminal sanctuaries consecrated to the god.

27. Segal (1986, 68–71) shows the ties that align the metaphorical labor of Battus's ancestor with that undertaken by Jason to capture the Golden Fleece (lines 224ff.). But in the legend as Pindar treats it, the labor of Jason does not bear fruit but leads implicitly to the reconquest of legitimate power over a city (105ff.), not to the foundation of a new city. Jason is, in some sense, already in possession of a “root.”

28. Segal (1986, 81–82) is sensitive, as well, to the “citizen” isotopy that runs through the entire ode (cf. 7, 19–20, 56, 260, 272), but he neglects its “terrestrial” counterpart. The myth of Cyrene's foundation does not bring us from the desert to civic life, but from a virtually fertile ground to its products: a fecund *chōra*, “territory,” and a well-administered city.

29. Hdt. 4.179, 188; Diod. Sic. 3.70.2, as well as schol. ad 4.36a (102.7ff.) and schol.

A.R. 4.1311 (p. 313.140 Wendel); cf. also Diod. Sic. 5.70.4 and 72.3. Athena is born from the umbilical cord of Zeus, fallen near the river Triton in Crete, in a spot called, ever since, *omphalos* (cf. Call. *Jov.* 42 ff.). On the place of Lake Triton in the Greek representation of the inhabited world and the aspects of the Golden Age associated with it, see Ballabriga 1986, 216–21.

30. On the gate to Hades at Cape Taenarum, cf. Men. fr. 842 Kock, cited by schol. ad 4.76d (108.1ff.), Strab. 8.5.1, schol. Aristoph. *Ach.* 510 (I.1B, p. 71.19ff. Roster), and schol. Lyc. 90 (II, p. 50.5ff. Scheer).

31. On Heracles and Cerberus, see Bacch. 5.56ff.; Eur. *HF* 23ff., 612 ff., and 1277ff.; version confirmed by Apoll. 2.5.12, as well as by Diod. Sic. 4.25.1 and 26.1; Paus. 2.35.10 and 3.25.5. Pausanias, to nurture his skepticism with regard to the cavern that he visits at Cape Taenarum, with its path of communication to Hades, cites the attempt at a rationalizing explanation by Hecat. *FrGHist* 1 fr. 27. On the possibly Peisistratid origin of the version that makes of Heracles an initiate in the Eleusinian Mysteries, see Godfrey W. Bond, *Euripides: Herakles* (Oxford, 1981), 218–19. Apropos of the worship of Demeter Chthonia at Hermione, cf. Burkert 1977, 308, and Detienne and Vernant 1979, 203–8.

32. Clem. *Protr.* 2.17, schol. Luc. p. 275.23ff. Rabe, with the parallels of analogous gestures given in Burkert 1977, 365–70, and the interpretation proposed in Detienne and Vernant 1979, 191–99. See also Epict. 4.8.36, with commentary in Detienne 1972, 215–20.

33. Call. *Del.* 11ff. and 30ff.; *HAp.* 53ff. and 72ff.; for the cosmogonic action of Poseidon, see W. H. Mineur, *Callimachus: Hymn to Delos* (Leiden, 1984), 77–78. On the change of name from “Calliste” to “Thera,” cf. also Hdt. 4.147.4, schol. A.R. 4.1763 with schol. ad 4.455c (161.12ff. Wendel), and Call. fr. 716 Pfeiffer, with numerous references in the apparatus to this fragment.

34. Hom. *Il.* 2.653ff.; Pind. *O.* 7.27ff., with commentary in Angeli Bernardini 1983, 170–85. Version of the foundation of Rhodes is rationalized in Diod. Sic. 5.56.1ff.; for Apoll. 1.4.5, Rhode, daughter of Poseidon and Amphitrite, would be the sister of Triton; cf. Prinz 1979, 78–97. The island of Syme, inhabited from the origin, is the object of a first colonization on the part of the men who accompany Triops under the guidance of a certain Chthonios, son of Poseidon and of Syme; cf. Diod. Sic. 5.53.1. A semantic analysis of the verb *ktizō* in its archaic usage shows that, particularly for the islands, this verb designates the activity of cultivation after the clearing of terrain, as well as the civilizing construction of a civic establishment; see Casewitz 1985, 21–34.

35. Paus. 3.1.1; on other autochthonous heroes and founders of cities, see Brelich 1958, 137–39.

36. Apropos of Cecrops, see, notably, Aristoph. *Vesp.* 438 and Philoch. *FrGHist* 328 fr. 93, Marm. Par. *FrGHist* 239 A 1, and Apoll. 3.14.1. For the dispute between Poseidon and Athena, cf. Hdt. 8.55, Plut. *Them.* 19, Paus. 1.26.5 and 8.10.4, etc. If the double nature of Cecrops (half-man, half-serpent) attaches this figure to the earth, that of Triton (half-man, half-dolphin) attaches him to the sea, as does his descent from Poseidon and Amphitrite; Hes. *Theog.* 930ff., A.R. 4.1602ff., as well as schol. A.R. 4.1619 (p. 324.7ff. Wendel) and schol. Lyc. 886 (II, p. 287.5ff. Scheer). By his family lineage, Triton is, incidentally, the brother of Rhode; cf. n. 34 above! But Lyc. 886 and 892 cause this *dimorphos* god to descend from Nereus. Libya herself is termed *autokhthōn*; Hdt. 4.45.3. In relation to birth from the earth expressed by the concept of *gēgenēs*, autochthony has the added

implication of residence on the ground where one was born; cf. Enrico Montanari, *Il mito dell'autoctonia* (Rome, 1981), 31–37; V. J. Rosivach, “Autochthony and the Athenians,” *CQ* 81 (1987): 294–306; more recent bibliography in Calame 2009a, 142–49, and in Calame, “Myth and Performance on the Athenian Stage: Praxithea, Erechtheus, Their Daughters, and the Etiology of Autochthony,” *CPh* 106 (2011): 1–19.

37. On Erichthonius born from the seed of Hephaestus scattered on the ground of Athens, without having touched Athena the *parthenos*, cf. Apoll. 3.14.6, as well as Hom. *Il.* 2.546ff., Eur. *Ion* 266ff. Other versions of the birth of Erichthonius/Erechtheus are in Robert Parker, “Myths of Early Athens,” in Bremmer 1987, 187–214, with the impact of this birth in a nurturing earth on the representation of the standing of the Athenian citizen. See also, in this regard, Loraux 1981, 41–72. For figured representations, cf. Claude Bérard, *Anodoi: Essai sur l'imagerie des passages chthoniens* (Neuchâtel and Rome, 1974), 34–38.

38. Aesch. *Sept.* 752ff. On the myth of the autochthonous birth of the Cadmeans, see Vian 1963, 158–76. See also Malkin 1994, 180. On the legend of autochthony attributed to Argos by Aeschylus in the *Suppliants*, see Calame 2009a, 136–46.

39. A.R. 1.182ff.; in his catalogue of the Argonauts, he attributes to Euphemus the same ancestry as Pindar does. See also Paus. 5.17.9; he indicates that on the chest of Cypselus, Euphemus was presented as the winner of the chariot race in the games for Pelias; Hyg. *Fab.* 14.15, schol. ad A.R. 4.61 (106.3ff. Wendel), and schol. Lyc. 886 (II, p. 287.17ff. Scheer). It is true that the Hesiodic tradition makes Euphemus into a son of Poseidon and Mecionice, the daughter of Eurotas; Hes. fr. 253 Merkelbach-West, as cited by schol. ad A.R. 4.36c (102.16ff.) and developed by schol. ad 4.15b (99ff.). In addition, Euphemus is taken to have married one of Heracles' sisters; schol. ad 4.79b (108.7ff.).

On Tityus born of Ge, cf. Hom. *Od.* 11.576. One will notice that the Trojan king Erichthonius(!), mediator between Dardanus (a son of Zeus), the founder of a first city in the Troad, and Tros, the founder of the city of Troy properly speaking, possessed mares capable of running on the “nurturing glebe” as well as on “the back of the sea”; Hom. *Il.* 20.219ff. and Diod. Sic. 4.75.1ff. This capacity to run with a team on the surface of the sea also belongs to Poseidon himself; Hom. *Il.* 13.17ff.

Apart from the suppositions given by the scholiasts to explain the placement of Euphemus at the prow of the boat when the Argonauts arrive in Libya, one might wonder whether this explicit indication from Pindar (line 22) could not be placed in relation to this special faculty of Euphemus of walking on water; cf. schol. ad 4.36c and 61 (102.11ff., 105.18ff., 106.5ff.), who cites Theotim. *FrGHist* 470 fr. 2. In any case, these respective functions attributed to the two pilots of Theseus show that the *proreus*, “officer in command at the bow,” is the second of the *kubernētēs*, “helmsman”; Philoch. *FrGHist* 328 fr. 111.

40. These are, in any case, the qualifications Pindar attributes to the Lemnian women, even if their unions with the Argonauts, in other versions of the legend, mark their return to marriage under the sign of the good odors dispensed by Aphrodite; see, in this regard, Detienne 1972, 172–84.

41. On the polysemy of this expression in Pindar, see Thomas J. Hoey, “Fusion in Pindar,” *HSCPh* 70 (1965): 236–52, and Segal 1986, 64, 71. On its particular meaning here, cf. below.

42. Hdt. 4.147, in a text analyzed below; cf., equally, schol. ad 4.10b (citing Hierocles), 10ff., and 88c (97.14ff., 98.1ff., 110.10ff.). As for the second, it mentions taking its information on the sanctuary of Poseidon and Athena founded by Cadmus at Thera from Theocrestus of Cyrene (not Theophrastus); *FrGHist* 761 fr. F 3. On other, analogous insular foundations attributed to Cadmus, see Vian 1963, 60–64.

43. This ascertains that the function traditionally attributed to the Fourth *Pythian*, that of affirming the legitimacy of the Battiad dynasty, and in particular of Arcesilas the Fourth (Giannini 1979, 37, 39, 42–43), passes along a tortuous path, destined to designate the singular quality of founding hero that distinguishes the figure of Battus (cf. below).

44. Despite the doubts of interpreters in this regard, the term *nepodes* (line 1745) is particularly adapted to the designation of the descendants of Euphemus. Taken from Homer (*Od.* 4.404), where it designates the baby seal offspring of Halosudne, the “Daughter of the Sea,” this term readily designates in Alexandrian poetry the descendants of a river god; Call. fr. 66.1 and 533 Pfeiffer (but in fr. 222, the aquatic meaning of the term is no longer active; the same holds in Theocr. 17.25). Here, the usage of this term to designate the descendants of Euphemus can point back as much to the capacity of their ancestor, the son of Poseidon, to walk on water (cf. n. 39 above) as to their own insular destiny as mediators between the sea and the earth. On the representation of the seal as amphibious animal and mediator, see Detienne and Vernant 1974, 244–52. On the etymology of the term *nepodes*, see Pierre Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris, 1974), 3:747.

45. The scholia have not failed to complete the narrative of the Alexandrian poet by mentioning his Cyrenean issue; see schol. A.R. 4.1750/57 and 1760/64d (pp. 327.7ff., 328.3ff. Wendel), who mark the difference between the neglect of which the clod is the object in the Pindaric version and the voluntary gesture by Euphemus in Apollonius.

46. On Poseidon as divinity of the ground, in particular of its continental bowels, and as god of the sea depths, see Burkert 1977, 217–19. On the origin and nature of the worship of Poseidon in Thera, cf. n. 42 above.

47. Mus. fr. 2 B 11 Diels-Kranz, cited by Paus. 10.5.6, cf. also 24.4 and Ephor. *FrGHist* 70 fr. 150 and 31b; see commentary by Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, in her “Myth as History: The Previous Owners of the Delphic Oracle” (in Bremmer 1987, 215–241), who enumerates the different versions of the succession from Ge to Apollo at Delphi while showing the vanity of a historicist analysis. For epigraphical attestations, see Georges Daux, “The *Poteidanion* of Delphi,” *BCH* 92 (1968): 540–49.

48. On the intervention in the Fourth *Pythian* of both Zeus and Apollo in relation to Metis and Themis, cf. Giannini 1979, 42, 49–53.

49. The Libyan cult of Zeus Ammon is already placed in connection with that of Dodona by Hdt. (2.54ff.), who attributes to them a common Egyptian origin; see commentary in Alan B. Lloyd, *Herodotus Book II: Commentary 1–95* (Leiden, 1976), 251–64. According to schol. ad A.R. 4.28 (100.25ff. Wendel), all of Libyan earth was consecrated to Zeus. For the forebears of Libya, cf. schol. ad 4.25 (100.11ff.), but also Aesch. *Suppl.* 315ff. and Apoll. 2.4.1ff.

50. On the organizing and fertilizing functions of Zeus, see Burkert 1977, 200–203. Segal (1986, 171–79) places these functions in relation to the “patriarchal” role of the

god. The tradition includes elsewhere, in relation to the fecundity of the ground, a Zeus Chthonius; Hes. *Op.* 465; cf. also 379, 474, 488.

51. The subtle play of echoes that refer the Pindaric version of the quest for the Golden Fleece back to the foundation legend of Cyrene is highlighted by Segal (1986, 72–85, 92–93). Segal insists essentially on the passage, across the interchange between sea and land, from instability to the establishment of civic roots. But he does not see that the principal protagonist of the foundation legend of Cyrene is neither Euphemus nor Battus but the miraculous clod.

52. Parallelism glimpsed by Segal (1986, 84–85, 160–61); and on the cosmogonic echoes of the same episode, see pp. 103–5 and 144. The same scholar puts forward the hypothesis (p. 91) that, in his turn, Pindar follows an itinerary articulated as a departure and a return. On the *mētis*, “cunning intelligence,” that Pindar exercises with regard to Damophilus, see Giannini 1979, 60–62; for the problematic mention of that Cyrenean aristocrat at the end of the song, see Gentili et al. 1995, 107–9, 505–10. On the genealogy of Atlas, hero of hubris, cf. Hes. *Theog.* 507ff.; on the cosmogonic role of Atlas in relation to the sea, cf. Hom. *Od.* 1.52ff. and Aesch. *Prom.* 348ff. Cf. Martin L. West, *Hesiod: Theogony* (Oxford, 1966), 311; Ballabriga 1986, 75–91.

53. Those who interpret the circularity of this course as a simple return omit its transformative aspect. Such is the case with Burton 1962, 168; Kirkwood 1982, 163; and even Segal 1986, 89–93. See the good study by Nancy Felson Rubin, “Vicarious Transport: Fictive Deixis in Pindar’s *Pythian Four*,” *HSCPh* 99 (1999): 1–31. On Damophilus as ambassador of the poet, see Lattmann 2010, 236–38.

54. This paradox has been pointed out many times, most recently by Woodbury (1982, 245–46). Köhnken (1985, 94) likewise offers a solution at the level of the narrative. On the Delphic character of the answer given by Chiron, see Dougherty 1993, 147–9. In the poetry of Pindar, the figure of Apollo varies according to the receiver of the poem; see Angeli Bernardini 1983, 64–67.

55. Köhnken (1985, 78–79) well illuminates the divergences within the structure of Pindaric narrative in relation to chronological succession.

56. The two nymphs who guard the cattle of the Sun on a remote island are also the daughters of the cattle’s proprietor; Hom. *Od.* 12.131ff. On the other hand, in Call. *Dian.* 206ff., Cyrene appears as the companion of Artemis. The nymph is honored by the goddess after an athletic victory, as an *eromenos* would be; cf. Fritz Bornmann, *Calimachi Hymnus in Dianam* (Florence, 1968), 97–98. In assimilating Cyrene and Atalanta (cf., most recently, Woodbury 1982, 251–53), the commentators have effaced the positive character of the former’s hunting activity, as well as the note of *aidōs* that marks her union with Apollo. It is never said that Cyrene *phugei gamon*, as in the case of Atalanta; Hesiod fr. 73 Merkelbach-West, *Theognis* 1287ff., and Aristoph. *Lys.* 785ff. Other sources and pictorial documentation are in John Boardman and Giampiera Arrigoni, “Atalante,” in *LIMC* II.1: 940–50.

57. Thus Cyrene cannot be assimilated to Artemis Agrotera, as Dougherty (1993, 142–43) would like. On the armament of the adolescent Theseus in his combats against monsters, see Frank Brommer, *Theseus: Die Taten des griechischen Helden in der antiken Kunst und Literatur* (Darmstadt, 1982), 3–34.

58. Slightly different versions of the genealogical origin of Hypseus are in Pherecydes, *FrGHist* 3 fr. 57, and in Acesandrus, *FrGHist* 469 fr. 2, which are cited by the scholiast on 9.27b (233.12ff.); cf. also schol. on 9.104 and 105 (230.7ff., 13ff.). The athletic implications of the union between Apollo and Cyrene are pointed out in Lattmann 2010, 274–97.

59. In Pind. O. 6.29ff., Iamus, the son of Apollo and Evadne (herself a daughter of Poseidon), has a destiny similar to that of Aristeus. He, too, ends by sharing with his father one of his essential functions—in this case, the oracular art. The analogy is pointed out in Crotty 1982, 116–17. On the *epiclēseis* “surnames” of Aristeus, see n. 78 below. For the Greek marriage as the young woman’s rite of passage toward motherhood, see Claude Calame, *The Poetics of Eros in Ancient Greece* (Princeton, NJ, 1999), 116–29.

60. Even if the schol. on 9.6a (221.12ff.) asserts that Pindar draws the legend of Cyrene from an *Ehoiē* of Hesiod, fr. 215 Merkelbach-West, cited in this scholium, attributes to Cyrene a place of sojourn more suitable to the ascendancy of her father (cf. n. 58 above): the grandchild of Peneus and Creusa stays in the country of Phthia, beside the waters of the river Peneus, which flows down from Mt. Pindus. Pindar’s geographical displacement of Mt. Pindus to the Pelion range, while presenting a place equally marked by savagery, shows the liberties the poet takes with regard to his supposed source (Diod. Sic. 4.81.1 follows the Pindaric version). This fact ought to contribute to the subversion of the historicist hypotheses that have been drawn from the scholiast’s information; cf. Malten 1911, 154–63; Chamoux 1952, 84–88, 171. On the other hand, A.R. 4.500 brings back the Hesiodic version of the presence of Cyrene by “the marshes of the Peneus.” As for the transfer of Cyrene from Thessaly to Libya, the versions differ just as much. The nymph is carried to Libya by the swans of Apollo (Pherecydes, *FrGHist* 3 fr. 98; Ariaethus of Tegea, *FrGHist* 316 fr. 3); she makes a stop in Crete (Agroitas, author of *Libyca*, *FrGHist* 762 fr. 1); she emigrates to Libya of her own free will (Mnaseas the Periegete, *FHG* fr. 3, III, p. 156 Müller); cf. also Phylarchus of Athens, *FGHHist* 81 fr. 16. All these fragments are cited by schol. A.R. 498/527a (p. 168.13ff. Wendel).

In myths of topographical foundation that present the rape of a nymph by a god, islands and mountains take their name from a nymph seduced by Poseidon—thus, Mt. Rhodope (schol. Theocr. 75d, p. 98.17ff. Wendel) or Corcyra (Diod. 4.72.3); continental colonies are reserved to a beloved of Apollo—for example, Sinope on the Black Sea (schol. A.R. 2.946c, p. 196.15ff. Wendel).

61. Here, the power that Aphrodite usually wields over flower gardens is limited by that of Zeus, a habitué of these same gardens, who turns them into areas productive of civility. Aphrodite brings the power to seduce and fertilize that is necessary to the paradigmatic matrimonial union taking place there. References for gardens of Aphrodite and Zeus are in Motte 1973, 121–36, 207–28, and Calame, *Poetics of Eros* (see n. 59 above), 153–64. These gardens are opposed to Adonis’s sterile garden; cf. Detienne 1972, 191–201. In the Fifth *Pythian*, Aphrodite’s garden where Arcesilas is celebrated is included in Apollo’s sanctuary. For the “garden of Zeus,” see Malkin 1994, 158–67.

62. The parallelism Pindar establishes between the florescence of the land of Cyrenaica and the blossoming of Cyrene is highlighted in Rubin 1978, 359, 365. During the fifth century, the question of whether Libya and therefore Africa formed a third continent after Europe and Asia was hotly debated; cf. Hdt. 4.16.

63. On the geographical identification of this hill, cf. n. 75 below.

64. Köhnken (1985), throughout his study, explains that the victorious conquest of the fiancée and the marriage form the common denominator of the myths staged by the Fifth *Pythian*. Procreation in the poem takes the figure of florescence traced by Kirkwood (1982, 216).

65. This union is omitted in the otherwise stimulating narrative analysis in Rubin 1978, 358–63.

66. Pind. *I.* 4.52ff., with schol. ad loc. (III, p. 235.14ff. Drachmann), who emphasizes the *apanthrōpia* and the *asebeia* of the giant; cf. Angeli Bernardini 1983, 58–62. See Phryn. *TrGF* 3 fr. 3a, Diod. Sic. 4.17.4, Apoll. 2.5.11, etc.; other sources and iconography are in Ricardo Olmós and Luis J. Balmaseda, “Antaois I,” in LIMC I.1: 800–811.

67. For chronological reasons, two distinct Anteuses are thought to have existed, according to schol. ad 9.185b, 185d, and 217 (238.5ff., 16ff., 240.16ff. Drachmann). On the circumstantial reasons for the text’s refusal to accept the doubling of the figure of Anteus, see Chamoux 1952, 281–85, and Robbins 1978, 103 n. 37. The young native would thus be the daughter of the king of Anteus’s city; see Gentili et al. 1995, 616–17. Schol. ad 9.185a (237.19ff.) attributes the name “Barce” to Anteus’s daughter; according to the epic poet Pisander (fr. 6 Kinkel), she is named Alceis. Apropos Irasa, “the most beautiful of the regions of Libya,” which the natives prevent the Greek colonists from seeing in the version of Hdt. 4.158.2, cf. Pherec. *FrGHist* 3 fr. 75 (cited by the same scholium). The latter situates the Libyan city near Lake Triton; cf. Ballabriga 1986, 216–17. On modern attempts to find the locale of Irasa, see Goodchild 1971, 17–18, and Stucchi 1975, 5. For the founding of Barce, cf. Hdt. 4.160, with commentary in Chamoux 1952, 136–38. We notice that Barce seems to have had a native king named Alazir. Arcesilas III marries his daughter, perhaps repeating the legendary gesture of Alexidemus; Hdt. 4.164.4.

68. According to the interpretation proposed by Woodbury (1982, 254–55); see the intelligent commentary by this author (246–47, with nn. 8 and 9) on the line discussed (line 100), which describes the double object of the desire of Telesicrates’ admirers. Cf. also Segal 1986, 187–88.

69. Cyrene itself is progressively feminized as man takes precedence over woman. Finally, Cyrene, as the “country of beautiful women,” receives Telesicrates (line 74), just as Aphrodite received Apollo at the beginning of the narrative (lines 9 and 56).

70. The reference to grazing is constant in the qualification of Cyrenaica; it is green in the middle of a wild, desert Libya (Hdt. 2.32.4). The oracles given to Battus telling him to colonize this well-watered soil especially recall this quality; Hdt. 4.155.3 and 157.2 (*mēlotrophos* qualifies Libya at this point). Cyrene itself benefited from waters from both the sky (4.158.3) and the earth (Apollo’s spring: 4.158.3; river: 4.164.3); they ensure the *Kurēnaîē khōrē’s*, the “Cyrenaean land’s,” extraordinary fertility and productivity (4.199). See also later testimonia in Arr. *Ind.* 43.13 and Strab. 17.3.21. In A.R. 4.1561, the reading *thērotrophos*, “feeding wild beasts,” must be retained, in spite of its concurrence with *mēlotrophos*, to qualify Libya in its primordial state. In this vein, we remark that Libya was supposed to nourish golden goats (not sheep), who were watched over by a dragon called *agrios*, “savage”; Agroitas, *FrGHist* 762 fr. 3a and b. In addition, in Lyc. 893, the Libyan people who receive the Argonauts are presented as a pastoral people. Homer had already mentioned the marvelous animals that situate pastoral Libya between savagery and the Golden Age, attributing to this region ewes that furnished milk abundantly all year long

(Od. 4.85ff.; cf. also Hdt. 4.29). Undoubtedly, the qualities accorded silphium should be evaluated in this context; cf. Aristoph. *Plut.* 925 and schol. Aristoph. *Eq.* 894 (p. 66.22ff. Dübner); further documentation in Chamoux 1952, 246–63.

71. On the building of Troy, see Hom. *Il.* 21.441ff. The complementarity of constructing a city with houses, walls, and temples, and the constitution of the *aroura*, the cultivated territory that surrounds it, is manifested in the act of the foundation of Scheria; Od. 6.8ff.

72. Cf. also P. 4.2 and 5.32 ff., 85, 92, and 115, as well as Call. fr. 716 Pfeiffer. Even if Pindar does not seem to have used it here, it is useful to recall the image of the domestication of mares, the metaphor that represents the effects of marriage; cf. my remarks about this subject in Calame, *Choruses of Young Women in Ancient Greece: Their Morphology, Religious Role, and Social Functions*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD, Boulder, CO, New York, and Oxford, 2001), 238–44. Alexidemus's marriage with the native princess could receive a metaphorical expression in the domestication represented by the passage from nomadic equitation to maneuvering chariots.

73. Call. Ap. 43–8. As for the origin and placement of the horned altar of Delos, see the references in Williams 1978, 59–60. For the poem, I refer to my extensive study “Legendary Narration and Poetic Procedure in Callimachus’ *Hymn to Apollo*,” in Calame, *Masks of Authority: Fiction and Pragmatics in Ancient Greek Poetics* (Ithaca, NY, and London, 2005), 70–86. The form *themethla*, the first term Callimachus used for the foundations established by Apollo, designates in P. 4.16 those of the sanctuary of Zeus Ammon and consequently those of the Libyan soil. The same term is used again to designate Apollo's foundation of the temple at Delphi; HAp. 254 and 294. On the use of the verb *huphainein*, “to weave,” to denote the construction of an edifice, see Williams 1978, 56–57, and John Scheid and Jesper Svenbro, *Le Métier de Zeus: Mythe du tissage et du tissu dans le monde gréco-romain* (Paris, 1994), 106–12. The weaving refers to the activity of Apollo as an architect; see Marcel Detienne, “Apollon Archègète: Un modèle politique de territorialisation,” in M. Detienne, ed., *Tracés de foundation* (Louvain and Paris, 1990), 301–11.

74. Hdt. 4.158, Call. Ap. 85ff. On the probable geographical location of Aziris (orthography “Azilis” in Call. Ap. 89), see Goodchild 1971, 19–20. On the warrior aspect assumed by the Spartan-Theran colonists celebrating the Carneia, see Williams 1978, 75–76. On the military character of the Carneia itself, see Burkert 1977, 354–58. The Carneia's implantation in Libya also constitutes an organizing theme in the version of the Greek migration to Cyrenaica that is presented in the Fifth *Pythian*; cf. below.

75. The “Mount” of Myrtes is also mentioned by schol. A.R. 2.505, where it also designates the site of Cyrene before its colonization, and by Steph. Byz. s.v. “*Murtoussa*” (p. 464.17ff. Meineke). For its geographical identification, cf. Chamoux 1952, 268, or Stucchi 1975, 117; Stucchi collapses the Myrtoussa of the legend with the ground on which the sanctuary of Apollo was built. In this case, the “breast” that Pindar speaks of in P. 4.14 corresponds to the entire hill of the Acropolis, as well as the “eminence” surrounded by a plain mentioned in P. 9.55.

76. Acesandrus, *FrGHist* 469 fr. 4, cited by schol. A.R. 2.498/527a (p. 168.25ff. Wendel). In conformity with this version, A.R. 2.509 indicates that Apollo made an *agrotis*, a “huntress,” of Cyrene in Libya. On Eurypylus, native king of Cyrene, cf. n. 15 above. On the supposed opposition between this version and the Pindaric version, see Chamoux

1952, 77–83, which also mentions later sources. Malten (1911, 51–55) would like to see the versions of Acesandrus and Callimachus as purely local narratives. Different reasons have been alleged to justify this divergence, as enumerated by Paola Radici Colace, in “Cirene e Artemide *potnia therōn* nell’Inno secondo di Callimaco,” *GIF* 27 (1975): 45–59, who herself advances a ritualist thesis that is difficult to defend.

77. Robbins 1978, 96–104. In an explicitly structuralist reference, Robbins confuses the second term of the opposition with that of cultivation (agricultural); more prudence with respect to this subject is found in commentary by Kirkwood (1982, 223, 226). For an analysis of the Centaur’s double nature, see G. S. Kirk, *Myth: Its Meaning and Function in Ancient and Other Cultures* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), 152–62.

78. A.R. 2.498ff., with schol. ad loc. (pp. 168.4ff., 169.10ff., 24ff. Wendel). Aristeus is already defined, along with Hermes, as the guardian of flocks by Hes. fr. 217 Merkelbach-West (cf. also fr. 216 and *Theog.* 977). Call. Aet. fr. 75.32ff. Pfeiffer attributes the name “Aristeus” to Zeus Icmaius, making of this name an *epiclēsis* “surname” of the god of the etesian winds. In this connection, one sees that in Hom. *Il.* 13.154 and 14.213, as well as in *Hymn Hom.* 23.1, Zeus is qualified as *aristos*. No doubt this *epiclēsis* “surname” facilitated the assimilation of Aristeus to the god of the celestial water. In addition, Pindar probably uses the name “Aristeus” in a play of mythological assimilation manifested in the Ninth *Pythian*; the hero’s name is found once again in the designation of the suitors for the hand of Aristeus’s daughter, among whom is Alexidemus (*aristēēs*, 107); cf. Köhnken 1985, 105. On Aristeus’s essentially pastoral function, see Woodbury 1982, 255–58. Brelich (1958, 171) sees that the alimentary inventions attributed to Aristeus do not include the cultivation of cereals; cf. Diod. Sic. 4.81.2ff. and schol. ad 9.112 and 115b (231.1ff. and 13ff.); other sources are in Malten 1911, 77–85. We also note that according to schol. ad 4.4 (94.268), Aristeus himself would have been honored by the Cyreneans as oecist.

79. Both Amphitryon and Iolaus were objects of heroic cults in Thebes; cf. Pind. *O.* 9.98ff., *I.* 5.32ff., *N.* 4.19ff., and fr. 169.47ff. Snell-Maehler. See Albert Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia* (BICS 1981, suppl. 38.1), 30–31, and (BICS 1986, suppl. 38.2), 64–65, citing all the other evidence on the tomb shared by the two heroes. Heracles, whose brother Iphicles is the father of Iolaus, is attached to this hero by a double relation, familial and amorous. The uncle and the nephew were probably both honored in the same Ioleia/Heracleia festival. Pindar seems to situate another of Telesicrates’ agonal victories there; on this subject, cf. Laura Nash, “The Theban Myth in *Pythian* 9, 74–103,” *QUCC* 40 (1982): 77–97; references in Kirkwood 1982, 228–29; and discussion of the syntactic articulation of this passage in Burton 1962, 45–50, and Carey 1981, 90–91. On the founding and civilizing character of Heracles’ athletic exploits, see Brelich 1958, 193–96.

80. This metaphorical relation is highlighted by Köhnken (1985, 108–10), who, however, does not perceive that the *telos* of both battle and marriage applies to Telesicrates (cf. lines 99ff.!). In the same vein, see Crotty 1982, 95; Emilio Suarez della Torre, “El mito de Cirene y la victoria de Telesicrates (Pind. *Pyth.* IX),” *EC* 26 (1984): 199–208 (with an abundant bibliography on the subject in n. 2); and Segal 1986, 187–88. More subtly done is Anne Carson’s “Wedding at Noon in Pindar’s Ninth *Pythian*,” *GRBS* 23 (1982): 121–28. She shows that Telesicrates’ victory is effective only to the extent that it is integrated into the community through the civilizing ritual of marriage. Since Elroy L. Bundy’s *Studia Pindarica* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962), I:17–18, and Burton 1962, 48–50, we have

found allusions in lines 79–103 to different victories carried off by Telesicrates, not only at Thebes, but also at Aegina, Megara, and, finally, Cyrene, in the local festivals cited in lines 97–103; cf. especially Jacques Peron, “Pindare et la victoire de Télésicratès dans la IXe Pythique (vv. 76–96),” *RPh* 50 (1976): 58–78, and Nash, “Theban Myth” (see n. 79 above).

81. On the Heraclids’ intervention in the Peloponnesus, see Prinz 1979, 277–313, which considers the insertion of Delphic influence to be rather late (p. 278, n. 82). On the tripartite division of the Peloponnesus confirmed by the Heraclid legacy, see my remarks in “Spartan Genealogies: The Mythological Representation of a Spatial Organization,” in Bremmer 1987, 153–86.

82. These different movements along the time line have not aided the comprehension of this passage. One wonders particularly how “the gift-bearing men whom Battus brought on the ships” could receive “the drivers of horses,” those descended from Antenor the Trojan (lines 85ff.). Making *dekontai* into a historical present only reinforces the contradiction; this, however, is the solution proposed by Chamoux (1952, 71, 279 n. 5; but cf. 389) and by Jean Brunel, in “Les Anténorides à Cyrène et l’interprétation littéraire de Pindare, *Pythique* V, v. 82–88,” *REA* 66 (1964): 5–21. Brunel proposes making to *ethnos* the subject of the verb *dekontai*, following various paraphrases of the passage given by schol. ad 5.113; see also Dougherty 1993, 119 n. 31, and commentary in Gentili et al. 1995, 531–34. Francis Vian, in “Les Anténorides de Cyrène et les Carnéia,” *REG* 68 (1955): 307–11, argues that the verb under discussion, specified by *thusiaisin* and by the expression *oikhneontes sphe* (allusions to the movement of a procession), refers to an act of cult devoted to the heroes. On the other hand, as we shall see, it is impossible to envision as probable the real installation of the Antenorids in Cyrene before its colonization by the Thereans. Menelaus himself passes as having stopped in Libya; see Hdt. 2.119.2, with an allusion in Hom. *Od.* 4.85 (see Malkin 1994, 48–52).

83. Theras’s family ancestry and his political destiny are unfolded in Hdt. 4.147ff. in a *logos* commented on below (cf. n. 102 below); see Pietro Vannicelli, “Gli Egidi e la relazione tra Sparta e Cirene in età arcaica,” *QUCC* 70 (1992): 55–73. For the attempts to connect the figure of Theras to the herding protected by Apollo, see R. Holland, “Theras,” in *Ausführ. Lexikon der gr. u. röm. Mythologie* (Leipzig, 1916), 5:640–52. We note that historians after Herodotus will attempt to suppress the Aegid line in the history of Cyrene’s founding by substituting Samus, a descendant of Euphemus, for Theras, the founder of Thera; cf. n. 114 below.

84. Hes. *Op.* 156ff. On the content of the *Cyclia* (in the broad sense), see especially the introduction to *Cypria* fr. 1 Bernabé: the Theban War and the Trojan War are inscribed in the same plan by Zeus. For a reconstruction of the epic cycle’s plot, see Albert Severyns, *Le cycle épique dans l’Ecole d’Aristarque* (Liège and Paris, 1928), 163–425.

85. The ancient historians had already arrived at the thesis of Cyrene’s precolonization by Antenor’s descendants who fled the destruction of Troy; Lysimachus (*FrGHist* 382 fr. 6), a historian of the second century B.C.E., is cited by schol. ad 5.110 (186.3ff.). Cf. schol. Lyc. 874 (II, p. 283.20ff. Scheer). See also Timach. Rhod. *FrGHist* 532 fr. 17, with commentary in Chamoux (1952, 72); this hypothesis justifies the early date of 1336 attributed to the colonization of Cyrenaica (cf. n. 1 above). Among modern historians, the hypothesis of a “pre-Dorian” or “Mycenean” colonization of Cyrene was advanced by

Alfred Gercke, in "Die Myrmidonen in Kyrene," *Hermes* 41 (1906): 447–59. In addition, there have been attempts to identify the Antenorids with the Tritopatores or the Acaman-tes cited in SEG IX.72.21ff; cf. Malkin 1987, 209–12; Leschhorn 1984, 68. There is a more prudent historicist thesis in Malten 1911, 112–51. A refutation of the various precolonization hypotheses can be found in Chamoux 1952, 71–91. Lorenzo Braccesi, in "Antenoridi, Veneti e Libyi," *Quaderni di archeologia della Libya* 12 (1987): 7–14, gives an interesting historical explanation for the fifth-century insertion of the Antenorids in Cyrenean legend.

86. On the institution of cults, at Mycenaean sites, devoted to the heroes of the Trojan War during the archaic period, see Claude Bérard, "L'héroïsation et la formation de la cité," in *Architecture et société: De l'archaïsme grec à la fin de la République romaine* (Paris and Rome, 1983), 43–59; see also Currie 2005, 47–49 (with an extensive bibliography on the problem). For something more specific on the "invention of the mythic founder" and the cult devoted to him, see François De Polignac, *La naissance de la cité grecque*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1995), 170–76. On Sparta, see Calame, "Spartan Genealogies" (see n. 81 above), 153–86. The problem posed by the founding of Rome is identical. Built, in legend, by heroes of the Trojan War, Rome has existed, from the archeological point of view, only since the eighth century B.C.E.! Other colonies wanted to have a heroic past; cf. Malkin 1987, 153.

87. The existence of the Hill of the Antenorids is pointed out by Lysimachus in *FrGHist* 382 fr. 6. For an attempt to locate it, see François Chamoux, "Les Anténorides à Cyrène," in *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire Charles Picard* (Paris, 1949), 1:154–61. Chamoux's article contains some of the arguments he developed (see n. 85 above) to refute the historical existence of a pre-Battiad colonization of Cyrene.

88. *Makar* essentially denotes the happy condition that gods enjoy living in the ideal regions; Martin L. West, *Hesiod: Works and Days* (Oxford, 1978), 193–94. Heroes accede to this after mortal existence; Brelich 1958, 352–53. I have studied traces left in legend by the process of Battus's heroization; see Calame 1988, 118–23.

89. If we follow Theotimus, Cyrene's historiographer, we can affirm that even the charioteer Carrhotus is inscribed in the sequence of founders/civilizers, since on Arcesilas the Fourth's demand he is substituted for a certain Euphemus (see n. 19 above) to take charge of a colonial expedition to the Hesperides; *FrGHist* 470 fr. 1, cited by schol. ad 5.34 (175.16ff.); cf. Chamoux 1952, 173–75.

90. On Corinth: Paus. 2.4.3. On Sicily: Paus. 2.6.7. We must not forget that Heracleon or Heraclid ancestry was used as a means of attaching a dynasty to either an Achaean or a Dorian ancestry; cf. Domenico Musti, "Continuità e discontinuità tra Achei e Dori nelle tradizioni storiche," in Musti 1985, 37–71. For the state of the question, see Prinz 1979, 212–16. On Rhodes: Hom. *Il.* 2.653ff., also Pind. *O.* 7.20ff., with schol. ad loc. (I, p. 208.17ff. Drachmann). On Cos: Hom. *Il.* 2.677ff.; cf. G. S. Kirk, in *The Iliad: A Commentary* (Cambridge, 1985), 1:225, 228, who shows that the Achaean continuity implied by this genealogical projection does not have an archeological correspondence. On Lydia: Hdt. 1.7. On Macedonia: Thuc. 2.99.3 and Diod. Sic. 7.15.3ff.

91. On Aigimius as representative of the Dorians, see Pind. *P.* 1.62ff. and Strab. 9.4.10. The legend of the encounter of Heraclids and Dorians for the conquest of the Peloponnesus, pretext for a first Aegid emigration from Thebes, is made explicit by schol. ad 5.101b (184.12ff.), who cite Eph. *FrGHist* 70 fr. 16. Cf. n. 101 below.

92. On these legends, see Prinz 1979, 187–205, 97–111, 56–78, without forgetting Rome's founding by Aeneas!

93. Antenor's favorable, conciliatory attitude vis-à-vis Menelaus and Odysseus is described in Hom. *Il.* 3.205ff. and 7.348ff.; cf. also Bacch. 15, Paus. 10.27.3, and commentary by schol. ad 5.110 (186.3ff.), Lysimachus *FrGHist* 382 fr. 6. Antenor himself founds Patavium in the Veneto; Soph. *TrGF*, pp. 16ff. Radt, Strab. 5.1.4, Liv. 1.1, and Verg. *Aen.* 1.242ff.; other evidence is in Mark Davies, "Antenor I," in LIMC I.1: 811–15. The hospitality isotopy is also actualized in the Fourth *Pythian*; cf. n. 14 above.

94. On the "Dorian" character attributed to the Carneia since antiquity, cf. Thuc. 5.54.2 and Paus. 3.13.4. The festival is best attested in Sparta; sources in Samuel Wide, *Lakonische Kulte* (Leipzig, 1893), 63–87; cf. also Burkert 1977, 354–58. On double *aition* of the Carneia, see Paus. 3.13.3 and 5; see also Alcm. fr. 52 Page, Theop. *FrGHist* 115 fr. 357, Con. *FrGHist* 26 fr. 1.26, and schol. Call. *Ap.* 71 (II, p. 48.20ff. Pfeiffer); see comment in Malkin 1994, 149–52. This game of temporal effacement through a probable reference to the double origin of the Carneia leads me to consider the Carneia cited in line 80, the welcome sacrifices offered to the Antenorids in line 86, and the festival designated in line 90 by the general term "Apolloniai" as all one festival. Analogous interpretation is in Lefkowitz 1985, 45, 50. See, however, schol. ad 5.121 (188.1ff.). On the Cyrenean celebration of the Carneia, see again Call. *Ap.* 77ff., a text commented on below.

95. On the Apollonian cult whose object was Battus in Cyrene, see Chamoux 1952, 285–87 (with an error in the location of the hero's tomb; cf. n. 97 below), and Calame 1988, 118–23. Dougherty (1993, 103–12) points out the relationships, through Apollo, between Battus the founder of Cyrene and Arcesilas the Fourth, the victorious king in Delphi; see also Currie 2005, 247–48.

96. The assimilation of these two heroic references is facilitated, not only by the double return to the present and the common celebration of the Carneia already evoked, but also by the subtle enunciative play Pindar exploits in the poem. The "I" of the narrator that expresses his kinship with the Aegid heroes (*emoi pateres*, 76; cf. *I.* 7.12ff.) returns in line 80 with "we" (*sebizomen*), which may also refer to the Cyrenean *choreutai* who sing the Fifth *Pythian* for Arcesilas, as well as to those who celebrate the Carneia, which honors also the Antenorids. For this frequent procedure of "choral delegation" in Pindar's poems, see Calame, "Fra racconto eroico e poesia rituale: il soggetto poetico che canta il mito (Pindaro, *Olimpica* 6)," *QUCC* 92 (2009): 11–26 (with an extensive bibliography on the controversial question of the poetic "I" in Pindar's poems). On the Fifth *Pythian* in particular, see, for instance, the indecisive remarks in Lefkowitz 1985, 45–49, and Lefkowitz, "Who Sang Pindar's Victory Odes?" *AJP* 109 (1988): 1–11, and the more precise remarks in Gordon M. Kirkwood, "Pythian 5.72–76, 9.90–92 and the Voice of Pindar," *ICS* 6 (1981): 12–23; see also Krummen 1990, 136–41; Gentili et al. 1995, 160–61; and Calame, *Masks of Authority* (see n. 73 above), 4–7. Burton (1962, 146–47) attempts to reduce the contradiction represented by this double enunciative reference by imagining that Pindar himself participated in the celebration of Arcesilas the Fourth at Cyrene!

Perhaps the occasion for the Fifth *Pythian*'s recitation is to be found in the Carneia; cf. Burton 1962, 135–37, and Christian Froidefond, "Pittoresque et idéalité dans la V^e Pythique de Pindare," *REA* 80 (1981): 217–27; see also Krummen 1990, 114–15, 148–51. This hypothesis finds confirmation in the narrator's recommendation (after evocation of the

festival's introduction in Cyrene) to Arcesilas to celebrate Apollo "by the song of young people" (line 103; announced by the *komoi* of line 100); this song is none other than the Fifth *Pythian*. This means that Aphrodite's garden, where the execution of Pindar's ode takes place (line 24), is part of Apollo's sanctuary, not next to it (as argued in Chamoux 1952, 267–69). A small temple of Aphrodite seems to have been part of the sanctuary, at any rate; see Stucchi 1975, 53, 54, 54 n. 3. Perhaps the Ninth *Pythian*'s matrimonial isotopy recurs here; on the qualities of Aphrodite's garden, see Motte 1973, 121–37. In Delos, also, the statue of Aphrodite brought by Theseus probably stands in Apollo's sanctuary; cf. Philippe Bruneau, *Recherches sur les cultes de Délos à l'époque hellénistique et à l'époque impériale* (Paris, 1980), 19–21, 333–34.

97. The identification of the tumulus corresponding to Battus's tomb is not yet certain; cf. Goodchild 1971, 94, and Stucchi 1975, 12, 104 n. 4; more recent references in Gentili et al. 1995, 536; see also Krummen 1990, 100–108. An attempt at reconstitution is in Büsing 1978, 66–75. On the cult of the oecist, see Malkin 1987, 204–12. On the Hill of the Antenorids, cf. n. 87 above. For the heroization of Arcesilas the Fourth, see Currie 2005, 236–48.

98. Hdt. 4.145–57 (the ethnographic part of the Herodotean introduction to Libya extends from 168 to 199). This Herodotean version of the antecedents of Cyrene's founding is at the same time recapitulated and completed by schol. ad 4.88b (109.14ff.); cf. also schol. ad 5.99b (184.3ff.). The coincidence of these two lineages at Sparta at the moment of the decision to found Thera is also emphasized by Paus. 7.2.2, who dates this colonization one generation after that of Ionia. As for Herodotus's practice of synchronic historical writing and its defects, see Catherine Darbo-Peschanski, *Le discours du particulier: Essai sur l'enquête hérodotéenne* (Paris, 1987), 30–32. On Libya as a third continent, cf. n. 62 above.

99. The Minyans' claim to consider their return to Sparta as a return to the land of their fathers (Hdt. 4.145.4) is marked by a fire lit on the slopes of the Taygetus, which may be interpreted as a sacrifice to Hestia; cf. Francesco Prontera, "I Minii sul Taigeto (Erodoto IV 145): genealogia e sinecismo in Sparta arcaica," *AFLPer* 16 (1978/79): 159–66. Prontera's interpretation is confirmed in A.R. 4.1761, who shows Euphemus's descendants coming to establish themselves "by the hearth" (*ephestioi*) of the Spartans; this term is glossed by "colonists" (*epoikoi*) in schol. ad loc. (p. 327.71ff. Wendel). According to Herodotus, Pindar's use of the enigmatic expression *meikthentes*, "mingling with" (P. 4.257), to qualify Euphemus's descendants' stay in Sparta may be taken in its direct sense of matrimonial union and its secondary signification of incorporation into the civic body of Sparta.

100. The same genealogy, going back to Oedipus, is recalled in Call. Ap. 74; cf. schol. A.R. 1760/64C (p. 327.25ff. Wendel).

101. On the Spartan destiny of the Aegids, cf. Pind. I. 7.12ff., with schol. ad loc. (III, p. 263.1ff. Drachmann), who cite Androt. *FrGHist* 324 fr. 60b, with complex commentary in Franz Kiechle, *Lakonien und Sparta* (Munich and Berlin, 1963), 82–95. The reference to Sparta in the Fifth *Pythian* by means of the mention of the Aegids is part of the process of heroization that traverses this ode; cf. Nafissi 1985, 378, 380.

102. Calame 1988, 108–18; developed in Calame 2011, 200–41.

103. As far as bastardy is concerned, legend makes Penthilus, founding hero of Les-

bos, the offspring of the unmarried union of Orestes and Erigone, who herself is born of the unsanctioned union of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus; cf. Paus. 2.18.6 and 3.2.1 and Alc. fr. 70.16ff. Voigt. On the other hand, the destiny of Agamemnon's mother strangely resembles that of the mother attributed to Battus in the Cyrenean version. She, too, a Cretan, granddaughter of Minos the Second, is taken away by her father and entrusted to Nauplius to be sold abroad; at Argos she marries Pleisthenes the Atreid; see Eur. *Cressai*, pp. 494ff. Kannicht and Apoll. 3.2.2.

104. The two versions of Tarentum's colonization, cited by Strab. 6.3.2 and 3, go back to Antiochus of Syracuse, *FrGHist* 555 fr. 13, and to Ephorus, *FrGHist* 70 fr. 216, respectively. Other sources are in Marinella Corsano, "Sparte et Tarente: le mythe de fondation d'une colonie," *RHR* 196 (1979): 113–40, which, following an abundant bibliography, furnishes the best analysis of this legend.

105. Schol. Pind. I. 7.18c (III, p. 263.18ff. Drachmann), who cites Arist. *Resp. Lac.* fr. 532 Rose.

106. Dion. Hal. 19.1; Paus. 10.10.4; other sources in Corsano, "Sparte et Tarente."

107. Call. *Ap.* 88, Steph. Byz. s.v. "Kurēnē" (p. 396.17ff. Meineke). Chamoux (1952, 126–27) cites the moderns' epistemologizing attempt to give a meaning to this toponym.

108. Herodotus's silence on the subject of the clod received by Euphemus in no way prevents the historian from Halicarnassus's knowing of the forced march of the Argonauts in Libya. But the version he gives thereof, apropos of his description of Lake Triton (4.178ff.; cf. n. 29 above), mentions only the exchange of the tripod, which Jason destined for Delphi, contrary to the information transmitted by Triton. This gift of a tripod is the promise of numerous Greek foundations in Libya. Undoubtedly, it is an echo of a narrative found in an especially enigmatic passage of Lycophron (886ff.): having become a mixing bowl and been transmitted to Triton by Medea, the gift of the Greeks, too, presents itself as the presage of Greek control over Libya. Completely detached from the Cyrenean context, this Herodotean narrative cannot be considered a Libyan version intended to be opposed to the Theran version of the founding of Cyrene in the Fourth *Pythian*: the theme of autochthony carried by this ode forbids this interpretation, which is proposed in Jutta Kirchberg, *Die Funktion der Orakel im Werke Herodots* (Göttingen, 1965), 53–55. Forgotten therein is that the clod lost at Thera is of Libyan origin!

109. On the chronological system that Herodotus put in place, see Hermann Strasburger, "Herodots Zeitrechnung," *Historia* 5 (1956): 129–61, and Darbo-Peschanski, *Le discours du particulier* (see n. 98 above), 25–32. For an attempt (illusory) to bring together the chronology of the Herodotean narrative and that of the Fourth *Pythian* narrative by thus making Theras the one who, in the fourth generation, should have founded Cyrene, see Büsing 1978, 62–66. With regard to generational succession as a chronological principle of historiography, see Ricoeur 1985, 160–71.

110. The attribution of the battle with the Libyan lions to Battus is inscribed within the framework of the spatial displacement of the nymph Cyrene's hunting activity from Thessaly to Cyrenaica to civilize the native king Eurypylos's territory; cf. nn. 15 and 76 above. Aristarchus, cited by schol. ad 4.76b (181.11ff.), understood perfectly the civilizing action attached to the effect of Battus's voice, whatever interpretation one may give; cf. schol. ad 78a, 80a, 83 (181.2ff., 182.11ff., 18ff.). The version given by Pausanias (10.15.7; cf. also schol. Call. *Ap.* 65; II, p. 51.61ff. Pfeiffer), far from representing the myth of origin

as supposed by Burton (1962, 145), is, no doubt, a later development. The transference of the fear displayed by the wild animals to Battus himself only rationalizes the legend. There is another attempt of the same type by Acesandrus (*FrGHist* 469 fr. 6), who talks about a transformation *apo tautomatou* (i.e., spontaneous) of the voice of Battus, who becomes from then on an *anēr rhētorikos*, “rhetor”! Cf. also Call. *Ap.* 76, who calls the oecist an *oulos*, a term to which schol. ad loc. (II, p. 52.81ff. Pfeiffer) gives the meaning “healthy in language”; see commentary in Williams 1978, 69–70. On the double name Battus-Aristoteles, see Leschhorn 1984, 61 n. 2.

For Plutarch, *Pyth. Or.* 405b, there is no incompatibility between Battus’s stuttering and the fact that he is *basilikos* (“kingly”), *politicos* (“civic-minded”), and *phronimos* (“prudent”)! Henceforth, the legend is rationalized and the passage from stuttering to strong voice is no longer seen as the affirmation of sovereignty. The Fourth *Pythian* is unambiguous in this regard: the oracular interrogation concerning a voice’s clumsiness opens up onto the institution of a royalty still prosperous through the eighth generation. The central character of the transformation undergone by Battus in the process of the heroization of an oecist is made explicit in Maurizio Giangiulio, “Deformità eroiche e tradizioni di fondazione: Batto, Miscello e l’oracolo delfico,” *ASNP* 3, no. 9 (1981): 1–24. Segal (1986, 145–50) also points out that Battus represents the inverse of Oedipus the tyrant; other bibliographical references in Calame 1988, 122 n. 14. In a late version of the legends concerning Athenian Thesmophoria (Ael. fr. 44 Hercher), Battus is taken to be emasculated because he has seen that which he ought not to have seen or understood; cf. Detienne and Vernant 1979, 184–209. I will leave the exegesis of the stuttering hero’s impotence to a psychoanalytic interpretation.

111. Menecl. *FrGHist* 270 fr. 6, with commentary in Calame 1988, 105–6. Unfortunately, the text of the oracle given by Menecles is corrupt; cf. Herbert W. Parke and Donald E. W. Wormell, “Notes on Delphic Oracles,” *CQ* 43 (1949): 138–40. It is still possible to see a metaphorical play there: the passage from an unstable maritime country to a continent glossed as “terra firma” (*sterros gē*) undoubtedly echoes the transition from stuttering, to which the name “Battus” refers, to the accomplishment of the Theraean oecist’s enterprise.

112. Callimachus claimed Battiad ancestry for himself; cf. test. 1, 4, 6, and 87 Pfeiffer, with commentary in Williams 1978, 65, 67. As the latter suggests, it is not impossible to see in the term *patrōios* an explicit reminder of the “Aegid” ancestry Pindar claimed in *P.* 9.76.

113. On the meaning of this term, cf. Williams 1978, 63.

114. This is especially so in the case of Acesandrus, who, in his treatise on the history of Cyrene, makes the eponymous nymph’s combat with the lions under the reign of Eurypylus follow the episode of Battus’s stuttering; *FrGHist* 469 fr. 4 and 6. This historian attempts to rationalize the legend by attributing the founding of Thera directly to Samus, a descendant of Euphemus, rather than to an Aegid; fr. 5; cf. also Theocr. *FrGHist* 761 fr. 1 and schol. ad 4.88b (110.5ff.). There are echoes of another “historicization” of the legend in Strab. 17.3.20ff.

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7 INTRODUCTION Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood (1945–2007) was one of the leaders in a fundamental shift in the interpretation of images on Greek vases that started in the 1970s. She refers in her chapter to other scholars with whom she was in dialogue at the time.^a One of them, Claude Bérard, in presenting the papers from a seminar that took place in Lausanne in 1981–82, named and described the new approach thus:

For archaeologists, semiotics presents itself in the first place as a fundamental tool for understanding images that pose problems of meaning, second for establishing and analyzing corpora of images, at the same time revealing the deep logic that governs their execution. The result is an altogether new reading: no longer as illustrations of a literary classical Greece, or, still worse, of supposed daily life, but as a system of . . . representations . . . belonging to an anthropology of the social imaginary, which does not cease . . . to astonish the specialists themselves. In fact, at least for classical archaeology, reflection on problems of method, the theory of archaeology, is quite underdeveloped in relation to the theories that preoccupy the history of art.^b

Semiotics, whether in archaeology or in another field, takes its object of study to be a system of signs. The signs are the smallest definable units. They have no fixed meaning in themselves but are polysemic. In a painting on a particular vase, the signs, or images, acquire particular significance in their combination. The scholar of imagery, or iconography, who has analyzed the system can “read” a vase painting, to use Bérard’s metaphor. (It is also Sourvinou-Inwood’s.) The arrival of this method was signaled by a conference organized by Bérard and his colleagues, “Images et sociétés en Grèce ancienne: l’iconographie comme méthode d’analyse” (Lausanne, February 8–11, 1984), the papers from which were published as *A City of Images*.^c

The contribution of Sourvinou-Inwood to the first edition of *Approaches to Greek Myth* remains a powerful statement of semiotic theory and method for the interpretation of Greek vase painting.^d It also demonstrates the method in her “reading” of a series of five fifth-century Athenian vases showing Theseus, sword in hand, pursuing a woman. Although Theseus, as the Athenian national hero, is exceptionally well known in all stages of his life, from both literature and art, the episode in question is rather obscure, and it is for this reason that interpretation of the vases in question presents itself as a problem. Sourvinou-Inwood is able to identify the woman as Medea. The pursuit is hostile. Theseus is driving his mur-

derous stepmother out of Athens. She would go East, and her son Medos would give his name to the Medes, the later enemies of Greece. In its historical context, the scene expressed, amongst other things, Athenian pride in the victories at Marathon, Thermopylae, and Salamis.

The approach of Sourvinou-Inwood and the Lausanne group (and Parisian fellow-travelers) coincided with and contributed to a decline in what had been the prevailing way of doing scholarship on Greek vases. In the words of Richard Neer, “One of the wholly salutary effects of the work of pioneering scholars like Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood and Claude Bérard was to provide an alternative to connoisseurship in the study of Greek vases.”^e “Connoisseurship” was the attribution, on the basis of small stylistic traits, of unsigned vases to potters and painters and the chronology and dating of the vases.^f Its two greatest exponents in the twentieth century were John Beazley (1885–1970) and Gisela Richter (1882–1972), who was also a connoisseur of sculpture.^g The two editions of Brian Sparkes’s overview, *Greek Art*, published in 1991 and 2011 in the series “New Surveys in the Classics,” track the change. In the first edition, “connoisseurship” gets its own chapter; in the second, it has become a section in a chapter entitled “Potters, Painters, and Clients.” “This approach,” Sparkes writes, explaining its decline, “has been felt to pay insufficient attention to aspects such as the significance of the pots and of the images in the contexts in which they once had their being: the functions of the pottery in home, sanctuary, or tomb; the viewers, the customers, and the traders.”^h On Sparkes’s account, the economic afterlife of the product now gets more attention than the product itself.ⁱ Iconography, by whatever approach, while of great interest to scholars of Greek myth, is going to suffer.

At the same time, connoisseurship, in other guises, such as the study of individual painters and individual vase shapes and the relation of shape to decoration, keeps an inertia.^j It is also the case that the scholar who has compiled long catalogues of vases or has organized large exhibitions feels himself or herself qualified to pronounce on the significance of iconography. This tendency is reflected in the fortune of Sourvinou-Inwood’s work on Theseus in the *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Graecae*, “without a doubt the single most important and influential project of its generation in classical archaeology.”^k The first three of the five vases studied by Sourvinou-Inwood in this chapter are listed, not in the lexicon’s article on Theseus, but in the one on his stepmother, Aethra.^l In the article on Helen, Lilly Kahil (1926–2002) does list and discuss these three vases;^m she concludes that the scene could be Theseus pursuing Helen. The astonishment of which Bérard spoke awaited Kahil if she ever read Sourvinou-Inwood’s chapter in the first

edition of this volume. The influence of Sourvinou-Inwood and the Lausanne school did not, in any case, go unfelt, as a title like *Reading Greek Vases* (2007) shows." As for amateurs and scholars interested in Greek myth, they have in Sourvinou-Inwood's chapter an example of what can be done and how to do it.

Myths in Images

Theseus and Medea as a Case Study

CHRISTIANE SOURVINOU-INWOOD

The Greek world was full of images,¹ many of which represented mythological subjects. An attempt to consider how myths are articulated in images, and thus also how the representational evidence can contribute to the study of Greek myth, must begin with a central methodological question: how can we read these mythological representations as nearly as possible in the ways in which they were read by their contemporaries and avoid imposing on them our own assumptions, expectations, and preconceptions? A "commonsense" approach is obviously unsatisfactory, since it is empirically demonstrable that perception and understanding (including, of course, "common sense" itself) are culturally determined; any "direct" reading involving an empirical confrontation with the ancient images inevitably deploys implicitly our own assumptions, which are culturally determined and thus vastly different from those of the ancient Greeks and which are therefore alien intrusions corrupting our reconstruction of the ancient meanings.

In this chapter I set out the methodology I consider appropriate for the reading of ancient images and apply it to the solution of a particular problem, the reading and interpretation of a set of fifth-century mythological scenes painted on Athenian vases. The iconographic theme on which this investigation is focused—though other themes will also be discussed—represents Theseus, drawn sword in his right hand, pursuing a woman, who is shown on the same or on the other side of the vase running away from him (cf. plates 1–3). This theme (on which see Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 1987a; Kron 1981, 420, 422–23, 429) will henceforth be referred to as "Theseus with a (drawn) sword." A section of this chapter summarizes the results of the detailed iconographic and semantic analyses of "Theseus with a sword" conducted elsewhere (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 1987a). The fact that many of the technical analyses have been published else-

where will allow me to cover a lot of ground without exhaustively setting out all parts of the argument in the detail necessary for methodological rigor. Here I first sketch out the arguments elaborated elsewhere on the basis of which I concluded that the images under consideration represent Theseus attacking his stepmother Medea, who had tried to poison him. Next, I answer certain objections. Finally, I further illustrate my methodology for reading Greek mythological representations by offering a sample reading of selected scenes that I have not considered before and that, I shall argue, support my interpretation of the central series.

Investigations in different fields, from the psychology of perception to art history and literary criticism, have shown that we make sense of pictures and of texts through perceptual filters shaped by our culture-determined assumptions and expectations.² Thus, if our aim is to reconstruct the meanings particular ancient images had for people of the society in which they were produced, it is necessary first to reconstruct the relevant assumptions and expectations that shaped ancient perceptual filters in an attempt to reconstitute those filters and read the ancient pictures through them. Otherwise, we will implicitly wrench them from their historical context and read them as “floating pictures” by default because, unless they are blocked, our own perceptual filters, shaped by and bearing alien assumptions, naturally come into play and inevitably distort the original meanings. Of course, our own cultural determination cannot be completely eliminated from our reading and interpretation of texts and images; but it is possible to approximate the ancient realities to a considerable extent by using a methodology capable of preventing—as far as possible—our own assumptions from intruding and thus distorting the reading and interpretation of the ancient pictures. This is what I propose here.

I first set out the parameters governing the production of meaning as I see them.³ No sign—in our case, no iconographic element—has a fixed meaning. Its value in any given signifier—in our case, image—is determined by a complex and dynamic process of interaction involving for each iconographic element, for example, the drawn sword: (1) that element as it appears in a given scene with its semantic field of functions, associations, connotations, and so on; (2) its syntactic relationships with other elements in the representation and their semantic fields; and (3) its relationships with semantically related elements that might have been, but were not, selected in its place. For example, the value of the drawn sword held in the left hand (represented in an image I will consider below) is in part determined by the fact that it is not a drawn sword held in the right hand.

An example of a whole iconographic schema without a fixed meaning but

with a basic semantic core, which acquires its specific meanings with the help of and in interaction with the particular contexts in which it occurs (cf. also Bérard 1983a, 112), is the iconographic schema I call “fleeing woman” (cf. plates 1–3), which appears in the scenes at the center of this investigation. It shows a girl/woman running away,⁴ head turned back (in the most frequent variant she is turning back toward a male who is pursuing her), making gestures of supplication or alarm. This schema is common. It is a codified sign deployed in many different themes: in erotic pursuits, to represent the girl about to be abducted (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, esp. 136–37); in scenes of attack in which she is the victim; and also in other contexts (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, 137, n. 36).⁵ The schema itself denotes “girl/woman fleeing in panic.” This basic semantic core, and so also the iconographic sign “fleeing woman,” is applicable to several different situations involving women. The particular contexts give it particular meanings. In some instances the “fleeing woman” schema itself is slightly modified to denote a particular context and set of meanings. For example, in some erotic pursuits the fleeing girl holds a flower, an element connected with girls’ abductions (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, 137 and nn. 38–42). Even divine attributes do not have a fixed meaning but acquire value in context; the same attributes can be associated with different divinities, and it is the context that helps determine the divine identity (Metzger 1985, 173–78).

A second important characteristic of signs—again, in our case images—is that they are polysemic; they produce more than one meaning, and these meanings are often ambiguous and ambivalent. So for example, many scenes are both mythological and paradigmatic, sliding toward the generic. In the case of Greek images the distinction “mythological” and “nonmythological” is not always sharp and clear-cut (cf. Touchefeu 1983, 21–23; Schnapp 1985, 74–75). In addition to the polysemy of all signs, Greek myths and their representations functioned also as paradigms. For example, the images showing Theseus’s erotic pursuits did not only signify the mythological narrative in which Theseus pursued and abducted a girl. Theseus was, among other things, the Athenian ephebe par excellence. The chlamys, petasos, and spear that characterized him in erotic pursuits also characterized Athenian ephebes in general (cf. Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, 135). Thus, for the Athenians, the elements “youth” combined with “chlamys,” “petasos,” and “spear(s)” made up the sign “ephebe” or “Theseus as ephebe.” Consequently, the pursuer in “erotic pursuit” scenes was perceived to represent “ephebe” as well as “Theseus,” especially since the context was of direct relevance to all ephebes because it articulated certain Athenian perceptions pertaining to marriage and

the relations between the sexes (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, esp. 135, 152). Thus the representations depicting the mythological narrative of Theseus's pursuit of a girl were read at the same time as "Theseus as ephebe" and "any ephebe" pursuing a girl, with all the meanings that such representations carried.

Not all representations of erotic pursuit are mythological in the first instance. When the protagonist is a generic youth, the representation in the first instance is "generic," "emblematic"; it expresses certain perceptions about women and male-female relationships, though when read through fifth-century Athenian eyes it would also refer to, and acquire its value through, the mythological paradigm of Theseus. The differences between fully mythological scenes and this type of "generic" scene are only a matter of emphasis. All representations of the theme carried both components, and many were probably not positively identified as one or the other, but belonged to an indeterminate part of the semantic spectrum from "Theseus as ephebe" to "generic youth."⁶ The presence of an element such as a deity pushes the scene toward the mythological pole, though a deity is also compatible with the generic version. Many scenes were identified as, above all, mythological; a most potent element in this identification is inscriptions ascribing mythological names to the figures.

The assumptions and expectations we need to recover in order to reconstruct the perceptual filters through which images were inscribed and read in fifth-century Athens are of two basic types: iconographic—the conventions, codifications, and modalities of the signifying system of Greek iconography; and semantic—the knowledge, ideas, assumptions, and mentality that constitute the semantic fields related to, inscribed in, and called up by the signifiers under consideration in the two processes of meaning production, the inscription of meanings in the representations by the painters and the extraction of meaning, the making sense of the scenes, by the viewers. The iconographic assumptions can be recovered through formal analyses of various kinds (cf., e.g., Bérard 1976, 61–73; Durand and Lissarague 1980) and the semantic assumptions through semantic analyses. Formal iconographic analyses alone are not sufficient. Though they appear to be objective, they are in fact subject to cultural determination. Since even the recognition of resemblance between an iconic sign and the represented object is culture dependent (Gombrich 1977, 73–78, 230–31; Culler 1981, 24; Eco 1976, 204–5), the process of comparison is clearly vulnerable to the intrusion of our own culturally determined notions of, for example, what constitutes a significant similarity or a significant difference. This type of cultural determination can be considerably reduced by making the formal analyses as ex-

haustive as possible. Also, cultural determination in the evaluation of the resulting data can be reduced considerably through preliminary sets of analyses that help define the concepts directly relevant to the investigation in fifth-century Athenian terms (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987a, 42–43). Thus, for example, I tried to show that the study of the relationship between two iconographic themes can be grounded more securely by recovering the parameters of the concept “thematic differentiation” in fifth-century Attic ceramic iconography by considering, first, the parameters of variability within one iconographic theme in the work of each artist and, second, the parameters of variability and the modalities of differentiation between different themes in the work of each artist. The second reason why the iconographic analyses must be complemented by semantic analyses is that the reading of an image is a complex process involving a continuous to-and-fro movement between the image and the reader’s semantic universe, his knowledge and assumptions that were called up by it (see Eco 1981, 3–43, on reading texts); thus the fifth-century Athenians deployed their semantic assumptions in the very process of recognizing and organizing, reading, the iconographic elements that made up these images. For example, an operation such as the individuation of topic (Eco 1981, 24–27), which takes place as the viewer makes sense of the image, generates certain expectations and directs the reading in certain ways, highlights certain things, reduces the polysemy in certain directions, and so on.

Given that all reconstructions and interpretations are culturally determined, and given also the fragmentary state of our evidence, methodological rigor demands that the two sets of analyses, the iconographic and the semantic, be conducted separately and independently in order to prevent the interpenetration of assumptions and fallacies from one set of analyses to the other and consequent contamination, which would lead to fallacious conclusions. This procedure also does not allow, as its “synthetic” alternative does, unconscious adjustments to make the two types of evidence fit. Such adjustments can vitiate the evidence and corrupt the discourse. Finally, this strategy allows us to effect a control on our analyses by cross-checking their conclusions. If the results of the independently conducted iconographic and semantic analyses coincide, their validity is significantly confirmed. Thus, for example, in an earlier investigation of “Theseus with a drawn sword” prompted by Bérard’s (1980, 619) suggestion that it may represent an erotic pursuit, I showed that the results of my two sets of analyses converge. The iconographic comparisons of “Theseus with a drawn sword” with the images of erotic pursuit by Theseus show that the former is a true attack, while the latter is not, and that the iconographic schema of erotic pursuit by a

god, which includes elements of attack, is different from that of erotic pursuit by Theseus and other heroes, which does not include attack. These conclusions coincide with those of the semantic analyses showing that there are fundamental distinctions between “erotic pursuits by heroes” and “erotic pursuits by gods”: the latter have seriously threatening connotations corresponding to the observed iconographic differences between the two erotic pursuit schemata. These conclusions entail that it is not legitimate to postulate that erotic pursuits by heroes could have been shown through the same schemata as erotic pursuits by gods and, consequently, that “Theseus with a drawn sword” does not show an erotic pursuit (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987a).

The overwhelming majority of the scenes representing Theseus with a drawn sword deploy the same basic iconographic schema, illustrated here in plates 1–3, with or without additional elements, such as an altar at which the fleeing woman is taking, or is about to take, refuge (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 35–41, 42, nos. 4, 25, 33), or one or two additional figures—a king and/or female companions (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 43–45; plate 3). None of these scenes depicting this schema is inscribed, though another one, painted by Macron, in which the two figures are differently arranged and Theseus is unsheathing his sword (plate 4), is. Given the potential importance of apparently small divergences (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987a, 42–43), and thus the theoretical possibility that this apparently similar scene represents a different iconographic theme, we should prevent any prior (inevitably culturally determined) assumptions from corrupting the discourse by separating the uninscribed scene from the others and leaving it aside for the moment.

The detailed analyses of the iconographic schema under discussion, of the two figures, their gestures and stances, and of their relationships, and of the iconographic schema as a whole in all its variants (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 41, 42–43, 70, nn. 147–50; 1987a, 44) demonstrate conclusively that these scenes represent a serious, life-threatening attack by a male youth against a woman. The identity of the youth as Theseus is incontrovertible. It does not depend on the inscription on the Macron cup. The youth with the sword is represented according to the iconographic schema used to represent Theseus; this occurs in different variants, found both in our scenes and in other, certain, representations of Theseus (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, 133–34). To be sure, this iconographic schema was used to represent other ephebes also; it was not confined to the Athenian ephebe par excellence that was Theseus. But the specific action depicted, and its nature, indicate that these scenes were in the first instance and above all mythologi-

cal. The combination of chlamys, pilos, sword, and club on a cup in the Vatican (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 35, no. 4; Kron 1981, PL 330 Aethra I 38) confirms this conclusion and makes clear that the mythological figure depicted is Theseus (cf. also Kron 1981, 423). The identity of the mythological male protagonist can be recovered also in the other scenes. I submit that in the absence of a sign to identify him as a mythological figure other than Theseus, the mythological male protagonist of this attack is Theseus. Theseus was the Athenian ephebe par excellence, and thus in the absence of iconographic elements that could have identified the youth as some other mythological ephebe, the schema under discussion would have been read as “ephebe attacking a woman with a sword” or “Theseus attacking a woman with a sword.” It cannot be argued that the Athenians understood the scene differently because they possessed information we do not have, for there are no additional iconographic elements (in the ephebic schema) that may have signaled to them (but not to us, because we do not share their knowledge) that this was someone else, not Theseus. Nor can it be argued that the ephebe was identified by the Athenians as someone other than Theseus through the identification of the topic, for (even leaving aside the fact that Theseus was shown attacking a woman in some scenes) like the theme “erotic pursuit,” the theme “attack against a woman” is too general to be attached to only one ephebic hero.

Orestes, Alcmaeon, and Telephus are but three examples who spring to mind as alternative candidates (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 8–9, 13). Of course, the codification of the schema (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 4, 61, n. 2) would have quite strongly attached an identity to the protagonists; but in Attic iconography, if the hero were not Theseus, given that the schema was used to represent “Theseus attacking a woman” at least in the case of the Vatican cup, such a codification would have had to include an element identifying the protagonist as other than Theseus (cf. Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, 133–35). That it is Theseus is confirmed by the fact that on more than one vase (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, nos. 9, 11, 21), our theme is combined with an erotic pursuit by Theseus, and the semantic axis along which the connection is made is, as in the case of other, comparable combinations, the identity of the protagonist (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, 148–49, cf. 133–34). Since images are polysemic and ambiguous, and the same iconographic schema was also used to represent common ephebes, the possibility should be kept in mind that these scenes (or at least some of them) may also have had a paradigmatic facet of signification, that they could also be read, on a second level, “generically,” with Theseus the paradigmatic Athenian ephebe symbolizing also something relevant to all ephebes. As we shall see, it is indeed possible to

reconstruct a “paradigmatic” level of signification in Theseus’s attack against his stepmother Medea.

The interpretation of this iconographic schema as a serious, life-threatening attack is confirmed by the fact it is iconographically very similar to certain other scenes known to represent a serious attack (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 41, 42–43, 70, nn. 147–50; 1987a, 44). The basic elements in the stance of Theseus in “Theseus with a sword” can be paralleled in many other scenes of attack. The nearest iconographic parallels for the whole schema are representations of Odysseus attacking Circe and of Menelaus attacking Helen, two themes representing the “averted murder of a perfidious woman by a man whom she had wronged.” This is of some importance, as is the fact that the closest parallel of the two, the one for which the same iconographic schema as that involving Theseus is used most consistently, is that depicting the averted murder of a perfidious sorceress. The similarity between these iconographic schemata suggests the possibility of a semantic similarity between the two represented subjects. On my interpretation of our scenes, they are indeed semantically similar.

The woman’s iconography cannot help us identify her. She is shown, we saw, according to the schema “fleeing woman,” which suits her situation, and according to the iconographic type suitable in Greek iconography for both girls of marriageable age and above and mature (albeit not elderly) women. Of the other elements that can appear in our scenes, the figure of the king suggests a context in which one of the kings with whom Theseus came into contact would not have been out of place. Space prevents me from discussing all the scenes that are combined with representations of Theseus attacking a woman with a sword,⁷ but I will mention briefly a group of seven vases by, or close to the style of, the Karlsruhe painter (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, nos. 17–23). Four, possibly five, of these vases (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, nos. 17–20, cf. no. 22), all by the Karlsruhe painter, repeat the same decorative schema: on side A, Theseus is attacking a woman with a sword; on B, an identical woman is fleeing away from a king who is not pursuing her; and in the tondo, a king is shown in the company of a Nike. It is not impossible that the same decorative schema may also have been repeated on the fragmentary stemless cup Barcelona 538 (ARV² 738.142). In addition, no. 23 has a related combination: it represents Theseus attacking a woman with a sword on the tondo and Nike and a fleeing woman on A. This suggests that there is a good possibility that all three scenes may have been connected in the eyes of the artist and his contemporaries who shared his assumptions. As we shall see, on my reading they can indeed be seen as connected, relating to the same event. The

fact that this painter uses women, Nikai, and kings also elsewhere in his repertoire, in different arrangements, is not, of course, an argument against this view. Through the manipulation of established, often polysemic, schemata, different scenes and themes are created in an iconographic system with the economy and conventionality of Attic ceramic iconography. It is not inconceivable that the motif of the helmet, attached to Theseus (he is wearing it) on no. 19 and to Nike on the tondo (she is holding it) of no. 22, may confirm the connection and allusively relate both scenes to a military victory; again, the fact that the schema "Nike with a king holding a helmet" is not limited to vases with this particular combination of subjects (cf., e.g., the tondo of the stemless cup Villa Giulia 25048 [ARV² 738.139]) does not constitute an argument against this hypothesis, whether or not such scenes on other vases were sometimes seen as extracts from the "triptych" postulated here. On my reading, such a connection with a military victory does indeed obtain, as we shall now see.

Semantic analyses of the Theseus myth show that (leaving aside the Amazons with their special iconography) the only woman with whom Theseus had been in conflict, and whom he had confronted in a way that could be iconographically articulated through the schema of the serious attack, was his stepmother Medea (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 22–25 and *passim*). When Theseus arrived in Athens from Troezen, Medea made two attempts to bring about his death, by persuading Aegeus, who was ignorant of Theseus's identity, first to send him to fight the Marathonian bull, and then, when he emerged victorious from this confrontation, to poison his drink; before Theseus could drink the poison, Aegeus saw the sword he had left for his son under a rock at Troezen and recognized his son and heir; Medea was expelled from Attica. This confrontation between Theseus and Medea was very important in Athenian myth and ideology, though it has attracted far less attention from scholars. It maps out in a condensed form the basic skeleton of the symbolic universe of fifth-century Athens. For when we consider the characteristics of, and the values and connotations associated with, each of the two figures in the Athenian perceptions and representations (through which images, stories, and plays were made sense of), it becomes clear that in their eyes it was inevitably perceived (at whatever points of the conscious-unconscious spectrum) as a confrontation between two figures in whom were condensed and crystallized, and structured hierarchically, a series of antitheses that in fact articulated the Greek semantic universe (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 53).

The first antithesis articulated in, and through, this myth is "male versus female"; the second is "Greek, especially Athenian, versus Oriental." The combina-

tion of these two antitheses has helped all the negative values associated with the female to drift to the figure of Medea in this context. The fact that she is a sorceress in opposition to Theseus, who is a benefactor of humanity, is a manifestation of, and a means of expressing in a polarized form, these negative characteristics. Medea is a murderous stepmother. She is not the only bad stepmother in Greek myth; there are many others who, in one way or another, seriously threatened the children of their husband's first marriage or liaison. An example of a "straightforward" murderous attempt is that of Ino, Athamas's second wife, against Phrixus (Apollod. i.9.1). Phaedra destroyed Hippolytus via a different route (*E. Hipp.*), but the two mythological schemata are permeable to each other's motifs (cf. Pherecyd. *FrGHist* 3 fr. 98). Such myths are articulated by the perception that a father's second wife threatens the interests, and may even conspire against the life, of the children of the first marriage (Sourvinou-Inwood 1988a, sect. 2).

The figure of the bad stepmother expresses more than this perception, however. It is also a mask for the figure of the bad mother, in the sense that the negative traits of the figure of the mother, the fear that she will not care for, and may even use her virtually unlimited powers to damage, her powerless small (male is what matters) children, have drifted to the figure of the stepmother. This can be seen in a variety of relationships between these two figures. First, in some myths the role of the destructive mother and the destructive stepmother are interchangeable in the different versions. Thus, the blinding of the Phineids is sometimes ascribed to their mother and sometimes to their stepmother—and in some other versions to their father, at the instigation of the stepmother (Sourvinou-Inwood 1988b). Second, in another type of myth a woman kills her own children by mistake, while trying to murder her stepchildren (as happened to Themisto [Nauck, *TGF*², p. 482; Hygin. *Fab.* 4])—or nephews, as in the case of Aedon in one variant (Pherecyd. *FrGHist* 3 fr. 124). Such myths express both the threat of the stepmother and a censored (inadvertently killed her children) representation of the "bad mother," itself a polarization of what were perceived as the negative traits of the mother and symbolized also through the figure of the stepmother. The combination of these two forms of censorship in such myths confirms that one representation articulating them is the "bad mother." Another modality of censorship of the "bad mother" underlies the figure of the mother who kills her children while in a state of madness (as in the version of Aedon's story in *Od.* 19.518–23, and in that of the Minyads [Plu. *Mor.* 299E–F]). Third, the behavior of the bad stepmother is the same as that of the much rarer figure of the unambiguously bad mother, such as Clytemnestra, who (unsuccessfully)

threatened the life of her son Orestes, or Procne, who killed her son Itys (*TrGF*, vol. 4 [Ratd ed.], p. 435). Fourth, Medea, the bad stepmother par excellence—because she threatened the life of the Athenian hero par excellence—becomes the bad mother par excellence in another myth in which she actually murders her children (*E. Med.*). In addition, the myth of Medea illustrates the fact that the schemata “unintentional killing by the mother” and “intentional murder by the mother” expressed closely related perceptions and can be seen as transformations of each other, and thus also that the former can be seen as being, among other things, a censored version of the latter; for in one major variant of her myth (almost certainly the earliest), Medea, who eventually was the murderous mother par excellence and the murderous stepmother par excellence, had killed her children unintentionally, while trying to make them immortal (Page 1938, xxii; Knox 1977, 194).

Let us return to the notion that Medea is a polarization of the negative traits of the female in the Greek collective representations. When the female is opposed (as a symbolic counter) to the male, she stands for the negative values in the Greek representations (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 9–10, 53). This is connected with, and reinforced by, the fact that women were perceived as biologically and socially inferior, in need of control, and potentially dangerous and treacherous. Men were most vulnerable to women in their family relationships, where women had some power that men could not always be certain of controlling. A bad wife can damage her husband in a variety of ways; for example, she can introduce someone else’s children into his *oikos*, pretending they are his, or hurt or destroy his small sons (whether her own or some other woman’s) while they are in her power. Thus she is always a potentially threatening mother and stepmother. (In the latter role she can always seduce her husband’s sons and turn them into his sexual rivals [Sourvinou-Inwood 1988a, section 2].) She has also a partly comparable power as a daughter and sister. Medea condensed into herself all these negative traits in a polarized form subverting all family relationships. She subverted the father-daughter relationship by betraying her father, helping and running away with Jason, and, above all, by killing her brother, her father’s son, thus also subverting the sister-brother relationship. She subverted the father-daughter relationship in another way by causing the Peliades to kill their father. Through the murder of her sons she subverted the wife-husband and the mother-son relationships. The former she subverted again in trying to kill the son of her next husband, Aegeus. In other words, she subverted the woman’s role in the family in all possible ways. One particular facet of this subversion is manifested in Me-

dea's exploitation of men's fatherhood (her father's, Pelias's, Jason's, Creon's, and Aegeus's desire for fatherhood) to gain her ends or defeat or punish her enemies (Hanson 1965, 57–60). This is another negative and polarized articulation of the notion that a man's fatherhood is in a woman's hands, and more generally of the male vulnerability to women in the family sphere and of the threat perceived to be represented by a bad woman.

Thus in the fifth-century Athenian mythological universe,⁸ Medea is, among other things, a polarization of all the negative traits of the female. Consequently, Theseus's defeat of her expressed, among other things, the notion of victory of the male hero par excellence over the frightening female, the bad woman who threatens male power, and even male life, especially in the sphere of the family. One of the figures lurking under, and defeated in, her persona is the "bad mother." Theseus the ephebic hero par excellence defeats the par excellence bad mother, here crystallized into the figure of the stepmother.

Medea is, and she is not, like other women, and she both stands for, and is differentiated from, the figure "Greek woman." The complexity and ambivalence of this figure has been most subtly expressed in Euripides' *Medea*. Insofar as she is a woman abused by a man as well as a stranger in a foreign land, Medea arouses some sympathy as well as revulsion. The iconographic equivalent of this is the fact that in our scenes identified as "Theseus attacking Medea to punish her" she is represented through the schema of the fleeing woman, the normal schema used to represent women (passive and innocent as well as "wicked" women) who are fleeing to escape a man who either is attacking them or wants to force his sexual attentions on them, or otherwise threatens them. Insofar as Medea's vulnerable and abused situation (at least in Euripides' *Medea*) is a polarized version of all women's vulnerability, and insofar as she embodies in a polarized form all the negative characteristics, potentialities, and connotations associated with women in the Greek collective representations, she is perceived as being up to a point "like other women," as representing—among other things—a facet of "woman" (cf. also Knox 1977, 211, 218–25); women, being powerless and at the mercy of men, can only use perfidious means to defend themselves. But insofar as that facet is entirely negative, indeed an extreme and sharply polarized version of that negativity, correlative with, and expressed through, Medea's character as an Oriental and a sorceress, she was perceived as very different from ordinary Greek women (Eur. *Med.* 1339–43). Thus, this polarized negativity has drifted to the Oriental sorceress, and the representation of ordinary Greek women is protected from this negativity, which is, however, at the same time articulated, marginal-

ized, and purged, defeated through the victory over Medea of the Athenian hero par excellence, Theseus.

Her expulsion from Athens and Greece was not the end of her story, however, and its sequel brings us to yet another level of signification in the myth and the images of the confrontation between Theseus and Medea. When Medea was expelled from Athens she went to the East, and there (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 49) she (Eust. *Comm.* on D.P. 1017.20; Paus. 2.3.8) or her son Medus (sometimes, though not always, said to be Aegeus's son [cf. both versions in D.S. 4.55.5–56.2]) reigned in Media (according to one variant [D.S. 10.27] founded by Medus) and/or gave their name to the land. This story is already found in Herodotus (Hdt. 7.62). Given this pseudohistorical and thus also symbolic association between Medea and the Persians, it was inevitable that the myth under discussion would be perceived by the Athenians as “Theseus, the Athenian hero, defeating, and chasing out of Attica and Greece, Medea, an Oriental woman closely connected with the Medes, and thus in general with the Persian enemy.” This myth, then, is clearly a mythological correlative of, and thus a mythological paradigm for, the Greek, and especially Athenian, victories over the Persians. The identification of Medea with the invading Persians was explicitly made at that time. At some point the story that Medea/Medus was associated with, and the ancestor of, (some of) the Medes was explicitly connected with the Persian Wars, and in particular with the battle of Marathon. It became part of the mythicohistorical discourse deployed as part of the historical and political discourse of the present. In schol. Ar. *Pax* 289,⁹ Datis the Mede, the Persian general at Marathon,¹⁰ is said to have claimed Attica by virtue of his descent from Medus, Medea's son from Aegeus. Diodorus Siculus 10.27, following Ephorus (Raubitschek 1957, 236), reports the same story and adds that the Athenian answer, given by Miltiades, was that since Medus the founder of Media was an Athenian, it was the Athenians that should lay claim to the land of the Medes and not vice versa. We do not know the date at which this story first appeared. However, the years following the Persian Wars are the most likely time both in terms of the general interest and because this type of mythological discourse concerning common ancestry between Greeks and Persians had been articulated at that time (cf. Hdt. 7.150). Certainly Herodotus gives us the *terminus ante quem* for the connection between Medea and the Medes. Indeed, as Professor Burkert kindly pointed out to me, the unique form (*ho*) *Medeion* (*strategos*) in Ibycus 320 Page is thought to reflect already the etymology Medoi/Medeia. Another instance of this association between Medea and the Persians in the mythicohistorical discourse pertaining to the Persian Wars is

found at the beginning of Herodotus's *Historiai* (1.1–5), where it is claimed that according to the Persians, the origins of the Persian Wars (in the sense of being the causes of the enmity between Greeks and Asians) were the rape of Io, the rape of Europa, the abduction of Medea, the abduction of Helen, and, above all, the Trojan War.

I hope to have shown (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 49–50) that the correspondence between, on the one hand, the mythical events of Theseus's career from his arrival at Athens from Troezen until Medea's expulsion and, on the other, the Persian Wars is extremely close, too close to be coincidental, and that therefore the career was reshaped to fit and function as a mythological paradigm for, and prefiguration of, the wars. Even if we leave aside the dates suggested by the vases—to avoid any hint of circularity—the best candidate for this manipulation is Pherecydes, in the context of the Cimonian promotion of the figure of Theseus (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 54–55). Incidentally, an additional “coincidence” that I had not noticed in my earlier discussions, which gives, I submit, strong support to the notion that the manipulation of the Theseus-Medea myth took place in Cimonian times and in a Cimonian milieu—where the notion that Cimon was “like” Theseus was promoted—is that Theseus's paternal half-brother Medus who went to the East, according to one version via Phoenicia (D.S. 4.556), and became the ancestor of the Medes has an exact counterpart in Cimon's paternal half-brother Metiochus, who was captured by Phoenicians but then was given land and a Persian wife by Darius and whose children counted as Persians (Hdt. 6.41.2–4).

In these circumstances, it was inevitable that images representing Theseus attacking Medea would be seen as symbolizing, among other things, the Greek victory over the Persians. For, once created, the symbolic identification between Medea and the invading Persians was part of the assumptions through which the fifth-century Athenians made sense of the scene. Moreover, the fact that at this time a series of other similar themes, the Trojan War, Amazonomachies, Centauromachies, came to be seen and to be used as mythological paradigms of and metaphors for the Persian Wars (cf., e.g., Thomas 1976, 40–46; Boardman 1982, 5–15; Gauer 1968, 18 and n. 48; Kebric 1983, 14–16) not only makes it very likely that this interpretation of the Theseus-Medea myth would have taken place at this time, but also entails a culturally conditioned reception especially geared to seeing (certain types of) myths also as mythological paradigms and metaphors for contemporary events, above all the central contemporary event, the Persian Wars, and to reading the images representing such myths as, among other things, symbolizing and articulating certain perceptions of that event—

perceptions of the type “victory of the civilized and superior over the uncivilized and inferior.” Indeed, I would be inclined to go further and suggest that in the particular climate of reception of the second quarter of the fifth century (the two earliest scenes, which do not follow the schema, date from the 470s; the heavy concentration is between the 460s and the 440s), any representation of Theseus attacking a woman was likely to be interpreted as Theseus expelling Medea, seen as a paradigm for the defeat of the Persians, unless there were signs indicating otherwise.

Let us now consider how the conclusions of the semantic analyses of the myth “the confrontation between Theseus and Medea” compare with those of the iconographic analyses of the representations of Theseus attacking a woman, drawn sword in hand. I submit that there is a perfect match (cf. also Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 42–43). The pattern of appearance of the scenes, both the chronological pattern and the number of scenes, which is large (Brommer 1982, 134, n. 21, s.v. no. 3), fits the expected pattern of the theme “Theseus confronting Medea” as we can reconstruct it in its main lines on the basis of its symbolic importance. I shall return to this. The woman’s iconography fits that of Medea—another point to which I shall return. As for the other iconographic elements, the altar is also found in one of the two scenes depicting Theseus’s recognition (Brommer 1982, pl. 44; discussion in Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 42). Of the two additional figures, a second woman is also represented in the second recognition scene (plate 7), and thus was not out of place in that context. The king is clearly Aegeus, whose role in this scene is obvious; the rarity of his portrayal, like the absence of Attic ceramic scenes representing Theseus’s recognition, is strongly motivated and will be discussed below. Most strikingly, the theme of Theseus and Medea as analyzed here fits the iconographic combinations so often repeated by the Carlsruhe painter: Medea running away from Aegeus after the discovery of her plot (symbolizing her role as bad wife), his revulsion at her action, and the fact that he as well as Theseus chased her out of Athens. The king with the Nike would be polysemic, signifying Aegeus’s “victory” of ensuring a worthy heir and of having avoided his son’s murder, and also Theseus’s victories over the bandits, the bull, and Medea, and finally the Athenian victories over the Persians, to which the helmet held by Nike may allude.

The heavy clustering of scenes of “Theseus with the sword” in the years from the 460s to the 440s prompted me to suggest that interest in the theme of the confrontation between Theseus and Medea was sparked by a tragedy, and that this may have been Sophocles’ *Aegeus*, of whose ending I offered a tentative re-

construction (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 55–56). I shall now consider a scene that I entirely overlooked when I put forward that hypothesis and that I have now come to believe was inspired by the end of this tragedy as I have reconstructed it. I do not mean that it is a re-presentation of it, but that it is an iconographic creation articulating (certain perceptions of) the events shown at the end of this tragedy. The systematic reading of this scene, through detailed iconographic analyses, the results of which will be related to the conclusions of the semantic investigations, will now illustrate in concrete detail the methodology I am advocating here.

In his review of my book (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979), Bérard (1980, 620) suggested, not, I believe, entirely in earnest, that my proposed reconstruction of the end of Sophocles' *Aegeus* might be reflected in a scene on the cup New York 53.11.4 (plate 8). This suggestion prompted me to attempt to read this scene systematically, on the basis of the methodology I am here advocating. I will now set out the relevant analyses. But first I will summarize my proposal concerning the end of Sophocles' *Aegeus* (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 56). I suggested that while Theseus was pursuing Medea sword in hand in order to punish her with death for her attempt on his life, Athena appeared as a *dea ex machina* and stopped the hero, urged him to let Medea go, and prophesied that on leaving Athens she would settle in the East in a land whose people would be called Medes after her, would come to Greece and try to subjugate it, and would be defeated.

The cup New York 53.11.4 (ARV² 406.7; Add 115) represents Theseus and Amphitrite in the tondo (plate 10), Theseus, Triton, Poseidon, and the Nereids on A (plate 9), and a scene described by Beazley (in ARV²) as "Theseus returning to Athens" on B (plate 8). It is the last scene that concerns us here. The iconographic analyses show that the scene is located in Aegeus's palace. The spatial indicators are two columns with part of an entablature and an altar. The combination column + altar can, depending on the context, denote either "sanctuary" or "house"—the courtyard of a house in particular (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, 141–43). The two columns with entablature + altar are a grander version of the column with entablature + altar and here denote a palace; this is shown by the fact that on side A of this cup, the same indicators, two columns with a part of an entablature and an altar (the altar represented under the handle is inescapably read into both scenes), denote Poseidon's palace, which in the tondo is denoted through the indicators "column with part of entablature + chair," which indicate generally "house" and in particular "courtyard of a house."

Theseus had been associated with three palaces apart from that of Poseidon: that of his grandfather Pittheus at Troezen, that of his father, Aegeus, at Athens,

and that of Minos in Crete. The first can be excluded here for a combination of reasons. First, Pittheus is absent. Second, none of the women surrounding Theseus is represented as being more prominent than the others, as would befit Theseus's mother, Aethra. Thus, if this were Pittheus's palace, the two crucial figures of Theseus's early life would be absent at an important moment in that life (so characterized by the presence of Athena and the crowning) that took place in their home. Furthermore, since the women crowning Theseus are undifferentiated (in status and prominence) and, among other things, remind us of the undifferentiated Nereids on A, they are likely to represent a group of undifferentiated women (such as "the women of Athens"). Finally, Theseus is here represented as someone who had won general acclaim, and it is unlikely that he would have been so represented when he left Troezen. It is true that Nike crowns him with a taenia for lifting the rock underneath which lay the *gnōrismata* on the scyphus Ferrara T971 (Brommer 1982, pl. 18a). But this is simply an emblematic way of representing Theseus's achievement, which was, however, a "private" achievement marking his passage out of boyhood (Sourvinou-Inwood 1971, 99–100)—a perception articulated in some representations of Theseus lifting the rock through the depiction of Pittheus or Aethra (Sourvinou-Inwood 1971, 103–4, nos. 1, 2, 5). Minos's palace can also be excluded because of the context of popular acclamation and of the absence of Minos. Aegeus's palace fits the representation without any difficulty; it was, incidentally, also associated with a sanctuary, the Delphinion (Plu. *Thes.* xii.3; Graf 1979, 15), and thus fits both potential denotations of the spatial indicators. In addition, there is at least one scene set in Aegeus's palace representing Theseus's recognition (and thus, on my reading, immediately preceding this one) in which an altar is shown (Brommer 1982, pl. 44). Moreover, Aegeus's palace is totally symmetrical with that of Poseidon on the other side—a selection that makes perfect sense if the scenes on the two sides were located in the palaces of the divine and the human fathers of Theseus. The absence of his human father from the scene does not, we will see, spoil this harmony.

Let us continue the comparison between the two scenes. The central group is different: Poseidon, Triton, and Theseus on A; Athena and Theseus on B. On B there are four female figures apart from Athena, three of which are about to crown Theseus with taeniae, while the fourth is turned away from the central group with her head looking back. On A, three Nereids are present; the one near the altar is holding a jug and phiale for a libation, and another is holding a phiale. A fourth woman belonging to the context of Poseidon's palace is shown on the tondo: Amphitrite is offering Theseus the wreath mentioned by the liter-

ary sources (B. 17.113–16) that would help him in his Minotaur adventure (Isler-Kerenyi 1977, 22). As has been correctly remarked, the Nereids are about to pour the libation for Theseus's departure (Brommer 1982, 79) and for the success of his enterprise. On another vase, a Zurich pointed amphora (Isler-Kerenyi 1977, 20–24, pl. 1b), the Nereids are crowning Theseus with taeniae in a schema very similar to that on side B of our cup, not on the occasion of a victory, but as part of their joyous reception and acknowledgment of Theseus as the son of Poseidon.

In our scene on B there is one woman, the figure next to the altar, who differs from the other women in this scene and also from the Nereids on A in two important respects. First, she is the only one of these figures whose body is turned away from the central group, though she turns her head back toward it. Her stance is a variation on the “fleeing woman” schema and appears to denote that she had been moving in the opposite direction from the central group and suddenly stopped. The gestures of her hands do not conflict with this; they are the gestures made by one particular iconographic variant of the “fleeing woman” schema used both in representations of erotic pursuit, to represent the pursued girl and/or her companion(s) (cf., e.g., the stamnos Oxford 1911.619 [ARV² 629.16; Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, pl. 111b]; the stamnos Krefeld Inv. 1034/1515 sides A and B [ARV² 502.5; CVA Germany 49, pls. 37.1–4, 38.1–4]) and in representations of serious attacks, as, for example, in a representation of Menelaus's attack on Helen, which is in the process of coming to a halt as shown by the fact that Menelaus is dropping his sword (on the bell krater Louvre G 424 [ARV² 1077.5; 1682]). Thus, the gestures made by the woman on the right of the altar in our scene denote “alarm”; they are one particular version of the gestures of alarm and/or supplication that are part of the “fleeing woman” schema. Since meaning is created in context, this reading will be confirmed and further defined if the rest of the scene proves to provide an appropriate context for such a gesture, and indeed such a schema. As we shall see, this is in fact the case here. This woman's gestures constitute the second difference between her and all the other women on B and the Nereids on A: she is the only one among them whose gestures do not denote some form of benign activity toward Theseus.

At the center of the scene are Athena and Theseus. The identity of the youth is certain beyond doubt, thanks to the combination of the iconographic schema through which he is depicted and the proximity to the incontrovertible representations of Theseus on the tondo and especially on A, where he is depicted according to what is virtually the same iconographic schema. In our scene he

is holding the sword in his left hand and making a gesture toward Athena with his right. The meaning of this latter gesture can be identified with certainty: it is a gesture of adoration common in votive reliefs that are emblematic images of worship toward the deity who is shown as ideally present (cf., e.g., Neumann 1979, pl. 46b; Petrakos 1981, 93, no. 73 [votive relief Athens NM 4466]; 104, no. 83 [votive relief Athens NM 1402]). It also occurs in other contexts (cf. the figure on the votary on the Niinnion tablet; Mylonas 1961, pl. 88). This gesture can also be made with the left hand, while the right hand is pouring a libation (cf. the cup Tarquinia RC 1918 [ARV² 366.88]). The sword held in the left hand is rare, but not wholly unparalleled in Attic iconography (Prag 1985, 1, 61, 108, n. 11). In at least one case originating in the same milieu it is not a random variation of the normal “sword in the right hand” schema but carries specific connotations—in the particular context of the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, connotations of revulsion toward the act to be performed by the sword (Prag 1985, 61).

Moreover, I hope to have shown (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987a, 46) that in scenes of erotic pursuit, the iconographic element “spears carried in the left hand” is part of the characterization of the spear as “not weapon used or about to be used in an attack.” Thus we must not assume that the “sword in the left hand” here is a variant without significance of the common schema “sword in Theseus’s right hand.” On the contrary, the presumption must be that the variation is significant, especially since small divergences are more immediately obvious to the members of the cultural community in which the images were produced (Gombrich 1977, 53). Indeed, reversals of this type belong to a common modality through which the vase painters manipulated the established schemata to create different meanings. (A different but comparable manipulation is that of the *kanoun* carried during a sacrifice, which in representations of Heracles and Busiris is modified into the “fallen *kanoun*” because in them the “sacrifice” schema has been reversed to depict human sacrifice [Durand and Lissarague 1983, esp. 158, 166].) Because the sword in the right hand denotes attack and the spears in the left hand help denote “not attack,” I suggest that the sword in the left hand may also signify some form of “not attack.” It would be fallacious to think that “the sword in the left hand” was “not significant” because it was dependent on the fact that Theseus was making the gesture of adoration with his right. Whatever the factors that determined these selections, the arrangement carried certain meanings in the fifth-century assumptions shared by the painters and their contemporary viewers through which the viewers made sense of the schema. Thus, they would have understood

the sword to be directly significant to the scene's action; otherwise it would not be shown, or it would be in its scabbard, but at that particular moment not in use in an attack, with perhaps some emphasis on the connotation "not attack."

Theseus's gesture of adoration toward Athena shows that she is not simply ideally present, a symbolic representation of her protection, help, and encouragement to Theseus, but an actual participant in the action, visible to him. This is confirmed by the fact that this gesture (though not the rest of Theseus's stance) is closely paralleled on the hydria Berlin 2179 (ARV² 252.52; Add 101), where Athena, toward whom Theseus is again making this gesture, is known to have been a participant in the action: she is ordering Theseus away from Ariadne, who is being led away by Dionysus. In this case (and therefore, conceivably also in ours), the gesture made by Theseus as he is obeying Athena and moving away denotes obedience as well as worship, the acceptance of Athena's command. This reading is also confirmed by the fact that Athena's gesture toward Theseus in our scene is similar to that made by Poseidon in the direction of Triton (and also Theseus) urging the action on, urging Triton to carry Theseus back to the surface (cf. von Bothmer 1972, 52–53, s.v. no. 22). Equally, Theseus's gesture toward Athena is very similar to, albeit not identical with, the gesture he makes with his right hand toward Poseidon on A. Athena, then, on B is depicted in epiphany, communicating with, and making a gesture toward, Theseus, who is making a gesture of adoration (with perhaps also connotations of obedience) toward her.

The gesture made by Athena is one made also by other divine beings (as well as humans, but it cannot be assumed that the significance of the gesture is the same whether made by gods or men [cf. Sourvinou-Inwood 1987a, 50–51]). A close parallel is the gesture made by the god whose identity is controversial on the astragalus London E 804 (ARV² 765.20; Add 140). Another, very similar but not identical, is that made by Hermes in another scene in which Theseus deserts Ariadne in obedience to divine command, the cup Tarquinia RC 5291 (ARV² 405.1; Add 114). Zeus's gesture on the pelike London E 410 (ARV² 494.1; Add 122) is also comparable. The significance of these gestures is not totally clear, because their contexts do not normally allow the unambiguous recovery of their meanings. In the case of Hermes, and probably in the case of Poseidon on side A of our cup, the gesture appears to signify that the deity is urging some course of action. The god on the astragalus is also urging some course of action with the gestures of both arms and hands; Neumann (1965, 23–24) takes them to signify beckoning. Zeus's gesture on the pelike, Neumann (1965, 34) takes to be above all characteristic of the god, a power gesture that is also made by the statue, and thus

emblematic representation, of Zeus from Artemisium (Ridgway 1970, fig. 98), whose outstretched left hand and arm are very similar to Athena's outstretched right in our scene.

Gestures do not have a fixed meaning; they are defined by the context. It may be possible to see the two sets of meanings as part of the same "divine power" semantic field, within which the context sometimes defines the gesture as an emblematic power gesture and other times, when addressed to humans, as a gesture urging a certain action, which in the circumstances is equivalent to a gesture of divine command.

The fact that Theseus is holding the sword in his left hand probably signifies, we saw, some form of "not attack," evidently not in the sense that he is not attacking the goddess, for on fifth-century Athenian assumptions, this alternative would be inconceivable, and no Athenian artist would have used it. One possible reading of this iconographic schema is that Theseus had been in the process of attacking someone and was interrupted by Athena's appearance. This reading gains support from the presence of a figure, the woman on the right, who fits iconographically the role of victim of Theseus's attack. Thus, even if we leave aside Bérard's suggestion and my proposal concerning the end of Sophocles' *Aegeus*, the fact that this is a representation in which Theseus had been attacking a woman with a sword connects it with the main series that concerns us and suggests that it probably also belongs to the same theme. If this is correct, we gain a series of arguments in support of my reading of our main series. First, this vase places the scene of Theseus attacking a woman in the exact context in which both the textual and the iconographic tradition place Theseus's recognition and the attack on Medea: in Aegeus's palace, by an altar. Second, the context of the whole vase, the combination of the three scenes, and the not negligible iconographic similarities between A and B suggest very strongly a close semantic as well as iconographic connection between the two scenes such as is provided by my thesis that the scene on B pertains to the reception of Theseus by his human father and/or stepmother—in counterpoint to his reception by his divine father on A and his divine stepmother on the tondo. The reception of Theseus by his divine father and stepmother stands in a relationship of symmetry and reversal to that by his human father and stepmother (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 27–28). The emphasis on Theseus's good and helpful divine stepmother, who is represented alone on the tondo, would be thus explained. It balances and counterpoints the bad human stepmother, who threatened the hero's life but was defeated—a defeat that is, on my reading, the focus of the scene on B. These two arguments strongly sup-

port the view that “Theseus with a drawn sword attacking a woman” represents Theseus attacking Medea after the discovery of the poisoning attempt and his recognition by Aegeus.

Furthermore, I submit that the reading of the scene on side B of our cup produces meanings that correspond very closely to my reconstruction of the end of Sophocles’ *Aegeus*.¹¹ For in this scene Theseus has just stopped his attack on a woman shown standing near an altar; people in fear of their lives took refuge at an altar and, we saw, some scenes show the woman attacked by Theseus fleeing to an altar. Theseus is responding to Athena’s command by stopping the attack and making a gesture of worship indicating obedience. Of course, this scene would be an autonomous image, not a faithful re-presentation of the tragic scene. Athena is not shown as a *dea ex machina*, but as an actual divine presence; the scene is not articulated as a theatrical performance, but is located in the mythological time of which the tragic articulations present themselves as reflections. The women are crowning Theseus in joyful celebration of the recognition of this acclaimed hero (who had performed exploits on the road from Troezen to Athens and defeated the bull) as Aegeus’s son and heir to the Athenian throne. Plutarch (*Thes.* 12.3) describes a grateful public acknowledgment by the Athenians of Theseus as heir to the throne. As we saw, we have a close iconographic parallel for the schema “women crowning Theseus in celebration of his being acknowledged as their lord’s son” in the representation of Theseus being crowned by the Nereids on the Zurich pointed amphora. In this particular context the crowning also signified Theseus’s salvation from Medea’s murderous plot and, through it, the historical motif for which this confrontation between Theseus and Medea was the mythological paradigm, the Greek victories over Persia.

What, it may be asked, of Aegeus’s absence? Would it not be surprising if he were absent from a scene representing an event that followed immediately after his recognition of Theseus and depicted the celebration of this recognition? Far from it. For when we take account of the assumptions and perceptions relevant to this scene and the vase as a whole, we see that the following considerations are correlative with, and can thus be seen to underlie, the absence of Aegeus: (1) the emphasis on the divine parentage of Theseus and at the same time on his Athenian nationality; (2) the emphasis on the symbolic focus of the story, the confrontation between Theseus, the Athenian hero, and Medea, the ancestress of the Persians, and its function as a mythological prefiguration of, and paradigm for, the victory against the Persians in this symbolic mode so common to Greek iconography, especially in this period; (3) finally, the fact that Aegeus’s role in the



Plate 1. Manchester III.1.41



Plate 2. Leningrad 777 (St. 1786)



Plate 3. London B.M. E 446



Plate 4. Cup Leningrad 1543 (649, St. 830), tondo



Plate 5. Cup Leningrad 1543 (649, St. 830), side A



Plate 6. Cup Leningrad 1543 (649, St. 830), side B



Plate 7. Leningrad W 205



Plate 8. Cup, Metropolitan Museum, New York 53.11.4, side B



Plate 9. Cup, Metropolitan Museum, New York 53.11.4, side A



Plate 10. Cup, Metropolitan Museum, New York 53.11.4, tondo

plot against Theseus was not glorious and thus would not be stressed in images glorifying Theseus and Athens. This last consideration may explain why the only known ceramic representations of the recognition are on two Apulian kraters reflecting Athenian tragedy (Brommer 1982, pl. 44 [the Adophseck vase]; plate 7 [the Leningrad vase]), despite the fact that this episode stressed Theseus's Athenian identity. Brommer (1982, 127) acknowledged that the complete absence of Attic ceramic representations of Aegeus's recognition of Theseus is remarkable. My interpretation can explain this oddity, by showing that the recognition nexus became symbolically focused on, and represented by, the moment of its conclusion, Theseus's attack on Medea, which elided Aegeus's complicity and focused on a symbolically potent confrontation that also expressed highly pertinent patriotic historical and ideological meanings.

On my reading, one scene conflates and articulates emblematically the recognition of Theseus by Aegeus and Medea's defeat and ultimate expulsion. On side A of a neck amphora in a German private collection (Hornbostel 1977, 332–35), a youth is shown, depicted according to the commonest iconographic schema used for Theseus, with petasos slung at the back of his neck, chlamys and endromides, and holding two spears that rest on the ground vertically, spearheads upwards, his sword hanging in its scabbard. He is facing a mature, bearded king holding a scepter resting on the ground vertically. The two figures are looking at each other. On B, a woman is represented according to the "fleeing woman" schema also used for the woman attacked by Theseus. She is looking back, as is normal in this schema, and this visually connects side B with the scene on A. Even if we disregard this (it may, after all, be a culturally determined perception), the reconstruction of the process of meaning creation suggests that much of the debate about this vase and the relationship between its two sides, reported by Hornbostel (1977, 332, 335), is misplaced.

It is not the vase painter's intentions, which are in any case inaccessible, that we should be trying to determine, but the process through which the vase painting's contemporaries, reading through perceptual filters shaped by the iconographic and semantic assumptions they shared with the vase painter, made sense of it. The fact that the fleeing woman is a codified sign that occurs in a variety of contexts does not make it meaningless; as we saw, this, like all other signs, acquires meaning in context. Given the existence of the established iconographic schema "Theseus attacking a woman with a sword," which sometimes includes the figure of a king (ascribed crucial importance in the story through the activation of semantic knowledge), I submit that, even independently of my particular

interpretation of the theme, the juxtaposition of the fleeing woman with a youth represented according to the schema used for Theseus, including the sword, and a king would have activated that iconographic schema as part of the assumptions through which the topic of the image was identified; and this would have inevitably led the viewers to connect the two sides and make sense of them as one image. If my reading of the theme “Theseus with a sword” is correct, this diptych image makes perfect sense: the juxtaposition of a fleeing Medea with Theseus activates the “poison attempt–recognition–Medea’s expulsion” nexus and thus identifies the king as Aegeus and the scene on A as an emblematic image of the relationship between the two figures as it emerged as a result of the recognition, father and son, king and heir. For on side A, the image of the two looking at each other articulates the notion of a close relationship between them, which in this context can be seen as an emblematic representation of Theseus’s recognition by Aegeus as well as a more general representation of Theseus, the son of Aegeus and future Athenian king. The scene may also have had more generic meanings pertaining to the relationship between father and son, the latter’s accession to manhood at the completion of the *ephebeia*, and prospective replacement of the father as a warrior and citizen.

The close correspondence between the image on side B of the New York cup and the end of Sophocles’ *Aegeus* as I had tentatively reconstructed it (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 56) confirms, I submit, the validity of that reconstruction by showing that the action plot I had predicted (since I had taken no account of this scene until Bérard’s suggestion drew my attention to it) is in fact articulated iconographically. Such a confirmation of a prediction is one of the strongest forms of validation.

I will now try to show that the other proposed interpretations of the scene, based on an empirical matching of what is depicted with Theseus’s career as it is known from the texts, are unsatisfactory even independently of the case for the reading proposed here. The least unconvincing is the interpretation (von Bothmer 1972, 52–53; Brommer 1982, 79) that Theseus is greeted by Athena and some of the grateful mothers of the victims intended for the Minotaur and that he has unsheathed his sword as he tells the story of his slaying of the Minotaur. A first serious objection against this reading is that it cannot account for the woman on the right of the altar. A second is that, insofar as we can judge, Athena’s gesture toward Theseus does not indicate greeting but urges a course of action. It should be added that in the representation of Theseus’s victory over the Minotaur on the *stamnos* Leningrad 804 (ARV² 484.16), where Athena is greeting the hero and/or

expressing her pleasure while a woman is crowning him, the goddess's gestures are very different from the one under discussion.

Even if we leave aside these two arguments entirely, I submit that Theseus's stance, and in particular the way he holds the sword, disallows the interpretation here under consideration. To begin with, the sword in itself cannot be considered as particularly characteristic of the Minotaur adventure and thus capable of conveying the meaning that the victory for which Theseus is being crowned is the one against the Minotaur. Moreover, his way of holding the sword does not suggest that he is or had been displaying it while narrating his adventures—even assuming that an image showing Theseus giving an illustrated (with gesticular reconstruction) talk to the mothers of his companions (in the absence of the latter) is a representation likely to have been articulated in fifth-century iconography and not a culturally determined construct, which I doubt. He is not displaying the sword or holding it in a way that can be seen as a modification of the displaying schema. Nor is he holding it in the way he does (always in his right hand) in the scenes representing the moment after his victory over the Minotaur (cf., e.g., London E 84 [Brommer 1982, pl. 13]) and on the Leningrad stamnos mentioned above, where he is being crowned in the presence of Athena and other spectators. Since the schema “sword in the left hand” here is a reversal of “sword in the right hand” in positions of attack, it suggests not “display” but “not attack,” in this case probably “desisting from attack.” A final argument against the interpretation under discussion is that if it were correct, the three sides of this cup would be the only example of a coherent Theseus cycle that has nothing to do with his exploits on the road from Troezen to Athens (Brommer 1982, 79). This argument cannot, obviously, invalidate this interpretation, but it does add a little weight to the strong cumulative case against it.

The other main hypothesis concerning the interpretation of our scene is that it represents Theseus's arrival at Athens from Troezen (Froning 1971, 47–48; cf. Shapiro 1982, 297 and no. 29). A most serious objection to this interpretation is, as Brommer (1982, 79) noted, the absence of Aegeus. Also, unless the scene is situated after the recognition, which would virtually equate it to my reading, the unsheathed sword not only does not make sense but is in fact in conflict with the development of the story.

In these circumstances, I submit that there can be little doubt that the reading of the scene under discussion that emerged at the conclusion of the detailed analyses set out here must be correct; it accounts for all elements and aspects of the scene without leaving any unanswered problems, and in addition, it articu-

lates a dramatic situation that was independently reconstructed on the basis of other evidence.

Let us now return to the iconographic theme "Theseus with a sword" and consider the inscribed scene painted on the tondo of the cup Leningrad 1543 (649, St. 830) by Macron (plate 4; ARV² 460.13; Add 120; Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 35, no. 1; Kron 1981, 422, no. 25), which names the figures "Theseus" and "Aethra." The iconographic analysis of this scene, whose schema is different from that of the others, shows (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 3–6) that it represents a serious, life-threatening attack. This is demonstrated through the analyses of the individual gestures and of the iconographic schema as a whole. There is a close iconographic parallel to the Leningrad scene, painted by an artist whose work is related to Macron's, the Brygos painter, and it represents a serious attack, Odysseus's attack against Circe (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 5). The similarities between these representations acquire even greater significance when it is considered that, as we saw, the closest iconographic parallels for the scenes depicted according to the iconographic schema "Theseus attacking a woman sword in hand" are representations of the same theme, Odysseus's attack against Circe. In these circumstances, it is certain that the scene on the Leningrad tondo represents a serious attack and cannot be explained away as horseplay.

The interpretation put forward by Kron (1981, 429), that Theseus is trying to force his mother with the sword to disclose his father's name while she is begging him not to undertake the dangerous journey, is not as unsatisfactory as the horseplay thesis, but is, I believe, also incorrect. First, since the schema articulating the Macron scene corresponds to, and denotes, the established schema "serious attack," a fifth-century artist would not have used it for, and his viewers would not have understood it to be, a different subject, in which the attack was not serious and the supplication was about something else entirely. Second, in the story as we understand it from the surviving sources (Sourvinou-Inwood 1971, 100–101; 1979, 6), the recovery of the *gnōrismata* and the revelation of Aegeus's fatherhood were inextricably connected; there was no point to the first without the second. This makes sense in terms of logic, mythological and "ordinary." If Macron had wished to create a new variant in which Aethra showed Theseus the *gnōrismata* but would not reveal his father's name, he would not, I submit, have chosen to articulate it by means of an iconographic schema his viewers would have understood to denote serious attack and supplication in response to it.

It cannot be claimed that the characters' names would have made the meaning clear. I do not know of any case in which the iconographic schema denotes a

particular action plot, X, and the inscriptions alone alter this to make the schema denote an entirely different action plot, Y. Even if this were possible, the meaning of the scene would not have been clear because the viewers could only have read it as a representation of a serious attack by Theseus on his mother. I do not deny that inscriptions can be used to “surdéterminer le sens de l’image, . . . imposer une lecture qui n’allait pas de soi” (Schnapp 1985, 75), nor do I deny the possibility of “les jeux savants de la composition.” But we have to be certain in each specific case that we do not overinterpret and import our own preconceptions. Because we do not share the ancient assumptions, we have to reconstruct them systematically before deploying them. It is not methodologically legitimate simply to choose to privilege the inscriptions, especially since fifth-century Athenian vase painters did not privilege writing in the way that our (academic) culture does. Furthermore, as we saw, we must protect our analyses from cultural determination by conducting each set separately, thus preventing the iconographic analyses from being contaminated by assumptions and expectations generated by the inscriptions and the (conscious or unconscious) consequent attempt to reconcile the two in what appears to us a logically satisfactory way. Thus, we must first try to reconstruct what the schema in itself meant before the inscriptions came into play. Of course, for the Athenians this was an interactive process, but our limited access entails that the rigorous strategy is to separate the two in the first stage of the investigation in order to avoid unconscious adjustments in the reading.

We must, then, begin with the fact that the analyses of the gestures, stances, and overall schema show that this is a serious, life-threatening attack. I should mention that, since the significance of the schema is the same, and the male protagonist is the same, there is a case for considering this scene to represent the same subject as the main series discussed above, especially since the closest iconographic parallels for both schemata are in representations of the same theme, Odysseus’s attack on Circe. However, if the inscriptions are to be seen as creating a different reading from that created by the schema, then it would not follow that Macron’s scene represents the same subject as the others (of which the only other early example known to me is Myson’s scene [Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 35, no. 2]). In that case the inscriptions would differentiate Macron’s scene from the rest.

A series of semantic analyses (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 18–28, cf. 8–17) shows conclusively that in the Athenian myth of Theseus there was no space in which a life-threatening attack by Theseus against Aethra could have been located—not

simply that we have no evidence for it, though we do not, not a single, even ambiguous and controversial, trace of such a story in the literary sources, but also that the structures and mentality of the myth exclude such a possibility. As I hope I have shown (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 7–17, esp. 17), in matricide and averted matricide (as in patricide) myths, the hostility consistently begins with the parent, and in the Athenian myth of Theseus there was no space in which such an act of hostility from Aethra to Theseus could have been located (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 18–28). Patterns such as matricide and averted matricide in mythological schemata are not random; they are constant within certain parameters because the myths are structured by, and express as “messages” the realities, perceptions, beliefs, and ideologies of, the society that produced them (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 8–17; 1988a, sect. 2). In the myth of Theseus, the schema I call, conventionally, “hostility between parent and child” has gravitated to the figure of the father and the stepmother, both of whom initiated acts of hostility toward Theseus (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 21–28). Moreover, the structures that determined this state of affairs were not open to variability, for they were correlative with the mythopoeic “compromise” between Athens and Troezen concerning Theseus’s homeland (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 20–27), which shaped, determined, and dominated at least the fifth-century and later versions of the Attic myth of Theseus.

There are also further reasons against the notion that the Theseus myth could have included an averted matricide schema and that Theseus would be represented as attacking his mother, Aethra. As we saw, the stepmother is also a censored version of the mother, so that the attack on the stepmother is a censored version of an attack on the mother. This representation “attack on the mother” does not only correspond to certain attitudes toward the mother; it is polysemic. Myths of matricide are also structured by, and relate to, the pattern of adolescent initiation marking the passage from boyhood to manhood. In Greece as in other societies, “killing the mother” is an image for separation from the world of women and children and integration into the world of men. Symbolically, every Athenian ephebe had to overcome and “defeat” the figure of the mother in order to become fully male and join the world of men (Zeitlin 1978). The representation of Theseus, the paradigmatic Athenian ephebe (various episodes of whose saga reflect, and are connected with, initiatory institutions and representations), attacking and defeating the figure of the mother fits perfectly within that context. However, this mother could not be Theseus’s mother, Aethra, for a variety of reasons. First, as we saw, there was no place in his myth for a life-threatening attack

on Aethra—a “justifiable” attack, that is, one that (according to the established mythological mentality as it can be observed in a variety of myths) would not leave Theseus’s reputation besmirched. Second, whatever the symbolic meanings of the theme, a hero’s attack on his mother was not perceived as a praiseworthy feat to be advertised on vases, as witness the paucity of representations depicting matricide or averted matricide. On the one hand, matricide as a symbolic representation was significant and, as it were, “desirable.” On the other, matricide was a deplorable and dangerous act. Thus, the representation “attacking/killing the mother” is censored (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 12–14, 16–17). Averted matricide is one form of censoring; another, and more potent one, is novercacide—or, in the case of Theseus, averted novercacide, a double censure, which in the negative figure of Medea transforms the notion “attack on the mother” to “attack on a hostile stepmother who also happens to be an Easterner, a sorceress, and the ancestor of the country’s enemy”: a perfect representation crystallizing the multifaceted and polysemic exploits of Theseus, the ideal ephebe, who was also the hero standing for the Athenian people, who won the victories over the Persians with his help (Plu. *Thes.* 35.5; cf. Paus. 1.15.3). To put it differently, Theseus, the ideal ephebe and male in general, was a matrix in which to articulate male existence as perceived in the fifth-century Athenian practices and representations in a paradigmatic form. Thus, with regard to the mother, he had to express both sides of the ambivalent representations: he had to be a loving son, acting out the ideology about, and prescriptive behavior toward, the mother; and he had symbolically to kill his mother in order to act out symbolically the ephebic transition. This was articulated through a split, following an established censoring modality for the “killing the mother” motif, helped by the historical development of the Theseus myth that dictated certain roles for Aethra and for Aegeus (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 18–25): the positive traits and behavior drifted to the mother, the negative to the stepmother, who, in the case of the Athenian hero par excellence was the bad mother/bad stepmother par excellence, the bad woman par excellence, who also came to represent Greece’s historical enemy.

In addition, there is, in my view, a further possible reason why a myth and representation of Theseus attacking his mother would not have been appropriate. I suggest that the figure of Aethra had a different significance in Athenian myth and iconography in the second quarter of the fifth century, which would have blocked the creation of an iconographic type depicting Theseus attacking his mother. One segment of Aethra’s myth was popular in Athenian iconography in the years that concern us, the story of her liberation (cf. Kron 1981, 426–27, nos.

59–76, 430; Kron 1976, 152–56): Aethra, who was guarding the abducted Helen for Theseus, had been taken prisoner by the Dioscuri when they liberated their sister and went to Troy as Helen's servant; after Troy's sack she was liberated by her grandsons, Theseus's sons, Acamas and Demophon. In my view, this theme's Athenian connections do not adequately explain its popularity, and especially the fact that it was represented on one of the metopes of the Parthenon. Kron's (1976, 155, n. 731) explanation that it was not considered to be humiliating because it was celebrated as a paradigm for behavior characterized by *pietas* is probably right, but not, in my view, sufficient to explain it.

In order to reconstruct the meanings this particular theme had in the eyes of its contemporary viewers we must consider it in its full context; its iconographic and mythical context was the sack of Troy, which was one of the themes that came to symbolize, in the years following the Persian Wars, the Greek victories, seen in terms of Greece and civilization defeating barbarism and the Eastern "other." Part of those victories pertained to, and affected, Greeks under Persian rule. The notion of the liberation of the Ionians, the Athenians' kinsmen, matched, and thus, I suggest, came to be symbolized by, the myth that among the enemy at Troy was a servant, Aethra, who was closely connected with Athens, and whose grandsons were fighting on the Greek side. Besides the match of historical and mythological event, Aethra herself was an appropriate figure to represent Ionia. Leaving aside her general connections with Asia Minor through her grandfather Pelops (*E. Med.* 683–84), she had been Poseidon's beloved, and Poseidon was the god of the Panionion at Mycale and thus most closely associated with the notion "Ionia." Moreover, the nexus Ionia–Poseidon–liberation of Ionia was inevitably brought symbolically together by an event particularly associated with the liberation of Ionia, the battle of Mycale (*Hdt.* 9.90.96–106), in which the Ionians revolted against the Persians; in Herodotus's report of this battle, incidentally, the contribution of the Troezenians as well as of the Athenians (and the Corinthians and Sicyonians) is stressed (*Hdt.* 9.105).

If this hypothesis about Aethra's symbolism is right, it would further strengthen the conclusion that in the case of Theseus, the ideal Athenian hero, all the positive values have drifted to the mother and all the negative ones to the stepmother. The former is pushed toward the positive pole at every dimension of signification because the fully negative stepmother fills the negative role. Whatever its significance, the theme of Aethra's rescue is a reversal of the theme of Medea's expulsion from Attica: Medea is expelled from the family and from Attica and Greece

(by her stepson) and goes to the East, while Aethra is brought back from the East and reintegrated into the family, Attica, and Greece (by her grandsons).

A final reason why the woman attacked by Theseus should not be Aethra is that the most consistent parallels for our theme are representations of an averted attack against a perfidious woman, which creates a presumption that our theme may also represent such an attack. Aethra did not have, in Attic myth, any trait, or perform any act, that could characterize her as a “perfidious woman,” while Theseus is indeed known to have confronted and defeated a perfidious woman, Medea. This argument cannot on its own prove that the woman is Medea, but it adds weight to an already strong cumulative case.

Consequently, an attack by Theseus on Aethra does not fit either the mythological or the ideological level of signification of their myth, and there are many reasons for thinking that it was not part of that myth. How, then, do we explain the inscriptions on Macron’s cup? We must begin by acknowledging that there is a contradiction between representation and inscription. Two easy ways of eliminating this contradiction are both, I submit, fallacious. First, to assume that we have misread the scene is fallacious because the reading is based on a series of systematic analyses, the results of all aspects of which converge. Recovery of the iconographic assumptions through which Macron’s contemporaries read the scene shows incontrovertibly that they would have read it as a serious, life-threatening attack.

The second easy way out is through rejection of the notion that we can reconstruct the structures of myths and mythological schemata in ways that allow us to determine whether a particular mythological schema (such as matricide or averted matricide) can have been part of a particular hero’s myth. Such a rejection appears rigorous because it wears the mask of skepticism, and our own culturally determined mode of reception privileges the skeptical articulation, the “we cannot know” mode; but in fact it is fallacious because it relies on hidden assumptions that, when unraveled, appear questionable. It entails the implicit belief that mythological articulations and developments happened at random, that there were no constricting factors guiding their development. This belief is wrong; it ignores the nature of myth in general and Greek myth in particular. That Theseus was the Athenian hero par excellence, the paradigmatic epebe, and the good king, and that Aegeus was his mortal father and Poseidon his divine one, had certain implications for the articulation of his myth. This myth did change, it generated new variants over the years, under the influence of,

and in response to, a variety of historical and other factors. But these developments were always determined by the parameters of what was appropriate to or compatible in the Greek mentality with these roles (with all their ambivalences and ambiguities, of course), in interaction with the parameters derived from the schemata that came into play (for example, that in matricide and patricide the hostility begins with the parent, determined by the “messages” articulating these schemata, which express the beliefs, practices, and ideologies of the society) and, of course, in interaction also with the main lines of the myth, which were themselves structured by the above factors and parameters.

Perversions of these established myths are possible in particular genres, such as comedy, but they have to be seen as they would have been perceived by their contemporary viewers, through the perceptual filters created by the conventions of the genre and the context of the articulation, a distortion of the norm deployed as an ad hoc creation to serve the comedian’s comic purpose. A similar interpretation of Macron’s cup as an ad hoc comic or parodic creation, a subversion of the norm, is not impossible, at least in theory. But this does not entail that there was a reference myth that the image reflected, nor that all the other scenes also represented this distortion. On the contrary, such a distortion could not have become as popular a theme in Attic iconography, especially between the 460s and 440s, as the theme “Theseus attacking a woman with a sword” was. In addition, since the confrontation between Theseus and Medea is a mythological fact, attested in the sources, whose meanings, we saw, inevitably included a symbolism pertaining to the victories over the Persians, representations of Theseus attacking a woman were bound to be interpreted as representations of that confrontation and victory, unless information was given to the contrary, and in all the other scenes it was not. Moreover, in order to make sense as a parody, Macron’s creation would need to have been parasitic on a straightforward, established myth and/or its iconographic reflections, which in the circumstances would mean parasitic on the myth and representation “Theseus confronts and defeats Medea.” This, then, is one possible explanation of the contradiction between, on the one hand, the iconographic schema that represents an attack and, on the other, the mythological relationship of the figures named by the inscription, which did not include the possibility of a serious attack.

The other possible explanation, which is the one I proposed (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 29–30), is that the inscription “Aethra” is the result of a slip of the pen. I must stress that the slip of the pen is an attested phenomenon in Attic red-figure vase painting. An interesting comparable example is seen on a lekane

fragment in Leningrad representing an erotic pursuit, in which the youth is inscribed “Theseus” and the pursued girl “Thetis” (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, pl. 11b). Beazley (1954, 81) took “Thetis” to be a slip, and indeed this is the most likely explanation; alternatively, the theme of Theseus’s erotic pursuit may have been deliberately conflated with the semantically and iconographically closely related theme of the erotic pursuit of Thetis by Peleus—some kind of joke or play (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, 133, 134–35, 138–39). This undeniable example of what is either a slip of the pen or an “incongruity” of a different kind suggests that when two themes or figures are closely related there is the possibility of unconscious (slip) or conscious (conflation/joke) slippage. The figures of Medea and Aethra are very closely related in precisely the kind of relationship that is likely to, and known to, generate such slips at a variety of levels, and through a variety of mechanisms, any one of which is sufficient to generate a slip. It can be called a textbook case of a slip of the pen (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 29–30, 69, nn. 112–18; Timpanaro 1976, 147–48, cf. 22, n. 4; Fowler 1982, 273–74, 278–79).

This slip, if it is a slip, would involve antonyms (the mother’s name for the stepmother’s). In addition, it can also be seen as a “Freudian” slip, insofar as it would decensor the censored version of the killing of the mother, since at one particular level of signification Medea is a transformation of Aethra, and the attack on the stepmother a transformation of the schema “killing the mother.” This may have been explicated, whether unconsciously, as a slip of the pen, or consciously, as a result of a deliberate manipulation, through the creation of a variant iconographic schema without a mythological reference. Thus in a way the distinction between the two alternative possibilities is deconstructed. Finally, with regard to the possibility of a slip of the pen, there is a third type of propitious condition for the generation of such a slip; the context, the Trojan scene on the outside with Demophon and Acamas, may have called up Aethra’s name and encouraged a contextually produced slip.

Since there are very good reasons for thinking that a life-threatening attack on Aethra could not have been part of Theseus’s Attic myth, while it could make some sense as an ad hoc image created as a transformation of the “Theseus attacking Medea” theme, it follows that if the inscription “Aethra” on the Macron cup is the result not of a slip of the pen but of an intentional manipulation, the scene would not be the representation of a mythological theme, referring to a story about Theseus’s relationship to Aethra, but an image pertaining to a symbolic aspect of Theseus’s persona—especially to his persona as an ephebe. Let us now consider a related question, one that may help us approach the problem from

another angle. If the “Aethra” inscription was the result of a slip, how would the Athenian viewers have made sense of the scene? After what has been said above, we can assert that they made sense of it through the filter, as a perversion, of Theseus’s attack on Medea; either they would have identified the inscription as a mistake, or they would have read it as an image to be understood without a myth, functioning at the symbolic level of signification in connection with Theseus and in particular with the directly related myth and schema “Theseus attacking Medea.” That is, “Aethra attacked by Theseus” only made sense by being parasitic on “Medea attacked by Theseus.” It is possible to identify a context in which such a perversion of Theseus’s confrontation with, and victory over, Medea could be seen as a political parody.

First I shall consider an aspect of the reading of Macron’s Leningrad cup that I have hitherto neglected: the scenes on the outside. On side A (plate 5) are shown Diomedes and Odysseus, each holding a palladium, quarreling, in the presence of Demophon and Acamas, Agamemnon and Phoenix; all the figures are named.¹² On B, Greek princes are shown (plate 6). Though the exact meaning of the scene is problematic, the representation of the two palladia and the presence of Demophon and Acamas next to each of the two litigants indicate that the variant articulated here was some variation of the story according to which the true palladium ended up in Athens.¹³ Thus A and B depict an episode from the Trojan War that had a special reference, first, to the Greek victory, since Troy could not be taken until the palladium was stolen from it, and second, to Athens. Moreover, this image also created meanings at a further level of signification. In the years following the Persian Wars, the Trojan War functioned as a mythological paradigm and symbolic representation of those wars, and in particular of the Athenian contribution, especially Cimon’s aggressive campaigns against the Persians (Gauer 1968, 19, 106–17; Thomas 1976, 65). At least by the time of the Eurymedon victory (a decade or so later than our scene),¹⁴ the palladium was an important element in that symbolic connection (Amandry 1954, 314–15; Thomas 1976, 62). Consequently, an important facet of signification in the scenes on A and B referred to the Greek victories over the Persians, with a special emphasis on Athens in general and Cimon in particular. Given that Macron often painted connected scenes on the tondo and the outside of a cup,¹⁵ and that the tondo scene on the Leningrad cup does not involve a Trojan theme, this state of affairs suggests that this tondo scene is likely to represent a mythological theme with a symbolic meaning pertaining to the Greek, and especially Athenian, and in particular Cimonian, victories over Persia. My interpretation of the image as

Theseus attacking Medea, a myth that also functioned as a symbolic representation of, and paradigm for, the Greek and especially Athenian, victories, fits this requirement precisely, and this is an important argument in its favor.

In that context, and given the very significant promotion of the figure of Theseus by Cimon (Sourvinou-Inwood 1971, 108–9; 1979, 54–55) and the consequent symbolic association between the two figures in the semantic knowledge of the time, the viewers may have seen the Theseus of the tondo also through the filter of Cimon. Cimon and his (and his father's) Persian victories would have been connoted unproblematically if Theseus's antagonist and victim were Medea, but with Aethra in that role (and in the absence of a mythological reference), meaning becomes problematic, and the image could only function with reference to the "Theseus attacking Medea" theme, as a parody and a perversion of it. It cannot be totally excluded that this was, and was perceived to be, a perversion of the accepted schema used for "Theseus attacking Medea" scenes, here deployed to create a negative image of Theseus, and through him of Cimon. Theseus attacks, instead of his guilty stepmother, his own innocent mother. Could this be the expression of a negative view of Cimon's generalship of the Delian League (through a trope deploying the symbolic association between Aethra and the liberated Ionians [if the latter has been correctly identified])? I do not, personally, find this cartoon type of reading very convincing, nor do I find any other images in Macron's work that could be seen as allowing the space for comparable practices. But the possibility cannot be totally excluded.

In these circumstances, we conclude that, while all the other representations of "Theseus with a drawn sword" depict Theseus and Medea, Macron's, which also represents a serious attack by Theseus against a woman, depicts, as it now stands, something else: the woman here is his mother instead of his stepmother, named through an inscription that is either a slip of the pen or a tool through which Macron created an ad hoc iconographic articulation without a mythological reference, probably a parodic image, and certainly one parasitic on the theme "Theseus's confrontation with, and defeat of, Medea."

Before leaving this cup, I must consider very briefly the notion (which raises issues of great methodological importance) that there were other versions of the myth of Medea in Athens, unattested in the surviving literary sources but reflected in some representations on vases. The idiom of Attic red-figure iconography is not solely, or indeed above all, descriptive-narrative (Moret 1984, 154–55); it does not only represent (mythological and other) events and stories as they (were perceived to have) happened; it also articulates particular percep-

tions of those events and stories, and it weaves emblematic figures like Erotes into mythological and genre scenes.¹⁶ In one particular modality of representation, iconographic elements are juxtaposed that were heretofore separate in (the mythological or everyday) reality; they are deployed emblematically; thus, for example, a space is constructed that expresses certain symbolic values (Durand and Lissarague 1980, 103 and *passim*) and articulates iconographically particular perceptions of the theme represented without a (real or mythological) referent (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, 141–47). One version of this modality juxtaposes in the same scene figures who belonged to different periods. Thus, for example, in the representation of the birth of Erichthonius by the Codrus painter (who also painted one of the scenes relevant to our discussion, to which I will refer below) on the cup Berlin F 2537 (ARV² 1268.2; Add 177), Aegeus and his brother Pallas are shown present at the birth of Erichthonius, which according to mythological history took place long before they were born. Another juxtaposes figures who were not in the same place in the mythological “reality” (Raeck 1984, 22–23).

Consequently, it is not legitimate to assume that, unless the contrary is proved beyond doubt, all representations are “descriptive-narrative,” represent figures interacting as they did at a particular moment in (mythical) time; therefore, it is not legitimate to consider the presence of a figure in a context from which, according to the extant versions of her story, she was absent as constituting evidence of unknown versions of her myth (cf. also Moret 1984, 153). The hidden presumption on which such notions rely implicitly is that if a descriptive narrative reading is possible it should be preferred, a presumption that has no epistemological or methodological basis. It is simply the unconscious result of our own culturally determined assumptions and expectations, based on an unarticulated assumption that “realism” or its nearest approximation, in this case the descriptive-narrative mode representing the events of one particular moment, is “natural” and everything else is an exception—a presumption that is wholly unjustified in a highly conventional idiom such as that of red-figure vase painting, in which the emblematic mode is demonstrably important. Thus, for example, the fact that on side A of the cup Bologna PU 273 by the Codrus painter (ARV² 1268.1; Add 177) Medea and Aethra are shown in the same scene, a representation of Theseus’s departure for one of his adventures, does not suggest that there was a version of a myth that placed Medea and Aethra in Athens together.

Limitations of space force me to set out my detailed reading of the Bologna cup elsewhere. Here I will only mention that the analysis of the scenes on sides A and B and on the tondo of the cup shows that they do not re-present events as

they were perceived to have taken place at a particular moment in the mythical past, but are emblematic scenes constructed to articulate certain representations of a mythical past, with direct and complex symbolic associations to the present. Therefore, this and other such scenes do not testify to the existence of unknown versions of the myth of Medea in Athens. I must stress that even if there were such unknown myths unattested in the surviving literary sources, my argument that there cannot have been a myth in which Theseus attacked his mother would not be affected; as I have tried to show, the parameters determining the developments of Theseus's myth did not allow a space in which such an attack could have been located.

To conclude this essay, I consider, and briefly answer, some objections against my interpretation raised by Brommer, because they involve serious methodological issues. His objections run as follows (Brommer 1982, 134, n. 21).

(1) *The subject I propose is not attested in the literary tradition* (Brommer 1982, 126, note; 134, n. 21). This is entirely incorrect, and the formulation of this objection exemplifies one of the flaws in Brommer's approach to the iconography of Greek myths. The reality is that what is not attested is a specific description of an attack of Theseus on Medea, sword in hand; the story of the confrontation between the two and of Medea's murderous plot and the story that Theseus threw her out of Attica are amply attested.¹⁷ Whether or not Theseus had intended to kill her in the myth, we can reasonably conclude that the act of throwing her out of the country was not, in the circumstances, an amicable, friendly operation, but a hostile and violent act, whose iconographic articulation our scenes clearly are. But in any case, even leaving such reasonable conclusions aside, since the main confrontation and hostility and Theseus's defeat of Medea and her plots are unambiguously attested, the only way this objection can be taken to be correct is if we understand the notion "attested in the literary sources" to be equivalent to "precisely described."

For this notion to make any sense, let alone to be a valid argument against my thesis, it would be necessary to rely on an assumption that is in reality entirely fallacious: that vase painters were directly and narrowly dependent on texts, that they translated texts into pictorial images, and that they did not create their own iconographic versions, did not manipulate the schemata to create different versions of the same stories (cf., e.g., Sourvinou-Inwood 1987a, 44), did not condense action into symbolic crystallizations, did not use emblematic elements to articulate particular perceptions, constructions of the *imaginaire social* (Durand and Lissarague 1980, 89 and *passim*), because only in that case can a confronta-

tion often referred to in the surviving texts be said not to be attested in the literary sources. This is a demonstrably erroneous view of Greek ceramic iconography, which had its own freedom of creation in the treatment of mythological and other subjects and did not necessarily depend closely on texts (Touchefeu 1983, 22–26; Moret 1984, 153–58) and which produced polysemic images articulating complex perceptions through the manipulation of conventional iconographic schemata. Theseus attacking Medea to kill her, or Theseus throwing Medea out of Attica, either or both could be represented through the iconographic schema under discussion; and either or both represented (inevitably, given the assumptions of the time), among other things, also the Greek victory over the Persians, with whom Medea was symbolically identified, a symbolic association that, we saw, is also mentioned in the literary sources.

As it happens, in this particular case, even if the erroneous perception of the relationship between text and image referred to above were right, Brommer would still have been wrong to use against my interpretation the argument that the story represented in these images according to that interpretation is not attested in the sources. For since the relevant tragedies have not survived, the story of Medea's attempt on Theseus's life and its aftermath is preserved only in mythographic summaries. Thus the nature of the surviving sources precludes the inclusion of a detailed description of the hostile violent act that followed Aegeus's recognition of Theseus and preceded and brought about Medea's expulsion; all that could be attested in any case is the core of the story of the confrontation, and this is indeed well attested. The story that is not attested is the alleged attack of Theseus against Aethra. Even the notion that a deity intervened to avert the killing of Medea and predict her future settlement in the land of the Medes is not without textual support. Theopompus's fragment 17K from the *Theseus* parodies an address to Medea (Herter 1939, 318, n. 389) in which she is told by a prophesying god (Herter 1973, 1083) that she will settle in the land of the Medes, which fits precisely my reconstruction of the tragedy (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 56–57), now, I submit, also supported by the reading of the New York cup.

In these circumstances, it is clear that Brommer's first objection against my hypothesis is invalid.

(2) *My interpretation is not attested through inscriptions on vases.* This is correct. But this state of affairs pertains also with respect to many other iconographic subjects, including, for example, another popular theme involving Theseus, his erotic pursuit of a girl (Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, 132–36). There is nothing odd

about this, given that inscriptions played only a minor role in the construction and manipulation of iconographic schemata.

(3) *He, Brommer, knows at least twenty more representations of Theseus attacking a woman in addition to those I listed (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 35–41), so that this story would have been represented more often than any other Theseus story except for the Minotaur and the bull.* This alleged objection in fact provides very strong support for my interpretation. The popularity of the scene cannot be explained if it represented an unattested attack of Theseus against his mother, which (even supposing I am mistaken, and it did exist in the myth of Theseus) did not arouse sufficient interest to leave any traces in the surviving literary sources. It does, on the other hand, make perfect sense, as does its concentration in the decades 460s to 440s, if it represents, as I suggested, Theseus's confrontation with and victory over Medea, a polysemic image that among other things was a symbolic representation of the Greek, and especially Athenian, victories against the Persians. Indeed, in my view, only this type of image can explain its popularity.

(4) *The woman is never shown in Oriental dress, as we would have expected her to be if she were Medea, and if the theme of Theseus attacking Medea symbolized the Greek victory over the Persians (Brommer 1982, 134, n. 21; Bérard 1980, 620).* The first argument against this objection pertains to the pattern of appearance of the scenes: the overwhelming majority of them were painted between the 470s and the 440s; only in the second half of the century is Medea given Oriental dress—and then, of course, not always. It follows then, first, that the iconographic schema under consideration had become firmly established by the time Oriental dress became an element that could be selected and, second, that Oriental dress was not an available iconographic choice for Medea in the period in which the schema was popular and symbolically most potent. But it can be asked why, if my reading is indeed correct, didn't they earlier invent Oriental costume, which would have made explicit the symbolic identification between Medea and the Persians?

Leaving aside the fact that the question is itself culturally determined—it relies on expectations formed after certain choices (that changed perceptions) had been made—there is a very good reason why Medea in this scene is never shown wearing Oriental costume. Myths and their images are polysemic. The fact that Medea came to stand for the Persian enemy did not entail that the meanings attached to her figure and to her confrontation with Theseus were limited to just this one—however important—semantic dimension. Medea was also a particu-

lar version of the figure of the mother, and this particular transformation of the schema “killing the mother” articulated, and was articulated by, important meanings in the eyes of fifth-century Athenians. Thus the representations of Theseus attacking Medea were polysemic images, crystallizing the multifaceted exploits of Theseus as the ideal ephebe and the paradigm for the Athenian male, as well as the Athenian hero par excellence and a symbol of Athens. For these images to function in this complex way, the censored version of the mother whom Theseus was confronting had to be depicted as a generic woman/mother. The use of Oriental dress would have produced closure of a whole dimension of meanings, blocked Medea’s signification of “woman” and “mother” in general, and thus also the production of the ephebic nexus of the scene’s meanings (which was not necessarily consciously articulated) and limited the scene’s meanings to the historical/ideological ones. On my reading, Medea in these scenes is at the same time the mother, the (dangerous) female, and the symbol for the Persians, in a rich and polysemic process of meaning production involving fundamental Athenian perceptions and ideas that operated at different levels of signification. It is because, in the artists’ perceptions, Medea in this episode stood also for “woman” and “mother” that the selection “Oriental dress” was blocked for them.

(5) *The woman is never shown holding the vessels that Medea is holding in other representations of the Theseus cycle.* This is factually correct. (As Bérard 1980, 618–19, noted, the fragment of the left hand with the jug in my no. 26 does not belong.) However, this is not an argument against the Medea identification, for it makes perfect sense that Medea in these scenes should not be characterized by the vessels involved in the poisoning. First, as we saw, there were good reasons, pertaining to one of the important facets of the scene’s signification, why she should be represented through as generic an iconographic schema as possible, and this drift was underpinned by the fact that the scene’s high codification made the protagonists’ identities unambiguous (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 39). Second, the vessels’ absence also makes sense in purely narrative terms, for in the dominant articulations of the myth Medea had not been holding any of her vessels at that particular moment: in one representation inspired by tragedy, on the Adolphseck krater depicting the recognition of Theseus (Brommer 1982, pl. 44), she drops the jug at the moment of the recognition in surprise and consternation; in the second recognition scene, on the bell krater Leningrad W 205 (plate 7; Cambitoglou and Trendall 1961, 27, pl. viii, figs. 37–38), she does not have a jug or other vessel. (Medea is probably the seated woman, but in any case,

neither woman has any vessels.) This dissociation of Medea from the vessels is confirmed, and its importance enhanced, by the consideration that it is emblematically significant because it also denotes the failure of her plot and her transformation from aggressor to hunted woman and eventually exile. Consequently, the fact that the woman whom Theseus is attacking, sword in hand, is not holding the vessels associated in other scenes with Medea is not a valid objection to her identification as Medea. On the contrary, it makes perfect sense at every level of signification.

This section of this discussion, then, demonstrates once again the dangers of reading the ancient images through the distorting mirrors of our own culturally determined assumptions and expectations, and thus also the need for a systematic methodology that can, as far as possible, block this process and allow us to reconstruct (however partially) the ways in which the images' contemporary viewers made sense of them. I hope to have shown that the methodology I have here advocated and illustrated meets these requirements.

NOTES

Lowell Edmunds is grateful to Jacquelyn Clements for advice on this introduction.

- a. She does not, however, refer in her chapter to a fundamental article: Hoffmann 1977.
- b. Bérard 1983c, 2.

- c. In French: Bérard et al. 1984; English translation: Bérard et al. 1989.

d. On her method, Stansbury-O'Donnell (2011, 73–77) summarizes Sourvinou-Inwood 1991, 29–98. He does not cite her chapter (in the first edition of this volume, 1990), reprinted here. Stansbury-O'Donnell (2009) studies three pursuit scenes (Peleus and Thetis, Ajax and Cassandra, and Boreas and Oreithyia) and concludes that “it is hard to see that the action of pursuit carries an inherent meaning in itself. Rather, the dichotomy of the pursuer and victim creates a structured range of religious, social, and gender meanings in the image that is further refined by the context of a vase” (372). Sourvinou-Inwood would not be displeased.

- e. Neer 2009, 25.

- f. For an overview, see Sparkes 2011, 106–9.

- g. For a succinct history, see Ferrari 2002, 1–2; for a fuller history, Oakley 2009, 605–7.

- h. Sparkes 2011, 107, cf. 19, 118; cf. Oakley 2009, 612–13.

- i. Oakley 2009, 612–13.

- j. On these approaches, see Oakley 2009, 606–8.

- k. Oakley 2009, 614.

l. I base this statement on LIMC Indices I (1999), where “Aithra I” is cited for each of the three but not “Theseus,” viz., Aithra I 29*; Aithra I 31; Aithra I 28. Her fourth vase, NY Met 53.11.4, is LIMC “Theseus” 219* = 309; her fifth, Leningrad 1543 (649, St. 830),

is LIMC "Aithra I" 25 = LIMC Theseus 30. The LIMC articles are, on Theseus, Neils and Woodford 1994; on Aethra, Kron 1981.

m. Kahil 1988. She cites Sourvinou-Inwood 1987a but not Sourvinou-Inwood 1979 or 1987b.

n. Steiner 2007.

I am indebted to Dr. I. Saverkina and the Hermitage Museum, Leningrad, for plates 2 and 4–7; to Dr. J. Prag for plate 1; to the Trustees of the British Museum for plate 3; and to the Metropolitan Museum, New York, for plates 8–10.

1. My focus here is the classical world. I take account of the preceding archaic age but do not consider the Hellenistic period.

2. A few references to discussions of cultural determination in sensory perception and in the perception of pictorial representations: Gregory 1966, 204–28; Gombrich 1977, 76–77, 170–203, 231; 1971, 158. On perceptual controls in general, cf., e.g., Douglas 1982, 1–8.

3. On signs and signification, cf., e.g., Derrida 1967, 311–14; 1972, 29–46, 105–30; 1973, 129–60; 1974–76, 11–15, 44–73; Culler 1981, 41–42.

4. Girls and women are represented through the same iconographic type in fifth-century iconography; cf. Sourvinou-Inwood 1988c, pt. 1, sect. i.

5. On codification, see Guiraud 1975, 24–25.

6. On this type of indeterminacy, see also Schefold 1975, 27; Krauskopf 1977, 28.

7. The consideration of such combinations can offer some support for a proposed identification of a subject, but because there is not always a thematic connection between the scenes on a vase, they cannot invalidate it; cf. Sourvinou-Inwood 1987b, 148–50.

8. We are here concerned with the versions dominant in the Athenian mythological representations, not those in which the murder of her children had cultic connections and different connotations; see Brelich 1969, 356–65; Page 1938, xxi–xxv. Ideally, we should consider each text and each image separately; but the limitations of space make this impossible. (On the history of her myth and its chronology, see Simon 1954, 203–27; Page 1938, xxi–xxxix; Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 53.) Though each articulation of the myth was autonomous, the fact that the main lines of her story and persona appear to be constant makes the procedure followed here legitimate, especially since the semantic knowledge pertaining to Medea activated by our images is made up of precisely such a conflation.

9. I owe this reference to Professor W. Burkert.

10. On Datis, see Raubitschek 1957, 234–42; Lewis 1980, 194–95.

11. I believe this cup was painted in the 460s; this date would fit with the date of production I proposed for Sophocles' *Agaveus* (Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 57).

12. On the scene, see Scheibler 1960, 83; Moret 1975, 71–73; Kron 1976, 149–51.

13. On the myths pertaining to the Trojan palladium, cf. Nilsson 1967, 435–36; Kron 1976, 149–51.

14. I would date this cup somewhere in the 470s. Others think Macron's career stopped at 480. Chronological precision is not, in my view, possible at this particular moment in Attic vase painting.

15. Cf., e.g., Louvre G 153 (ARV² 460.14; Add 120): on the tondo the ransom of Hector, on A-B the sacrifice of Polyxena; Athens Acr. 327 (ARV² 461.23): Athena and Giant on the tondo, on A-B Gigantomachy; Orvieto Faina 36 (ARV² 461.39): I. Maenad, A-B satyrs and Maenads; cf. also ARV² 462 nos. 41–45, 47–48; ARV² 463.50–53; 464.76, and many others.
16. Cf., e.g., in a mythological scene by Macron: on side A of the scyphus Boston 13.186 (ARV² 458.1; Add 119). Cf. also in a “genre” wedding scene: loutrophoros Boston 10.223 (ARV² 1017.44; Oakley 1982, 115, fig. 2). Cf. also Shapiro 1986, 3–23.
17. For the testimonia, cf. Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 22–24, 49; cf. also above on the story that she went to the land of the Medes. The version in which it is stated that Theseus cast her out is Apollod. *Epit.* 1.5–6 (on which cf. Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, 52, 55).

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8

INTRODUCTION Freud's discovery of the Oedipus complex, which he would come to regard as the "nucleus of neuroses," can be dated to the 1890s.^a His first publication of his discovery came in *The Interpretation of Dreams* in 1900.^b Here is the first of Freud's three main discussions of the complex, in each of which he uses Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*. He finds that the complex "is confirmed by a legend that has come down to us from classical antiquity," that is, the legend (or myth) of Oedipus.^c Although *Oedipus the King* is the only ancient source for this myth that he uses, he was well aware of the distinction between myth and tragedy.^d In fact, the psychoanalytic interpretation of both begins in the foundational book of 1900. Freud's reference to Hamlet was taken up by Ernest Jones in 1910, in the article "The Oedipus-Complex as an Explanation of Hamlet's Mystery: A Study in Motive."^e Although Freud was not much interested in interpreting either myth or literature, his followers, as Robert Segal shows, soon pursued his suggestions. The year 1909 was a big year for the psychoanalytic interpretation of myth, with books by Karl Abraham and Otto Rank, as 1910 was for interpretation of the tragedy *Hamlet*.^f In the field of Classics, the psychoanalytic approach to tragedy is a perennial favorite. Victoria Wohl has spoken of the "romance of psychoanalysis and tragedy."^g

The theory of this approach to myth was summed up and explained by Richard Caldwell in his contribution to the first edition of this book: "the primary function of myth is identical to that of dreams."^h As the example of Oedipus shows, myth manifests the dark side of the unconscious. C. G. Jung, however, an early follower and then apostate, turned to the notions of "collective unconscious" and inherited, instinctual "archetypes." He held that myths could have therapeutic value. As Segal explains, "Where for Freud, myth in particular is a way of venting unconscious wishes without becoming aware of them, for Jung, myth is the opposite: it is a way of becoming aware of unconscious sides of the personality, . . . For Freud, myth perpetuates neurosis. For Jung, myth helps preclude neurosis." Jung as an interpreter of myth bears a certain similarity to Freud, however, in that his approach depended on followers (and sometimes collaborators)—especially Erich Neumann (1905–60), Carl Kerényi (1897–1973), and Joseph Campbell (1904–87). With Kerényi, Jung published *Einführung in das Wesen der Mythologie* (literally, *Introduction to the Essence of Mythology*) in 1941. The English translation of the second edition was published in 1949 under the somewhat more modest title *Essays on a Science of Mythology*.ⁱ Jung concentrated in this book on what he called the "child archetype." He provided the theory, while Kerényi wrote on

the myth or myths, under the heading “Kore” (Maiden), referring in particular to Hecate, Persephone, and her mother, Demeter. The notion of an archetypal mother-daughter relation led directly and indirectly, through others’ reception of Jung’s and Kerényi’s writings, to feminist interpretation of the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*.^j

But, unlike other fields in the humanities, Classics has, for the most part, had little use for Jung.^k Ironically, his ideas about myth in general and Greek myth in particular have become best known through the follower in whom they are least precise, the vastly popular Joseph Campbell, discussed by Segal along with other epigonal figures in both the Jungian and Freudian traditions. (Campbell’s *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* probably remains the classic Jungian analysis of hero myths.)^l But the concept of the archetype was rather elusive in the master himself.^m

In the twentieth century, the third major psychoanalytic theorist was Jacques Lacan (1901–81), a major influence on post-structuralist thought in France and in the world.ⁿ But as Nadia Sels observes, “While Freud and Jung figure in almost any general introduction to the theory of myth, Lacan is hardly ever mentioned.” As for Greek myth in particular, Freud’s theories have had an even weaker impact on interpretation than Jung’s, despite the long list of Greek myths that he discussed.^o

No doubt the norms of proof in classical scholarship discourage myth interpretation that, in the end, looks like evidence for the theory from which the interpretation started rather than an independent finding about the myth. This procedure, as was alleged by a prominent classicist against Freud, assumed logical circularity: Freud used the Oedipus myth to confirm the complex and the complex to explain the myth. The classicist in question assumed that in talking about *Oedipus the King*, Freud was psychoanalyzing Oedipus. But Freud did not suggest that Oedipus himself felt the urges of the Oedipus complex, and thus his reading of the tragedy is not guilty of the alleged circularity. For Freud, the crimes of Oedipus in the tragedy correspond to or mirror the unconscious desires of the audience. The fate of Oedipus, decreed by Apollo, corresponds to the psychological inevitability of the Oedipus complex.^p In fact, the perennial use of Freud in the interpretation of Greek myth suggests that many scholars think they can engage without *petitio principii* in useful hermeneutical projects.^q The same may yet prove to be true of Jungian and Lacanian approaches.^r

Greek Myth and Psychoanalysis

ROBERT A. SEGAL

By “psychoanalysis” I do not mean only Freudian psychology, which, to distinguish itself from the version worked out a hundred years ago by Freud himself, is now called just psychoanalysis. I will use this term even more broadly, as equivalent to depth psychology, which means that variety of psychology that recognizes an unconscious. The most famous psychoanalysts of myth are Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung.

By no means do all or most varieties of psychology or even of therapy recognize an unconscious. For example, humanistic or existential psychoanalysis, while retaining the word *psychoanalysis*, dismisses the notion of an unconscious. Its most celebrated proponent, Jean-Paul Sartre, takes the appeal to an unconscious to account for behavior as an evasion of responsibility, as “bad faith.”¹ Alternatively, the behaviorism of B. F. Skinner simply sidesteps the issue of an unconscious and limits itself to the relationship between what goes into the head and what comes out: stimulus and response, or input and output.² The mind is considered an unknowable black box. Its existence is not denied, just circumvented.

The Psychologizing of Myth

The psychologizing of myth does not begin with Freud or with Jung. The recognition that myth involves the projection of human qualities onto gods goes back to at least the pre-Socratic philosopher Xenophanes, who, writing in the sixth century B.C.E., observed that Ethiopians imagine their gods to be swarthy and flat-nosed, whereas Thracians visualize their gods as fair-haired and blue-eyed. Most famously, Xenophanes asserted that if lions, horses, and oxen had gods, their gods would look like them. Jung in particular is eager to trace a psychological understanding of myth all the way back to ancient Gnostics and to medieval alchemists. Going beyond—and against—Xenophanes, he claims that ancient myth-tellers themselves often recognized the psychological meaning of their myths.³

Nevertheless, for Freud and Jung alike, the key intellectual accomplishment of modernity has been the disentanglement of the psychological from the physical and the metaphysical—the disentanglement of the inner from the outer. Projec-

tions onto the outer world, which had taken the form of gods and of myths about gods, have largely been withdrawn. The outer world has come to be recognized as a natural rather than a supernatural domain, to be explained by impersonal scientific laws rather than by the decisions of gods recounted in myths. For both Freud and Jung, the rise of science has spelled the fall of religion and of religious myths. Freud writes:

Let us consider the unmistakable situation as it is to-day. We have heard the admission that religion no longer has the same influence on people that it used to . . . Let us admit that the reason—though perhaps not the only reason—for this change is the increase of the scientific spirit in the higher strata of human society. Criticism has whittled away the evidential value of religious documents, natural science has shown up the errors in them, and comparative research has been struck by the fatal resemblance between the religious ideas which we revere and the mental products of primitive peoples and times.⁴

Jung writes: “Only in the following centuries, with the growth of natural science, was the projection withdrawn from matter and entirely abolished altogether with the psyche . . . Nobody . . . any longer endows matter with mythological properties. This form of projection has become obsolete.”⁵

Most remaining projections are onto other persons and peoples, not onto animals, plants, stones, and planets. With the fall of religion has come the fall of myth, or at least myth as it had traditionally been taken: as a story about a god acting in the world.

Freud abhors religion on psychological grounds. For him, religion compounds the very neurosis over Oedipal guilt that it was created to alleviate. He dislikes myth because it perpetuates, whether or not compounds, the same Oedipal neurosis. Therefore the disappearance of both is, for Freud, to be touted, not mourned.

By contrast, Jung laments the loss of religion and myth as an explanation of the world—not because he, any more than Freud, prefers clinging to the religious explanation of the world but because, till now, religion has simultaneously provided one of the most effective means of tending to the unconscious. With the demise of religion other means must be found—the main one being therapy itself. Jung does allow for the development of secular myth, which can survive the death of religion.

Freud on Myth

It was in his most famous book, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900, trans. 1953), that Freud first analyzed myth. And what myth does he discuss? Fittingly, that of Oedipus. While Freud analyzes myths throughout his writings, though never so fully as Jung, the key myth for him is that of Oedipus. His interpretation takes up only a few pages of his hefty book and is followed by a briefer discussion of a more disguised version of the enactment of the Oedipus complex, that of *Hamlet*:

If *Oedipus Rex* moves a modern audience no less than it did the contemporary Greek one, the explanation can only be that its effect does not lie in the contrast between destiny and human [free] will, but is to be looked for in the particular nature of the material on which that contrast is exemplified. There must be something [latent] which makes a voice within us ready to recognize the compelling force of destiny in the *Oedipus* . . . His [Oedipus's] destiny moves us only because it might have been ours—because the oracle laid the same curse upon us before our birth as upon him. It is the fate of all of us [males], perhaps, to direct our first sexual impulse towards our mother and our first hatred and our first murderous wish against our father. Our dreams convince us that that is so. King Oedipus, who slew his father Laïus and married his mother Jocasta, merely shows us the fulfilment of our own childhood wishes. But, more fortunate than he, we have meanwhile succeeded, in so far as we have not become psychoneurotics, in detaching our sexual impulses from our mothers and in forgetting our jealousy of our fathers. Here is one in whom these primæval wishes of our childhood have been fulfilled, and we shrink back from him with the whole force of the repression by which those wishes have since that time been held down within us. While the poet . . . brings to light the guilt of Oedipus, he is at the same time compelling us to recognize our own inner minds, in which those same impulses, though suppressed, are still to be found.⁶

On the surface, or manifest, level the story of Oedipus describes that figure's vain effort to elude the fate that has been imposed on him. Latently, however, Oedipus most wants to do what manifestly he least wants to do. He wants to act out his "Oedipus complex." The manifest, or literal, level of the myth hides the latent, symbolic meaning. On the manifest level Oedipus is the innocent victim of Fate. On the latent level he is the culprit. Rightly understood, the myth is not

about Oedipus's failure to circumvent his ineluctable destiny but about his success in fulfilling his fondest wishes.

Yet the latent meaning scarcely stops here. For the myth is not really about Oedipus at all. Just as the manifest level, on which Oedipus is the victim, masks a latent one, on which Oedipus is the victimizer, so that level in turn masks an even more latent one, on which the real victimizer is both the myth-teller and any hearer or reader of the myth smitten with it. Here the myth is about the fulfillment of the Oedipus complex in the male myth-teller, hearer, or reader, who identifies himself with Oedipus and through Oedipus fulfills his own kindred yearnings. At heart, the myth is about oneself. It is not biography but autobiography.

In whom does the Oedipus complex lie? To a degree it lies in all adult males, none of whom has fully outgrown the desires that first arose in childhood. But the complex lies above all in neurotic adult males, who are stuck, or fixated, at their Oedipal stage. For many reasons they cannot fulfill their desires directly. Their parents may no longer be alive or, if alive, may no longer be so intimidating or so alluring. Furthermore, the parents would not readily consent. Anyone who succeeded in the act would surely be caught and punished. And the guilt felt for having killed a father whom one loved as much as hated, and for having forced oneself upon a resisting mother, would be overwhelming. But the biggest obstacle to the enactment of the complex is more fundamental. One does not know that the complex exists. It has been repressed.

Under these circumstances myth provides the ideal kind of fulfillment. True, the fulfillment is mental rather than physical, vicarious rather than direct, and above all unconscious rather than conscious. But myth still permits some degree of release. If on the one hand the outer layers of the myth hide its true meaning and thereby block fulfillment, on the other hand they reveal that true meaning and thereby provide fulfillment. After all, on even the surface level Oedipus does kill his father and does have sex with his mother. He simply does so unintentionally. If on the next level it is Oedipus rather than the myth-teller, hearer, or reader who acts intentionally, the action is still intentional. The level above therefore partly reveals, even as it partly hides, the meaning below. The true meaning always lies at the level below but is always conveyed by the level above. By identifying themselves with Oedipus, neurotic adult males secure a partial fulfillment of their own lingering Oedipal desires, but without becoming conscious of those desires. Myth thus constitutes a compromise between the side of oneself that

wants the desires satisfied openly and the side that does not even want to know they exist.

When Freud observes that modern audiences, who no longer believe in Fate, are still moved by the play of Oedipus, he takes for granted that the myth is not about the external world. When he claims that modern audiences are moved by the destiny of Oedipus only because "it might have been ours," he takes for granted that the myth is really about us. When he asserts that the "guilt of Oedipus" "compel[s] us to recognize . . . those same impulses" in us, he takes for granted that the myth fulfills our wishes. Like dream, myth is a fantasy.

Rank's Freudian Hero Myths

In *Dreams in Folklore* (1911, trans. 1958), written with D. E. Oppenheim, Freud interprets dreams in folklore, but none of the pieces of folklore considered is a myth. The classical Freudian analyses of myth are Karl Abraham's *Dreams and Myths* (1909, trans. 1913) and Otto Rank's *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (also 1909, trans. 1914). Both Abraham and Rank follow the master in comparing myths with dreams and in deeming both the disguised, symbolic fulfillment of repressed, overwhelmingly Oedipal wishes lingering in the adult myth-teller, hearer, or reader. But Rank's work is by far the richer and sprightlier of the two. He considers more myths and analyzes them in more detail. Most of all, he presents a common plot, or pattern, for one category of myths: that of heroes, specifically male heroes. Rank provides a manifest pattern that he then translates into latent terms. At the same time he boldly implies that all myths can be seen as hero myths. Rank later broke irrevocably with Freud, but at the time he wrote *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* he was an apostle and soon emerged as Freud's heir apparent. Freud himself wrote a section of the work.⁷

For Rank, heroism covers what *Jungians* call the first half of life: the period from birth to young adulthood. This period involves the establishment of oneself as an independent person in the external world. The attainment of independence expresses itself concretely in the securing of a job and a mate. The securing of either requires both separation from one's parents and mastery of one's drives. Independence of one's parents means not the rejection of them but self-sufficiency. Similarly, independence of one's drives means not the rejection of them but control over them. It means not the denial of drives but the rerouting of them into socially acceptable outlets. When Freud declares that the test of happiness is the capacity to work and love, he is clearly referring to the goals of the first half of life,

which for him apply to all of life. Classical Freudian problems involve a lingering attachment either to parents or to drives. Either to depend on one's parents for the fulfillment of desires or to fulfill them in antisocial ways is to be fixated at childhood.

Rank's pattern, which he applies to more than thirty hero myths, roughly parallels the pioneering pattern of Johann Georg von Hahn (1876), of which he was apparently unaware. Rank's goes from the hero's birth to his attainment of a "career":

The hero is the child of most distinguished parents; usually the son of a king. His origin is preceded by difficulties, such as continence, or prolonged barrenness, or secret intercourse of the parents, due to external prohibition or obstacles. During the pregnancy, or antedating the same, there is a prophecy, in form of a dream or oracle, cautioning against his birth, and usually threatening danger to the father, or his representative. As a rule, he [i.e., the son] is surrendered to the water, in a box. He is then saved by animals, or by lowly people (shepherds), and is suckled by a female animal, or by a humble woman. After he has grown up, he finds his distinguished parents, in a highly versatile fashion; takes his revenge on his father, on the one hand, and is acknowledged, on the other, and finally he achieves rank and honors.⁸

Literally, or consciously, the hero, here always male, is a historical or legendary figure like Oedipus. He is heroic because he rises from obscurity to, typically, the throne. Literally, he is an innocent victim of either his parents or, ultimately, fate. While his parents have yearned for a child and sacrifice him only to save the father, they nevertheless do sacrifice him. The hero's revenge, if the parricide is even committed knowingly, is, then, understandable: who would not consider killing one's would-be killer?

Symbolically, or unconsciously, the hero is heroic not because he dares to win a throne but because he dares to kill his father. The killing is definitely intentional, and the cause is not revenge but sexual frustration. The father has refused to surrender his wife—the real object of the son's efforts: "as a rule the deepest, generally unconscious root of the dislike of the son for the father, or of two brothers for each other, is referable to the competition for the tender devotion and love of the mother."⁹ Too horrendous to face, the true meaning of the hero myth gets covered up by the concocted story, which makes the father, not the son, the culprit. The pattern is simply "the excuse, as it were, for the hostile feelings which the child harbors against his father, and which in this fiction are projected

against the father.”¹⁰ What the hero seeks gets masked as power, not incest. Most of all, who the hero is becomes some third party—the named hero—rather than either the creator of the myth or anyone stirred by it. Identifying himself with the named hero, the myth-teller, hearer, or reader vicariously revels in the hero’s triumph, which in fact is his own. *He* is the real hero of the myth, which, properly deciphered, is autobiography.

Literally, the myth culminates in the hero’s attainment of a throne. Symbolically, the hero gains a mate as well. One might, then, conclude that the myth fittingly expresses the Freudian goal of the first half of life. In actuality, it expresses the opposite. The wish fulfilled is not for detachment from one’s parents and from one’s antisocial instincts but, on the contrary, for the most intense possible relationship to one’s parents and for the most antisocial of urges: parricide and incest, even rape. Taking one’s father’s job and one’s mother’s hand does not quite spell independence of them.

The myth-teller, hearer, or reader is an adult, but the wish vented by the myth is that of a child of three to five: “Myths are, therefore, created by adults, by means of retrograde childhood fantasies, the hero being credited with the myth-maker’s personal infantile history.”¹¹ The fantasy is the fulfillment of the Oedipal wish to kill one’s father in order to gain access to one’s mother. The myth fulfills a wish never outgrown by the adult who either invents or uses it. Psychologically, that adult has never grown up. Having never developed an ego strong enough to master his instincts, he is neurotic: “There is a certain class of persons, the so-called psychoneurotics, shown by the teachings of Freud to have remained children, in a sense, although otherwise appearing grown up.”¹² Since no mere child can overpower his father, the myth-maker imagines being old enough to do so. In short, the myth expresses not the Freudian goal of the first half of life but the fixated childhood goal that keeps one from accomplishing it.

To be sure, the fulfillment of the Oedipal wish is symbolic rather than literal, disguised rather than overt, unconscious rather than conscious, mental rather than physical, and vicarious rather than direct. By identifying himself with the named hero, the teller, hearer, or reader of the myth acts out in his mind deeds that he would never dare act out in the world: “the myth is constituted as compensation for disowned psychic realities and the justifiable projection of these upon superhuman gods and heroes who may still be permitted that which has become shocking to man.”¹³ Even the Oedipal deeds of the named hero are disguised, for the heroic pattern operates at or near the manifest, not the latent, level.¹⁴

Still, the myth does provide fulfillment of a kind and, in light of the conflict between the neurotic's impulses and the neurotic's morals, provides the best possible fulfillment. It constitutes a compromise between "powerful mental tendencies clamoring for expression and at the same time . . . the counter impulses which keep these from complete achievement."¹⁵ Rank contrasts the neurotic, who has repressed his impulses and so needs an indirect outlet for them, to the "pervert," who acts out his impulses and so presumably has no need of any half-way measure like myth.¹⁶

As brilliant as it is, Rank's theory can be criticized on multiple grounds. One can grant the pattern while denying the Freudian meaning, which, after all, reverses the manifest one. Or one can deny the pattern itself. Certainly the pattern fits only those hero myths, or the portions of them, that cover heroes in the first half of life. Excluded, for example, would be the bulk of the myths of Odysseus and Aeneas, who are largely adult heroes. Rank's own examples come from Europe, the Near East, and India and may not fit heroes from elsewhere. His Greek heroes are Paris, Telephus, Perseus, Heracles, and Amphion and Zethus. His Roman heroes are Romulus and Remus.

Rank's pattern does not even fit any of his own examples, including that of Oedipus, the would-be paradigmatic case. Oedipus does not, on the literal level, quite kill his father intentionally. Yet far from oblivious to any departure from his scheme, Rank, in defense, appeals to loose ends on the literal level to suggest a cover-up. Oedipus, having been told at a banquet that his father is not the King of Corinth, asks the oracle who his real parents are. When, in reply, he is told that he is fated to kill his father and to marry his mother, he somehow forgets the uncertainty that drove him to the oracle and reverts to his innocent assumption that the King and Queen of Corinth are his real parents. He flees Corinth to try to ensure that he evades his would-be fate. This illogical reaction, Rank would suggest, disguises Oedipus's recognition of who his real parents are and of his real mission in leaving Corinth for Thebes.

Why, for Rank, is there any disparity between the literal level of the myth and the pattern it purportedly typifies? It is for the same reason that there is a disparity between that pattern and the Freudian meaning it purportedly harbors: even the pattern, not just the meaning of it, bears too wrenching a truth for either the creator or the user of the myth to confront consciously. Still, Rank assumes that the myth is close enough for the pattern to be said to hold.

Rank actually presents two wishes that a hero myth supposedly fulfills. In addition to the sexual, Oedipal wish, the part of the pattern called the "family ro-

mance” fulfills a non-Oedipal, nonsexual wish: the wish to replace one’s present, ordinary parents with the strongest man and the most beautiful woman in the world. Rank never recognizes the incompatibility of these contrary wishes. Like Freud, he takes for granted that the wishes work in tandem since both get rid of the father. But the Oedipal aim is to get rid of the real, royal father; the non-Oedipal aim is to get rid of the lowly, foster father.

Despite the title of Rank’s book, the emphasis is on the hero’s Oedipal conflict with his father, not on his birth and so on the relationship with his mother. But the title is prescient because Rank came to regard birth rather than the Oedipus complex as the key trauma and as the key source of neurosis.

Post-Freudian Rank on Myth

In addition to *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, Rank wrote *Der Künstler* (1907), *The Incest Theme in Literature and Legend* (1912, trans. 1992), *Psychoanalytische Beiträge zur Mythenforschung* (1919), *The Don Juan Legend* (1922/24, trans. 1975), *The Trauma of Birth* (1924, trans. 1929), *The Double* (1925, trans. 1971), *Truth and Reality* (1929, trans. 1936 [Rank 1978a]), and *Will Therapy* (1929 and 1931, trans. 1936 [Rank 1978b]). He became ever more philosophical and ever less psychological, a tendency that culminated in his aptly titled posthumous work, *Beyond Psychology* (1941). In 1913, while still a disciple of Freud, he and Hanns Sachs wrote an accessible overview of applied psychoanalysis entitled *The Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Mental Sciences* (trans. 1916). Their chapter “Myths and Legends” matches the analysis in the first edition of *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*.

Once Rank breaks with Freud, he ventures far beyond even contemporary psychoanalysts.¹⁷ Rank began as a Freudian disciple, and Rank’s *The Incest Theme in Literature and Legend* (1912 in German) actually gave Freud evidence, albeit literary, of the Oedipus complex.¹⁸ Freud even wrote the section on the second, nonsexual wish, that of the family romance, in Rank’s *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*. Yet it has been argued that Rank’s apparent focus on the *birth* of the hero shows that even as early as 1909, the date of the first edition of the book, he was starting to break with Freud—a break that would come explosively with the publication in 1924 (trans. 1929) of *The Trauma of Birth*.

In *The Trauma of Birth* Rank makes the prime relationship for everyone that to one’s mother rather than, as for Freud, to the parent of the same sex. Because the maternal relationship goes back to birth and infancy, the prime stage of life is pre-Oedipal rather than Oedipal. The relationship to the father comes later—in,

above all, the Oedipal stage. The relationship to the mother is originally that of union, and the deepest feelings toward her are those of dependence and identification. With birth comes the first trauma: that of separation. Because the mother carries the fetus yet then gives birth to it—kicks it out—and because the mother feeds yet also weans her child, feelings toward the mother are ambivalent. Like the father for Freud, the mother for Rank is feared as well as loved.

For Rank, the infant's anxiety at birth is the source of all subsequent anxiety. Conflict with the father remains, but because he blocks the son's yearning to return to the mother's womb rather than because he blocks the son's Oedipal yearning. Fear of the father is a displacement of fear of the mother, who, moreover, has abandoned, not castrated, her son. For Freud, the father blocks the son's fulfillment of the Oedipus complex by the threat of castration. It is the father, not the mother, who is feared. For post-Freudian Rank, the fear is of the mother, though not from any threat of castration. Sexual desire for the mother is likewise a means of returning to the womb, not of securing Oedipal satisfaction.

Seemingly all of human life is interpreted to fit the birth trauma. Fear of the dark, oral and anal activities, sexual activities of every variety, neurotic symptoms, sleeping, dreaming, symbols, attitudes toward death, religion, art, philosophy, mysticism, and not least the Oedipus complex—all are either expressions of the physical separation from the mother at birth or efforts at undoing that separation, whether by returning to the womb or, as the fallback, by creating a womb-like world after birth. As Rank declares, "just as the anxiety at birth forms the basis of every anxiety or fear, so every pleasure has as its final aim the re-establishment of the intrauterine primal pleasure."¹⁹

The wish now fulfilled by myth is, like that of culture as a whole, either to undo birth or to create a second womb. Oedipus's "blindness in the deepest sense represents a return into the darkness of the mother's womb, and his final disappearance through a cleft rock into the Underworld [in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*] expresses once again the same wish tendency to return into the mother earth."²⁰ Rank laments, not advocates, return to the womb, which is akin to the death instinct for Freud. The aim of therapy is to provide a second, nontraumatic rebirth, which one will not yearn to undo: "analysis finally turns out to be a belated accomplishment of the incompleting mastery of the birth trauma."²¹

While Freud, in a footnote added to the second (1909 German) edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, was prepared to grant that "the act of birth is the first experience of anxiety, and thus the source and prototype of the affect of anxiety,"²² he was never prepared to make birth the main, let alone sole, source of anxiety

and neurosis. He refused to subordinate the Oedipus complex, which centers on the father, to the trauma of birth, which necessarily centers on the mother.

How much of post-Freudian Rank is to be found in the second, 1922 edition or even the first, 1909 edition of *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*? In actuality, the second edition (Rank 2004) does not so much break with the first as exacerbate the divide already found in the first edition between Freudian and post-Freudian Rank. The second edition drops almost nothing from the first and instead adds to it. In both editions there is a hiatus between the post-Freudian focus on the hero's birth and the Freudian focus on the hero's deeds—with the emphasis in the second edition shifting toward birth. In both editions there is a parallel disjunction between the post-Freudian title and the Freudian pattern, neither of which changes. While the title obviously singles out the hero's birth, the pattern subordinates the birth to the deeds: the birth is decisive not because of the hero's separation from his mother but because of the parents' attempt to fend off, at birth, the prophesied parricidal consequences.²³

Rank alters not at all the presentation of Oedipus in the second edition of *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*. The elements of Rank's original pattern remain: royal parents; delay in conception; prophetic warning against birth; attempted infanticide to elude the prophecy; infanticide by exposure on sea rather than, as for Sophocles, on land; rescue by foster parents; eventual discovery of identity; subsequent parricide; and succession as king. Because the foster parents are as royal as the real parents, the nonsexual wish for idealized real parents goes unfulfilled. Far more important, Oedipus still consciously seeks to avert parricide, so that the wish to kill the father is fulfilled most unintentionally. Oedipus's discovery of his identity comes only long after the parricide and so can hardly be the spur to it.

Rank could have used the inadvertent nature of the parricide to downplay Oedipus's Oedipus complex. Certainly many commentators stress Oedipus's pre-Oedipal traumas of abandonment, mutilation, and adoption.²⁴ But Rank does not.

Yet, still later, Rank—the Rank of *Truth and Reality* and even more of *Will Therapy*—is even more distinctively Rankian. Now the infant, while still seeking to remain with the mother, simultaneously seeks to separate from her. Life is an ongoing struggle between the desire for autonomy and the desire for reunion. For Freud, the conflict is between the desire for unfettered sexual release and the desire for no release at all. The conflict is that between id and superego, which in Freud's final metapsychology in *The Ego and the Id* (1923) are the opposing parts of the mind that the third part, the ego, strives continually to balance. For Rank,

the conflict between the id and the superego is reduced to merely one venue where the conflict between the desire to separate and the desire to unite is played out. The conflict can be diminished but never resolved. Mental health consists of a balance between the inclinations. One can be independent yet still connected to others.

The mother matters less as the object of fulfillment, sexual or otherwise, and more as the nurturer. And the father matters in the same way. Both parents are desexualized. The child seeks not to kill one parent in order to have sex with the other but to retain the love of both without sacrificing autonomy. Even a parricidal or matricidal urge would still stem from a desire for separation. The converse urge for union with the parents would stem not from an incestuous desire but from cowardice.

For Rank, the key entity in the psyche is now the will. Where Freud's ego develops out of the denial or the delay of drives, Rank's will is innate. Where Freud's ego can at best mediate between the drives and the superego, Rank's will can master and direct the drives. Where Freud's ego strives only to mediate, Rank's will strives creatively to forge an independent person. By the will Rank means a will not to power but to autonomy. The cause of neurosis is not a weak ego but a weak will. The will is weak because it is burdened by guilt, which is reflected in the ambivalence felt toward the act of separation.

In *Will Therapy* Rank contends that Oedipus is condemned by Sophocles on multiple counts: for assuming that intellect (consciousness) rather than will governs human action; for assuming that knowing (consciousness) is superior to not knowing (illusion); and for blaming Fate rather than himself for his deeds. All three condemnations of Oedipus are, for Rank, also condemnations of Freud, who attributes neurosis to the unconscious and so to ignorance, who seeks to make the unconscious conscious and so relies on intellect for the cure, and who absolves Oedipus of responsibility by blaming his unconscious: "In the Oedipus saga all evil arises not from doing, but from knowing or wanting to know, for which one must finally take over responsibility oneself instead of putting it on fate, or the Gods, or the unconscious."²⁵ Where in *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* Oedipus is the victim of his unconscious, which overrides his conscious will, in *Will Therapy* he consciously wills his actions. Any appeal by psychoanalysis to the unconscious is, as for Sartre, an excuse to evade responsibility: "the denial of the will . . . makes the thinking, feeling, and acting of the individual dependent on forces outside of himself and thus frees him from responsibility and guilt."²⁶

In *Truth and Reality* Rank contrasts the heroic myth, as represented by the

story of Oedipus, to the “religious myth,” as represented by the Garden of Eden story (Gen. 3). Now Oedipus’s fall stems from will *without* consciousness, whereas Adam and Eve’s fall stems from consciousness, or over-intellectualization, that paralyzes the will. Oedipus would not have married his mother had he known who Jocasta was, and Adam and Eve would not have been inhibited sexually had they not eaten from the Tree of Knowledge:

The hero myth represents experience (living), the deed, the will, which consciousness could only restrict, as we find it expressed in the Oedipus story, but the hero comes to grief and must come to grief in the fact that he cannot know beforehand and does not even want to know so that he can act. The religious myth represents “knowing,” the knowledge of God, that is, self knowledge, and here man suffers again in that, knowledge about himself interferes with naïve action, restrains him and torments without affording him the satisfaction and liberation which the deed grants.²⁷

However one reconciles Rank’s characterization of the source of Oedipus’s downfall in *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, *Truth and Reality*, and *Will Therapy*, the issue now is the relationship between consciousness and will rather than, as in *Myth*, the relationship between ego and id.²⁸

Jung on Myth

Where for Freud and Rank heroism is limited to the first half of life, for Jung it is to be found in both halves, though in the second half even more. For Freud and Rank, heroism involves relations with parents and instincts. For Jung, heroism in even the first half involves, in addition, relations with the unconscious. Heroism here means separation not only from parents and antisocial instincts but even more from the unconscious. It means the formation of consciousness. Every child’s managing to forge consciousness is for Jung a supremely heroic feat. In the first half of life the object of consciousness is the external world.

The goal of the uniquely Jungian second half of life is likewise consciousness, but now consciousness of the Jungian unconscious rather than of the external world. One must return to the unconscious, from which one has invariably become severed. But the aim is not thereby to sever one’s ties to the external world. On the contrary, the aim is still to return to the external world. The ideal is a balance between consciousness of the external world and consciousness of the unconscious. The aim of the second half of life is to supplement, not to abandon, the achievements of the first half. Daring to return to the unconscious, while not

becoming overwhelmed by it, is at least as much a heroic feat as that in the first half of life.²⁹

Just as classical Freudian problems involve the failure to establish oneself in the outer world, in the form of working and loving, so distinctively Jungian problems involve the failure to reestablish oneself in the inner world, in relation to the unconscious. Freudian problems stem from excessive attachment to the world of childhood. Jungian problems stem from excessive attachment to the world one enters upon breaking free of the childhood world: the external world. To be severed from the internal world is to feel empty and lost.

Jung's Greek heroes, in contrast to Rank's, are heroes of the second half of life. They are adults who undertake an adventure of some kind. Among them are Odysseus, Prometheus, Hermes, Cadmus, and most of all Heracles. They are a mix of gods and humans. For psychoanalysts, the difference between gods and humans does not matter. Once psychologized, gods become either humans (Freud) or human traits (Jung).

Freud and Jung

Freud (1856–1939) and Jung (1875–1961) were a generation apart. Freud was Austrian and Jewish, and was trained as a neurologist. Jung was Swiss and Protestant, and was trained as a psychiatrist—a specialty that, for him, made him more qualified than Freud to decipher the mind. Jung was never a disciple of Freud. When the two made contact, Freud was world famous, but so, through his word association tests, was Jung, if not yet equally so acclaimed. They never collaborated, but they did exchange views for about a decade.

Freud and Jung were both pioneers, but not in postulating an unconscious, which had been postulated since days of yore.³⁰ They were pioneers, though not even here the sole pioneers, in studying the unconscious scientifically. Neither denies the existence of consciousness. Rather, they deny its importance. They deny that most ideas and feelings are conscious. Some ideas and feelings are wholly conscious, but most are only partly so, and some not at all so. For both, “unconscious” means that of which one is unaware, not just at the moment but forever. The only way to become even partly conscious of what is unconscious is through therapy.

From the start, Jung refused to accept Freud's preoccupation with sex. In turn, Freud refused to accept Jung's preoccupation with religion. Freud viewed ideas and actions as the mechanical expression of instincts—or more precisely, of drives, which, unlike instincts, can manifest themselves in varying forms.

Whether or not strictly a materialist, Freud focused on the mental effects of frustrated sexual fulfillment.

Jung saw sex as a symbol and scorned Freud's focus on actual sexuality. Jung was a dualist of a muddled kind, though not of a Cartesian kind. For him, the mind and the body interact. Certainly his focus is not on the fulfillment, direct or indirect, of instincts or drives but on self-discovery. Where for Freud myth in particular is a way of venting unconscious wishes without becoming aware of them, for Jung myth is the opposite: it is a way of becoming aware of unconscious sides of the personality, albeit never fully. For Freud, myth would fail if one became aware of its real meaning. For Jung, myth would succeed if one ever did become aware of its real meaning. For Freud, myth perpetuates neurosis. For Jung, myth helps preclude neurosis.

While long coming, the break between Freud and Jung peaked with the publication of *Psychology of the Unconscious* (1912, trans. 1916). Here Jung explicitly repudiates Freud. Thereafter Freud ignored Jung. Antithetically, thereafter Jung began every work trying to refute Freud. The struggle between them was Oedipal-like.

The key difference between Freud and Jung is that for Freud the unconscious is the product of repression, whereas for Jung the unconscious is naturally unconscious. Repression is like a prison. It is an artificial container of what was originally conscious. The contents of the Freudian unconscious are called "complexes." A complex is a cluster of ideas and emotions associated with a particular subject. It was Jung who identified and named the concept, which was initially used as well by Freud (Oedipus complex) and Adler (inferiority complex and superiority complex) but was eventually ceded by Jungians to Freudians. It was also Jung, not Freud, who coined the term "Electra complex" to characterize the female counterpart to the Oedipus complex. After the break with Jung, Freudians discarded the term and used "Oedipus complex" and "Oedipal stage" for girls as well as for boys.

The contents of the Jungian unconscious are called "archetypes." Jung did not coin the term, which goes back to the *Poimandres*, the first tractate of the Hermetic Corpus.³¹ Where a complex is about another person, above all a family member, an archetype is a side of one's own personality. Where the subject of an Oedipus or Electra complex is one's parents, the subject of an archetype is oneself. To claim that a myth is about the Oedipus complex of the main character is to claim that the myth, rightly fathomed, is the fulfillment of the character's desires toward his parents. To maintain that a myth is about the father or mother

archetype is to maintain that the myth, correctly understood, is about the father-like or mother-like sides of either a male's or a female's own personality. Archetypes no less than complexes get projected onto other persons, but they are not really about others.

Freud and Jung alike parallel myth to dream. Even if dreams are private rather than public, and even if dreams are experienced while asleep rather than while awake, the strong parallel holds. Jung actually allows for private myths. For both Freud and Jung, myths and dreams are means by which one encounters the unconscious. But for Freud myths and dreams are what are called "compromise formations." They are a middle ground between the outright denial of sexual wishes and the outright fulfillment of them. They are a compromise between the unbending inclination of the superego and the equally unbending inclination of the id. The outright fulfillment of wishes would presuppose awareness of them, which myths and dreams are concocted to prevent.

For Jung, myths and dreams are not compromises of any kind. Just as for Freud, so for Jung, they must be translated from the literal, surface level into a symbolic, underlying level. But where for Freud levels are like clothes, with each outer layer covering up the layer beneath, for Jung levels are translations from the language of consciousness into the language of the unconscious. For Freud, the literal level is created as a barrier to deciphering the unconscious. For Jung, the literal level is merely the level on which consciousness operates. The unconscious enlists myths and dreams to try to reach consciousness, not to try to keep consciousness from reaching it. There is no cover-up. For Freud, interpretation is like deciphering the Enigma code. For Jung, it is like deciphering the Rosetta stone. Yet for neither is deciphering the unconscious easy.

The Freudian unconscious is simply called the unconscious. It is composed of complexes, of which the Oedipus and Electra complexes are the best known. Jung renames Freud's unconscious the "personal unconscious" because it is created by every person. It is created by the end of the Oedipal stage, or ages three to five. To the personal unconscious, Jung adds what he names the "collective unconscious." It is inherited genetically. Its collective nature refers not to the common content—the content of the personal unconscious is similarly the same for all—but to the common origin: one does not create it for oneself. In contrast to the Freudian unconscious, the collective unconscious contains nothing antisocial or otherwise objectionable—save for a single archetype, the evil side of humans that Jung names the "shadow." The collective unconscious is unconscious because it is "made that way."

The Jungian goal, like the Freudian one, is to become as nearly conscious as possible of the contents of the unconscious. The collective unconscious is harder to “access” than the personal unconscious exactly because it is inherently unconscious. Still, myth, religion, and dream are among the means of becoming aware of the unconscious, though only unconsciously so. Short of therapy, one still assumes that what one is encountering is in other persons and in the world out there, not in oneself. Therapy, for Freudians and Jungians alike, enables one to withdraw projections and to become conscious of the unconscious, if never fully so.

Campbell's Jungian Hero Myths

Though commonly called one, Joseph Campbell was never a straightforward “Jungian.” Campbell differs most with Jung over the origin and function of myth. Where for Jung the archetypal contents of myth arise out of the unconscious, only in some of Campbell's works do they do so. Even then, sometimes the unconscious for Campbell is, as for Freud, acquired rather than, as for Jung, inherited. Other times the contents of myth emerge from the imprint of either recurrent or traumatic experiences. In all of these cases, as for Jung, each society creates its own myths—whatever the source of the material it uses. Other times, however, Campbell, antithetically to Jung, is a diffusionist: myths now originate in one society and spread elsewhere.

For Jung, myth functions to enable humans to encounter the unconscious. For Campbell, myth serves additional functions as well. Campbell comes to declare repeatedly that myth serves four distinct functions: to instill and maintain a sense of awe and mystery before the world; to provide a symbolic image for the world such as that of the Great Chain of Being; to maintain the social order, by giving divine justification to social practices such as the Indian caste system; and most of all to harmonize human beings with the cosmos, society, and the parts of themselves. Jung, ever seeking a balance between the internal and the external worlds, would doubtless applaud many of these functions for keeping humans anchored to the outer, everyday, conscious world. But he himself is more concerned with reconnecting humans to the inner, unconscious world, with which they have invariably lost contact.³²

Despite these conspicuous differences, Campbell stands close to Jung and stands closest in *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (1949, rev. 1968), which remains the classic Jungian analysis of hero myths. Campbell himself, to be sure, states that he became even more of a Jungian *after* writing *Hero*,³³ but he is probably

basing this characterization of *Hero* on his reliance on the pioneering Freudian anthropologist Géza Róheim, who himself, however, strays from Freudian orthodoxy in a manner that Campbell adopts and carries still further toward Jung.

Jung himself, as noted, allows for heroism in both halves of life, but Campbell does not. Just as Rank confines heroism to the first half of life, so Campbell restricts it to the second half. Rank's scheme begins with the hero's birth. Campbell's scheme, or "monomyth," begins with the hero's adventure. Where Rank's scheme ends, Campbell's begins: with the adult hero ensconced at home.

Rank's scheme ends with Oedipus's killing his father and succeeding him as King of Thebes. What follows in Sophocles' play falls outside Rank's focus, which is on the hero's success, not subsequent fall and guilt. When Freud, as quoted, writes that "the poet . . . brings to light the guilt of Oedipus," the guilt refers to Oedipus's deeds, not to his discovery of them. The play is "compelling us to recognize our own inner minds, in which those same impulses, though suppressed, are still to be found." It was Bernard Knox (1957) who argued that Freud misconstrues Sophocles because the play is less about Oedipus's fated deeds than about his insistent discovery of them. In other words, Freud and in turn Rank concentrate on the first half of life.

Rank's hero must be young enough for his father and in some cases even his grandfather still to be reigning. Campbell does not specify the age of his hero, but the hero must be no younger than the age at which Rank's hero myth ends: young adulthood. While some of Campbell's own examples are of child heroes, they violate his scheme, according to which heroes must be willing to leave behind all that they have accomplished at home. Even more, they violate his Jungian meaning, according to which heroes must be fully developed egos ready to encounter the unconscious from which they have long been severed. Campbell's heroes should, then, be in the second half of life. Campbell does acknowledge heroism in the first half of life and even cites Rank's monograph, but he demotes youthful heroism to mere preparation for adult heroism.³⁴

Rank's hero must be the son of royal or aristocratic parents. Campbell's need not be, though often is. Where Rank's heroes must be male, Campbell's can also be female, though Campbell inconsistently describes the hero's initiation from an exclusively male point of view. Finally, Campbell's scheme dictates human heroes, even though many of his examples of heroes are divine. Rank's pattern, by contrast, allows for divine as well as human heroes.

Where Rank's hero returns to his birthplace, Campbell's marches forth to a strange, new world, which the hero has never visited or even known existed:

... destiny has summoned the hero and transferred his spiritual center of gravity from within the pale of his society to a zone unknown. This fateful region of both treasure and danger may be variously represented: as a distant land, a forest, a kingdom underground, beneath the waves, or above the sky, a secret island, lofty mountaintop, or profound dream state.³⁵

This extraordinary world is the world of the gods, and the hero must hail from the human world precisely to be able to experience the distinctiveness of the divine one.

In this exotic, supernatural world the hero encounters above all a supreme female god and a supreme male god. The maternal goddess is loving and caring: "She is the paragon of all paragons of beauty, the reply to all desire, the bliss-bestowing goal of every hero's earthly and unearthly quest."³⁶ By contrast, the male god is tyrannical and merciless—an "ogre."³⁷ The hero has sex with the goddess and marries her—the reason the hero must here be male. He competes with the male god and then kills him—the reason the hero must again here be male. Yet with both gods, not just the goddess, he becomes mystically one and thereby becomes divine himself.

Where Rank's hero *returns* home to encounter his father and mother, Campbell's hero *leaves* home to encounter a male and a female god, who are neither his parents nor a couple. Yet the two heroes' encounters are remarkably akin: just as Rank's hero kills his father and, if usually only latently, marries his mother, so Campbell's hero, in reverse order, first marries the goddess and then kills the god.

The differences, however, are even more significant. Because the goddess is not the hero's mother, sex with her does not constitute incest. Moreover, the two not only marry but also become mystically one.

Despite appearances, the hero's relationship to the male god is, for Campbell, no less positive and so no less non-Freudian. Seemingly, the relationship is blatantly Oedipal. Campbell even cites Róheim's analysis of aboriginal myths and rituals of initiation, which evince the son's fear of castration by his father and the father's prior fear of death at the hands of his son:

The native Australian mythologies teach that the first initiation rites were carried out in such a way that all the young men were killed. The ritual is thus shown to be, among other things, a dramatized expression of the Oedipal [counter-] aggression of the elder generation; and the circumcision, a mitigated castration. But the rites provide also for the cannibal, patricidal impulse of the younger, rising group of males.³⁸

Róheim, however, departs from a strictly Freudian interpretation.³⁹ The sons seek not sex with their mothers but *reunion* with them. They seek to fulfill not their Oedipal desires but their even earlier, infantile ones—a booming echo of the post-Freudian Rank. Their fathers oppose those desires not because they want to keep their wives for themselves but because they want to break their sons' prenatal ties to their mothers. If the fathers try to break those ties by threatening their sons with castration, they also try to break the ties by offering themselves as substitutes for their wives. The fathers selflessly nourish their sons with their own blood, occasionally dying in the process.

Campbell adopts Róheim's more harmonious interpretation of the clash between sons and fathers and carries it even further.⁴⁰ Since Campbell's hero is in the second half of life, he is not, like Róheim's initiates, seeking separation from his mother—for Róheim, as for the renegade Rank, the central experience of life. He is seeking reintegration with her. Furthermore, he is seeking reintegration with his father as well. He is not really fighting with his father over his mother. For again, the two gods are neither his parents nor a couple. The hero is seeking from the god the same love that he has just won from the goddess. To secure it, he need not give up the goddess but need only trust in the god, who is symbolized by the father: "One must have a faith that the father is merciful, and then a reliance on that mercy."⁴¹ The father sacrifices himself to his son.

When Campbell writes that initiation rituals and myths "reveal the benign self-giving aspect of the *archetypal* father," he is using the term in its Jungian sense.⁴² For Freudians, gods symbolize parents. For Jungians, parents symbolize gods, who in turn symbolize father and mother archetypes. The hero's relationship to these gods symbolizes not, as for Freud, Rank, and Róheim, a son's relationship to other persons—his parents—but the relationship of one side of a male's personality—his ego—to another side—his unconscious. The father and the mother, on which Campbell concentrates, are but two of the archetypes of which the collective unconscious is composed. For Campbell, following Jung, myth originates and functions not, as for Freud and Rank, to satisfy neurotic urges that cannot be manifested openly but to express normal sides of the personality that have just not had a chance at realization.

By identifying himself with the hero of a myth, Rank's myth-teller, hearer, or reader vicariously lives out in his mind an adventure that, if ever directly fulfilled, would be acted out on his parents themselves. While also identifying himself—or herself—with the hero of a myth, Campbell's myth-teller, hearer, or reader vicari-

ously lives out in the mind an adventure that even when directly fulfilled would still be taking place in the mind. For parts of the mind are what the myth-teller, hearer, or reader is really encountering.

Having managed to break free of the secure, everyday world and go off to a dangerous new one, Campbell's hero, to complete the journey, must in turn break free of the new world, in which the hero has by now become ensconced, and return to the everyday one. So enticing is the new world that leaving it proves harder than even leaving home was. Circe, Calypso, the Sirens, and the Lotus Eaters thus tempt Odysseus with not just a comfortable, long life but a carefree, immortal one.

Though often misconstrued, Jung no less than Freud opposes a state of sheer unconsciousness. Both strive to make the unconscious conscious. While they differ over the origin of the unconscious and over its capacity to become conscious, the ideal for both remains consciousness. Jung opposes the rejection of ordinary, or ego, consciousness for unconsciousness as vigorously as he opposes the rejection of unconsciousness for ego consciousness. He seeks a balance between ego consciousness and the unconscious, between consciousness of the external world and consciousness of the internal one. For Jung, the hero's failure to return to the everyday world would spell his failure to resist the allure of the unconscious, just as, we shall see, Adonis does.

Breaking with Jung, Campbell seeks a state of pure unconsciousness. Campbell's hero never returns to the everyday world but instead surrenders to the unconscious. Yet Campbell demands the hero's return to the everyday world. How, then, can his hero really be spurning it? The answer is that the world to which Campbell's hero returns is not really the everyday world but the strange, new world, which turns out to pervade the everyday one. No separate everyday world exists. The everyday world and the new world are really one:

The two worlds, the divine [i.e., new] and the human [i.e., everyday], can be pictured only as distinct from each other—different as life and death, as day and night . . . Nevertheless—and here is a great key to the understanding of myth and symbol—the two kingdoms are actually one. The realm of the gods is a forgotten dimension of the world we know.⁴³

The hero need never have left home after all.

To maintain that the everyday world and the new world are one is to maintain that no distinctive everyday world exists. Campbell thus dismisses as illusory the

“values and distinctions” of the everyday world. If no everyday world exists, then the hero’s apparent return to it is a sham. If no everyday world exists, then the ego, which provides consciousness of it, is itself a sham as well.

Jung rejects the everyday world, the object of ego consciousness, as the *sole* reality, not as *a* reality. While he seeks to integrate the everyday world with the new one, ego consciousness with the unconscious, he denies that it is possible to fuse them, at least without thereby dissolving both the everyday world and the ego itself.

Campbell’s hero returns home only to save others:

The full round, the norm of the monomyth, requires that the hero shall now begin the labor of bringing the runes of wisdom, the Golden Fleece, or his sleeping princess, back into the kingdom of humanity, where the boon may redound to the renewing of the community, the nation, the planet, or the ten thousand worlds.⁴⁴

If there is no separate everyday reality, then there can be no return to it. But even if there is a separate everyday reality, there is no reason to return to it except to apprise others of the fact. Consequently, Campbell’s chief heroes include the selfless Buddha, Moses, Jesus, and Aeneas.

Like Rank’s theory, Campbell’s can be faulted on various grounds. As with Rank’s theory, one might grant the pattern but deny the meaning. Or one might question the pattern itself. Since it obviously applies only to myths about heroes in the second half of life, it excludes all of Rank’s hero myths, or at least all of Rank’s portions of them. Whether it even fits Campbell’s own examples is not easy to tell, for Campbell, unlike Rank, provides no set of hero myths to accompany the whole of his pattern. He cites scores of hero myths to illustrate individual parts of his pattern. They include the Greek heroes, successful or failed, Actaeon, Adonis, Ariadne, Daphne, Eurydice, Heracles, Jason, Odysseus, Phaethon, Prometheus, Psyche, and Theseus. But he never applies his full pattern to even one myth.

One might question even so seemingly transparent a confirmation of Campbell’s pattern as the myth of Aeneas, which Campbell names as an example of his pattern.⁴⁵ Aeneas’s descent to Hades and return does fit Campbell’s scheme snugly, but Aeneas’s larger itinerary does not. Rather than returning home to Troy upon completion of his journey, he proceeds to Italy to found a new civilization. Similarly, Odysseus’s descent to the Underworld fits Campbell’s pattern, but his larger journey, which Campbell cites,⁴⁶ does not. Odysseus, unlike Aeneas, does return home, but also unlike Aeneas, he arrives with no boon in hand. His return

is an entirely personal triumph. Since Campbell distinguishes a myth from a fairy tale on exactly the grounds that the triumph of a mythic hero is more than personal,⁴⁷ Odysseus's story would thereby fail to qualify as a myth.

Freud and Jung as Twentieth-Century Theorists of Myth

It is conventionally assumed that, on myth as in general, Freud and especially Jung are arguing against each other. But on myth both are in fact arguing at least as much against nineteenth-century theorists such as the pioneering anthropologists E. B. Tylor and J. G. Frazer.⁴⁸ As I classify modern theories, nineteenth-century theorists pitted myth against science. Myth originated and functioned to do for primitive peoples what science now did for moderns: account for all events in the physical world. The kinds of myths studied were those about the external world. One could not consistently hold both kinds of explanations. Moderns, who were *defined* as scientific, were therefore logically obliged to abandon myth. The rise of science spelled the death of myth.

Twentieth-century theorists, by contrast, reconciled myth with science. Myth, they argued, was anything but the outdated counterpart to science, which might still be wholly or largely modern. Whatever myth was, it was not a literal explanation of the physical world. Moderns, still defined as scientific, could now retain myth. Theorists like the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski and the historian of religions Mircea Eliade maintain that myth, while still about the world, is not an explanation of the world, in which case its function diverges from that of science.⁴⁹ Here would also fall Walter Burkert.⁵⁰ Theorists like the New Testament scholar Rudolf Bultmann and the philosopher Hans Jonas maintain that myth is not to be read literally, in which case the subject matter of myth is not the physical world.⁵¹

Most radical among twentieth-century theorists are Freud and Jung, for whom neither the subject matter nor the function of myth is like that of science. They remove myth as far as possible from any parallel to science. For theorists like Tylor and Frazer they hold the strongest contempt.⁵² From myth, one learns not about the world but about oneself.

Finally, the pioneering structuralist theorist, the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss,⁵³ might seem to defy my characterization of twentieth-century theories. Myth for him is wholly primitive yet is not prescientific, let alone antiscientific, but fully scientific. But myth for him is ultimately about the human mind, not about the world, and so fits my depiction of twentieth-century theories of myth.

Frazer and Jung on Adonis

To see the difference between the nineteenth-century approach to myth and the psychoanalytic approach, let's compare Frazer with Jung on Adonis. One could alternatively compare Tylor with Freud, but Tylor analyzes no whole myth, and Freud's grievance is against the nineteenth-century approach to myth generally.⁵⁴ For example, against the otherwise obscure theorist E. Stucken, who interprets the choice of the caskets in *The Merchant of Venice* as a celestial myth, Freud, in "The Theme of the Three Caskets" (1913), comments snippily:

He [Stucken] says, "The identity of the three suitors of Portia is clear from their choice: the Prince of Morocco chooses the gold casket: he is the sun; the Prince of Arragon chooses the silver casket: he is the moon; Bassanio chooses the leaden casket: he is the star youth . . ." Thus our little problem leads to an astral myth. The only pity is that with this explanation we not have got to the end of the matter. The question goes further, for we do not share the belief of many investigators that myths were read off direct from the heavens; we are more inclined to judge with Otto Rank that they were projected on to the heavens after having arisen quite otherwise under purely human conditions. Now our interest is in this human content.⁵⁵

Myth is about the family, not the sky.

The myth of Adonis, for which the main sources are Apollodorus and Ovid,⁵⁶ describes the miraculous birth of a preternaturally beautiful human out of a tree, the fighting over him by goddesses, and his annual sojourn in Hades with one of those goddesses. For both Apollodorus and Ovid, his birth results from his mother's incestuous yearning for her father. Adonis's split schedule may become routine, but it is not therefore natural. For Apollodorus, it stems from love and jealousy on the part of Aphrodite and Persephone. Nor is Adonis's eventual death natural. He is killed and in various versions is even murdered—by either a spurned lover, Artemis, or a bested rival, Ares.

Frazer discusses Adonis in all editions of *The Golden Bough*.⁵⁷ He locates the potted gardens of Adonis, a feature of the cult, in the first of his two, in truth three, prescientific stages of culture: the stage of magic. Since in this stage humans believe that impersonal forces rather than personalities cause events in the physical world, Adonis here cannot be a personality. Without personality there is no myth, so that this first stage is premythic as well as prereligious. Greeks would be planting seeds in shallow, earth-filled pots not to persuade a divine personal-

ity to grant growth but, by the magical Law of Imitation, to force the impersonal earth itself to grow. Mimicking the growth of crops would ensure their actual growth. The plants would shoot up quickly, but then just as quickly they would die—like the personality Adonis. Magic, like all subsequent stages of culture, originates and functions to secure food. If our forbears had had science, they would have used it instead of magic or religion.

In Frazer's second stage, that of religion, Adonis is an outright personality. He is the god of vegetation. In fact, Frazer distinguishes religion from magic on precisely the grounds that now divine personalities rather than impersonal forces cause events in the physical world. As the god of vegetation, Adonis could, most straightforwardly, be asked for crops. Or the request could be reinforced by ritualistic and ethical obedience. Just as there is now religion, so there is now myth: the biography of Adonis. Information from that biography would help worshippers figure out how best to get Adonis to grant crops. Frazer himself writes that rites of mourning were performed for Adonis—not, as in the next stage, to undo his death but to seek his forgiveness for it.⁵⁸ For Adonis has died not, as in the next stage, because he has descended to the Underworld but because in cutting, stamping, and grinding the grain—the specific part of vegetation he symbolizes—humans have killed him. Yet Adonis is somehow still sufficiently alive to be capable of punishing humans, something that the rituals of forgiveness are intended to avert. Since, however, Adonis dies because vegetation itself does, the god is here really only a metaphor for the element that he supposedly controls. As vegetation goes, so goes Adonis.

Frazer declares the existence of three stages of culture: magic, religion, and science. Beginning with the second stage, these stages arise in reaction to the failure of the preceding stage and are supposed to be mutually exclusive. But Frazer actually devotes the bulk of the second (1900), third (1911–15), and abridged (1922) editions of *The Golden Bough* to a stage that comes between religion and science and, more, that manages to unite the seemingly incompatible stages of magic and religion. In this in-between stage myth flourishes most fully. The cause of the state of vegetation remains the god of vegetation—the legacy of the stage of religion. But now it is the physical condition, not the decision, of the god that determines the condition of vegetation. When the god is strong, not to say alive, the crops are alive. When the god is weak, not to say dead, the crops die.

The legacy of magic in the combined stage is that humans seek to revive the dead or ailing god by imitating the death and in turn rebirth of the god. The myth of the god is the script of the ritual, which operates by the magical Law of Imita-

tion. The king plays the part of the god in the play. Rather than being killed, he simply plays the role of the dead and in turn resurrected god. The rebirth of the god means the rebirth of vegetation.

Adonis's death means his descent to the Underworld for his stay with Persephone. If in Frazer's stage two, as vegetation goes, so goes Adonis, now in the combined stage, as Adonis goes, so seemingly goes vegetation. Frazer assumes that whether or not Adonis wills his descent, he is too weak to ascend by himself. By acting out his rebirth, humans facilitate it. Strictly, the employment of the Law of Imitation does not, as in the first stage, compel but only bolsters Adonis, who, despite his present state of death, is somehow still hearty enough to revive himself, just not fully. He needs a catalyst, which the enactment provides. In this stage gods still control the physical world, but their effect on it is automatic rather than deliberate. To enact the rebirth of Adonis is to spur his rebirth and thereby the rebirth of vegetation.⁵⁹

Yet even if Adonis chooses to descend to the Underworld, he is not choosing the death of crops, which is just the automatic consequence of his sojourn below. Similarly, even if he chooses to return, he is not thereby choosing the rebirth of crops, which likewise simply follows automatically from his resurfacing.

In all three of his prescientific stages Frazer reduces Adonis to the mere personification of vegetation. For even where Frazer does deem Adonis an independent personality—in the second stage and the combined stage—the only aspect of Adonis's life he considers is that which parallels the natural course of vegetation: Adonis's death and rebirth. Yet Adonis's final death terminates, not perpetuates, the change of seasons. How, given his finale, he can still be either the god of vegetation or a symbol of the god of vegetation, Frazer never explains.

Unlike Frazer, Jung mentions Adonis only in passing,⁶⁰ but he does mention him as an instance of the archetype of the eternal child, or *puer aeternus*.⁶¹ That archetype, too, Jung discusses only in passing, but he does devote many pages to an allied archetype, that of the Great Mother.⁶² As examples of Greek or assimilated Great Mother gods, Jung names Demeter, Cybele, Semele, Gaia, and the Fates. Marie-Louise von Franz, one of Jung's closest disciples, wrote a book on the puer archetype, *The Problem of the Puer aeternus* (1970b, rev. 1981), but she deals largely with cases other than that of Adonis.

From a Jungian point of view the myth of Adonis serves as a warning to those who identify themselves with the puer archetype. Where for Freud and Freudian Rank an adult stuck, or fixated, at the Oedipal stage is psychologically a child, for Jung an adult in the grip of the puer archetype is psychologically an infant and,

ultimately, a fetus. The life of a puer in myth invariably ends in premature death, which psychologically means the death of the ego and a return to the womb-like unconscious.

As an archetype, the puer constitutes a side of one's personality, which, as a side, must be accepted. A puer personality just goes too far: the puer archetype becomes the whole of his personality. Unable to resist its spell, he surrenders himself to it, thereby abandoning his ego and reverting to sheer unconsciousness.

The reason a puer personality cannot resist the puer archetype is that he remains under the spell of the archetype of the Great Mother, who initially is identical with the unconscious as a whole. Unable to free himself from her, he never forges a strong, independent ego, without which he cannot in turn resist any smothering female he meets. His surrender to the puer archetype means his surrender to the Great Mother, to whom he yearns to return. A puer "only lives on and through the mother and can strike no roots, so that he finds himself in a state of permanent incest." Jung even calls him a mere "dream of the mother," who eventually draws him back into herself.⁶³

Biologically, a puer can range in age from late adolescence to middle or even old age. Psychologically, however, he is an infant. Where for Freud a person in the grip of an Oedipus complex is psychologically fixated at three to five years of age, for Jung a puer is fixated at birth. Where an Oedipus complex presupposes an independent ego "egotistically" seeking to possess the mother for itself, a puer involves a tenuous ego seeking to surrender itself to the mother. A puer seeks not domination but absorption—and thereby reversion to the state prior even to birth.

Because an archetype expresses itself only through symbols, never directly, the aspects of the mother archetype that a child knows are only those filtered through his actual mother or mother substitute. A mother who refuses to let her child go limits him to only the smothering, negative side of the mother archetype. A mother who, however reluctantly, finally lets her child go opens him up to the nurturing, positive side of the archetype.

Approached properly, the puer archetype provides an ego that has severed itself from the unconscious with reentry into it. Taken rightly, the puer dimension of a person evinces itself in moments of playfulness, imagination, and spontaneity—moments that complement the rationality and sobriety of the ego. Taken to excess, the puer personality amounts to nothing but these moments. Taken rightly, the puer is childlike. Taken to excess, it is childish.

Although the puer personality arises in infancy, it manifests itself most dra-

matically at adolescence. A puer personality is even called an eternal adolescent. A puer is impulsive, dreamy, irresponsible, and self-centered. He makes great plans but never acts on them. If he works at all, he works only sporadically and only when interested. A puer avoids commitments and refuses to be tied down. He craves excitement and seeks risks. Scornful of the mundane, everyday world, he waxes spiritual and otherworldly. Sexually, he is promiscuous. The difference between a puer personality and a normal adolescent is that a puer remains an adolescent for life. In fact, it is normally at adolescence that the son finally breaks away from the mother. Rites of passage serve precisely to force a break. Still, the puer personality is infantile rather than adolescent. It arises in infancy, not adolescence, and at adolescence merely expresses its infantilism in adolescent form.

Jung pits the puer archetype against that of the hero.⁶⁴ A hero succeeds where a puer fails. Strictly, there are two stages of heroism. In the first half of life an ego is heroic in managing to liberate itself from the unconscious and establish itself in society. A hero manages to secure a fulfilling relationship and a job. A puer fails to do either. In the second half of life a now independent ego is heroic in managing to break with society and return to the unconscious without falling back into it. Because a puer never establishes an independent ego, he never faces the possible loss of it. Where a real hero is like Daedalus, a puer is like Icarus. Because a puer is a failed hero in the first half of life, he is necessarily a failed hero in the second half as well. Indeed, for him there is no second half.

Nevertheless, Jung does not oppose the development of the puer archetype, any more than he does the cultivation of any other archetype. He opposes the domination of one's personality by any one archetype, including that of the hero. He espouses balance among archetypes. That ideal has been attributed by some to the political balance among the cantons in Jung's native Switzerland.

Adonis is a quintessential puer because he never marries, never works, and dies young. He never grows up. His puer personality spans the period from infancy to adolescence. He must first break out of a tree in order to be born. His mother, transformed into the tree, is reluctant to let him out. Like any other mother, she may be overjoyed at his conception. But unlike normal mothers, she wants to hoard him. In Ovid's version (10.503–18) Adonis himself has to find an exit.

Adonis's mother has herself proved unable to break out of her father, the only male who has ever aroused her. Even if her incestuous desire results from a curse, the curse is punishment for her indifference to other men, for which a prior at-

tachment to her father is probably the latent cause. In any event her desire is not really for intercourse with her actual father but for absorption in the father archetype. For she, too, has never severed herself from the unconscious and therefore has never grown up. Not coincidentally, she is incapable of raising Adonis, whom others, whatever their motives, must raise instead. She is under the sway of the puella archetype.

No sooner does Adonis emerge from the tree than, in Apollodorus's version (3.14.4), Aphrodite thrusts him back—not, to be sure, into the tree but into a chest. She thereby undoes the birth that had proved so arduous. She tells no one, for she wants Adonis all to herself. When Persephone, to whom Aphrodite has entrusted the chest without revealing its contents, opens it, she similarly falls in love with Adonis and refuses to return him. Each goddess, just like Adonis's mother, wants to possess him exclusively. Though Zeus's decision leaves Adonis free for a third of the year, Adonis readily cedes his third to Aphrodite. Never, then, is he outside the custody of these archetypal mother figures.

In his analysis of the myth of Adonis the French structuralist Marcel Detienne makes him a seducer.⁶⁵ A Jungian analysis would make him the seduced. He may scurry from goddess to goddess, but only because he is attached to each. He does not come and go on his own. He cannot imagine an independent life. He is unable to resist the goddesses, not because they arouse him sexually but because he does not even recognize them as goddesses. He sees them not as irresistibly beautiful females but as his mother, with whom he wants not intercourse but absorption. Between him and the goddesses there exists the primordial state of mystical oneness that the philosopher Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, whom Jung often cites, calls *participation mystique*. Psychologically, Adonis is at exactly that stage of humanity that Lévy-Bruhl and, following him, Jung deem "primitive."⁶⁶

Seemingly, a Jungian interpretation of the myth faces the same contradiction as Frazer's: that Adonis annually breaks free of the mother yet eventually dies permanently. Like Frazer, a Jungian might dismiss Adonis's final death as an aberration and instead stress his perennial liberation from the mother. In that case Adonis would be a hero rather than a puer. Jung identifies Adonis with Frazer's annually reborn corn (grain) god: "The corn-god of antiquity was Adonis, whose death and resurrection were celebrated annually. He was the son-lover of the mother, for the corn is the son and fructifier of the earth's womb."⁶⁷

Yet a Jungian interpretation need not ignore Adonis's final demise, which is reconcilable with his recurrent revival. For the annual cycle of death and rebirth can symbolize not Adonis's annual liberation from the mother but the opposite:

his annual return to the mother, even if that return ends in release. Where a normal child needs to be born only once to liberate himself from the mother, Adonis, as a puer, continually returns to the mother and so must be born again and again. His final death is simply his permanent rather than temporary return to her. It is the culmination of his past returns rather than a break with them. Previously, he had been strong enough to resist the mother temporarily. Now he can no longer do so.

Contemporary Freudian Theory of Myth

Mainstream Freudian psychoanalysis has changed sharply since *The Interpretation of Dreams* and the first edition of Rank's *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*. Led by the development of ego psychology, which has expanded Freudian analysis from a theory of abnormal personality to a theory of normal personality, contemporary Freudians such as Jacob Arlow see myth as contributing to normal development rather than to the perpetuation of neurosis.⁶⁸ For them, myth helps one to grow up rather than, like Peter Pan, to remain a child. Myth abets adjustment to the social and the physical worlds rather than childish flight from them. Myth may still serve to fulfill id wishes, but it serves far more the ego functions of defense and adaptation and the superego function of renunciation. Furthermore, for contemporary Freudians, myth serves everyone, not merely neurotics. Put summarily, contemporary Freudians take myth positively rather than, like classical ones, negatively. To quote Arlow:

Psychoanalysis has a greater contribution to make to the study of mythology than [merely] demonstrating, in myths, wishes often encountered in the unconscious thinking of patients. The myth is a particular kind of communal experience. It is a special form of shared fantasy, and it serves to bring the individual into relationship with members of his cultural group on the basis of certain common needs. Accordingly, the myth can be studied from the point of view of its function in psychic integration—how it plays a role in warding off feelings of guilt and anxiety, how it constitutes a form of adaptation to reality and to the group in which the individual lives, and how it influences the crystallization of the individual identity and the formation of the superego.⁶⁹

For classical Freudians, myths are like dreams. Announces Abraham, the title of whose book, *Dreams and Myths*, says it all: "I aspire to an interpretation of myths after the model of dream interpretation."⁷⁰ For contemporary Freudians, myths are unlike dreams. Where dreams still serve to satisfy wishes, myths serve

either to deny or to sublimate them. Mark Kanzer writes: "Where the dream represents the demands of the instincts, the myth tends to perpetuate and represent the demands of society on the mental apparatus for symbolization and acceptance."⁷¹ For classical Freudians, myths are simply public dreams: "The manifestation of the intimate relation between dream and myth . . . entirely justifies the interpretation of the myth as a dream of the masses of the people."⁷² For contemporary Freudians, myths, *because* public, serve to socialize: "Myths are instruments of socialization."⁷³

In his best-selling book *The Uses of Enchantment* (1977 [1976]) the well-known Freudian analyst Bruno Bettelheim says much the same as Arlow, but says it of fairy tales *rather than* of myths, which he quirkily sets against fairy tales and interprets in a classically Freudian way. Classical Freudians tend to see myths and fairy tales as akin, just as they do myths and dreams.⁷⁴ It is contemporary Freudians who contrast myths to fairy tales, but usually they favor myths over fairy tales, seeing myths as serving the ego or the superego and fairy tales as serving the id.

Bettelheim does the reverse. To be sure, he does not take myths as wish fulfillments. In fact, he seems to echo Arlow in maintaining that "myths typically involve superego demands in conflict with id-motivated action, and with the self-preserving desires of the ego."⁷⁵ But for Bettelheim, in contrast to Arlow, the mythic superego is so unbending that the maturation it espouses is unattainable. Fairy tales no less than myths preach maturation, but they do so in gentler ways and thereby succeed where myths fail: "In the myth there is only insurmountable difficulty and defeat; in the fairy tale there is equal peril, but it is successfully overcome."⁷⁶ In myths the heroes, who are often gods, succeed because they are exceptional. In fairy tales the heroes are ordinary persons, whose success inspires emulation. In short, for Bettelheim myths wind up hindering psychological growth, whereas fairy tales spur it.⁷⁷

The key exception among classical Freudians to the paralleling of myths to fairy tales is Géza Róheim, on whom Campbell relies for the interpretation of hero myths. Róheim contrasts myths to fairy tales, or folktales, in a fashion that presciently anticipates contemporary Freudians such as Arlow. For Róheim, myths provide "a more adult" and folktales "a more infantile" "form of the same conflict."⁷⁸ Folktales are sheer fantasies: "the child obtains a fulfilment in imagination of those unconscious wishes which it cannot yet obtain in reality." By contrast, myths "link up phantasy and reality."⁷⁹ Oedipal folktales end in parricide. Oedipal myths end in submission to the resurrected, triumphant father, who is the real hero.⁸⁰

According to Róheim, where in the tale of Jack and the Beanstalk Jack out-smarts the ogre, becomes rich, and lives happily ever after,⁸¹ in the myth of Prometheus the hero “becomes the representative of renunciation; and his achievement, the great cultural act of the discovery of fire, is performed with energy, or better libido, that has been diverted from its original aim.”⁸² Moreover, Prometheus is punished by Zeus for stealing fire: “The desire [id] continually returns (the liver) and is continually eaten by the eagle (superego).”⁸³

If on the one hand Róheim anticipates the contemporary separation of myths from fairy tales, on the other hand he goes further than even classical Freudians in the linkage of myths with dreams. Where Freud, Rank, and Abraham parallel myths to dreams, and where Arlow pits myths against dreams, Róheim derives myths from dreams.⁸⁴ No other psychoanalyst of myth goes this far.⁸⁵ When Freud observes that Jocasta, desperate to reassure her son that he has not committed incest, ironically tells him that many males dream of sleeping with their mothers when few, if any, actually do so (Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 977–82), he is not quite deriving myth from dream, the way Róheim does. At most, dream for Freud anticipates the dreamlike nature of myth.⁸⁶

Much like Róheim, who is acknowledged only in passing, Arlow sets myths against fairy tales. Just as for Róheim, so for Arlow, fairy tales serve to fulfill wishes, and myths serve to renounce or sublimate them. Just like Róheim, Arlow contrasts Jack to Prometheus, and then adds the case of Moses at Mt. Sinai. Manifestly, all three stories describe a hero's ascent to the domain of an “omnipotent figure resident in the heavens” and a return “with some token of power, wealth, or knowledge.”⁸⁷ But where Jack brashly steals whatever he wants from the ogre, Prometheus fears Zeus and is punished by Zeus. Still, like Jack, he steals. By contrast, Moses ascends Mt. Sinai as the servant, not the antagonist, of God and relays God's laws to the Israelites below:

The fairy-tale version [i.e., Jack and the Beanstalk] of this problem belong[s] to the wish-fulfilling tendency of childhood in which contribution of the super-ego is minimal and unformed and the fear of retaliation is disposed of omnipotently . . . What is epitomized in this variation [i.e., the myth of Prometheus] is the stage beyond the untroubled wish fulfillment of the simple fairy tale, the overwhelming impact of the fear of retaliation . . . What was originally [i.e., in Prometheus] a crime of defiance and aggression against the gods is, in this later version [i.e., the myth of Moses], represented as carrying out the wishes of God Himself.⁸⁸

Where Prometheus is put in his place for daring to challenge god, Moses is elevated to godlike status for deferring to god. Moses thus fulfills his wish to become the father, but not by toppling him.

Ironically, Abraham also focuses on the cases of Prometheus and Moses but argues that the obedient Moses is a displacement for a Promethean-like, rebellious, Oedipal Moses, who, after all, is barred from entering the Promised Land. Abraham suggests that just as the obedient Moses covers up a rebellious Moses, so the deed which keeps Moses from entering the Promised Land—striking the rock to get water—itself covers up a more serious, truly Promethean-like challenge to God.⁸⁹

As for Rank, so for Arlow, the presumably male myth-teller, hearer, or reader identifies himself with Moses and thereby vicariously becomes the real hero of the myth, but now as law-giver rather than as rebel: “The mythology of religion fosters social adaptation of the individual and integration with the community and its values by virtue of the fact that the individual unconsciously identifies with the idealized qualities of the mythological hero.”⁹⁰ For Arlow, as for Freud, Rank, and Abraham, myth represents a compromise, but not in the form of the disguised rather than open fulfillment of wishes. Rather, myth combines fulfillment with sublimation and renunciation. It satisfies at once id, ego, and super-ego.⁹¹

Not all present-day Freudians have spurned the classical approach.⁹² The American folklorist Alan Dundes was defiantly old-fashioned.⁹³ For him, myth fulfills rather than renounces or sublimates repressed wishes: “The content of folklore . . . is largely unconscious. Hence it represents id, not ego, for the most part. From this perspective, ego psychology cannot possibly illuminate much of the content of folklore.”⁹⁴ Dundes delights in demonstrating the hidden, antisocial wishes vented by myths—wishes that are as often anal as Oedipal, as often homosexual as heterosexual, and at times nonsexual altogether.⁹⁵

Also against the contemporary Freudian emphasis on the adaptive function of myth stands the American analyst Harry Slochower.⁹⁶ Distinguishing “myth” from “mythopoesis,” he grants that myth, as part of religion, espouses renunciation and sublimation, as Arlow asserts, but argues that mythopoesis, or myth transformed by individual artists, advocates rebellion. In mythopoesis the hero, undertaking a journey that roughly duplicates that etched by the barely acknowledged Campbell, creates new values, ones not easily harmonized with old values. Slochower contrasts Rank’s heroic pattern, which by Slochower’s superficial rendition ends cheerfully with the hero’s triumphant return to the community, to

his own, which ends with only a temporary *modus vivendi*.⁹⁷ Yet Slochower, in contemporary fashion, attributes rebellion to the ego, not to the id: “whereas in mythology there is pressure toward conformity, in mythopoesis we have a *change in function* which allows a greater role of the ego, as well as of a more critical individualized superego.”⁹⁸

From the perspective of contemporary psychoanalysis the analysis of myth by Freudian, not post-Freudian, Rank seems outdated. Myths are like dreams.⁹⁹ Myths are also like fairy tales. Myths, dreams, and fairy tales alike evince the satisfaction of repressed, antisocial wishes. The mythic hero topples his father, rather than submit to him, and does so to secure sexual access to his mother. There is neither sublimation nor renunciation.

Contemporary Jungian Theory of Myth

The most influential Jungian theorists of myth after Jung himself have been Erich Neumann (1905–60), Marie-Louise von Franz (1915–98), James Hillman (1926–2011), and the quasi-Jungian Joseph Campbell (1904–87). Neumann systematizes the developmental, or evolutionary, aspect of Jungian theory.¹⁰⁰ Jung himself certainly correlates myths with stages of psychological development, but Neumann works out the stages. He begins with the “uroboric” state of sheer unconsciousness and proceeds to the incipient emergence of the ego out of the unconscious, the development of an independent ego consciousness, and the eventual return of the ego to the unconscious to create the self. Like Jung, Neumann characterizes the course of psychological development as one of continuing heroism. Neumann concentrates on heroism in the first half of life, both in *The Origins and History of Consciousness* (1949, trans. 1954 [Neumann 1970]) and even more in *The Great Mother* (1956, trans. 1963 [Neumann 1972]), which focuses on primordial unconsciousness as the matrix of all subsequent development. Neumann’s emphasis on heroism in the first half of life complements Campbell’s focus on heroism in the second half in *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*.

Von Franz is best known for her many books on fairy tales—among them *An Introduction to the Psychology [or Interpretation] of Fairy Tales* (1970a, rev. 1996), *Shadow and Evil in Fairy Tales* (1974, rev. 1995), *Individuation in Fairy Tales* (1977b, rev. 1990), and *The Psychological Meaning of Redemption Motifs in Fairytales* (1980). But she is also the author of the fullest Jungian book on creation myths: *Patterns of Creativity Mirrored in Creation Myths* (1972, rev. 1995).¹⁰¹ At the same time Jungians, like classical Freudians, tend not to set a firm divide between myths and

fairy tales. For example, Campbell begins *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*, which is about myths, with the first of the Grimms' tales, "The Princess and the Frog."

For von Franz, creation myths symbolize the same process of the emergence and development of the ego out of the primordial unconscious that hero myths of the first half of life do for Neumann. But for her, creation myths are far more abstract and impersonal than hero myths since their literal subject matter is the birth of the whole world rather than that of a single figure within it. No less than Neumann does von Franz deem the act of creation heroic, but she focuses on myths of creation of the cosmos itself. Rather than, like Neumann, classifying stages in the process of creation, she classifies the means of creation—for example, creation by two creators instead of one. Like Neumann, she stresses the difficulty of creation, which likewise represents the ego's difficulty in breaking free of the unconscious. For her, myths that present creation as a long and arduous effort better fit the development of the psyche than do those that depict it as a quick, effortless act.

By far the most radical innovation in the Jungian theory of myth has been the development of "archetypal" psychology, which in fact considers itself post-Jungian. The chief figure in this movement is Hillman, whose main theoretical works include *The Myth of Analysis* (1972), *Loose Ends* (1975a), *Re-Visioning Psychology* (1975b), *The Dream and the Underworld* (1979), (with others) *Puer Papers* (1979), *Archetypal Psychology* (1983a), *Inter Views* (1983b), and (with Karl Kerényi) *Oedipus Variations* (1991).¹⁰² Another important figure in the movement is David Miller, perhaps best known for *The New Polytheism* (1975).

Archetypal psychology faults classical Jungian psychology on multiple grounds. By emphasizing the compensatory, therapeutic message of mythology, classical Jungian psychology purportedly reduces mythology to psychology and gods to concepts. In espousing a unified self, or "Self," as the ideal psychological authority, Jungian psychology supposedly projects onto psychology a Western, specifically monotheistic, more specifically Christian, still more specifically Protestant, outlook. The Western emphasis on progress is purportedly reflected in the primacy that Jungian psychology accords hero myths and the primacy that it accords the ego, even in the ego's encounter with the unconscious: the encounter is intended to abet development. Finally, Jungian psychology is berated for placing archetypes in an unknowable realm distinct from the knowable realm of symbols.

As a corrective, Hillman and his followers advocate that psychology be viewed as irreducibly mythological. Myth is still to be interpreted psychologically, but

psychology is itself to be interpreted mythologically. One grasps the psychological meaning of the myth of Saturn, a favorite Roman god of Hillman's, by imagining oneself to be the figure Saturn, not by translating Saturn's plight into clinical terms like depression. Moreover, the depressed Saturn represents a legitimate aspect of one's personality. Each god deserves its due. The psychological ideal should be pluralistic rather than monolithic—in mythological terms, polytheistic rather than monotheistic. Hillman takes his mythic cues from the classics rather than from the Bible, however simplistic his equation of Greece and Rome with polytheism and of the Bible with monotheism may be.

Insisting that archetypes are to be found *in* symbols rather than outside them, Hillman espouses a relation to the gods in themselves and not to something beyond them. The ego becomes but one more archetype with its attendant kind of god, and it is the "soul" rather than the ego that experiences the archetypes through myths. Myth serves to open one up to the soul's own depths. The payoff is aesthetic rather than moral: one gains a sense of wonder and contemplation, not a guide to living. The most apposite myths for the archetypal school are those of the playful puer and of the receptive anima, the archetype that symbolizes the female side of the male personality rather than, as for classical Jungians, those of the striving hero and of the fully integrated wise old man.

Hillman reinterprets the myth of Adonis. The classical, negative interpretation of the puer archetype and therefore of Adonis by Jung and von Franz is replaced by a positive view. Adonis is to be applauded, not castigated, for his identification with that archetype. Where for Jung and von Franz the life of a puer ends tragically, if not pathetically, in premature death, for Hillman it ends triumphantly, in a refusal to compromise with the everyday world. The behavior that for Jung and von Franz is childish is for Hillman childlike.¹⁰³

Conclusion

The academic world is divided into two kinds of persons: particularists and generalizers. Humanists, who include classicists, biblicists, and others devoted to a single culture, understandably focus on what makes the myths of each culture distinctive. The differences rather than the similarities among myths worldwide are what grab them. Similarities tend to be scorned as sketchy and superficial. The skepticism toward generalizations in postmodernism has only reinforced this wariness. By contrast, social scientists, from whom most though by no means all theories of myth hail, concentrate on what makes myths worldwide akin. Differences tend to be spurned as trivial and incidental.

Theories are, by definition, generalizations. They purport to identify the common origin, function, and subject matter of all myths. The distinctiveness of any myth is never denied. It is just ignored. Theories claim that all myths are similar, not identical.

Psychoanalysis, as a theory of the mind, has developed over the past century plus, as I have tried to outline. It is anything but dead or dogmatic. How commendable it would if classicists smitten with psychoanalysis of any variety were to consider applying to Greek myth not just Freud but contemporary Freudian psychoanalysis. How commendable it would be if even Jung himself, let alone contemporary Jungian psychology, were applied. One psychoanalytic approach that I have not even mentioned is that of the largely British school of independents, or object relations theorists, who have admittedly not focused on myth. I myself have briefly applied the theory of play of one of its most celebrated figures, D. W. Winnicott, to the myth of Gaia.¹⁰⁴

NOTES

a. Dated on the basis of letters published after his death. In one of these letters (October 15, 1897), he writes to Wilhelm Fliess: "I have found, in my own case, too, falling in love with the mother and jealousy of the father, and I now regard it as a universal event of childhood . . . If that is so, we can understand the riveting power of *Oedipus the King* . . ." (SE 1:265).

b. SE 11:46–48. It is one of three extensive discussions of the Oedipus complex in relation to Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*. Another is in *Five Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, published in 1910 (SE 11:46–48). It is also in 1910, in another work, that he uses the term "Oedipus complex" for the first time (SE 11:171). The third discussion is in the *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (SE 16:328–38). For a detailed survey of Freud's use of *Oedipus the King* in his exposition of the Oedipus complex, see Bollack 1986. For a list of places in which Freud refers to or discusses Oedipus, see Paduano 1994, 4 n. 7.

c. SE 4:261.

d. Condello 2009, CXXVIII–CXXXVI.

e. Jones 1910. Thirty-nine years later, it became a book (Jones 1949).

f. Segal discusses these books. As for Freud's own writing on Greek myth, besides Oedipus there was a discussion of the Prometheus myth (SE 22:187–93), a mention of Medusa (SE 22:24), and a two-page essay on Medusa, posthumously published (GW 17:47–48).

g. Wohl 2008.

h. Caldwell 1990, 349. Summarized in Armstrong 2011, 472–73. For a longer account of Freud and the psychoanalytic interpretation of myth, see Csapo 2005, 80–131.

i. For the complicated publication history of the parts of this work and the work as a whole, see "Editorial Note" in Jung and Kerényi 1949; for the intellectual history, see Calame 2009, 33 and n. 52.

- j. Calame 2009, 33–36.
 - k. For the other fields, see Cleary 1993.
 - l. Campbell 1968.
 - m. A point stressed in Armstrong 2011, 479–82.
 - n. Sels 2011, 65.
 - o. Sels 2011, 65 n. 26.
 - p. SE 15:208. Or, the *objective* situation of Oedipus is perceived by the audience as a metaphor of its own subjective *condition*.
 - q. See, for tragedy, the assessment in Wohl 2008.
 - r. Armstrong 2011, 480–82. See Pint 2011 for a call for a return to Jung (in preference to Freud) in cultural studies.
1. See Sartre 1953. This work is a selection of two sections (pt. IV, chap. 2, and pt. I, chap. 2) from Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*.
 2. See Skinner 1953.
 3. See Segal 1992, 8–11, 33–35.
 4. Freud 1961, 38.
 5. Jung 1968a, 300.
 6. Freud 1953, 4:262–63.
 7. See Freud 1959 [1914] = Rank 1914, 63–68.
 8. Rank 1914, 61.
 9. Rank 1914, 74.
 10. Rank 1914, 68–69. What Rank, like other Freudians, simply calls projection, Alan Dundes renames “projective inversion” to capture the reversal involved: the hero's wish to kill his father becomes the father's wish to kill his son. See Dundes 1996, 152–57.
 11. Rank 1914, 82.
 12. Rank 1914, 63.
 13. Rank and Sachs 1916, 38.
 14. Some myths are more disguised than others. For example, Freud and in turn Rank observe that *Hamlet* is more repressed than *Oedipus Rex*—for both, a reflection of the “advance of repression in the emotional life of mankind” (Freud 1953, 4:264; see Rank 1992, chap. 2).
 15. On the difference in the degree of repression between the myth-teller and the hearer or reader, see Rank 1992, 119–20.
 16. See Rank 1914, 93.
 17. On post-Freudian Rank, see Rank 1929, 1941, 1971, 1978a [1936], 1978b [1936], 2004.
 18. Rank's much fuller analysis of the Oedipus myth in *The Incest Theme*, written back in 1906 but not published until 1912, is even more rigidly Oedipal than that in *Myth*; see Rank 1992, esp. 33–50, 189–98, 208–22, 487–91. Rank seeks to show how myths worldwide evince nothing but the Oedipus complex on the part of the artist, simply ever more disguised.
 19. Rank 1929, 17.
 20. Rank 1929, 43.
 21. Rank 1929, 5.

22. Freud 1953, 5:400 n. 3.
23. For a comparison of the two editions, see Segal 2004a, xviii–xxiv.
24. See, for example, Levin 1948, 1957; Balter 1969; Faber 1970, 1975; Michels 1986; Rudnytsky 1991, chap. 2; and the Adlerian Lazarsfeld 1944.
25. Rank 1978b, 51.
26. Rank 1978b, 44. On Rank's changing views, including his still more radical positions beyond *Will Therapy*, see Segal 2004a, xv–xxviii.
27. Rank 1978a, 28. For an appreciation of Rank's contribution to the psychoanalysis of myth, see Lieberman 1993.
28. The myth of Oedipus, not to say the Oedipus complex itself, has been interpreted by Freudians, post-Freudians, and anti-Freudians of all stripes. For surveys, see, for example, Malinowski 1927; Lessa 1961, 194–201; Glenn 1972, 137–39; 1976–77, 228–35; Caldwell 1974, 120–21; Edmunds and Ingber 1977; Spiro 1982; Edmunds and Dundes 1983; Edmunds 1985, 2006; and Johnson and Price-Williams 1996. It is no revelation to note that most classicists are averse to theorizing of any kind, let alone to psychoanalytic theorizing. For example, Kirk, while enamored of structuralism, writes collectively of the theories of Freud, Jung, and Ernst Cassirer that they “can hardly be described as very convincing accounts of the origins or nature of myths” (1970, 279). Burkert favors a biological or sociological approach over a psychoanalytic one, which he considers to be at best limited in its scope; see, for example, Burkert 1979, 136. Vernant, in an essay entitled “Oedipus without the Complex” (in Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1988, 88–111), dismisses Freud's analysis of Oedipus on the grounds that the complex is not found on the manifest level—and therefore, by Vernant's obtuse grasp of psychoanalysis, is not found at all. The psychoanalysis of Greek myth is scarcely confined to the case of Oedipus. For some representative recent examples of the psychoanalysis of Greek myth by classicists, see Leonard 2003; Baier 2008; Weiss 2008; and Wohl 2008. I thank Lowell Edmunds for these four references.
29. For Jung's interpretation of heroism in both halves of life, see Jung 1968b, paras. 259–305 (“The Psychology of the Child Archetype”); 1967, paras. 251–685; 1968c, paras. 437–41. For the classic Jungian analysis of myths of the first half of life, see Neumann 1970 [1954], 131–256; 1972 [1963], 203–8. On Jung's theory of myth, see Segal 1998, 3–45, which is reprinted in Segal 1999, chap. 6.
30. See Whyte 1960 and, magisterially, Ellenberger 1970.
31. On the use of the term *archetype*—more precisely, *archetypal power*—in the *Poimandres*, see Segal 1986, 29, 31, 44–45.
32. On Campbell's fluctuating theory of myth, see Segal 1990b. On the differences between Campbell and Jung, see Segal 1990b, chap. 12.
33. See Campbell 1988a, 121.
34. See Campbell 1949, 318–34. On Rank's view of heroism, see also Campbell 1964, 73–74, 77; 1988b, 124–25.
35. Campbell 1949, 58.
36. Campbell 1949, 110–11.
37. Campbell 1949, 126.
38. Campbell 1949, 139.
39. See Róheim 1922, 1941, 1945, 1950, 1952, 1971 [1943], 1974 [1934], 1992.

40. For Campbell on Róheim, see Campbell 1952.
41. Campbell 1949, 130.
42. Campbell 1949, 139–40.
43. Campbell 1949, 217.
44. Campbell 1949, 193.
45. See Campbell 1949, 30.
46. See Campbell 1949, 58.
47. See Campbell 1949, 37–38.
48. See Tylor 1871; Frazer 1890.
49. See Malinowski 1926; Eliade 1968.
50. Relying first on ethology (Julian Huxley, Konrad Lorenz) and then on sociobiology (E. O. Wilson), Burkert (1979, 1983, 1985, 1996) transforms the subject matter of myth and ritual—and, in general, of religion—from the physical world to the human world. Religion arises and functions not to secure food but to alleviate aggression and in turn guilt. Myth can be modern as well as primitive exactly because it is not about the physical world, which is surrendered to science. On Burkert, see Segal 2008, 27–34.
51. See Bultmann 1953; Jonas 1963.
52. On Freud and Jung versus nineteenth-century theorists of myth, see Segal 2003a. On modern theorizing about myth, see Segal 1999, 2004b.
53. See Lévi-Strauss 1966. A group of French classicists inspired by Louis Gernet and headed by Jean-Pierre Vernant have proved to be among the most faithful followers of Lévi-Strauss. Yet they have made structuralism far more historical than it is for Lévi-Strauss, who is regularly faulted for isolating myth from any context—social, cultural, political, economic, or sexual. Vernant and fellow classicists Marcel Detienne, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, and Nicole Loraux take as their guide the one work in which Lévi-Strauss does “contextualize” myth: his essay on the myth of Asdiwal. Following Lévi-Strauss, Vernant and the others do seek underlying patterns in myths, but they then link those patterns to ones in the culture at large. See, for example, Vernant 1980, 1983; Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1988.
54. For a fuller presentation of Frazer and Jung—and also Marcel Detienne—on the myth of Adonis, see Segal 1991.
55. Freud 1958 [1925], 292. In *Totem and Taboo* (1913) Freud does enlist Frazer, but on religion and on magic, not on myth.
56. On the myth of Adonis, see Apollodorus, *Library* 3.14.3–4; Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 10.519–739. On both the myth and the cult of Adonis, see Boedeker 1974, 64–66; Burkert 1979, 105–11; 1985, 176–77.
57. On Adonis, see Frazer 1890, I:278–96; 1900, II:115–30; 1913, I, chaps. 1–4, 9–10; 1922, chaps. 29–33.
58. See Frazer 1922, 393–94.
59. See Frazer 1922, 377.
60. On Adonis, see Jung 1967, paras. 321, 330 n. 32, 392, 530 n. 79; 1969, para. 715.
61. On the archetype of the *puer aeternus*, see Jung 1967, paras. 392, 526; 1968b, para. 193; 1973–74, I:82. See also Neumann 1970 [1954], 88–101. Neumann uses the term “son-lover” for puer.
62. On the archetype of the Great Mother, see Jung 1968b, paras. 148–98 (“Psycho-

logical Aspects of the Mother Archetype"); 1967. See also Neumann 1970 [1954], 1972 [1963].

63. Jung 1967, para. 392.

64. On the hero archetype, see Jung 1968c, paras. 437–41; 1968b, paras. 259–305 ("The Psychology of the Child Archetype"); 1967. See also Neumann 1970 [1954], 131–256; 1972 [1963], 203–8.

65. On Detienne's analysis of the myth of Adonis, see Segal 1991, 68–72.

66. On "primitive," or "archaic," man, see Jung 1970, paras. 104–47 ("Archaic Man").

67. Jung 1967, para. 530 n. 79.

68. See Arlow 1956, 1961, 1982.

69. Arlow 1961, 375.

70. Abraham 1913, 13.

71. Kanzer 1964, 32.

72. Rank 1914, 6.

73. Arlow 1961, 379.

74. See, for example, Ricklin 1915.

75. Bettelheim 1977 [1976], 37.

76. Bettelheim 1977 [1976], 199.

77. On Bettelheim's contrast of myths to fairy tales, see Segal 1999, chap. 5.

78. Róheim 1941, 279.

79. Róheim 1922, 181.

80. Róheim 1941, 275.

81. See Róheim 1941, 277–78.

82. See Róheim 1941, 275.

83. Róheim 1974 [1934], 260.

84. Róheim 1974 [1934], 261.

85. See Róheim 1952.

86. For an appreciation of Róheim's contribution to the psychoanalysis of myth, see Dundes 1992.

87. Arlow 1961, 381.

88. Arlow 1961, 382–83.

89. See Abraham 1913, 50–51.

90. Arlow 1982, 188.

91. For an appreciation of Arlow's contribution to the psychoanalysis of myth, see Kramer 1988.

92. For other examples of the contemporary psychoanalysis of myth, see Tarachow et al. 1964; Bergman 1966; Balter 1969.

93. See Dundes 1975, 1980, 1987, 1989, 1996, 1997, 2007.

94. Dundes 1987, xii.

95. For an appreciation of Dundes's contribution to the psychoanalysis of myth, see Carroll 1993; Segal 1990a, xxviii–xxxi.

96. See Slochower 1970a, 1970b.

97. See Slochower 1970a, 25; 1970b, 153.

98. Slochower 1970b, 155.

99. On myths and dreams, see, for example, Rank and Sachs 1916, 33; Rank 1992, 337.

100. See Neumann 1956, 1959a, 1959b, 1970 [1954], 1972 [1963], 1979.
101. See von Franz 1970a, 1970b, 1970c, 1972, 1974, 1977a, 1977b, 1980.
102. See Hillman 1972, 1975a, 1975b, 1979, 1983a, 1983b; Hillman and Kerényi 1991.
103. See Hillman et al. 1979.
104. See Segal 2003b (on Winnicott), 2012 (on the myth of Gaia).

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Index

- Abraham, 176
Abraham, Karl, 407, 438, 441; *Dreams and Myths*, 413
Acamas, 394
Acesandrus, *History of Cyrene*, 314, 349n114
Achilles, 169–70, 190n17
Ackerknecht, E. M., 127–28
Acusilaus of Argos, 3, 283
Adam, 420
Adler, Alfred, 423
Adolphseck krater, 400
Adonis, 429, 432–38, 444
Ado of Vienna, 56–57
Aegeus, 363, 365, 369–71, 375–76, 383–85, 389, 391, 396, 398
Aegids, 317, 319–21, 324
Aeneas, 416, 430
Aeschylus, 17, 165; *Bassarides*, 212; *Eumenides*, 15; *Seven against Thebes*, 300
Aesir, 219, 222–23
Aethra, 371, 386–96, 398
Agamemnon, 394
Agathon, *Antheus*, 13
Ages of Men, 175
Aigimius, 321
Aion (“Eternal Time”), 180
Akitu ceremony, 97
Alcaeus, 9, 20, 21
Alcmene, 311
Aletes, 320
Alexander the First of Macedonia, 321
Alexidemus, 310–13, 315
Alföldi, A., 106
allegory, 43, 55–56, 58, 59, 61–64, 66
alphabet, 185
Ambrose of Milan, 54
Amphion, 416
Amphitrite, 370–71
Amphitryon, 311, 343n79
Anacreon, 21
Anat, 167, 178
Anatolia, 171–74, 176–81, 186
ancient Near East, 152–88; Anatolian-Greek connections, 171–74; cosmogony and theogony in, 176–81; diversity in, 161; gods in, 166; Greek contact with, 152–59, 185–86; history of texts of, 155; Homer and *Gilgamesh*, 168–71; issues in study of, 155–59; main historical period and works, 182–84; map of Bronze Age, 169; map of Iron Age, 170; methodological considerations in study of, 159–65; myth-ritual connection in, 96–99; and transmission of myths, 185–88
Antenorids, 321
Anteus, 311
Antoninus Liberalis, 25
Anu, 171, 178, 181
Aphrodisias, 12
Aphrodite, 167–68, 204, 309–10, 432, 437
Apollo, 168, 209–10, 212, 218–19, 222, 287–88, 291–93, 295, 297–98, 301–16, 321–22, 325, 327–29
Apollodorus, 24, 25, 300, 432, 437; *Bibliotheca*, 2, 3, 42, 52–53, 53
Apollonius of Rhodes, 53, 59, 284–85, 301, 328, 330; *Argonautica*, 291–92, 302–4, 315
Aqhat, 157, 168
Aratus, *Phaenomena*, 54
Arcesilas the Fourth, King of Cyrene, 287–88, 293–94, 297, 306–7, 316, 318, 322, 338n43
Arcesilas the Second, King of Cyrene, 311
archetypal psychology, 443–44

- archetypes, 407, 423–24, 428, 434–35
 Argonauts, 290–92, 294–97, 302–3, 306–7, 323, 330
 Aristeus, 314–15, 343n78
 Aristophanes, 21, 181
 Aristotle, 6, 12–14
 Arlow, Jacob, 438–41
 Arnulf of Orléans, 57
 Arrhaphoroi, 107
 Artemis, 167
 Ashtart, 167–68
 assembly motif, 171–72
 Assyria, 156
 Astour, Michael, 156–57
 astronomy, 66–67, 98. *See also* catasterisms
 Athena, 176, 204, 297, 299, 301, 370–76, 384–85
 Athenaeus, 2, 167
 Athens, 363–64, 367–68, 370, 376, 383, 385, 388–90, 394–95
Atrahasis, 168, 172, 174
 “attack on woman” motif, 356, 357, 359–63, 366, 368–69, 372–76, 383–401
 Attica, 299–300
 Augustine, 54
 authors, in relation to culture, 164
 autochthony, 299–301, 304, 320, 325
- Baal, 166
Baal Cycle, 157, 166, 168, 178
 Babylon, 156
 Babylonian New Year festival, 97
 Bacchiads, 320
 Bacchylides, 21, 297–98
 Bachvarova, M., 159, 172
 Bacon, Francis, *The Wisdom of the Ancients*, 62
 bad mother motif, 364–66, 389
 Barthes, Roland, 286
 Bascom, W., 86
 Basel commentary on *Iliad*, 6
 Battiads, 280, 289, 318–19
 Battus, 288–89, 293, 296–97, 302, 304, 305, 307–8, 316, 318, 320–22, 324–27, 338n43
 Beazley, John, 354, 393
 Becket, Thomas à, 100
 behaviorism, 409
 Beloch, Julius, 156
 Benveniste, Emile, 285
 Bérard, Claude, 353, 354, 359, 370, 375, 384
 Bérard, Victor, 156
 Bergson, Henri, 92
- Bernal, Martin, 156–58
 Bersuire, Pierre de, *Ovidius moralizatus*, 58
 Bettelheim, Bruno, 439
 Bettini, Maurizio, 24
 Bible. *See* Hebrew Bible
Bible des poètes, 58
Bilgamesh and the Netherworld, 169, 170, 172, 190n15
 Boccaccio, Giovanni, 55, 61; *Genealogia Deorum*, 59–60
 Boedeker, Deborah, 28n39
 borrowing, in cultural exchange, 159–60
 boys. *See* men and boys, initiation of
 Brelich, A., 106
 Bremmer, J. N., 113–17, 119, 140n92, 158
 Bremond, Claude, 281
bricolage, 206, 232n3
 Brommer, Frank, 383, 385, 397–401
 Brown, John Pairman, 158
 Brygos painter, 386
 Buddha, 430
 Bühler, Karl, 20
 Bultmann, Rudolf, 431
 Burkert, Walter, 1, 16, 18–19, 23, 84–86, 88–89, 93, 105–8, 110, 113, 120–26, 148n158, 158, 165, 367, 431
- Cacestades, 320
 Cadmus, 422
 Calame, Claude, 44–45, 69, 280
 Caldwell, Richard, 407
 Callimachus, 284–85; *Hymn to Apollo*, 313–14, 328–30
 Calliste, 294, 298, 301–4, 324
 Cambridge school, 31n87, 84, 91, 95–96, 98–99, 102, 133n43
 Cameron, Alan, 53
 Campbell, Joseph, 126, 407–8, 425–31, 439, 441–42; *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*, 408, 425–26, 443
 Canaanites, 174–76
 Candaules, King of Lydia, 320
 Capella, Martianus, 57, 58
 Caprioli, Michele, 28n52
 Carlsruhe painter, 362, 369
 Carneia, 282, 314, 317, 321–22
 Carrhotus, 316
 Cartari, Vincenzo, *Imagini colla sposizione degli dei degli antichi*, 60–61
 castration myths, 156, 161, 162, 178–79, 181
 catalogues. *See* lists/catalogues/genealogies

- catasterisms, 51–52
catena, 59
 Catholicism, 61
 Cecrops, 209
 Celtic mythology, 209
 Centro Interdipartimentale di Studi Antropologici sulla Cultura Antica, University of Siena, 24
 Chaldaean Flood story, 156
 Chaos, 177
 Chiron, 308, 310, 314–15
 Christianity, 43, 54, 55, 58, 61, 443
 Chronos (Time), 180
 Chthonia, 180
 Cilicia, 186
 Cimon, 368, 394–95
 Cinaethon, 284
 Circe, 362, 386–87
 classical scholarship, and ancient Near East studies, 154–59
 Cobet, Justus, 10
 codices, 53
 Codrus painter, 396; Bologna cup, 396–97
 collective unconscious, 407, 424–25, 428
 comedy, 96
 Comestor, Peter, 56
 commentaries, 59
communitas, 113
 comparative folklore, 245–75; historic-geographic method in, 248; history of folktales, 246–47; narrative contexts of, 269–75; neglect of social context of narration, 268–69; Sailor and the Oar tale, 248–69; usefulness of, 268; uses of, 247–48
 compromise formations, 424
 connoisseurship, 354
 Conon, 25, 213
 contextualism, 247
 Conti, Natale, *Mythologia*, 60–62
 Cook, Arthur B., 31n87, 133n31
 Core, 298
Cormac's Glossary, 224
 Cornford, Francis M., 31n87, 95–96, 132n29
 Cos, 320
 cosmic egg, 180
 cosmogony, 176–81, 186
 Coulson, Frank, 58
 Counter-Reformation, 61
 Cox, George W., 68
 Crawley, E., 109
 creation myths, 442–43
 Creuzer, Friedrich, 65–67, 75n111
 Cú Chulainn, 217
 cult pattern, 97–98
 cults, 15–16, 18–19. *See also* rituals
 cultural exchange: issues in, 187–88; means of, 185–86; methodological considerations in, 159–65
 culture: authors in relation to, 164; as context for production and interpretation of images, 355, 356, 358–59, 383–84, 391–401; devolutionary model of, 202–3; language in relation to, 163–64; nature in relation to, 312–13
 Cup Leningrad 1543 (cup). *See* Macron, Cup Leningrad 1543
 Curtius, Ernst, 55, 57
Cypria, 174
 Cyprus, 186
Cyrenaica, 285
 Cyrene (person), 308–12, 314–15
 Cyrene (place), 280–331; Apollonius of Rhodes and, 201–92, 284–85, 287, 302–4, 328; and autochthony, 299–301, 304, 320; Callimachus and, 284–85, 287, 328–30; Herodotus and, 280, 284–85, 287, 304, 322–28; map of, 323; methodological considerations in study of, 285–87; Pindar and, 280, 282, 284–85, 287–322; pragmatics of the narrative about, 280, 281, 286 (*see also* myths: performance of; orality: context of); semantics of the narrative about, 280, 285–86, 294–99, 306–7, 310–12, 320, 327; syntax of the narrative about, 280, 287–94, 304, 308–10, 330
 Dadhyañc, 220–23, 222–23
 Damophilus, 306–7
 Daniel, book of, 175
 Darmon, Rachel, 61
 Darwin, Charles, 89, 100
 David, 175
 death, myth and ritual involving, 90–91
 Death God (Mot), 178
 decapitation, 211–31
 deixis, 19–21, 333n10
 De Jong, Irene, 6
 Delian League, 395
 Delos, 298–99, 313
 Delphi, 295, 305, 316, 324–26
 deluge theme. *See* Flood stories
 Demeter, 168, 191n30, 298, 408
 Demophon, 394
 depth psychology, 409

- Derveni Papyrus, 162, 181
 destruction motif, 174. *See also* Flood stories
 Detienne, Marcel, 44–45, 88, 122, 189n9, 437, 448n53
 devolutionary model, 202–3
 diegesis, 5–6
 Dieterich, A., 87
 diffusionism, 98, 158, 160
 Digby mythographer, 58
 Di Nola, A. M., 87
 Diodorus, *Bibliotheca*, 43
 Diodorus Siculus, 207, 367
 Diomedes, 394
 Dionysos, 160, 168, 181, 222
 Doak, B. R., 159
 Dodds, E. R., 102, 116
 Dorians, 320–21
 Douglas, Mary, 101, 135n66
 dreams, 407, 413, 424, 438–40
 drives, 413–14, 422
 Dumézil, Georges, 88, 106, 200–211, 219, 223, 226, 231
 Duncan, Isadora, 102
 Dundes, A., 121, 441
 Durkheim, Emile, 90, 92, 93, 106, 148n161, 200, 203

 Earth (Gaia/Ge), 177, 181
 Ecclesiastes, book of, 175
 Edmunds, Lowell, 161
 ego, 419–20
 ego psychology, 438–39
 Egypt, 156, 186, 189n12
 El, 178–80
 Electra complex, 423, 424
 Eliade, Mircea, 88, 105, 106, 148n161, 431
 Elias, Saint, 248–50, 254, 262–63, 269–70, 272–74
 Engnell, K. I. A., 98
eniautos daimon, 92, 93, 105
 Enlightenment, 45, 62–63
 Ennius, 43
Enuma Elish, 97, 167, 168, 177, 179
 ephebes, 357–58, 360–61, 388, 393–94
 Ephorus, 367
 epic: ancient Near Eastern themes in, 187; history in relation to, 284
 Epic Cycle, 4
 Eratosthenes, *Catasterisms*, 25, 43, 49, 51–52, 54
 Erebon, Didier, 200, 201

 Erichthonius, 396
 Eros (Love), 181
 Erotes, 396
 erotic pursuits, images of, 357–60, 373, 393, 401nd
 etiology, 7, 15–16, 52, 255, 262–63, 273–74
 Eudemos, 180
 euhemerism, 43, 55–56, 68, 163, 178–79
 Euhemerus of Sicily, 43, 55
 Euphemus, 290–94, 296–98, 301–4, 306, 319, 324, 326, 334n19
 Euripides, 298; *Alcestis*, 230; *Andromache*, 14–15; *Hippolytus*, 22, 229; inventiveness of, 14–16; *Ion*, 1; *Medea*, 366; *Suppliants*, 17; *Trojan Women*, 204
 Eurypylus, 290–91, 296, 314, 334n15
 Eustathius, 257, 260
 Eve, 420
 Even-Zohar, Itamar, 188
 everyday world, 429–30
 evolution, theory of, 89, 100
 existential psychoanalysis, 409

 Faelad, Cenn, 228
 fairy tales, 121–22, 439–40, 442–43
 family romance, 416–17
The Father and His Misguided Son, 175
 Fawkes, Guy, 100
 Fearn, David, 21
 Fehling, Detlev, 246
 females. *See* women and girls
 feminism, 408
 fiction, 12–13
 Finley, M. I., 102
 “fleeing woman” motif, 357–60, 362, 366, 372, 383–84
 Flood stories, 124, 147n156, 156, 174, 191n24
 folktales, 246–47, 439–40
 Fontenelle, Bernard de, 63; *De l’origine des fables*, 45
 Fontenrose, J., 86, 103
 Ford, Patrick, 221
 formalism, 281
 Fowler, Robert, 25, 48
 Frazer, James George, 31n87, 84, 90–92, 97–98, 101, 102, 105, 116, 127, 133n43, 248, 275na, 431–34, 437; *The Golden Bough*, 84, 90–92, 432–33
 Freud, Sigmund, 407–13, 425, 428, 429; on birth, 418–19; Campbell and, 126; contemporary theory of myth influenced by,

- 438–42; *Dreams in Folklore*, 413; Harrison and, 92; *The Interpretation of Dreams*, 84, 407, 411, 418; Jung and, 422–25; and myth, 88, 410–13, 423–24, 431, 440, 445nf; and Oedipus complex, 84, 407, 408, 411–13, 419, 426, 434–35, 445nb; and ritual, 90
 Fulgentius, 55–56, 58
 functionalism, 101, 135n65, 231nc
- Gadd, C. J., 98
 Garner, Barbara C., 62
 Gaster, T., 96, 100
 gender: male-female relations, 365–66; Orpheus myth and, 211–14. *See also* men and boys, initiation of; women and girls
 gender studies, 23
 genealogies. *See* lists/catalogues/genealogies
 Genesis, 174, 177
 Genesis, book of, 420
 Genette, Gérard, 5–6, 13
 geography, myth and, 3–4, 16–17, 48–49
 Germain, Gabriel, 257
 Germanicus, 54
 Gernet, Louis, 106, 132n29
 Gilgamesh, 190n17, 190n18
 Gilgamesh epic, 153, 168–71, 187, 190n15
 Gill, Christopher, 30n77
 Ginzburg, Carlo, 201
 Giraldi, Lilio, *De deis gentium uaria et multiplex historia*, 60–61
 girls. *See* women and girls
 girl's tragedy, 107
 Glaspell, Susan, 102
 Glenn, Justin, 248
 gods: in ancient Near Eastern traditions, 166; emotions as origin of, 93; foreign origins of, 189n12; human beings in relation to, 174–75; as humans turned divine, 43, 55–56, 68, 163, 178–79; nature of, 43, 55; rites as origin of, 92; scholarly study of, 61; theology, 176–81
 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 64, 65
 Goliath, 175
 Goody, Jack, 47
 Gordon, Cyrus, 157
 Graf, Fritz, 22, 45, 110, 113, 187
 Graves, Robert, 100
 Great Mother archetype, 434–35
 Greek language, 54
 Greimas, Algirdas-Julien, 280–81
 Grimm, Wilhelm, 245, 247
 Grimm brothers, 69, 202
 Gruppo Triestino di Ricerca sul Mito e la Mitografia, University of Trieste, 24
 Hades, 179, 291, 297–98, 432, 434
 Hahn, Johann Georg von, 245, 414
 handbooks. *See* manuals/handbooks
 Hansen, William, 23, 245–47
 Harrison, Jane Ellen, 31n87, 84, 91–95, 98–102, 105, 108, 110, 121, 123–24, 131n19, 132n29; *Epilogomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, 99; *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens*, 84, 92; *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, 91, 92, 105; *Themis*, 84, 92–93, 95–96, 100, 105–6
 Hattusili I, 173
 heads, severed. *See* severed head motif
 Heaven (Ouranos), 177
 Hebrew Bible, 156, 159, 174–77, 179, 187
 Hecataeus of Miletus, 3, 42, 47–48, 283
 Hecate, 408
 Hedammu, 179
 Helen, 2, 4, 8–12, 15, 204–5, 317, 321, 362, 372, 390
 Hellanicus of Lesbos, 3, 42, 47
 Hellenistic period: logographers in, 47–50; mythography in, 42–43; scholarly study of myths in, 43, 50–53
 Henrichs, Albert, 50, 69, 118
 Hephaistos, 167
 Hera, 204
 Heracles, 168, 190n18, 207–9, 216–17, 233n5, 297–98, 311, 314–15, 416, 422
 Heraclids, 317, 319–22
 Hermann, Gottfried, 66–68
 Hermes, 374, 422
 Hermetic Corpus, 423
 Herodotus, 189n12; on battle of Mycale, 390; and epic poetry, 4–5; and history, 284, 326, 328; on history of Cyrene, 280, 284–85, 287, 304, 314, 322–28; and Medea, 367; and myth, 9–11, 16–17, 49; on Persian Wars, 368
 heroism: Campbell and, 425–31; Jung and, 421–22, 436; Neumann and, 442; Rank and, 413–21, 426, 430
 heroization, 319–22
 Hesiod, 9; and Ages of Men, 175; and the ancient Near East, 165; *Catalogue of Women*, 3–4, 46–47, 50, 52; cosmogony and theology in, 176–81; destruction motif in, 174; and the Near East, 157; and systematizing of

Hesiod (*cont.*)

myths, 3–5; *Theogony*, 3, 9, 46–47, 96, 157, 162, 166, 176–81; *Works and Days*, 9, 175

Heyne, Christian Gott, 64

Hierocles, 301

Hieronimos, 180

Hilary of Poitiers, 54

Hillman, James, 442–44

Hippias, 13

historic-geographic method, 248

historiography, 47–48, 326, 328

history: Greek notion of, 283; in myth, 24; of myth, 24–25; myth in relation to, 23, 49, 283–84; myths as, 12; poetry in relation to, 284

Hittites, 164, 176

Hittite texts, 157

Hocart, A. M., 99–100, 124

Hoenir, 219

Holbek, Bengt, 246

Holcot, Robert, *Moralia super Ovidii Metamorphoses*, 58

“The Homecoming Husband” (folktale), 85–86

Homer: and the ancient Near East, 165; cosmogony in, 177, 179; and *Gilgamesh*, 153, 168–71; *Iliad*, 3–4, 23, 46, 153, 168–73; *Odyssey*, 4, 153, 168–71, 245–47, 252–63, 268–71, 274–75; oral and text traditions available to, 162; poets’ doubts about accuracy of, 9–11; Renaissance knowledge of, 59; and systematizing of myths, 3–5; and variation in myths, 5–11, 46; writing’s effect on, 168, 189n13

Homeric Hymns, 28n42

Homolle, T., 110

homosexuality, 109, 141n101, 148n159

Hood, Robin, 100, 111

Hooke, S. H., 96, 98–99

Horace, 46, 54

Hornbostel, Wilhelm, 383

Hrabanus Maurus, *De uniuerso*, 56

human beings, gods in relation to, 174–75

Humanism, 60–61

humanistic psychoanalysis, 409

Huxley, Julian, 122

Hyginus, 25, 58; *Fabulae*, 42, 53

Hyman, S. E., 100, 103

Hymn to Apollo, 209, 299

Hymn to Demeter, 408

iconography, 354, 356–63, 368–76, 383–401
id, 419–20

ideological analysis, 23

Iluyanka, 179

images. *See* vase paintings

Indo-European culture, 166

Indo-European languages, 68, 164, 189n10, 200

Indo-European structures, 200–231; features of, 204–6; functions, 203; Greek absorption of, 206–7; scholarship on, 202–3; severed head motif in, 211–31; transformation of, 206; warrior motif in, 208–11

ingestion motif, 178

initiation, 84–85, 94, 105–20, 124–27, 148n161

Instructions of Ankhsheshonq, 175

Iolaus, 311, 315, 343n79

Ionia, 390

Irish tales, 217–22, 224–28

Ishtar, 167, 171

Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae*, 56

Isis, 168, 191n30

Jackson, Shirley, 100

Jacob, Christian, 51

James, E. O., 98

Jason, 303, 306–7, 365

Jeanmaire, H., 106, 109

Jeremias, A., 98–99

Jesus, 430

Job, book of, 175

John of Garland, *Integumenta Ovidii*, 58

Johnson, A. R., 98

Jonas, Hans, 431

Jones, Ernest, 407

Joyce, James, *Ulysses*, 42

Jung, C. G., 88, 126, 407–10; on Adonis, 434–38; Campbell and, 425–30; contemporary theory of myth influenced by, 442–44; *Essays on a Science of Mythology*, 407–8; Freud and, 422–25; and myth, 410, 421–24, 431; and psychologizing of myths, 409–10; and puer archetype, 434–36
“The Juniper” (fairy tale), 233n10

Kaberry, Philip M., 86

Kahil, Lilly, 354

Kanzer, Mark, 439

kennings, 260–61

Kerényi, Károly, 88, 407; *Essays on a Science of Mythology*, 407–8

kings, and myth-ritual connection, 90

Kirk, G. S., 88–89, 92, 101, 103, 120–21, 165

- Kirta*, 157, 168
 Kitto, H. D., 90
 Kluckhohn, C., 86, 101, 121, 135n65
 Knox, Bernard, 426
koinē, 187–88
kouroi, 110, 144n131. See also *megistos kouros*
 Kron, Uta, 386, 390
 Kronos, 178–81
 Kuhn, Thomas, 126
 Kumarbi, 181
Kumarbi Cycle, 157, 167, 168, 178

 Lacan, Jacques, 408
 Lactantius, 54, 55
 Lambrechts, P., 103
 language, culture in relation to, 163–64
 Latacz, Joachim, 23–24
 Latin, 54
 Lausanne group, 354–55
 Leach, Edmund, 22, 101, 135n65
 Lemnus, 292–94, 303, 319, 323
 Leningrad 777 (vase), 355, 357, 360, 378
 Leningrad W 205 (krater), 369, 380, 383, 400
 Leviathan, 179
 Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 45, 121–22, 189n9, 206, 232n3, 245, 281, 312, 332ne, 431, 448n53
 Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien, 437
 Lewis, Sian, 23
Lexikon Iconographicum Mythologiae Graecae, 3, 43
 libations, 113
 Library of Alexandria, 50–52
 Libya. See *Cyrene* (place)
 Lincoln, Bruce, 88, 201
 Lindsey, Vachel, 102
 Linforth, Ivan, 229–30
 lists/catalogues/genealogies, 2–5, 42, 46–50, 52–53, 59–60
 local myths, 5, 17–18
 logographers, 47–50
 logos, meaning of, 48
 Lomna, 224–27
 London B.M. E 446 (vase), 355, 357, 360, 378
 López-Ruiz, Carolina, 23, 152–53, 159
 Loraux, Nicole, 448n53
 Lorenz, Konrad, 122
 Louden, Bruce, 159, 175–76
 Lucan, 54
 Lucian, 208–10, 216–17
Lybica, 285
 Lycophron, 53

 Mac Airt, Cormac, 226–27
 Mac Cumail, Finn, 224–26
 Macrobius, 57
 Macron, Cup Leningrad 1543, 360, 378, 379, 386–87, 391–95, 402n14
 magic, 90, 98, 105, 432–34
 Malinowski, Bronislaw, 101, 431
 Manchester III.1.41 (vase), 355, 357, 360, 377
 Manetho, 156
 Mannhardt, W., 89, 91, 248
 manuals/handbooks, 42–43, 52–53, 60, 68, 72n38
 Marduk, 97, 103–4, 166, 179, 190n18
 marginality and marginal signals, 111–18
 matricide, 388–89, 393
 Maurras, Charles, 201, 232nr
 Mauss, Marcel, 203
 Medea, 289–96, 353–56, 362–84, 390–401
 Medus/Medos, 354, 367–68
megistos kouros, 93–94, 96, 110. See also *kouroi*
 Melqart, 168, 190n18
 Menaces of Barce, 327–28
 men and boys, initiation of, 108–10
 Menelaus, 362, 372
 Merkelbach, R., 118
 Mesopotamia, 176, 186
 metals motif, 175
 Meuli, K., 123
 Middle Ages, reception of myth in, 53–59
 Miller, David, 443
 mimesis, 5–8
 Mimir, 219, 220, 222–23
 Mimmernus of Colophon, 284
 Minos, 371
Minos (pseudo-Platonic dialogue), 10
 Minotaur, 384–85
 Minyans, 306, 323–24
 Mochos, 180
 Momigliano, Arnaldo, 201
 Mondt, Robert, 152, 155, 165, 176, 189n9
 Montanari, Enrico, 201
 Moritz, Karl Philipp, 64
 Morris, Sarah, 158
 Moses, 430, 440–41
 Most, Glenn W., 67
 mothers. See *bad mother motif*; *matricide*; *parents, psychoanalysis on individuals' relations with*; *stepmothers*
 mother's tragedy, 140n92
 Mowinkel, S., 98
 Moyer, Ian, 159

- Müller, Friedrich Max, 68
 Müller, Karl Otfried, 68–69, 76n133
 Müller, Max, 89, 98, 202–3
 Murray, Gilbert, 31n87, 95–96, 99–100, 102–3
 Murray, Margaret, 100, 103
 Mursili, 173
 Musaeus, 230
 Mussolini, Benito, 201
 Mycale, battle of, 390
 Myson, 387
 myth and ritual school, 91, 96–103
 mythic ideas, 152
Mythographus Homericus, 53
Mythographus Vaticanus Primus, 56
Mythographus Vaticanus Secundus, 36
Mythographus Vaticanus Tertius, 56
 mythography: ancient, 42–43; historiography distinguished from, 48; meaning of, 61; medieval, 54–58; overview of, 24–25; popularizing, 68; Renaissance, 59–62
 mythology, meanings of, 45, 50, 70n4
 myths: comparative approaches to, 22–23, 154–88, 245–75; concept of, 44, 71n26, 283; corrections of, 9–12; cults in relation to, 18–19; defined, 1, 45; devolutionary model of, 202–3; exemplary value of, 6–9; generic scenes vs., 358; geography underlying, 3–4, 16–17, 48–49; as history, 12; in history, 24; history in relation to, 23, 49, 283–84; history of, 24–25; interpretation of, 43; local, 5, 17–18; meanings of, 48; as narrative, 69; performance of, 19–22, 46 (see also Cyrene (place): pragmatics of narration about; myths: telling and hearing of; orality: context of); poetry in relation to, 8, 17; psychologizing of, 409–10; religion in relation to, 4–5, 16–19, 87, 410; rituals in relation to, 16, 19–20, 23, 31n87, 69, 84–128; scholarly study of, 43, 45, 50–51, 60, 64, 67; science in relation to, 431; systematic character of, 3–4, 42, 45, 46, 50; telling and hearing of, 1–3, 13 (see also myths: performance of); temporal setting of, 1; tragedy in relation to, 13–15; twentieth-century theories of, 431; use and experience of, 1–19; use of, by Homeric characters, 6–9; variation in, 5–12, 42, 46, 55, 160; visual contact with, 2–3; writing's effect on, 161–62
 narrative theory, 280
 nature: culture in relation to, 312–13; ritual in relation to, 89–91; in Romantic approach to, 66–68
 Nazism, 66, 201
 Near East. See ancient Near East
 Neer, Richard, 354
 Nereids, 370–72, 376
 Nergal, 190n18
 Neumann, Erich, 407, 442–43
 Neumann, Gerhard, 374
 neurosis, 407, 410, 412, 415–16, 420, 423
 New Year complex, 85, 91, 97–98, 100, 105–6, 119, 124–27
 New York 53.11.4 (vase), 370–76, 381, 382, 384
 Night, 180–81
 Nikolaos, Saint, 254
 Nilsson, M. P., 87–88, 93, 105
 Numa, 231
 object relations theory, 444
 Odysseus, 169–70, 362, 386–87, 394, 416, 422, 429–31
 Odysseus story: eccentricity of, 145n138; as initiation story, 85, 117–19, 127; the mariner and the oar story and, 245–47, 252–63, 268–71, 274–75
 Oedipus, 319, 411–13, 416, 418–21, 426
 Oedipus complex, 84, 407, 408, 411–17, 419, 423, 424, 427–28, 434–35, 445nb, 446n18
 ogam, 224–27
 Ogmios, 208–10, 216–17
 Okeanos (Ocean), 177, 180
 Olrik, Axel, 267
 Oppenheim, D. E., *Dreams in Folklore*, 413
 orality: characterization in, 267; context of, 268–75 (see also Cyrene (place): pragmatics of narration about; myths: performance of); folktales and, 246; Greek–ancient Near East connection and, 153, 161–63, 185; myths and, 13; writing in relation to, 223–31
 Orient, connotations of, 366, 399–400
 origins, in cultural exchange, 160
 Orpheus, 210–16, 218–19, 221–22, 229–31, 233n8, 234n11
 Orphic poems, 159, 162, 176–81
Orphic Rhapsodies, 181
 Orphism, 229–31
 Oschophoria, 109–10
 Osiris, 168, 191n30, 233n8
 Otto, Walter, 138n85

Nagy, Gregory, 8, 30n77, 163–64, 169, 189n9
 Nagy, Joseph Falaky, 23, 200–201

- Oulomos ("eternal"), 180
 Ouranos, 178, 180
 out-and-out myth and ritualism, 99–101
 Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, 53, 57–60, 212, 218, 432, 436
Ovide moralisé, 58–59
- Page, Denys, 248, 268
 paintings. *See* vase paintings
 Palaephatus, 25
 Palaikastro, 93
 Pallas, 396
 Pàmias, Jordi, 42–43, 245
 Panhellenism, 4, 206
 paradigms, 126–27
 parents, psychoanalysis on individuals' relations with, 411–20, 426–28
 Paris, 203–5, 416
 Partch, Virgil, "Captain's Gig," 275
 Parthenius of Nicaea, 24, 25
 Pausanias, 5, 27n28, 156, 213–14, 255
 Pellizer, Ezio, 24
 Penglase, C., 159
 Penner, H. H., 86, 135n65
 Perry, W. J., 98
 Persephone, 191n30, 298, 408, 432, 434, 437
 Perseus, 416
 Persia, 367–68, 398–99
 Persian Wars, 11, 367–68, 394–95
 Persius, 54
 Phalanthus, 325
 Phanes, 180, 181
pharmakoi, 113–14
 Pherecydes of Athens, 42, 47–50, 51, 284, 368
 Pherecydes of Syros, 3, 24, 25, 180
 philology, 67
 Philon of Byblos, 156, 163, 178–80
 Philostratus, 212
 Phoenicia, 156, 174–81, 185–86
 Phoenix, 394
 Pictor, Georg, *Theologia mythologica*, 61
 Pindar, 17; and Cyrene's founding, 280, 282, 284–85, 287–322; Fifth Pythian Ode, 314, 316–22, 326; Fourth Pythian Ode, 287–307, 310, 318, 320, 326, 329; and Homer, 10–12; Ninth Pythian Ode, 308–16, 320; performance of works of, 21; on truth and falsehood, 10, 12
 Pittheus, 370–71
 Plato, 5–6, 13, 29n56, 204–5; *Republic*, 5, 205, 229–30
- Plutarch, 109, 231, 376
 Plutarch of Chaeronea, 191n30
 poetry: myth in relation to, 8, 17; oral nature of, 3
Poimandres (Hermetic Corpus), 423
 Polyphemus, 245–48, 263
 polysystem, 188
 Popper, Karl, 103
 Poseidon, 179, 254–56, 261, 268, 289–93, 296, 299, 301, 304–6, 313, 325, 370–72, 374, 390, 391
 Pothos (Desire), 181
 "Potiphar's wife" story, 152
 pragmatics, 19–22
 Pratt, Louise, 30n76
 Prometheus, 422, 440–41
 Propp, V. J., 121–22, 245, 280–81
 Protestantism, 61
 Protogonos, 180, 181
 Proverbs, book of, 175
 psychoanalysis, 69, 407–45; on Adonis, 432–38; Campbell, 425–31; classicists' objections to, 447n28; contemporary Freudian theory of myth, 438–42; contemporary Jungian theory of myth, 442–44; on first half of life, 411–21; Freud, 407–13, 422–25, 431; on function of myth, 407, 412, 415–16, 425, 438, 441; Jung, 407–10, 421–25, 431, 434–38, 443; and Oedipus complex, 411–17; Rank, 413–21, 426; on second half of life, 421–22, 426–31, 436
 puer archetype, 434–36, 444
 Puhvel, Jaan, 207
 Pythagoreans, 231
- Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns, 63
- Radermacher, Ludwig, 268
 Raglan, L., 100, 103, 119, 125
 Rank, Otto, 148n158, 407, 413–21, 426, 430, 432, 441–42, 446n18; *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, 413, 417, 419; *The Trauma of Birth*, 417–18; *Will Therapy*, 420
 rationalization, of myths, 48, 55–56
 reading, 12, 13
 reception of Greek myth, 42–69; and allegory, 55–56, 58, 59, 61–64; in antiquity, 45–53; book production and, 53–54; commentaries in, 59; creative elements in, 55; Enlightenment and, 62–63; and euhemerism, 55–56; intermediary vs. original texts in, 57;

reception of Greek myth (*cont.*)

logographers and, 47–50; manuals and, 52–53; meanings of, 42, 44; in the Middle Ages, 53–59; in modern period, 62–69; rationalization in, 48, 55–56; in the Renaissance, 59–62; Romanticism and, 63–68; scholarly study and, 50–53; stability of myths as feature of, 46–47; variation in myths as feature of, 45–46; writing's impact on, 47–48

Reformation, 61

religion: Frazer and, 433–34; marginality and, 113–18; myth in relation to, 4–5, 16–19, 87, 410

Remus, 416

Renaissance, reception of myth in, 59–62

Renault, Mary, 90

Resheph, 168

Rhea, 178

Rhodes, 299

Richter, Gisela, 354

Ridewall, John, *Fulgentius Metaforalis*, 56

Rig Veda, 209, 220

rituals: emerging focus on, in relation to myth, 89–99; Harrison and, 91–95; initiation, 105–20; invention of, 15–16; misunderstandings of, 84, 92; myth in relation to, 16, 19–20, 23, 31n87, 69, 84–128; myths arising from, 94–96, 99; myths arising together with, 94–95, 105, 120–23; myths as scenarios of, 94–101; performance of, 137n78; status of, in scholarship, 87–88; transference of biological to social function of, 122–23. *See also* cults

Robertson, N., 140n93

Robertson Smith, W., 90–92, 101–3, 134n43; *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*, 84

Róheim, Géza, 426–28, 439–40

Romano, A. J., 30n86

Romanticism, 63–68

Romulus, 416

Roscher, Wilhelm Heinrich, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, 68

Rösler, Wolfgang, 12

Rossum-Steenbeek, Monique van, 2, 25

Rouse, W. H. D., 269

Russell, Bertrand, 102

Sachs, Hanns, 417

sacral regicide, 100, 103, 137n79

sacrifice, 18–19, 90

Sailor and the Oar tale, 245–75; meanings of, 266–69, 273; narrative contexts of, 269–75; Odysseus story and, 252–56; subtype A, 251–53, 256–63; subtype B, 251–52, 263–66

Sallust, 257

Sappho, 9, 19–20

Sartre, Jean-Paul, 409, 420

Saussure, Ferdinand de, 245

“Savages,” 62–63

scapegoats, 113–15

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, 43, 64; *System of Transcendental Idealism*, 64–65

Schiller, Friedrich, 64

Schlegel, Friedrich, 64–66; *Dialogue on Poetry*, 64

Schliemann, Heinrich, 23

Scholia to Germanicus, 54

science, myth in relation to, 431

Sea God (Yam), 178, 179

Segal, Charles, 306

Segal, Robert, 69, 86, 407–8

Seidensticker, Bernd, 29n53

Sels, Nadia, 408

semiotics, 19, 353, 356–58

Sergeant, Bernard, 201, 233n5

Servius, 54

Seven, the, 17

severed head motif, 211–31, 234n12

sex, Freud's emphasis on, 422–23

Seznec, Jean, 55, 59–61

Shakespeare, William, 99; *Hamlet*, 407, 411;

The Merchant of Venice, 432

Shorey, P., 102

Sierksma, Fokke, 107–8

signs. *See* semiotics

Silius Italicus, 42

singer motif, 210–16, 229–31

“The Singing Bone” story pattern, 233n10, 234n11

Sírrabud Súaldaim, 217, 219–20

Śisūpāla, 211, 215

Skinner, B. F., 409

Sky God, 156, 162, 166, 171, 177, 178, 181

Slochow, Harry, 441–42

Smith, Grafton Elliot, 98

Smith, J. Z., 105

Snow White, 111

Socrates, 1, 18

Solon, 21

“Song of Kumarbi,” 178

Song of Release, 153, 171–73

- Sophocles: *Aegeus*, 369–70, 375–76, 384; *Oedipus at Colonus*, 418; *Oedipus the King*, 407, 411–13, 420, 426
- Sourvinou-Inwood, Christiane, 23, 353–55
- Sparkes, Brian, 354
- Sparta, 299–301, 303–4, 317, 319, 323–25, 329
- speech, power of, 208–23
- Stanford, W. B., 257
- Stansbury-O'Donnell, Mark, 401nd
- Starkađr, 211, 215
- Statius, 42, 54
- stepmothers, 364–65, 375, 388–90, 393
- Stesichorus, 9, 12, 29n56, 284
- Storm God, 166, 171–72, 177–80
- Story of Ahiqar*, 175
- Strabo, 1–2
- structuralism, 19; applied to folktales, 245; classicists' use of, 448n53; Lévi-Strauss and, 332ne; and myth-ritual connection, 121–22, 129n7; prevalence of, 23, 69; Propp's method and, 281
- Stucken, E., 432
- Sturluson, Snorri, 219
- Súaldaim, 217–18, 220, 222
- subliterary papyri, 2, 25, 25n7
- succession myths, 177–78
- Suibne, 227–28
- superego, 419–20
- symbol, 64, 66, 75n111
- symposia, 21
- Syria, 168, 186
- Táin Bó Cúailnge*, 217–18
- "The Talking Skull Refuses to Talk," 234n12
- Taras, 325
- Tarentum, 325
- Tarhunt, 166
- Telephus, 416
- Telesicrates, 310–13, 315–16
- Tell, William, 100
- Temenus of Argos, 321
- Teshub, 166
- Theagenes of Rhegium, 43, 55, 72n46
- Thebes, 17, 300, 316–17, 319
- Theocnidus, 55–56
- Theocritus, 53
- theogony, 176–81
- Theopompus, 398
- Thera, 282, 287–96, 298, 301–5, 307, 314, 317, 319, 324, 326, 329–30
- Theras, 300, 301, 304, 319, 321, 324, 326, 329
- Thesaurus Cultum et Rituum Antiquorum*, 43
- Theseus, 353–401
- "Theseus with a sword" motif, 355, 359–62, 369, 373–76, 383–86, 395
- Thessalus, 320
- Thessaly, 314–16
- Thetis, 393
- "They'll Do It Every Time" (comic), 265
- Thucydides, 10–11, 283
- Tiamat/Tawatu, 177, 179
- time: in cosmogonies, 180; mythical vs. present, 51–52; in narratives of Cyrene's founding, 288–89, 326, 328; representation of, in vase paintings, 396–97
- Timomachus, 325
- Tlepolemus, 320
- Tom Thumb, 111
- totem, 90
- tragedy: and fiction, 12–14; myth in relation to, 13–15; psychoanalysis and, 407; and year god ritual, 95–96
- Triton, 290–91, 297, 370–71, 374
- Trojans, 317, 319–21
- Trojan War: as historical event, 10–11, 23, 173; symbolic significance of, 390, 394–95
- truth, 12
- Turner, V. W., 111, 113
- "Two Brothers" (Egyptian story), 22
- Tylor, E. B., 89, 116, 431–32
- Typhon/Typhoeus, 179
- typology, 245, 275na
- Tyr, 201
- Ugaritic literature, 157, 174–76
- unconscious, the, 409, 420–26, 428–29, 435. *See also* collective unconscious
- Underworld, 190n17, 190n18
- Universitat Autònoma, Barcelona, 25, 201
- Usener, H., 87
- Uther, Hans-Jörg, 248
- Valerius Flaccus, 42
- Van Gennep, A., 108, 110, 111
- Van het Reve, Karel, 103
- Vanir, 219, 222
- vase paintings, 353–401; "attack on woman" motif, 356, 357, 359–63, 366, 368–69, 372–76, 383–401; cultural assumptions and expectations affecting underlying, 355, 356, 358–59, 383–84, 391–401; "fleeing woman" motif, 357–60, 362, 366, 372, 383–84;

vase paintings (*cont.*)

- iconographic analysis of, 358–63, 368–76, 383–401; inscriptions on, 386–87, 391–94, 398–99; methodological considerations in study of, 355, 358–60, 387, 395–401; polysemic nature of, 357, 359, 361, 363, 369, 388–89, 398–400; semantic analysis of, 358–61, 363–64, 369–70, 375, 383–84, 387–90; “The-seus with a sword” motif, 355, 359–62, 369, 373–76, 383–86, 395
- Vatican Mythographers, 58
- Ventris, Michael, 156
- Vernant, Jean-Pierre, 18–19, 46, 84, 88, 93, 122, 132n29, 189n9, 448n53
- Versnel, H. S., 16, 23, 69, 84–86
- Vickery, J. B., 100
- Vico, Giambattista, 63–64
- Vidal-Naquet, Pierre, 49, 88, 106, 189n9, 448n53
- Virgil, 54; *Aeneid*, 162; *Georgics*, 212
- Virgilio, Giovanni del, 58
- vital head motif, 211–31, 234n12
- Von Franz, Marie-Louise, 434, 442–44
- Von Hendy, Andrew, 62
- Vulgate Commentary*, on Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*, 58, 59
- Walcot, Peter, 157
- warriors, societal role of, 208–11
- Watt, Ian, 47
- West, Martin L., 50, 93, 152, 158, 176, 180, 188
- Whitman, Cedric, 270

- Widengren, G., 98
- will, 420
- Winkler, J., 118
- Winnicott, D. W., 444
- Wisdom Literature, 175, 187
- Wohl, Victoria, 407
- women and girls: initiation of, 107–8; Medea as symbol of, 366; negative characterization of, 364–66
- Wright, Matthew, 29n56
- writing: alphabet and, 185; and content of myths, 161–62; and fiction, 12–13; Homer and, 168, 189n13; orality in relation to, 223–31; Orpheus and, 235n19; Orphism and, 229–31; reception of Greek myth affected by, 47–48; severed head motif and, 223–31
- Wuthnow, R., 114
- Xenophanes, 409
- Xenophon, 17; *Apology*, 18; *Memorabilia*, 1
- Xerxes, 11, 16–17
- Yahweh, 167, 179
- Yamauchi, E. M., 103
- year king–year god scheme, 90–93, 97, 105
- Young, Stark, 102
- Yuldashev, Fazil, 85
- Zas, 180
- Zethus, 416
- Zeus, 166–67, 178–79, 181, 289–90, 293, 296, 299, 305–6, 309, 311, 313, 315, 318, 374–75